Luis Rubio

The election that will be over in nine days has not been the most polarized in history; whoever recalls the Vietnam era knows that there are cycles in this respect, but also an enormous capacity of regeneration. That is one of America’s strengths and characteristics and there is no reason to suppose that something similar would be impossible in the medium-term future. The question is what kind of relationship will ensue between the two nations.

Mexico ended up being an involuntary actor and (nearly) absent in the U.S. elections; many factors came into play to create the current electoral scenario: from technological change to migrants, by way of lousy U.S. support programs to adjust for commercial and technological change and, not at all trifling, the political scorning of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the U.S. Each and every one of the approaches and outcries that arose in that electoral race –from Sanders to Trump- are analytically disputable, but the political fact is that Mexico was, at the end of the day, an easy target of the criticism.

There are two post-electoral scenarios for Mexico and both are complex. In first place is found the possibility that Mr. Trump will win: this is the least desirable scenario from the Mexican perspective for the simple reason that it entails prodigious uncertainty, the latter aggravated by the explosive and impulsive temperament of the personage-in-question. The principal risk of a possible win by Trump lies in the actions in which he individually, in his character as chief executive, could engage, particularly with regard to NAFTA. If Trump wins and he does not act impulsively in this matter, we would enter into a period of uncertainty that would probably involve extensive negotiations and lobbying within the U.S. and, on a second plane, in bilateral matters, regarding which steps to take.

The second scenario, the Clinton triumph, although more benign, would not be free of risks and complications. Clinton has not headed a proactive campaign, which would deny her what the Americans denominate a “mandate”. In contrast with Trump, her campaign has instead been obscure and defensive, thus (with the possible exception of foreign policy) it would not be distinct from that of Obama and, in that regard, it would become a third presidential term, similar to what occurred with Bush Senior in 1988. Clinton has had long experience with Mexico and understands the complexity of the relationship; therefore we would not have to anticipate much ado except for her obvious wish to penalize the Peña government for the invitation to Trump.

The greatest risk of a Clinton government would reside not in Clinton herself but in the Congress. Were the Democrats to win control of the Senate and, on an extreme scenario, of the Congress, Clinton would fall into the hands of activist legislators determined to step up financial, labor and trade regulations, much of that with potentially grim consequences for NAFTA. Viewed from the most benevolent side, under this scenario it would be conceivable for a migratory reform initiative to prosper.

It seems to me that there are three lessons to be derived from this election. The first is without doubt that the Mexican government should acquire better understanding of our neighbors in order to avoid episodes of maladroitness such as the events that transpired with the Trump invitation to Mexico: there are well-established procedures for contacting candidates, thus eschewing the need to reinvent sliced bread.

The second is that the Mexican government cannot and should not intervene in the internal affairs of another nation, but it definitely should advance its interests. In the case of the U.S., this fine line is somewhat difficult to draw, if not artificial, due to the fact that the two societies and their economies are so profoundly intertwined. Although the Mexican government should articulate a strategy that would redress the poor reputation of Mexico exhibited in this electoral contest, it is clear that it is the Mexican society, and not the government, that should respond to the insults heaped upon us by Trump. It is sufficient to remember that the declarations of Fox as well the invitation issued to Trump inflated his electoral stakes. Better for artists, literati, entrepreneurs and chefs to stalwartly defend and advance a fairer picture of Mexico than our beleaguered -and ignorant-politicians.

The geopolitical reality obliges Mexico to get along and build with the Americans and we are the ones who, in the absence of visionary leadership on their part, will be required to take the initiative. Thus, whatever the electoral scenario of next November 8^th, Mexico will have no alternative to that of seeking out the best way to attenuate electoral broadsides and to correct its own dearth of strategic lucidity in the relationship.

Finally, much of what was addressed in the U.S. elections and its effects (for example, on the peso) have to do with what has not been accomplished within Mexico itself. Mexico continue to be a society dependent on low salaries to be competitive, we have returned to financial policies that render economic stability vulnerable and we have not grown up to the need to agree on a political process to settle disputes in general and over the economy in particular. Hence the unending disputes that consume the country and that proved so dangerous through this campaign. As long as we do not attend to these issues, Mexico will continue to produce risk factors that feed into those originating in the outside.

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@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

In his comedy The Knights, Aristophanes groups the population into a personage called Demos who, on being led by the nose, is coaxed with flattery and beguiled by adroit demagogues. The Athenians who applauded and celebrated the comedy did not appear to recognize that the fable referred to the audience itself. Surely something like that gave rise to the expression that nations have the governments that they deserve. Unless the citizenry of Mexico City wakes up, that very saying will have been exhibited by the political elites with what they denominate a ”constitution.”

The first problem with the attempted constitution is that no one requested it. This touches on an old demand by the elites of the Left that do not discern any value in the collective of denizens they pretend they govern. The document that the Head of the City Government presented is nothing more than a complex, dyslexic and very poorly written platform that has nothing to do with the daily reality; rather, it is a pretext to bring political bases on board, incorporate unconnected groups and consolidate interests and demands. Rights are addressed but it is not appreciated that a right comprises the obverse side of an obligation. Both must exist for there to be a social order; but no, in a political platform order is the least of it: the only thing that matters is to win and retain the power.

Defined in this way –a platform to retain the power- the constitution undertaken makes all the sense in the world and is perfectly explained as a document that does not claim to inspire; it is, strictly speaking, a reflection of ideological and political infighting among gangs, thus the text does not have to be inclusive. It is, in a word, an authoritarian and bureaucratic platform from which the current City Government Head can launch his candidacy for the 2018 presidency.

“What is a constitution?” asked Ferdinand Lassalle after the 1848 revolution, perhaps the most astute and practical observer in this matter: “The constitutional questions are not in the first instance questions of right but questions of might.” The content as well as the form in which the constitutional process has been administered for Mexico City (CDMX) evidence the clairvoyance of Lassalle: everything is about power and nothing is about rights, the latter nonetheless cited ad nauseam. What are important are compacts among the owners of local power and the safeguarding of their interests.

A constitutional process of consequence would have begun with two elementary queries: the first, a vigorous debate on the principles that would hold the constitution aloft -with the widest and most diverse citizen participation- about the future of Mexico City. The second is an intelligible argumentation and one directed toward the citizenry of the rules that would give shape to a “new” city. A process of this nature would have situated the CDMX, and its government, at the vanguard of the country. What has been done is to convert the government and its constituency into the laughingstock of the entire nation.

It is evident that among the document’s drafters the citizenry is conceived of as a nuisance on which rights should be imposed more readily than incorporating it into the discussion. That is what happened in Europe in the nineties and what those politicians are reaping at present is Brexit and a series of votes that are starting to scale back the European Constitution.

A bad constitution is much worse than no constitution at all. What the CDMX government has presented is an unintelligible mess that reveals more about the mobs in the bowels of power than of the future that, one would suppose, is aspired to for the city and the country. Worse yet, a constitution like that which has been proffered entails a poor system of government and, inevitably, would lead to a still worse performance of the city within the context of the nation. It is obvious that none of the esteemed writers has asked himself or herself why the CDMX has lagged behind in economic matters while states such as Querétaro, Aguascalientes, Yucatán and Nuevo León -let alone Singapore- grow at rates of nearly 7%, some of these for decades. Might it not be that the rights consecrated at such insistence (but that for some time have existed in practice) are obstacles to investment, job creation and city development?

Living in a fantasy world undeniably has its benefits and that is what the published text brings to light. However, this is not the recipe for political success, and all the more so when its main characteristic is aversion to democratic accountability. Surely the populace is far from being endowed with the drafters’ sophistication, but it is this very citizenry that maintains them and makes it possible for them to busy themselves with authoritarian exercises such as these.

The objective of a constitution should be to ensure a good government, not allotting monies and public posts among politicians. An earnest, honest constitution would establish the rights and obligations of the citizens and the limits of the authority, while simultaneously defining the rules of the game for interaction between the two. There is none of that in the published text.

The text is irretrievable: the process must be set into motion anew with a little more humility and a lot more vision.

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@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

What is novel in the U.S. electoral contest does not lie in the polarization of that society which is reflected not in the personages themselves, although there is much to be said about them, but rather in the fact that both monopolize a generalized rejection on the part of the society. In the post-war era, there were many polarized disputes -we recall as a paradigmatic example the Vietnam era- and the U.S. society exhibited an extraordinary capacity of regeneration. That is one of their strengths and characteristics and there is no reason to suppose that something similar is impossible in the not-too-distant future. What is exceptional on this occasion, particularly for us in Mexico, is the fact that Mexico is one of the central focal points of the dispute.

Regarding this commentary, I would like to concentrate on three aspects: first, on the fact that we are involuntary protagonists in the dispute; second, on the potential scenarios and their impacts on Mexico; and, third, on the possible responses on our part. First off, please allow me to set forth my conclusion: the relationship between the two nations today is so complex, profound and diverse that it could only become more accentuated, but the political factors that encompass it can turn into exceedingly disruptive elements if not managed intelligently by both parties. The geopolitical reality obligates us to deal with and build with the U.S. and we are the ones who, in the absence of visionary leadership on their part, will need to take the initiative. Therefore, whatever the scenario of next November 8, Mexico has no alternative other than to seek the best way of attenuating the electoral broadsides and to correct its own clarity in the relationship.

First, Mexico ended up being an unwilling as much as an absent actor in the elections; this happened due to endogenous as well as exogenous factors. On the one hand, the years of rapprochement between the two societies practically coincided with the moment of the greatest technological disruption that the modern world has experienced, particularly in the heavy and manufacturing industry, which has translated into structural unemployment, economic insecurity and disenchantment, in addition to drug addiction and uncertainty; additionally, the growth of Mexican migration has exerted an outstanding social impact on the most recondite quarters of U.S. society: it is not sufficient to argue that this concerns the virtual integration of the labor market; that fact has come to light hand in hand with a growing and, in many localities, overwhelming presence of foreign persons and, in an alien language, demanding minimal satisfiers that, within a context of job insecurity, implied the automatic identification of a scapegoat. On the U.S. side, their support programs for those affected by international trade have been a failure and that explains, in part at least, Trump’s social base. Finally, the trade deficit that Mexico possesses in this bilateral relationship had made the argument easy that Mexico wins and the U.S. loses.

Each and every one of the proposals and outcries that arose in this contest -from Sanders to Trump- are analytically disputable, but the political fact is that Mexico was in the end an easy target of the criticism. That occurred, in good measure, because, in contrast with China or with technological change, Mexico is right there, and from the time of the dispute regarding the approval of NAFTA it turned into an internal political factor. This is something that is not similar in the case of China. Our deficit in this matter is evident. At the same time, not any type of action would have been favorable.

Second, there are the electoral scenarios and their potential impact on Mexico. Beyond what the surveys indicate at the moment, there are two scenarios and both are complex. In the first place, there is the possibility that Mr. Trump will win: this is the least desirable scenario from the Mexican perspective for the simple reason that it entails enormous uncertainty, which would be aggravated by the explosive and impulsive personality of the Republican candidate. The main risk in a possible Trump triumph lies in the actions that individually, in his capacity of Chief Executive, he could take. NAFTA, the principal engine of growth of the Mexican economy and one of the constant objects of the Trump rhetoric, is plainly our main asset, but also our greatest vulnerability. In legal terms, there is a dispute over whether NAFTA, as an agreement and not as a treaty, can be cancelled by the Executive branch without a vote of the Legislative power. There are more than 200 agreements of the most diverse order and never has one been cancelled, thus the risk that Trump would act impulsively, initiating a legal process that, however potentially disputable, would signal immediate damage to the Mexican economy in exchange rate issues as well as in investment flows. While the legal situation was elucidated, the economic and financial impact on Mexico would be striking.

If Trump wins and does not act impulsively in NAFTA matters, we would enter into an uncertain time that probably would entail extensive negotiations within the U.S. and, on a second plane, with respect to bilateral matters, concerning the steps to be taken. Much would depend on the makeup of the Congress and the Senate, but we may anticipate that all of the key actors of the bilateral relationship would be on the playing field and that this would in return, perhaps in somewhat comedic form, to the scene of the dispute for the 1993 ratification of NAFTA. The unions and companies with investments in Mexico would be at the ready to exert an influence on the manner of acting in this matter and the arrangements they would reach would have a real impact, in contrast with the media impact, on Mexican economic activity. The great pains taken with these processes would become our chief challenge.

The second scenario, a Clinton win, although more benign, would not be absent from risks and complications. Clinton has not headed a proactive campaign, which would deny her what Americans call a “mandate”. In contrast with Trump, her campaign has been more obscure and defensive, thus she would not embrace a project distinct from that of Obama and, in that respect, hers would become a third Obama presidential term. The most evident parallel in this scenario would be that of George H.W. Bush, who found himself with an exhausted governing party, one without motivation and with few initiatives. The principal risk of that presidency would be the potential search for scapegoats; however, Clinton has had long experience with Mexico and it is highly improbable for that to be her drive, which would not exclude a review of NAFTA and other similar actions. That said, the strange and unprecedented way that the Mexican Government attempted to be in closer proximity to Trump could entail, as took place in 1993, a lengthy period of formal distancing.

The major risk of a Clinton government would lie not in the person herself but instead in the Legislative power. Should the Democrats win the Senate and recover the Congress, the Democratic Party would probably be overtaken by legislative activists who, taking advantage of the roiling river of a project-less administration, would seek to incorporate aggressive regulations in financial, labor and trade matters. On the more benevolent side, in this scenario it would be conceivable that a migratory reform initiative would prosper. Whichever way, given the surveys at this moment, this should comprise the most disturbing factor for Mexico.

Beyond the election itself, it is important to understand that U.S. politics is much more violent, much more hardball, that Mexican politics but, simultaneously, it enjoys a singular capacity of regeneration. This is a society with scarce historical memory, but with more ample flexibility than this year suggests. At the same time, its institutions are strong and obey logic of continuity that is much more true that it would seem. With regard to the positive, this implies that the capacity for adopting radical decisions (as could be represented by the cancellation or the renegotiation of NAFTA) is much more demarcated than what is apparent due to the counterweights that the Legislative power embodies and to the capacity of action of all types of the U.S. society’s groups and interests. In the same fashion, the U.S. is a highly institutionalized country, suggesting that the damage could be great but not infinite. As to the negative, there are policies, such as the systematic deportation of illegal immigrants, which will continue independently of who leads the next administration. Inertia in this matter, such as in budgetary matters, is obvious.

Of prime importance for the future will be the size of the Trump defeat, in case this is the result. A marginal defeat would surely intimate that the Trump legacy in ideological and political terms would be returned to by other candidates in the future and would permeate the proposals of the Republican Party. A more comfortable victory by Clinton would diminish this effect.

With respect to Mexico, it is easy to speculate on the potential impact of the U.S. elections on those of Mexico in 2018, but the usefulness of these speculations is not evident. To date, the sole well-defined candidate, Andrés Manuel López-Obrador, has not been benefited by Trump’s strength. In the case of a Republican win, the policies that a Trump government would decide to espouse would certainly impact Mexican decision making and political rhetoric, but it is not very probable that the latter would be modified by much. That said, it appears evident to me that the worst possible scenario for Mexico, for the bilateral relationship and for the region would be the combination of Trump and López-Obrador in the presidency of each of these nations. Two nationalists seeking to distance their countries from each other would certainly be lethal for the Mexican economy.

Finally, the core matter is what can and the Mexican response should be in the face of the U.S. elections. In the immediate term, the governmental response can be only one and that comprises attempting to reconstruct the relationship with the winning team. While the bureaucracy that oversees the relationship maintains course within its own normal inertia, the key will be to building a new political relationship that would permit the skirting of danger, avoiding damage to the relationship. The first impulse should be perfectly planned to begin a working relationship in which the criteria ought to be very simple: a) keep the ship afloat; b) avoid an executive decision from being made in NAFTA matters;  c) align the forces favorable to Mexico in the business as well as social and academic ambit; d) maintain the posture of NAFTA not being negotiable, but allowing it to be understood that, in the extreme case, any negotiation can be external, complementary agreements to NAFTA itself; and e) without adopting an inflexible position, make it very clear that Mexico also has interests and objectives and that it will not cease to protect and advance them. The central point is that the U.S. will not be the ones conducting the political or bureaucratic processes that affect Mexico: it is Mexico that must have the clarity of vision and provide ideas for the process so that these will become the decision of the U.S. This is how that country functions and we have to act under the logic that they have a multiplicity of interests and focal points, while they are a clear and vital one for us.

The Mexican government cannot and should not intervene in the internal affairs of another nation, but it should advance its interests. In the case of the U.S., this separation is somewhat difficult, if not artificial, due to that the two societies and their economies are so profoundly intertwined. In the last year a wide-reaching political debate has ensued in Mexico about what Mexico’s response should be in the face of Trump’s improprieties; while the government was lukewarm in its initial responses and subsequently incorporated itself in full into the electoral dispute, non-governmental actors demanded decisive action on the part of the government. It is not evident what the Mexican response can and should be in circumstances like these. On the one hand, to illustrate, the interventions of former President Fox had the effect of strengthening Trump’s numbers in the nomination process within his party; on the other hand, innumerable persons insisted on the defense of the national dignity. One way of responding could have been by the society and not the government: in fact, there were diverse efforts through texts, videos and other types of participations that achieved this objective at least partially. The heart of the matter is that a government cannot interfere in the electoral process of another country without there being costs and consequences. The difference between the acting of the society and of the government is definitive and decisive.

On a second plane, it is imperative to devote efforts and resources to understanding the U.S. society better, its social and political processes and the manner in which Mexico has become an integral part of these, whether we like it or not.    This is imperative in order to avoid clumsy -and even dangerous- behavior such as those that occurred recently, but also to develop a long-term strategy that avoids falling into a situation of extreme vulnerability like that evidenced during these months.

In this matter, it is necessary to understand that the campaigns of Trump and Sanders were not irrational, that they were not about new or recent phenomena, but that they were, yes, predictable; thus, we should have acted with vision some time back. Among the lessons to be learned from this contest, there are the following: first, there is great appreciation by the U.S. society for the culture, the language, the history, the traditions, the art, the cuisine and the attitude of the Mexicans; second, there is enormous contempt for the corruption, the bureaucracy, the insecurity and, in general, for Mexican politicians. This infers that the basis of any long-term strategy can be founded on the development and deepening of the links between the two societies, this by the Mexican society: that is, backing of the long-term relationship in terms of artists, chefs, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, students, etc., and not on what the U.S. society reproaches that, in general, is related with the government and the politicians.

I conclude here with two considerations. Before anything else, the geographic and geopolitical reality obliges us to act on and protect our interests and that, in this matter, denotes conquering the American society. Seen from the surface, it is difficult to understand the depth of the links that exist today between the two nations, the mutual dependence in an immense diversity of issues that cover everything, from the economy to security, the supply lines of basic goods and the personal and familial ties. The industrial integration is remarkable and key for the employment and salaries of Mexicans. And it would be impossible not to emphasize how crucial it is for us to realize as a country that we must, never again, become the scapegoat of the political discussion in that country.

Secondly, much of what was discussed in the U.S. elections and its effects on the process (for example, in currency exchange matters) concerns with what has not been done within Mexico. We continue being a society dependent on low salaries to be competitive, we have returned to financial policies that render economic stability vulnerable and we have not solved fundamental political processes to the degree that they impede our always being in dispute about the essence of the functioning of the country’s economy. As long as we do not attend to these factors, we will continue engendering risk factors that feed into those originating in the outside.

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@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

In his Political Testament (1640), Cardinal Richelieu sustains that the problems of the State are of two classes: easy and insoluble. The easy ones are those that were foreseen. When they blow up in your face, they are already insoluble. That is the history of security in Mexico.  The security system that existed between the forties and the seventies of the past century worked because it responded to the peculiar circumstances of that era and it was never brought up to date, or transformed, to respond to what came later: the problems exploded in the government’s face and it has yet to react.

“The past, says the British author Leslie Poles Hartley, is another country. There they do things differently there”. In effect, even the most unexceptional Mexican town in the fifties had three well-established institutions: the Church, the IMSS (the Social Security system of hospitals and clinics), and the PRI. Although the Constitution stated that Mexico was a federal country, those institutions were witness to the absolute centralization of the system of government; from the PRI–Presidency couple to the most unpretentious local representation, the tentacles of the system embraced and covered the country’s entire population, to the most remote hamlet. Information flowed in both directions and the rules were clear: no one doubted who was in command.

Of course there was a certain degree of local autonomy (it was not, after all, a Soviet system), but the forms and centralization were reproduced at all levels, allowing for effective control of the territory.  The advantage of the system was evident and was observed in the peace that reigned in the majority of the territory: when a problem came up, the system responded with efficacy, with thorough unity that only vertical authority provides. Authoritarian systems are governed with few institutions and scarce rules: it was sufficient for the will of the government to impose itself, arbitrarily or not, on the rest.

It worked while it worked. The system was effective but was never flexible and its capacity of adaptation was practically a null. The great virtue of that system is that it created conditions for economic prosperity; but that prosperity changed Mexican society and exacted the adoption of a dynamic framework that would respond to a world that did not stop transforming itself. Thus, the society of the seventies began to demand social and political satisfiers that the old system was incapable of providing, and the economic crises pressured for liberalization, which virtually eliminated the capacity of vertical control that had functioned in former decades.  That is, the success of the old system ended up undermining its own viability, in every realm.

Security was exercised vertically and was implemented through local actors, to the degree that the government itself administered criminals. It was a primitive system designed for a small country, relatively sparsely populated without significant contact with the rest of the world. Those circumstances changed: the population nearly quadrupled (25 million in 1950 vs. 119 in 2015), educative levels rose, and with that the demand for satisfiers was qualitatively altered. All this came to erode the functionality and efficacy of the security system until it collapsed.

In the nineties Mexicans started to observe a dramatic growth of crime and abductions. Later came the lethal combination of a structural political change (the “divorce” of the PRI and the Presidency with the defeat of the PRI in 2000), Fox’s aloofness and incomprehension of the change his victory had unleashed, and the burgeoning of organized crime, to a great extent due to the success of the Americans on closing drug entry via the Caribbean and the control achieved by the Colombian government of its narco mafias, whose beneficiaries were, in turn, the Mexicans who had worked for them and ended up appropriating the business.

All of this occurred precisely when the old security system broke down and the governors wrested the checkbook from Hacienda and, instead of constructing a modern security system at the local level, they misspent or outright stole these monies. That is, what no longer worked well practically disappeared and nothing was constructed in its place.

It has been sixteen years since this new era began and there is no recognition yet of two elemental things: first, that the objective of the security system should be that of protecting the population.  As basic as that. And, second, that the federal forces can serve to allay the problem, but that only the development of local capacity (bottom up) can solve the security problem in the long run. Proposed solutions like a single (or shared) security command will only work to the extent that conceived as a temporary means (even if it takes years) to stabilize the local situation to help develop local-level capacity. Security is either bottom up or it does not exist.

These principles are the same as those for states with relatively minor problems such as Querétaro as for those immersed in the world of criminality like Guerrero or Tamaulipas. The specific changes, but the generic remains the same: Mexico’s problem is that of the absence of government, of capacity of government, in the entire national terrain. Each case requires particular attention, but what is relevant for the whole country is obvious: structural reforms are necessary, but without security, the dividends that they promise will never materialize.

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@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

I have always been intrigued by the contrasts in Mexico’s political evolution with respect to the South American nations. Although there are in truth some parallels, the reality is that Mexico’s history through the XX century is not at all like those of the Southern countries. In analytical terms, without resorting to adjectives, today’s Mexico is encumbered by a more totalitarian than an authoritarian heritage: the nature of the PRI is not similar to that of the military dictatorships of the South and the difference explains, at least to some degree, those contrasts. But time and generational differences begin to erode the differences, yielding important lessons.

Guillermo O’Donnell* coined the phrase “delegative democracy” to clarify the distortions that southern dictatorships generate. Ironically, many of the signs observed at present in Mexico are not so distinct. For O’Donnell, delegative democracies “yet they are not—and do not seem to be on the oath toward being—representative democracies”. According to the author, the key lies in that “The installation of a democratically elected government [should open] the way for a ‘second transition’, often longer and more complex than the initial transition from authoritarian rule… [but] nothing guarantees that this second transition will occur. New democracies may regress to authoritarian rule, or they may stall in a feeble, uncertain situation.” Doesn’t this sound like Fox?

“The crucial element determining the success of the second transition is the building of a set of institutions that become the decisional points in the flow of political power… The successful cases have featured a decisive coalition of broadly supported political leaders who take great care in creating and strengthening democratic institutions.”

“A noninstitutionalized democracy is characterized by the restricted scope, weakness and the low density of whatever political institutions exist. The place of well-functioning institutions is taken by other non-formalized but strongly operative practices—clientelism, patrimonialism, and corruption.” Any doubt about how President Peña’s reforms were approved? Is it not possible to see within this logic the mobilizations of the CNTE, the paybacks (“moches”) of the PAN, the votes of the PRI in Congress, and the unusual growth of the public expenditure of late, thus the debt?

“Delegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constricted only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office… [In this view] other institutions—courts and legislatures, for instance—are nuisances that come attached to the domestic and international advantages of being a democratically elected president. Accountability to such institutions appears as a mere impediment to the authority that the president has been delegated to exercise.” Doesn’t this sound like the appointment of a close associate of the president to oversee governmental corruption? or the disdain of judiciary? the died-in-the-wool corruption of the legislative power? and the amazing mismanagement of cases like those of  Ayotzinapa and Nochixtlán?

“What matters is not only the values and beliefs of officials (whether elected or not) but also that they are embedded in a network of institutionalized power relations. Since those relations can be mobilized to impose punishment, rational actors will calculate the likely costs when they consider undertaking improper behavior.”

“Delegative Democracy gives the president the apparent advantage of having practically no horizontal accountability. Delegative Democracy has the additional apparent advantage of allowing swift policy making, but at the expense of a higher likelihood of gross mistakes, of hazardous implementation, and of concentrating responsibility for outcomes on the president. Not surprisingly, presidents in Delegative Democracies tend to suffer wide swings in popularity: one day they are acclaimed as providential saviors, and the next they are cursed as only fallen gods can be.“ The Trump affair? The fast train to Querétaro?

The history of reforms in innumerable countries worldwide -extensively studied- demonstrates that the errors -and opposition to them- build in direct relation to the concentration of power among the decision makers acting without counterweights. This seems like a textbook on the happenstances of the present-day government. The question is what the consequences will be.

“Once the initial hopes are dashed… cynicism about politics, politicians, and the government becomes the pervading mood… Power was delegated to the president, and he did what he deemed best. As failures accumulate, the country finds itself stuck with a widely reviled president whose goal is to just hang on until the end of his term.” Mexico is not the first country to suffer from so called “social ill-humor.”

The risk for Mexico is not what is done but rather what is not done up to the end of the presidential term. A country without effective counterweights to the presidency such as Mexico and with a government that is asleep and festering within, all but guarantees the electoral result that all Mexicans, and the President himself, find repugnant. The president’s term-of-office does not end until November 30, 2018: from here on in it is imperative to make the reforms effective for the country to land on its feet.

*Delegative Democracy, Journal of Democracy Vol 5, No 1, January 1994

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 Luis Rubio

The Government Palace is burning. It is ablaze in a state famous for being civilized and even developed. This is not Oaxaca or Guerrero but Chihuahua. The responsibility, says César Duarte, the outgoing state governor, corresponds to the winner of the elections to succeed him. That is, the one currently in governmental office is not responsible, the responsible one is he who is about to take office. With this Duarte constitutes the most patent example of the evasion of responsibility that has characterized our system of government since 1968.

Violence has nearly disappeared from public discussion not because it has diminished but because it has become an everyday issue: it no longer involves the surprise element. Governors, and many media outlets, leap in alarm in the face of any incidence of violence but never repair to the causes of the phenomenon nor do they ever assume any responsibility. The government and its retinue of personages are not there to solve security problems, create conditions for the growth of the economy or supply services. Its sole function is to keep the representatives of the system, of any party, in power.

Another governor, the Duarte of Veracruz state, even allows himself the luxury to change laws after his defeat, supposedly to deprive his successor of the pleasure of initiating judicial processes against him. Cynicism is so great that whoever changes the law does not imagine that his successor could do something exactly the same but in the opposite direction. In the last analysis, the law is a pliant tool in the hands of incumbents and not a rule of behavior with punitive instruments against those in non-compliance.

Today, finally, we have a governor who clarifies for us the reason for his not impeding the burning of the government palace. According to César Duarte in a radio program, “Lest they say that I’m a repressor, I let them burn the palace.” So, the government does not exist to maintain the peace, security and stability, but rather to evade responsibility. The phenomenon is played out in all latitudes and corners of the country.

Noam Chomsky described a similar circumstance in the Nixon era: “Even the most cynical can hardly be surprised by the antics of Nixon and his accomplices as they are gradually revealed. It matters little, at this point, where the exact truth lies as the maze of perjury, evasion and contempt for the normal –hardly inspiring- standards of political conduct.”

The end of the Nixon era and the Watergate scandals forced American politicians to adopt a legal framework for making the new ethical standards be enforced and to combat corruption; of course that did not destroy all the vermin swarming around the systems of government throughout the world, but it did evidence a clear break with the permissive world in matters of ethics and past corruption.

In Mexico, those who pretend to govern Mexico have wasted one opportunity after another to take the bull by the horns. The boorish manner in which the senators attempted to scoff at and take revenge on society by approving the anti-corruption law is revealing in itself. Instead of taking advantage of the adversity, the government has persisted in opening new fronts, day in and day out. Cases of corruption in recent years constituted an outstanding opportunity for the government to assume a leadership role that would not only change the country in terms of looking toward the future, but that also would convert the current government itself into a transformative factor.

Passivity and lack of vision won out. Now fronts accumulate and there is no response whatsoever. Is this trending pattern sustainable? If one glances back at the past, as one would assume the president has done, the probability of winding up poorly is high, but it might still be possible to avert a catastrophic end. However, the risks are amassing now that there are teachers and doctors in the streets, protests from entrepreneurs, the firing of volleys from all types of organizations from the civil-society, guerilla outbreaks and brutal events that can no longer be hided or ignored. From Ayotzinapa we went on to Oaxaca and, in between, a mass of cases keeps piling up that activists would like to take to the International Criminal Court which, although legally unviable, helps further deepen the discredit of both the Mexican government and the Mexican Army.

The main problem characterizing the country lies in the absence of government: since 1968, one government after another –federal as well as state and municipal- essentially abdicated their responsibility to safeguard the peace and, in a word, to govern. Faced with the risk of accusations of being repressors, they preferred the epithet of incompetent and corrupt. Today their only competency is for corruption.

There are two years left for the next presidential transition. This period could be one of political stabilization to avert a catastrophic transition and to lay the foundations of trust for economic renewal; it could also be a period of paralysis, totally devoid of a new vision. The president has been attempting a new discourse, aiming at convincing the people of what was sought in the past four years, without realizing that what’s required is something new, quite different. The problem is not (only) one of narrative but of perspective: it is still time to work on the arrangements and agreements for a smooth transition. What’s not obvious is that there’s the capacity or the will to attempt it.

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Luis Rubio

Could it be that we find ourselves witnessing one of those seismic moments of radical change one reads about in history books but that only occur in real life exceptionally? The world constructed after the end of the Second World War seems to be crumpling one bit at a time. The manifestations and symptoms are ubiquitous, but the big question is whether this is about a moment of catharsis that questions the status quo, only to later return to normality or whether, in reality, we are beginning to see the end of an entire era.

The signs are everywhere: voters in France, the U.S., Spain and Mexico reveal themselves in unusual and atypical forms, but all in the same direction: contempt for and rejection of what exists. Thus we can explain phenomena such as that of Marine Le Pen in France, Sanders and Trump in the U.S., El Bronco in the Mexican state of Nuevo León and the Podemos party in Spain. People are angry and display this through their vote.

On its part, the world economy no longer responds to the strategies that, for decades, achieved radical transformations, and for the better, around the world. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the orb’s central banks strive to solve the crisis of the last years but appear incapable of dealing with the depth of the convulsion that exploded in 2008. Some of these institutions champion orthodox solutions, others have become paragons of heterodoxy, but the growth rate of the world economy continues to be pathetic.

The claim of stagnation in incomes is universal; the advance of technology, above all robotics, displaces jobs that formerly seemed permanent and immovable. People in the South migrate to the North seeking better possibilities, in some cases due to the total absence of an alternative (as occurs in Sudan and Syria), or others simply in pursuit of better opportunities. Regardless, this massive movement of people has consequences, as Brexit exemplifies.

During the last decade we have witnessed the disintegration of authoritarian regimes and the collapse of dysfunctional political systems. The so-called Arab Spring came and went, leaving instability and violence in its wake. Yemen’s government collapsed while others attempted to regenerate themselves. In Guatemala the government failed and the Brazilian president is being impeached; it will probably not be long before something similar happens in Venezuela. The planet is experiencing spasms anywhere and everywhere.

The imbalance that the world is undergoing is omnipresent and all-inclusive. Some countries have governments in form that respond, or endeavor to respond, to the challenge of growth and stability; others simply retire into their shell, trusting that divine providence will rescue them. China is striving to undertake the most complex transition that any nation has ever attempted: that of going from a manufacturing-for-export platform to one based on consumption, in a few years. Singapore is the sole country that, with unique clarity of course, has accomplished a similar transformation, but this is a city-state, highly homogeneous and with a small and extremely well-educated population. China is a nation of monumental dimensions of hundreds of millions of poor and alienated peasants who have not been integrated into modern life.

Brazil is living through a strange combination of strong institutions on the judicial side, with weak checks and balances between the executive and the legislature. Some decades ago a president was removed there and the nation now finds itself in a similar tessitura. If the present crisis is resolved well and an effective system is erected against corruption and impunity, Brazil will emerge strengthened and more democratic; if, contrariwise, it turns out that this was more a dispute among counterpoised interests than a true attempt at nation building, an extraordinary opportunity will have been allowed to get away.

The opportunity of the Mexican government in matters of corruption is not a lesser one: instead of diluting the existing proposal, it would be better to take the bull by the horns and launch a true transformative system that severs itself from the past, even if that implies the exoneration of any past corruption. A new paradigm is clearly called for and moments of crisis are unique for implementing one.

The crisis of the postwar-era institutions can likewise conclude in a radical redefinition as well as in minor adjustments. Something of which I have no doubt is that those with a better capacity of adaptation, as well as flexible institutional structures, will come out better. Germany surely will emerge better than Greece and Tunisia better than Libya. The question-at-hand is how Mexico will end up.

The materialization of numerous candidates in each party -many not traditional and some independent- suggests that the existing structures lack the capacity for response, but also, simultaneously, that players are adapting, identifying ways of getting ahead. The reverse side of each problem always encompasses an opportunity.

Shortly before he died, Steve Jobs said something that is absolutely applicable to the current moment: “Innovation has nothing to do with how many R&D dollars you have. When Apple came up with the Mac, IBM was spending at least 100 times more on R&D. It’s not about money. It’s about the people you have, how you’re led, and how much you get it”.

Paradigms and problems change, but the only thing that matters is the clarity of the moment, the capacity to construct and respond, as well as the flexibility to do it in opportune fashion. Where do you think Mexico stands before these conundrums?

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 Luis Rubio

 Presidential candidacies grow and proliferate at the speed of sound. In that universe there are men and women, some young some older, experienced individuals and neophytes. If one were to assess Mexican politics by the number, diversity and intensity of presidential aspirants, one would fast conclude that our democracy is robust. What’s peculiar of the race that is beginning to catch steam is the fact that none of what the potential contenders argue over has much to do with the world we are living in today. It is that world, however, that will determine both the opportunities, as well as the risks that the country will face once the election is over.

The national as well as the international environment has tended to deteriorate in recent months, planting seeds of doubt with regard to political as well as economic stability. Gone is the nearly immovable certainty that produced the power equilibrium among the Cold War powers and the solidity of the multilateral institutions of that era, the mid-XX Century. That framework of certainty favored internal economic growth and social peace. However, from the seventies on, things changed in the world and within the country, undermining sources of confidence and threatening stability. These circumstances have characterized the ambit in which we have lived for several decades now, but the problematic has accelerated in recent times, creating a sea of doubts about the future.

In terms of the international milieu, we live in an era of convulsions. The Cold War ended, engendering a sensation of hope and opportunity. Twenty five years later, it seems clear that the opportunity was wasted and that the idyllic expectations of the nineties led to a world of terrorism, disequilibrium and renewed conflict. The U.S., the Cold War’s triumphant “hyperpower” nation, was unable to maintain its leadership and, after two costly wars in the Middle East followed by seven years of retreat, lost its capacity as international peacekeeper. The world began to look like the second half of the XIX Century, a time when the arrangement of power balance charted by Metternich in 1815 was exhausted, giving way to renewed rivalry among the powers, new sources of international conflict and, above all, a novel, acute absence of leadership. Unless these circumstances change with the U.S. presidential turnover in January 2017, the upcoming years can be nothing other than times of growing conflict and uncertainty. This is a scenario that no living Mexican has known.

With regard to the economy, there is little about which we Mexicans can be proud. The present government returned to the era of fiscal deficit financed by more taxes and debt, which did not avoid the economy’s continuing to show a pathetic growth rate. In addition, the measures adopted had the effect of generating growing uncertainty and a climate of absolute mistrust. Instead of producing conditions under which the economy could prosper to the extent that the circumstances would allow, the government clung to schemas that had for some time evidenced their obsolescence.

A similar sequence of events characterizes the political world and that of security. Rather than building new institutions, above all in matters of criminality, in Michoacán the federal government settled on the old formula of co-opting the opposition, without understanding that organized crime does not comprise a source of political opposition but instead one of corrosion that threatens everything. This six-year presidential term is entering into its second and last phase, not only without having solved the security problem, but also without even demonstrating that it is clear about the nature of the problem.

All of this has given rise to a climate of incredulity, mistrust and heightened uncertainty. The absence of governmental response has increased its discredit, affecting even more so credibility relative to the reforms driven by the administration itself. Social rancor is burgeoning and the ambiance of confrontation, doubtlessly nurtured by electoral interests, flourishes without surcease. Perhaps there is no better way to typify the present moment than to affirm that this is about conditions that no government would wish to experience precisely prior to the initiation of the battle for succession.

We find ourselves before an unprecedented scenario, one lacking the type of leadership, domestic or international, that would be necessary to lay a foundation of certitude. Much worse yet, without a recognition that confidence and trust are critical for development, particularly regarding a society that feels endangered, some by issues of physical safety, others by patrimonial security and still others by the growing concentration of power, persistence of cases of corruption and spaces of patronage as well as diminution of political, economic and personal freedoms.

Feasibly the greatest of the errors that have been prototypical of several recent governments (in Mexico and in the world) lies in a faulty reading from the outset. In Mexico and in numerous nations, voters have cast their ballots less in favor of someone than against someone else; this in no way alters the result, but does entail a radically distinct reality from what a new government presupposes and that demands great dexterity in terms of focusing its energies. To govern, the least that an incoming administration requires is to comprehend the circumstances. In the light of the changing, uncertain and precarious world we live in, the next government had better understand that it must resolve basic problems before imposing a dogmatic vision and one remote from the reality.

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Luis Rubio

One week that brought President Peña’s original vision to ruin and extinguished his personal style of leading the government. What was not achieved by the houses provided by a government contractor or Ayotzinapa was accomplished by Trump or, more to the point, by the series of ill-advised decisions and mishaps that led to the imprudent invitation for him to visit Mexico. What remains is to observe whether this is the beginning of a political realignment in favor of making the country more consolidated in anticipation of the 2018 elections, or whether it is a mere attention-distracting ploy in order to leap over the immediate hurdle.

In a country inclined to conspiratorial interpretations, what had not changed was clear: for some this was a case of the secretary having resigned, for others he was fired. Without factual information, the conspiracy theoriescarry the day. What there is no doubt about is that the pressure rose in proportion to the absurdity of the explanations proffered on what had been sought with the famous visit. Whoever imagined that it was possible to neutralize or commit Trump does not understand him, and whoever believed that U.S. politics can be meddled with in such a skewed and heavy handed way without paying a huge price does not understand the U.S.

A cartoon by Brozo in which he photographed Andrés Manuel López Obrador visiting Obama conveys everything that the government did not understand: it is one thing to inform, establish ties and communicate with the candidates of another nation and its government, and it is another, very distinct, to interfere in its political life. No Mexican would have thanked the U.S. President had he invited only one of the candidates up for election in Mexico. As obvious as that.

However, beyond the individuals, there are four lessons that this week has furnished: in first place, the Peña administration began with absolute control of its personnel, processes and discipline. Much of what was attempted was anachronistic (to recreate the world of the old PRIist system), but its functioning was impeccable, at least in what was observable from the outside.  That discipline started to erode when the president’s“white house” was exposed and disintegrated with the exit of Aurelio Nuño, President Peña’s Cabinet head; and the phenomenon was exacerbated by the inexistence of control over the feuding at the interior of the Cabinet. It has been two years now since the government forfeited the political initiative and there is nothing to suggest that this will change. Within this context, it is not difficult to imagine that instead of duly analyzed decision-making procedures, happenings dominated the discussion (if there was any at all), leading to the fateful decision.

In second place, this administration has been peculiar in its propensity for generating enemies without building sources of support; disdaining public discussion rather than leading it; eyeing with contempt the legitimate concerns of all Mexicans from all quarters: from PEMEX creditors to censored journalists and including the growing number of citizens disconcerted by the growth of the public debt. In four years a sufficient number of grievances accumulated to last a whole lifetime and all of the aggrieved appeared to have made their triumphant appearance last week. Governing cannot be accomplished without informing the public and credibility –not to say popularity- cannot be earned without at least trying to convince the people of the government’s plans. Accouterments of democracy. Worse, this government ignored the obvious: that the price of the dollar does indeed matter to the electorate and that its depreciation engenders consequences. The signature of this government has been remaining immutable in the face of the wave of doubts, disquiet and criticisms. Hence, it was remarkable that among the instructions that the President gave to his new Minister of Finance were two very prominent ones to which the former Minister had not cared for: to lower the debt and end the deficit.

In third place, the Trump affaire harkened back to the old Mexican nationalism, but with an excessively promising aggregate: the new nationalism is not anti-Yankee. What is surprising about the various responses to the invitation and the visit -and, in fact, to the entire gamma of anti-Mexican broadsiding of this last year- is that the Mexican views the relationship with the U.S. as something normal, positive and necessary. The problem is with the personage, not with the country. Many unsavory aftertastes prevail from the old political system, but this one was indubitably overcome.

Finally, during last week Mexico underwent an authentic popular rebellion. The visit of the U.S. presidential candidate caused generalized disapproval and the President was obliged to back down. The rebellion speaks of a mature society and one that is willing to defend its rights (and its honor), all without violence or excesses, all of which opens great possibilities for the future.

The question is whether this is a redoubt conceived pure and simply to dodge more criticisms, above all in the light of the 2017 budget revision, or whether it at least includes the intention of constructing something more solid that ushers in that mature society and that evades a new hecatomb in the electoral process of 2018 and thereafter. Time will tell.

Edmundo O’Gorman, the great historian of the XIX century, left the president a prescription that is appropriate at the present moment: “Since an awakening is urgent, may it not be when the emulation takes place of Rip van Winkle, waking to a strange and foreign world that was no longer comfortable for him nor one with the feasibility of participating in an adventure of a new life incubated during the absence of his lethargy”. New life or lethargy? There’s, as Shakespeare would say, the rub.

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Luis Rubio

A Polish tale tells of a town that built a bridge but did not finish it.  Vehicles used it and, on reaching the end, fell off into the abyss. The town leaders got together to decide what to do and their response was to construct a hospital under the bridge to care for those injured as a result of their fall. Mexico’s government seems to be like that: great initiatives that are not concluded, desperate actions that are not thought through and, later, consequences that are to be dealt with.

The succession of circumstances and actions that led the government to invite Mr. Trump to Mexico is now quite clear. It is also known that the invitation was issued weeks before and at the margin of the professionals responsible for conducting foreign affairs. A candidate was invited and, later, at a quarter to midnight, in the colloquial vernacular, another invitation was sent to the Democratic Party candidate, so as not to incur in a slight. Mr. Trump arrived, was treated as a Head of State, listened to the formal and respectful speech delivered by President Peña and proceeded happily to Arizona to reiterate his rhetoric regarding Mexico and Mexicans.

In addition to the gift of the red-carpet treatment, which was something invaluable for Trump because that is where his opponent has ample experience and world recognition, the Republican candidate made off with what is most valuable to Mexico: the Mexican President was obsequious in offering him the renegotiation of the NAFTA, something no country ever does because that implies, de facto, its annulment, i.e., precisely what Trump has proposed. In just a few hours, the President placed the country and his government in the most vulnerable position that it has been in since the Revolution of 1910.

In an article appropriately entitled “The Unspeakable and the Inexplicable”, the British periodical The Economist states that “Mr. Peña may believe that he took a bold initiative by opening a dialogue with Mr. Trump. His demand for respect is legitimate. But it should be delivered by citizen diplomacy within the United States, and conveyed after the election to the winner. By allowing his visitor to seem presidential, he has helped Mr. Trump perform some rhetorical climbdowns that were electorally inevitable. Even if Mrs. Clinton wins, she will not thank him for that. If he turns out to have contributed to electing Mr. Trump, many Mexicans will never forgive him or his party, and neither will much of the rest of the world.” It is not by chance that other articles ask “What was he thinking?” In a few hours, the government lost its privileged relationship with the Obama administration, exhibited irrational behavior and proved itself to be an untrustworthy actor. Mexico became the laughingstock of the world.

Whatever the logic in concocting the invitation had been, it ignored Trump’s nature, the absolute impossibility of changing his rhetoric (because therein lies the heart of his candidacy) and, above all, the fact that for Mexico everything was a risky downside, while for Trump everything was potential upside. Mexico, the host, bore all the risk, and lost out. The very notion that Trump could be “reasoned with” and convinced to tone down his discourse was ludicrous.

The question is: What’s next?  The approaching months will be without doubt dark days. Many will interpret Trump’s call for renegotiating NAFTA (therefore, presumably, not annulling it) as a sign that Mexico’s vulnerability was drastically reduced. This perhaps will contribute to appease the financial markets, at least in the short term, but will not satisfy the skeptics; we must not forget that the main justification for calling into question Mexican debt’s investment-grade score on the part of Moody’s was not the debt per se but rather the political problems that characterize the country and that are reflected in the manner in which decisions are made and in the absence of the Rule of Law.

In his book on the circumstances that led to the 1994 devaluation, Sidney Weintraub* concludes that it was the absence of accountability that made it possible for the functionaries of the outgoing and incoming administrations to make brutally dangerous wagers, something inconceivable in a representative democracy.  That is what manifested itself in the Trump Affaire: the government undertook a series of actions and decisions without needing to think about the consequences, without measuring the risks, and without consulting with other political forces (let alone the rest of the cabinet) on the alternatives, because that is Mexico’s political reality: the government is not accountable to anyone and its members will not have to bear the costs of their decisions.

There are two planes on which to deal with the consequences. The first is obvious and urgent: rebuild the relationship with the U.S. government and with the Clinton campaign. This will not be easy because the problem is one of trust and, when this has been lost, it is supremely difficult to recover, and worst, in the middle of such an acrimonious campaign. This may only be possible to the extent that the President carries out a radical change in his Cabinet, incorporating individuals who enjoy the absolute respect of the international community in general, and of people in the U.S. in particular, in the political, judicial, financial ambits and that of foreign policy.

The other plane comprises the future. President Peña has wasted every opportunity presented to him:  he could have become the leader of the struggle against corruption (i.e., the Mexican White House) and of the fight against impunity (i.e., Ayotzinapa). Now he has the last opportunity: to begin to forge checks and balances so that  never again can decisions be made that so dramatically jeopardize the viability of the nation.

*Financial Decision Making in Mexico

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