Mexican politicians are an odd combination of conservatism and temerity. They have abstained from the actions and responses that have been needed for years, in part because Mexican society is very divided in terms of what to do, but also because leaders have not emerged who are able to head a project of prudent and reasonable change. Despite this, once in a while we witness examples of great daring, sudden decisions to act, as if celerity were an alternative to logical reasoning and the proper understanding of public affairs. The combination of inaction and intrepidness, besides its perversity, is, above all, risky because it is sustained in a self-serving and fallacious world view. Nothing good, nothing that contributes to the well-being of the life of the population, can ensue when the political class acts in such a manner.
We are entering into a process of debate concerning the type of political and institutional reforms that the country requires to be able to function. As is natural, the proposals that have been presented reflect contrasting stances. Certain politicians, beginning with the president and the PRI leader in the Senate, have issued strong and clear statements. Diverse analysts and observers have afforded valuable perspectives and evaluations on the costs and benefits of the distinct reform possibilities. All of these recognize something essential: the design of the institutions -the incentives that these harbor for those who direct and operate them, as well as for the citizenry- is the determining factor in the attainment or failure of the reform. Good design could open opportunities and generate positive responses, while poor design could translate into yet more paralysis.
In recent years, we have had vast opportunities to observe failed attempts at reform. The way in which the banks were privatized -with minimum capital requirements- led to their disastrous collapse some years later. The electoral reform of 2007 did not resolve electoral problems, and did, on the other hand, polarize the society. The structure and content of the reforms is key for the success of the latter; good intentions are not enough: the reverse is true in the reform process itself, in which it is fundamental to recognize that there are always opportunistic and abusive individuals who will make the worst possible use of the institutions. Consequently, it is crucial to meditate on the complete panorama and not be misled by fallacious or purely self-seeking conceptions of the reality.
The executive-legislative debate has focused its attention on a series of themes that would revamp the relationship between the two public powers. Among the topics under discussion, we find ratification of the cabinet by the senate, re-election of legislators and municipal presidents, and the constitution of an executive figure appointed by the legislative power: a cabinet head. Each of these themes would imply substantial reconformation of the political functioning of the country. Cabinet ratification would submit, for legislative consideration, the appointments, which have to date been the privilege of the executive branch. Re-election of legislators and municipal presidents would modify the relationship between legislators and voters, and would in turn transform the ties between candidates and parties; re-election of municipal presidents would change the relationship between voters and legislators and of these with their parties, altering the incentives of the administrative authority in closest proximity to the population to carry out longer-term projects, and above all, there would be someone responsible for project results. The creation of a semi-parliamentary Prime Ministerial figure, such as that in France, would change our presidential model by the roots.
Each of these themes and proposals merits serious discussion. As thoughts and ideas, they are exquisite, and permit us to imagine substantial alterations in the inducements that drive our politicians and representatives at present. However, none of these can be carried out in practice if they do not consider, and resolve, all of the perimeters that they entail.
The matter of re-election of legislators and municipal presidents is particularly sensitive. The advantages of re-election are many and eminently obvious. The absence of re-election engenders incentives for poor achievement and promotes the irresponsibility of the officials who enjoy -at least in formal terms- representation of the populace or those charged with local administration. From the citizens’ perspective, re-election would enable professionalization of legislators and municipal presidents, in order to empower both with a closeness to the citizenry, and would strengthen the permanence, all of this subject to voter decisions, of trustworthy officials savvy in issues that are key for the country. Although circulation of politicians in power has its benefits, it can in no way be compared with that produced by experienced legislators, who are able to be reliable counterparts within their immediate environment, as well as in the totality of public life. What is not obvious is whether any of these advantages would be achieved with the proposed reform.
As is everything in our sparse debate, the problem lies in the reality. In the real life of our country, the state governors own the electoral procedures, the nomination of candidates, and the flow of resources. A great project of institutional re-design could be shipwrecked at the most vulnerable point: that over which the governors exercise absolute control. Unfortunately, the governors own the political parties at the local level, dominate the distribution process of public funds, and control the state electoral institutes. Given this frame of reference, the notion that the citizenry would decide on the re-election of municipal presidents and legislators appears somewhat naive. It is not difficult to imagine the scenario in which re-election would become an instrument in the hands of the governors, so that, through the party, they would impose their preferences on who, and who not, to re-elect, for the sake of perpetuating their power: precisely contrariwise to what is proposed by the reform initiatives.
The true Mexico is much more unrelentless and complex than what is suggested by the ideas debates. The view that modifying one aspect, however crucial, of our political life would lead to a general transformation of the country is extraordinarily ingenuous. But it does not have to be this way: for example, as one part of the reforms, a National Election Institute could be created -an IFE, endowed with responsibility for elections in the country- with the purpose of protecting the candidates, restricting gubernatorial might, and providing a better opportunity for the success of a reform as ambitious as this one. Without this, the proposed reforms will do nothing but further tighten the noose.