Luis Rubio
What is novel in the U.S. electoral contest does not lie in the polarization of that society which is reflected not in the personages themselves, although there is much to be said about them, but rather in the fact that both monopolize a generalized rejection on the part of the society. In the post-war era, there were many polarized disputes -we recall as a paradigmatic example the Vietnam era- and the U.S. society exhibited an extraordinary capacity of regeneration. That is one of their strengths and characteristics and there is no reason to suppose that something similar is impossible in the not-too-distant future. What is exceptional on this occasion, particularly for us in Mexico, is the fact that Mexico is one of the central focal points of the dispute.
Regarding this commentary, I would like to concentrate on three aspects: first, on the fact that we are involuntary protagonists in the dispute; second, on the potential scenarios and their impacts on Mexico; and, third, on the possible responses on our part. First off, please allow me to set forth my conclusion: the relationship between the two nations today is so complex, profound and diverse that it could only become more accentuated, but the political factors that encompass it can turn into exceedingly disruptive elements if not managed intelligently by both parties. The geopolitical reality obligates us to deal with and build with the U.S. and we are the ones who, in the absence of visionary leadership on their part, will need to take the initiative. Therefore, whatever the scenario of next November 8, Mexico has no alternative other than to seek the best way of attenuating the electoral broadsides and to correct its own clarity in the relationship.
First, Mexico ended up being an unwilling as much as an absent actor in the elections; this happened due to endogenous as well as exogenous factors. On the one hand, the years of rapprochement between the two societies practically coincided with the moment of the greatest technological disruption that the modern world has experienced, particularly in the heavy and manufacturing industry, which has translated into structural unemployment, economic insecurity and disenchantment, in addition to drug addiction and uncertainty; additionally, the growth of Mexican migration has exerted an outstanding social impact on the most recondite quarters of U.S. society: it is not sufficient to argue that this concerns the virtual integration of the labor market; that fact has come to light hand in hand with a growing and, in many localities, overwhelming presence of foreign persons and, in an alien language, demanding minimal satisfiers that, within a context of job insecurity, implied the automatic identification of a scapegoat. On the U.S. side, their support programs for those affected by international trade have been a failure and that explains, in part at least, Trump’s social base. Finally, the trade deficit that Mexico possesses in this bilateral relationship had made the argument easy that Mexico wins and the U.S. loses.
Each and every one of the proposals and outcries that arose in this contest -from Sanders to Trump- are analytically disputable, but the political fact is that Mexico was in the end an easy target of the criticism. That occurred, in good measure, because, in contrast with China or with technological change, Mexico is right there, and from the time of the dispute regarding the approval of NAFTA it turned into an internal political factor. This is something that is not similar in the case of China. Our deficit in this matter is evident. At the same time, not any type of action would have been favorable.
Second, there are the electoral scenarios and their potential impact on Mexico. Beyond what the surveys indicate at the moment, there are two scenarios and both are complex. In the first place, there is the possibility that Mr. Trump will win: this is the least desirable scenario from the Mexican perspective for the simple reason that it entails enormous uncertainty, which would be aggravated by the explosive and impulsive personality of the Republican candidate. The main risk in a possible Trump triumph lies in the actions that individually, in his capacity of Chief Executive, he could take. NAFTA, the principal engine of growth of the Mexican economy and one of the constant objects of the Trump rhetoric, is plainly our main asset, but also our greatest vulnerability. In legal terms, there is a dispute over whether NAFTA, as an agreement and not as a treaty, can be cancelled by the Executive branch without a vote of the Legislative power. There are more than 200 agreements of the most diverse order and never has one been cancelled, thus the risk that Trump would act impulsively, initiating a legal process that, however potentially disputable, would signal immediate damage to the Mexican economy in exchange rate issues as well as in investment flows. While the legal situation was elucidated, the economic and financial impact on Mexico would be striking.
If Trump wins and does not act impulsively in NAFTA matters, we would enter into an uncertain time that probably would entail extensive negotiations within the U.S. and, on a second plane, with respect to bilateral matters, concerning the steps to be taken. Much would depend on the makeup of the Congress and the Senate, but we may anticipate that all of the key actors of the bilateral relationship would be on the playing field and that this would in return, perhaps in somewhat comedic form, to the scene of the dispute for the 1993 ratification of NAFTA. The unions and companies with investments in Mexico would be at the ready to exert an influence on the manner of acting in this matter and the arrangements they would reach would have a real impact, in contrast with the media impact, on Mexican economic activity. The great pains taken with these processes would become our chief challenge.
The second scenario, a Clinton win, although more benign, would not be absent from risks and complications. Clinton has not headed a proactive campaign, which would deny her what Americans call a “mandate”. In contrast with Trump, her campaign has been more obscure and defensive, thus she would not embrace a project distinct from that of Obama and, in that respect, hers would become a third Obama presidential term. The most evident parallel in this scenario would be that of George H.W. Bush, who found himself with an exhausted governing party, one without motivation and with few initiatives. The principal risk of that presidency would be the potential search for scapegoats; however, Clinton has had long experience with Mexico and it is highly improbable for that to be her drive, which would not exclude a review of NAFTA and other similar actions. That said, the strange and unprecedented way that the Mexican Government attempted to be in closer proximity to Trump could entail, as took place in 1993, a lengthy period of formal distancing.
The major risk of a Clinton government would lie not in the person herself but instead in the Legislative power. Should the Democrats win the Senate and recover the Congress, the Democratic Party would probably be overtaken by legislative activists who, taking advantage of the roiling river of a project-less administration, would seek to incorporate aggressive regulations in financial, labor and trade matters. On the more benevolent side, in this scenario it would be conceivable that a migratory reform initiative would prosper. Whichever way, given the surveys at this moment, this should comprise the most disturbing factor for Mexico.
Beyond the election itself, it is important to understand that U.S. politics is much more violent, much more hardball, that Mexican politics but, simultaneously, it enjoys a singular capacity of regeneration. This is a society with scarce historical memory, but with more ample flexibility than this year suggests. At the same time, its institutions are strong and obey logic of continuity that is much more true that it would seem. With regard to the positive, this implies that the capacity for adopting radical decisions (as could be represented by the cancellation or the renegotiation of NAFTA) is much more demarcated than what is apparent due to the counterweights that the Legislative power embodies and to the capacity of action of all types of the U.S. society’s groups and interests. In the same fashion, the U.S. is a highly institutionalized country, suggesting that the damage could be great but not infinite. As to the negative, there are policies, such as the systematic deportation of illegal immigrants, which will continue independently of who leads the next administration. Inertia in this matter, such as in budgetary matters, is obvious.
Of prime importance for the future will be the size of the Trump defeat, in case this is the result. A marginal defeat would surely intimate that the Trump legacy in ideological and political terms would be returned to by other candidates in the future and would permeate the proposals of the Republican Party. A more comfortable victory by Clinton would diminish this effect.
With respect to Mexico, it is easy to speculate on the potential impact of the U.S. elections on those of Mexico in 2018, but the usefulness of these speculations is not evident. To date, the sole well-defined candidate, Andrés Manuel López-Obrador, has not been benefited by Trump’s strength. In the case of a Republican win, the policies that a Trump government would decide to espouse would certainly impact Mexican decision making and political rhetoric, but it is not very probable that the latter would be modified by much. That said, it appears evident to me that the worst possible scenario for Mexico, for the bilateral relationship and for the region would be the combination of Trump and López-Obrador in the presidency of each of these nations. Two nationalists seeking to distance their countries from each other would certainly be lethal for the Mexican economy.
Finally, the core matter is what can and the Mexican response should be in the face of the U.S. elections. In the immediate term, the governmental response can be only one and that comprises attempting to reconstruct the relationship with the winning team. While the bureaucracy that oversees the relationship maintains course within its own normal inertia, the key will be to building a new political relationship that would permit the skirting of danger, avoiding damage to the relationship. The first impulse should be perfectly planned to begin a working relationship in which the criteria ought to be very simple: a) keep the ship afloat; b) avoid an executive decision from being made in NAFTA matters; c) align the forces favorable to Mexico in the business as well as social and academic ambit; d) maintain the posture of NAFTA not being negotiable, but allowing it to be understood that, in the extreme case, any negotiation can be external, complementary agreements to NAFTA itself; and e) without adopting an inflexible position, make it very clear that Mexico also has interests and objectives and that it will not cease to protect and advance them. The central point is that the U.S. will not be the ones conducting the political or bureaucratic processes that affect Mexico: it is Mexico that must have the clarity of vision and provide ideas for the process so that these will become the decision of the U.S. This is how that country functions and we have to act under the logic that they have a multiplicity of interests and focal points, while they are a clear and vital one for us.
The Mexican government cannot and should not intervene in the internal affairs of another nation, but it should advance its interests. In the case of the U.S., this separation is somewhat difficult, if not artificial, due to that the two societies and their economies are so profoundly intertwined. In the last year a wide-reaching political debate has ensued in Mexico about what Mexico’s response should be in the face of Trump’s improprieties; while the government was lukewarm in its initial responses and subsequently incorporated itself in full into the electoral dispute, non-governmental actors demanded decisive action on the part of the government. It is not evident what the Mexican response can and should be in circumstances like these. On the one hand, to illustrate, the interventions of former President Fox had the effect of strengthening Trump’s numbers in the nomination process within his party; on the other hand, innumerable persons insisted on the defense of the national dignity. One way of responding could have been by the society and not the government: in fact, there were diverse efforts through texts, videos and other types of participations that achieved this objective at least partially. The heart of the matter is that a government cannot interfere in the electoral process of another country without there being costs and consequences. The difference between the acting of the society and of the government is definitive and decisive.
On a second plane, it is imperative to devote efforts and resources to understanding the U.S. society better, its social and political processes and the manner in which Mexico has become an integral part of these, whether we like it or not. This is imperative in order to avoid clumsy -and even dangerous- behavior such as those that occurred recently, but also to develop a long-term strategy that avoids falling into a situation of extreme vulnerability like that evidenced during these months.
In this matter, it is necessary to understand that the campaigns of Trump and Sanders were not irrational, that they were not about new or recent phenomena, but that they were, yes, predictable; thus, we should have acted with vision some time back. Among the lessons to be learned from this contest, there are the following: first, there is great appreciation by the U.S. society for the culture, the language, the history, the traditions, the art, the cuisine and the attitude of the Mexicans; second, there is enormous contempt for the corruption, the bureaucracy, the insecurity and, in general, for Mexican politicians. This infers that the basis of any long-term strategy can be founded on the development and deepening of the links between the two societies, this by the Mexican society: that is, backing of the long-term relationship in terms of artists, chefs, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, students, etc., and not on what the U.S. society reproaches that, in general, is related with the government and the politicians.
I conclude here with two considerations. Before anything else, the geographic and geopolitical reality obliges us to act on and protect our interests and that, in this matter, denotes conquering the American society. Seen from the surface, it is difficult to understand the depth of the links that exist today between the two nations, the mutual dependence in an immense diversity of issues that cover everything, from the economy to security, the supply lines of basic goods and the personal and familial ties. The industrial integration is remarkable and key for the employment and salaries of Mexicans. And it would be impossible not to emphasize how crucial it is for us to realize as a country that we must, never again, become the scapegoat of the political discussion in that country.
Secondly, much of what was discussed in the U.S. elections and its effects on the process (for example, in currency exchange matters) concerns with what has not been done within Mexico. We continue being a society dependent on low salaries to be competitive, we have returned to financial policies that render economic stability vulnerable and we have not solved fundamental political processes to the degree that they impede our always being in dispute about the essence of the functioning of the country’s economy. As long as we do not attend to these factors, we will continue engendering risk factors that feed into those originating in the outside.
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