Luis Rubio

The country is going through difficult times, which does not cease to be paradoxical to many. For the PRIists, who feel that they’ve “made it”, everything seemed to be moving forward without a hitch. For the general population, who just wants to live in peace, the sense of order that the new government has brought seemed to offer the opportunity to make that desire true. However, the only thing that is clear is that the real problems, those at the core, have not changed and, if anything, have intensified. Thinking about this, I recalled the famous phrase of Paul Valery that “The trouble with our times is that the future is not what it used to be.”

Part of the problem Mexico faces has to do with the fact that the discussion is marred by explanations, proposals, desires and interests, all legitimate, but that end up distorting rather than clarifying the picture. What follows is the way I understand and see the moment that Mexico is going through and how it got there.

•    The old system stabilized the country after the revolutionary epic, but ended up being unsustainable. It worked well for a while (especially between 1950 and 1970), but collapsed in part due to its own contradictions and partly by its success in creating an urban middle class that rebelled against “the system”.

•    Echeverria’s response was to inflate the economy to make room for all claimants, which created a caste of entitled beneficiaries (unions, business groups, peasants and politicians) who continue plundering and subtracting productivity from the economy as a whole. He also unleashed an era of economic crises and social conflict.

•    The reforms of the 80s and 90s sought to build a new platform for economic growth and laid the foundations of prosperity that the modern industrial sector enjoys today. Unfortunately, the folly of protecting entrenched PRI interests deepened and reinforced the contradictions that are obvious to all: protected sectors, lack of competition, powerful monopolies and, in general, very low productivity growth in the economy.

•    Despite this, prosperity has been real and has made it possible for the country’s politics to evolve toward democratic competition. Electoral reforms led to the defeat of the PRI in 2000 and to the alternation of parties in government. As in the economy, a reluctance to build modern institutions led to the contradictions that characterize today’s political life, above all the proliferation of conflicts for which the old institutions are inadequate. They cannot respond to the new issues or channel conflicts and pacify the country. They were created for a different era and not to foster citizen participation or to solve problems.

•    Mexico is an extraordinarily complex country that is very difficult to govern. The ethnic, religious, geographic, cultural and economic diversity and dispersion and the contrasts among regions require exceptional political skills. Historically, the system worked when there was a functioning central government in conjunction with skilled and effective local governments. As Dudley Ankerson argues, the PRI ruled for decades with methods that today are perceived as intolerable but that had the effect of making it appear easier than it actually was. The PAN governments believed that it was just a matter of removing the PRI. Today Oaxaca, Guerrero and Michoacán put in evidence how the old PRI methods are no longer viable. The same goes for PAN’s naiveté.

•    The crises, errors, corruption and incompetence of the country’s rulers discredited the political class. The arrogance of politicians (and their relatives) and their parasitism, the abuse by officials, the persistence of the excesses engaged in by labor leaders (which may change but which always remain the same) and the mockery that the government has made of the transparency mechanisms, all but justify and deepen the cynicism and mistrust characteristic of the Mexican.

•    These realities make it indispensable to carry out a real political reform. The Pact that the current government has devised is better than the paralysis of the past decades but is a poor substitute for a system of effective government (executive-legislative).

•    Beyond its specific traits, a political reform would have to achieve the following: a) politicians must be accountable to the electorate and not to their bosses; b) mechanisms to allow the formation of legislative majorities, c) a system of effective governance, both to make it possible for the government to actually govern, as well to resolve the looming security crisis. There is no one way to achieve these goals: the important thing is to achieve them. Some prefer a second electoral round, others a semi-parliamentarian system; some will want re-election, others a strong executive power; some prefer proportional representation, others a direct system. What matters is not the form but the result and the flexibility to correct the system until it works.

•    While politicians fight among themselves, opposition parties agonize and the government pretends to reform, the lives of the citizenry are increasingly beset by organized crime: extortion and kidnapping have become daily events in much of the country. The issue is not whether the previous government had the right strategy or the wrong one, or whether the current one can solve the problem without defining a different strategy. The issue is that organized crime is eroding the fabric of society and, if not addressed, will end up destroying it. It has happened elsewhere.

•    Therefore, it is urgent to launch a real reform of the justice system, of the office of the prosecutors, the police and, in general, of the entire security system. Mexico’s problem is not drug trafficking as such, but State capacity: the lack of basic law and order, law enforcement and justice for maintaining peace, security and justice. Rule of law. In a word, Mexico needs to become a modern country.

•    In addition to the above, it is imperative to transcend the notion that a few constitutional reforms will transform the country. What will transform it is the actual implementation of reforms on issues such as education, labor and social security, all of which entail the undermining of powerful interests of all kinds. The same is true of the energy sector and the tax and spending system and their supervision. It is there, not in legislative awards ceremonies, where the government’s success will be measured. At the end of the day, what counts is productivity growth: all the rest is mere rhetoric.

•    The current government has a clear sense of government and power, including extraordinary communications skills. However, it is essential to advance these characteristics and skills but they are not sufficient in themselves for achieving the government’s  mission. The country requires a new and modern institutional system, which is a clear break with the past, which keeps dragging it down and hindering its potential. Without that, not even the most competent government politically could be successful.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

The country is going through difficult times, which does not cease to be paradoxical to many. For the PRIists, who feel that they’ve “made it”, everything seemed to be moving forward without a hitch. For the general population, who just wants to live in peace, the sense of order that the new government has brought seemed to offer the opportunity to make that desire true. However, the only thing that is clear is that the real problems, those at the core, have not changed and, if anything, have intensified. Thinking about this, I recalled the famous phrase of Paul Valery that “The trouble with our times is that the future is not what it used to be.”

Part of the problem Mexico faces has to do with the fact that the discussion is marred by explanations, proposals, desires and interests, all legitimate, but that end up distorting rather than clarifying the picture. What follows is the way I understand and see the moment that Mexico is going through and how it got there.

•   The old system stabilized the country after the revolutionary epic, but ended up being unsustainable. It worked well for a while (especially between 1950 and 1970), but collapsed in part due to its own contradictions and partly by its success in creating an urban middle class that rebelled against “the system”.

•   Echeverria’s response was to inflate the economy to make room for all claimants, which created a caste of entitled beneficiaries (unions, business groups, peasants and politicians) who continue plundering and subtracting productivity from the economy as a whole. He also unleashed an era of economic crises and social conflict.

•   The reforms of the 80s and 90s sought to build a new platform for economic growth and laid the foundations of prosperity that the modern industrial sector enjoys today. Unfortunately, the folly of protecting entrenched PRI interests deepened and reinforced the contradictions that are obvious to all: protected sectors, lack of competition, powerful monopolies and, in general, very low productivity growth in the economy.

•   Despite this, prosperity has been real and has made it possible for the country’s politics to evolve toward democratic competition. Electoral reforms led to the defeat of the PRI in 2000 and to the alternation of parties in government. As in the economy, a reluctance to build modern institutions led to the contradictions that characterize today’s political life, above all the proliferation of conflicts for which the old institutions are inadequate. They cannot respond to the new issues or channel conflicts and pacify the country. They were created for a different era and not to foster citizen participation or to solve problems.

•   Mexico is an extraordinarily complex country that is very difficult to govern. The ethnic, religious, geographic, cultural and economic diversity and dispersion and the contrasts among regions require exceptional political skills. Historically, the system worked when there was a functioning central government in conjunction with skilled and effective local governments. As Dudley Ankerson argues, the PRI ruled for decades with methods that today are perceived as intolerable but that had the effect of making it appear easier than it actually was. The PAN governments believed that it was just a matter of removing the PRI. Today Oaxaca, Guerrero and Michoacán put in evidence how the old PRI methods are no longer viable. The same goes for PAN’s naiveté.

•   The crises, errors, corruption and incompetence of the country’s rulers discredited the political class. The arrogance of politicians (and their relatives) and their parasitism, the abuse by officials, the persistence of the excesses engaged in by labor leaders (which may change but which always remain the same) and the mockery that the government has made of the transparency mechanisms, all but justify and deepen the cynicism and mistrust characteristic of the Mexican.

•   These realities make it indispensable to carry out a real political reform. The Pact that the current government has devised is better than the paralysis of the past decades but is a poor substitute for a system of effective government (executive-legislative).

•   Beyond its specific traits, a political reform would have to achieve the following: a) politicians must be accountable to the electorate and not to their bosses; b) mechanisms to allow the formation of legislative majorities, c) a system of effective governance, both to make it possible for the government to actually govern, as well to resolve the looming security crisis. There is no one way to achieve these goals: the important thing is to achieve them. Some prefer a second electoral round, others a semi-parliamentarian system; some will want re-election, others a strong executive power; some prefer proportional representation, others a direct system. What matters is not the form but the result and the flexibility to correct the system until it works.

•   While politicians fight among themselves, opposition parties agonize and the government pretends to reform, the lives of the citizenry are increasingly beset by organized crime: extortion and kidnapping have become daily events in much of the country. The issue is not whether the previous government had the right strategy or the wrong one, or whether the current one can solve the problem without defining a different strategy. The issue is that organized crime is eroding the fabric of society and, if not addressed, will end up destroying it. It has happened elsewhere.

•   Therefore, it is urgent to launch a real reform of the justice system, of the office of the prosecutors, the police and, in general, of the entire security system. Mexico’s problem is not drug trafficking as such, but State capacity: the lack of basic law and order, law enforcement and justice for maintaining peace, security and justice. Rule of law. In a word, Mexico needs to become a modern country.

•   In addition to the above, it is imperative to transcend the notion that a few constitutional reforms will transform the country. What will transform it is the actual implementation of reforms on issues such as education, labor and social security, all of which entail the undermining of powerful interests of all kinds. The same is true of the energy sector and the tax and spending system and their supervision. It is there, not in legislative awards ceremonies, where the government’s success will be measured. At the end of the day, what counts is productivity growth: all the rest is mere rhetoric.

•   The current government has a clear sense of government and power, including extraordinary communications skills. However, it is essential to advance these characteristics and skills but they are not sufficient in themselves for achieving the government’s  mission. The country requires a new and modern institutional system, which is a clear break with the past, which keeps dragging it down and hindering its potential. Without that, not even the most competent government politically could be successful.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

“No immigration reform can expect to be successful if it clashes with human nature”. That is the way Demetrios Papademetriou sums up his view with respect to the U.S. migratory reform in a report* that he presented in Mexico this week. The immigration issue involves millions of Mexicans and persons of other nationalities who embarked upon the promising, but also dangerous, path in search of employment in the U.S. Now that the possibility is being discussed of a profound reform in the U.S., Mexico is faced with difficult decisions that would be indispensable for the legalization (immediate or protracted) of these millions of migrants.

The report of the Migration Policy Institute is oriented toward the U.S. discussion but, as the product of a study group that worked for more than two years –and that it involved numerous Mexicans including the group’s co-president, Mexico’s former President Ernesto Zedillo-, it embodies a great number of detailed analyses** on the nature of migration, the factors leading the potential migrant to undertake the complex process, the security conditions existing along the way and the political, economic and social problems that characterize Central America and Mexico, nations constituting an overwhelming proportion of the undocumented population. Whoever reads the report will be privy to a broad panorama of the changing dynamic of the migratory phenomenon, the complexity -political and practical- the possible solutions and their long-term implications for the U.S and for Mexico and Central America. The reader will also be able to appreciate that this reform, if approved, would be the last in a long time because, in contrast with the past, it boasts the active participation and responsibility of the employers.

The report sets out from the principle that immigration is sovereign in character –each country has full right to decide its population policy- but that this sovereign decision cannot ignore the changes that are taking place in countries such as Mexico. Although evidently a person who enters a country distinct from his or her own without first going through an immigration sentry terminal is breaking the law, the motivation of the vast majority of migrants is economic: the job market across the border is completely integrated and, with the exception of the growing difficulty of crossing the border itself, works in a highly efficient manner: when there is a demand the migratory current flows (as happened in the nineties), and when there isn’t one, the flow is negative. The report also emphasizes another key factor: Mexico has been experiencing basic changes in its economic structure and in its demographic profile, circumstances that allow consideration of a distinct economic future for the region, a future that could convert North America into a highly competitive region, very superior to that currently envisaged.

The changes that Mexico has undergone –some as the result legislative reforms, others as a consequence of the violence- have altered the migratory patterns, have modified the population type that migrates, how many do so and what motivates their decision. For example, a first effect of the pattern in migratory change is that the average schooling and skills of the most recent migrant are notably superior to those of the former cohorts. All this suggests, states the report, that the future of migratory matters is going to be very distinct from that of the past.

The most patent changes that have occurred in Mexico stem from the financial stability that the country has enjoyed for fifteen years (generating sources of  credit for housing and consumption that were previously inexistent); liberalization of imports (which has drastically diminished the proportion of the disposable income that families spend on food, clothing and shoes); the growing competitiveness of the domestic productive plant, as can be observed in industrial exports and that entails more, better paid, jobs; the remittances that have created a rural middle class, a factor that should modify the dominant perception in the U.S. about Mexico as an impoverished, corrupt and violent country. A person who already has a stable income and opportunities to raise his levels of consumption has a much lesser incentive to migrate than those of a farmer without a fixed income nor job options. In turn, insists the report, the demographic transitions that the country is experiencing (the birth rate has diminished drastically since the seventies), permits improvement in life levels and, eventually, will translate into smaller migratory flows.

Mexico has become a destination point for migrants from other latitudes, mainly from Central America, creating novel social and political realities. Many victims of the violence that has characterized the country are migrants from other nations and Mexico’s southern border has become the focus of enormous scrutiny.

Regarding the future, the report is very clear in its insistence that an immigration reform in the U.S. could be the solution for persons who are already there, but that the success of the migratory issue will depend in immense measure on the actions that the Mexican government is willing to take. Given that a great proportion of migrants who enter the U.S. illegally are Mexicans or individuals who transit through Mexico, the report proposes a joint set of responsibilities that Mexico would be required to assume in order for the proposed reform to be approved as well as for the beginning of the construction of a new regional development scheme.

In particular, Mexico would have to advance seriously on two fronts: first, control of its border to the South with the purpose of the country’s becoming a trustworthy partner which radically reduces regional vulnerability to the access of undocumented and unwanted individuals. This is what nations such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania in the European Union committed to and carried out with great success. Secondly, Mexico would have to commit to regulating migratory flows to the North. The latter would constitute a radical departure from Mexican tradition, in that it would imply that instead of de facto promoting and facilitating migration, the Mexican government would act as the guarantor of that only those who have obtained a U.S. work visa could transit the country.

The benefit of all this, as in the case in Europe, could be assessed by greater economic growth, growing regional competitiveness, further industrial integration, more exports and better living standards. In the end, there’s nothing like economic growth to ease political tensions.

*http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-FinalReport.pdf

**All available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

“No immigration reform can expect to be successful if it clashes with human nature”. That is the way Demetrios Papademetriou sums up his view with respect to the U.S. migratory reform in a report* that he presented in Mexico this week. The immigration issue involves millions of Mexicans and persons of other nationalities who embarked upon the promising, but also dangerous, path in search of employment in the U.S. Now that the possibility is being discussed of a profound reform in the U.S., Mexico is faced with difficult decisions that would be indispensable for the legalization (immediate or protracted) of these millions of migrants.

The report of the Migration Policy Institute is oriented toward the U.S. discussion but, as the product of a study group that worked for more than two years –and that it involved numerous Mexicans including the group’s co-president, Mexico’s former President Ernesto Zedillo-, it embodies a great number of detailed analyses** on the nature of migration, the factors leading the potential migrant to undertake the complex process, the security conditions existing along the way and the political, economic and social problems that characterize Central America and Mexico, nations constituting an overwhelming proportion of the undocumented population. Whoever reads the report will be privy to a broad panorama of the changing dynamic of the migratory phenomenon, the complexity -political and practical- the possible solutions and their long-term implications for the U.S and for Mexico and Central America. The reader will also be able to appreciate that this reform, if approved, would be the last in a long time because, in contrast with the past, it boasts the active participation and responsibility of the employers.

The report sets out from the principle that immigration is sovereign in character –each country has full right to decide its population policy- but that this sovereign decision cannot ignore the changes that are taking place in countries such as Mexico. Although evidently a person who enters a country distinct from his or her own without first going through an immigration sentry terminal is breaking the law, the motivation of the vast majority of migrants is economic: the job market across the border is completely integrated and, with the exception of the growing difficulty of crossing the border itself, works in a highly efficient manner: when there is a demand the migratory current flows (as happened in the nineties), and when there isn’t one, the flow is negative. The report also emphasizes another key factor: Mexico has been experiencing basic changes in its economic structure and in its demographic profile, circumstances that allow consideration of a distinct economic future for the region, a future that could convert North America into a highly competitive region, very superior to that currently envisaged.

The changes that Mexico has undergone –some as the result legislative reforms, others as a consequence of the violence- have altered the migratory patterns, have modified the population type that migrates, how many do so and what motivates their decision. For example, a first effect of the pattern in migratory change is that the average schooling and skills of the most recent migrant are notably superior to those of the former cohorts. All this suggests, states the report, that the future of migratory matters is going to be very distinct from that of the past.

The most patent changes that have occurred in Mexico stem from the financial stability that the country has enjoyed for fifteen years (generating sources of  credit for housing and consumption that were previously inexistent); liberalization of imports (which has drastically diminished the proportion of the disposable income that families spend on food, clothing and shoes); the growing competitiveness of the domestic productive plant, as can be observed in industrial exports and that entails more, better paid, jobs; the remittances that have created a rural middle class, a factor that should modify the dominant perception in the U.S. about Mexico as an impoverished, corrupt and violent country. A person who already has a stable income and opportunities to raise his levels of consumption has a much lesser incentive to migrate than those of a farmer without a fixed income nor job options. In turn, insists the report, the demographic transitions that the country is experiencing (the birth rate has diminished drastically since the seventies), permits improvement in life levels and, eventually, will translate into smaller migratory flows.

Mexico has become a destination point for migrants from other latitudes, mainly from Central America, creating novel social and political realities. Many victims of the violence that has characterized the country are migrants from other nations and Mexico’s southern border has become the focus of enormous scrutiny.

Regarding the future, the report is very clear in its insistence that an immigration reform in the U.S. could be the solution for persons who are already there, but that the success of the migratory issue will depend in immense measure on the actions that the Mexican government is willing to take. Given that a great proportion of migrants who enter the U.S. illegally are Mexicans or individuals who transit through Mexico, the report proposes a joint set of responsibilities that Mexico would be required to assume in order for the proposed reform to be approved as well as for the beginning of the construction of a new regional development scheme.

In particular, Mexico would have to advance seriously on two fronts: first, control of its border to the South with the purpose of the country’s becoming a trustworthy partner which radically reduces regional vulnerability to the access of undocumented and unwanted individuals. This is what nations such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania in the European Union committed to and carried out with great success. Secondly, Mexico would have to commit to regulating migratory flows to the North. The latter would constitute a radical departure from Mexican tradition, in that it would imply that instead of de facto promoting and facilitating migration, the Mexican government would act as the guarantor of that only those who have obtained a U.S. work visa could transit the country.

The benefit of all this, as in the case in Europe, could be assessed by greater economic growth, growing regional competitiveness, further industrial integration, more exports and better living standards. In the end, there’s nothing like economic growth to ease political tensions.

*http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-FinalReport.pdf

**All available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

FORBES-Luis Rubio

Two things are vital for a surgical procedure to be successful, my father used to say: the surgeon knowing what to do and how to do it. As the dedicated and meticulous surgeon that my father was, he never would “go into”, as he used to say, a patient if both conditions were not present, nor would he permit any of his team in the operating room to act without knowledge and skill. The same is true for the development of the country. Governing and lifting the country out of the rut it’s in also requires two things: political capacity to get things done and utter clarity in what needs to be done. These two conditions have not been present since 1994.

It’s important to call this story briefly to mind because it explains much of the present dilemma. With the 1968 Student Movement, the so-called “stabilizing development” economic strategy was abandoned and a decade of growth commenced based on deficit spending, financed with the foreign debt. That era ended obstreperously when the combination of inflation, indebtedness and recession practically bankrupted the country. The worst thing was that it left in its wake a trail of consequences and distrust that have yet to be erased from the minds of citizens and investors alike. In the eighties there began a process of economic reforms that, little by little –often reluctantly and not always integrally-, started parceling out viability to the country.

Regrettably, this impetus was lost once again with the Zapatista uprising, the governmental turmoil, the political assassinations and the 1994 financial crisis. At the beginning of that year the bearings were lost of the development adopted in the previous decade and, although stability was maintained (not a lesser feat) the country was not to procure a total transformation.

During the present decades, the country has survived and prospered thanks to two circumstances: on the one hand the financial stability that has enabled very low interest rates, growth of consumer credit and the gradual consolidation of a middle class that has become the cardinal factor of both the economic as well as the political stability the country possesses. On the other hand, the backbone of all this has been the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that has converted exports into the motor of the Mexican economy and that has slashed the prices of all sorts of consumer goods, allowing the acquisition of consumer staples (above all food, clothes and shoes) with a declining percentage of available family income, all culminating in better quality of life levels. Absent still is for the whole economy to join this transformation process in order to magnify the benefit for the entire population.

To achieve this transformation two simultaneous ingredients are required: a development strategy and the capacity to put it into practice. Both components are necessary and each entails its own characteristics. The strategy must be compatible with the environment in which it is to be implemented (NAFTA, financial stability, exports, the “old” manufacturing sector that languishes away) while it maximizes the potential of increasing the productivity of the economy in general. This combination of leveraging what’s successful and driving the growth of productivity forward could be the determining factor of the future of the country’s economy. For its part, the capacity to manage this political complexity is a sine qua non for implementing the strategy that the government decides to adopt.

Over the past two decades many ideas have been conceived for accelerating the growth of the economy, but a growth strategy has never been consolidated. Whatever the case, in all of this time the great absentee component in the mix has been the political skill to get things done; that is, even if there had been a viable strategy, the political incapacity would have made it irrelevant, as it actually did. Under the necessary conditions and in the presence of experts and well qualified advisors, the strategy could have been constructed with relative celerity. However, if the political side is lacking, the strategy may be extraordinary but it cannot be implemented. In other words, the strategy is necessary but it is not enough of a factor: it requires the capacity of political instrumentation.

The great opportunity that the country has before it is precisely that, as it has demonstrated in the last few months, the government today has more than sufficient political capacity, something not seen since January of 1994. What’s missing is an economic development strategy that transcends the commonplace scenarios, the list of occasionally disjointed reforms and the revamped mechanisms of political control. The government certainly knows how to do this. What’s needed now is for the government to clearly define what must be done. And to do it.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

INFOLATAM

México DF, 27 maio 2013

Por LUIS RUBIO

(Especial Infolatam).- O México experimenta hoje um momento paradoxal. Por um lado, não há dia em que não se anuncie uma nova meta em matéria legislativa: a agenda de reforma que levava anos paralisada, subitamente cobrou um impulso inusitado. Por outro lado, as crises políticas se multiplicam por todos os lados: os partidos políticos se dividem, algumas comunidades rurais vivem revoltas populares e, em múltiplas regiões, as autoridades locais entram em colapso. Trata-se de circunstâncias excepcionais ou faces de uma mesma moeda?

O presidente Enrique Peña Nieto tomou o poder quase como um furacão. Inclusive antes da sua inauguração formal, o novo governo já tinha mostrado seus dotes de operação política no processamento de iniciativas de lei durante o tempo de transição. Em menos de 24 horas, já tinha anunciado um Pacto por México com os principais partidos de oposição, incluindo uma detalhada agenda de reformas previamente consentidas. Os meios de comunicação, militantes e críticos até o dia anterior à tomada de posse, subitamente eram só elogios.

Algumas semanas depois, a outrora líder do magistério estava na prisão.Ninguém parecia ter previsto a possibilidade de que o México tivesse um governo em forma:desde a revolta zapatista em janeiro de 1994 até a chegada de Peña Nieto, os mexicanos tinham se acostumado à mediocridade e à incompetência na presidência. Agora, subitamente, tudo parecia mudar.

A chegada de Peña Nieto à presidência foi como um alívio, uma rajada de ar fresco, depois de anos ausência de liderança. Efetivamente: Peña Nieto lidera um projeto de poder que se inspira em Adolfo López Mateos, o último presidente (1958-1964) que concluiu felizmente seu mandato, presidiu um período de crescimento econômico próximo aos 8% anuais em média, entregou a administração sem crise e exerceu um poder incontestável. Com Peña Nieto retornaram as formas do poder e a formalidade nas relações entre políticos. Sua agenda legislativa nos primeiros meses incluiu diversos assuntos (educação, telecomunicações, lei de amparo), mas, o denominador comum é um muito específico: a concentração do poder.

Passo a passo, a presidência foi se fortalecendo não através de atos ilegais ou decretos unilaterais (práticas comuns no passado), senão mediante ferramentas legais que conferem instrumentos de controle ao governo sobre grupos, entidades e instituições chave e, especialmente, sobre o que, nós os mexicanos chamamos “poderes fáticos”, esse núcleo de líderes sindicais, empresários e políticos que, quando o PRI perdeu a presidência em 2000, se converteram em poderes livres, sem controle algum e com capacidade de veto para proteger seus interesses econômicos e políticos.

O paradoxo do novo governo é que seu projeto é de poder mais que de desenvolvimento e que sua visão é a de recriar o mundo do PRI dos anos sessenta. Naquela época, a presidência e o PRI guardavam uma relação simbiótica, a economia –fechada e protegida- funcionava com o impulso da demanda que gerava o investimento governamental em infraestrutura. O presidente era a figura central da política nacional e o governo o factótum de desenvolvimento. Como a história testemunha, o sucesso do modelo é indisputável. No entanto, as circunstâncias de sessenta anos atrás são radicalmente diferentes das atuais: uma população quatro vezes maior, uma realidade política de fragmentação e descentralização, uma economia globalizada, o mundo da Internet e uma sociedade demandante e militante. Em uma palavra, ainda que a maior parte da população tenha dado as boas-vindas a um governo em forma, suscetível a restabelecer um sentido de ordem, a realidade atual não é compatível com uma tentativa de recriar o mundo relativamente simples de meio século atrás.

Neste contexto, não é surpreendente que, paralelamente com a ordem que impõe a nova administração e o progresso sistemático do processo legislativo, as crises políticas se multiplicam por todas as partes. Não é que uma coisa propicie outra (ainda que em alguns casos seja assim), mas as instituições que caracterizam o sistema político são, em boa medida, as do passado que não servem para processar conflitos e demandas de uma sociedade radicalmente diferente. Em contraste com a Espanha ou o Chile, que viveram um rompimento claro com respeito ao velho regime, o México nunca experimentou um momento de avarie. Independente das razões, o velho PRI nunca teve que se reformar e retornou ao poder como se nada tivesse acontecido nos anos intermediários.

Há ao menos três fontes de conflito político. Uma se deriva da combinação de descentralização política (e do orçamento) junto com a concentração do poder do crime organizado: o poder se descentralizou, mas os governadores não construíram polícias, ministérios públicos e, em geral, capacidade de Estado que substituísse o controle vertical que o governo federal exercia e que, por muito tempo, permitiu manter uma aparência de ordem.

Isto ocorreu justo quando os americanos tinham fechado as vias de acesso das drogas pelo Caribe, os colombianos tinha recuperado o controle do seu país e, após 2001, os estadunidenses tinham fortificado a fronteira. Tudo isto criou uma mistura letal: um fortalecimento brutal das máfias criminosas em frente a um sistema de governo fraco. O desafio é fenomenal e não se resolve meramente com um governo federal em forma, ainda que sem isso fosse impossível conseguir.

A segunda fonte de choque tem sua origem em conflitos comunitários (terras, controle regional, lideranças indígenas) que sempre existiram, mas que por muito tempo foram controlados e atados por um sistema político forte que nunca se ocupou em resolver as fontes de conflito, mas meramente em evitar que estas explodissem. Desaparece a capacidade de controle e os conflitos se afloram. Em muitos casos, se trata de movimentos sociais com raízes profundas que não podem se resolver por meio da repressão, senão que exigem novas formas de participação política. Inevitavelmente, sobretudo quando se trata das rotas da droga, não é incomum encontrar entrelaçados os movimentos de origem comunitária com o crime organizado, semeando o que eventualmente conduz ao colapso de todo vestígio de ordem e governo funcional.

Finalmente, a terceira fonte de conflito é produto dos desencontros que são produto de um sistema político velho que se recusa a se transformar: um sistema político pré-moderno, justiça medieval e formas não democráticas de ação política. Os legisladores protestam pelo que veem no Pacto por México como usurpação de suas funções e responsabilidades. Os governadores exercem os gastos sem prestação alguma de contas. Os poderes públicos não têm bem definidos seus limites e mecanismos de contrapeso. Em uma palavra, sobrevivem instituições e formas velhas que são incompatíveis com uma realidade transformada.

O México vive um momento de paradoxos e efervescência. Por quase vinte anos, o país foi se transformando sem um governo que lhe impusesse um caminho e sem um projeto coerente de reforma institucional ou econômica. Ainda que muitas coisas tenham avançado, a desordem era crescente. Na ausência de liderança presidencial, o país se movia em seu ritmo e forma, mas sem capacidade de aproveitar oportunidades e acelerar o passo do desenvolvimento econômico. Agora que há uma liderança efetiva a grande pergunta é se saberá aproveitar o momento para construir instituições modernas e forjar um futuro diferente ou se se limitará a tentar recriar um mundo que já não é possível.

Traduzido por Infolatam

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

a quick-translation of this article can be found at www.cidac.org

http://www.infolatam.com.br/2013/05/28/auges-e-paradoxos/

Luis Rubio

“Confusion of goals and perfection of means”, wrote Einstein, “seems, in my opinion, to characterize our age”. It appears he was thinking about Mexican politics. Today nothing is clear: what’s the role of the political parties and what’s that of the government? What’s the relationship between the executive and the legislature? What’s the function of the Pact? What relation should there be between party leaders and the legislative contingents? How should the state governments interact with the federal government and where do their respective responsibilities begin and end? What is the role of ex-presidents in active politics? In a word, what is Mexican democracy and to what does it aspire?

The confusion and contradiction of concepts that characterize the public debate (or dispute) is infinite and reveal a very simple circumstance: the country has not adapted itself to its current political reality. During the years of what now could end up being an interregnum -from 1997 to 2012- the craving for revenge and to move the borders of power would appear to explain and justify the bickering that was the norm of the period. Today, with the return of the old PRIist ways and some of their discipline, what before seemed like confusion is now open conflict.

What’s taking place within the parties is not distinct from what is observed between the executive power and the governors. The forms may be different, but the phenomenon is the same: the country is facing profound disorder in matters of power and there are no appropriate mechanisms to resolve them. Worse yet, the conflicts intensify and deepen, putting at risk not an agenda of reform, but the stability of the country. Left behind are those so very absurd show offs by legislators that tried to present themselves as heroic players, suddenly independent of the president when the PRI lost the legislative majority; today it’s no longer about arm wrestling but about the clear manifestations of a dysfunctional system. What worked under the old system no longer works and what barely worked in recent years no longer tallies with the present reality.

The problems are not limited to the relations among branches of government or levels of administrative responsibility. It’s the same situation with the communications media, union dissent, the obstructionist groups that emerged from the sewers of society and politics (as in Guerrero and Michoacán), and the criminality that reappears simply because the idyllic past cannot be recreated.

Everyone knows that the power arrangements of the past are unsustainable and that the absence of institutional development lies at the heart of the present-day conflictivity. The question is what is to be done about it. Proposals abound for responding to and resolving the disagreements. Some make sense, others sharply mirror Einstein’s observation. Most privilege the objectives being pursued, while the means typically proposed for reaching these are nothing but a string of hackneyed scenarios that, frequently, are not coherent with or conducive to the desired objective. The key is functional means, not grandiose objectives.

The problem is obvious: the reality has changed much faster than the institutions whose place it is to govern it.  In the context of it’s an ill wind that blows no good, as the saying goes, to the most experienced go the spoils, but lasting solutions do not prosper. The country progressed from a centralized regime and one with vertical controls to extreme decentralization in which all of the groups, sectors and interests did whatever possible to expand their spaces and attributions without there being institutional means for channeling the conflicts arising from this. From this derived a rebellion against the old, vast, presidential powers, its rules and forms, with the consequent excesses. Not everything was ill willed: many were the honest attempts to find practical solutions to basic problems in which the forms of yesteryear clashed with a globalized economic reality that did not admit many deviations. The fifteen years that followed the 1997 defeat of the PRI in Congress was a stage of political fits of pique: everyone attempted to impose his preferences that with a little luck would take hold. It lasted while it lasted.

Although there were (and are) many solution proposals, the reality is that political and intellectual leadership did not exist, nor did the capacity or political disposition, to construct the new institutional structure that the reality cries out for. Instead of solutions came occurrences: although there have been serious proposals, the majority of these have not been more than unconnected recipes. The result is there for all to see: interminable -and internecine- disputes, crime, reforms meant to serve private objectives and a weakening of the system’s legitimacy. What didn’t change was the reality. The conflict continues to seethe, acquiring ever more worrisome undertones.

Within this context, one can do no more than welcome the inherent order of the forms and actions of the new government. Beyond the content, the sole fact of the existence of a sense of order implies notable headway. However, order is not a substitute for solutions and much less so of formal institutions that can respond to the issues raised in the first paragraph.

The country demands nothing less than a change of regime, that is, a redefinition of the essence of the relationships among branches of government, entities and functions. A change of regime can be as ambitious as construction from ground zero or as pragmatic as redefinition of the existing relations. What will not work is the pretense of employing rules of the game and criteria that have clearly proven to be dysfunctional or that do not lead to the strengthening of the structures of governability, security and economic performance. The specific nature of the institutions and rules that would be required to give viability to the country depends not on big intellectual concepts, as useful as they may be, but rather on a negotiation at the interior of the power structures. The key to this is that, once the new rules have been agreed upon, all participants would commit themselves to comply with these and that the government, at all levels, would possess effective capacity for enforcing them.

We all entertain our preferences as to how the regime should be and what the role of each actor would be in the process. However, this isn’t about preferences but about negotiation. The only thing that’s indispensable is the existence of effective leadership that is clear on the objective to pursue and dedicated to constructing it. Institutions do not arise from an intellectual vacuum but rather from political praxis. “Men”, said Machiavelli, “never do good unless necessity drives them to it; but when they are free to choose and can do just as they please, confusion and disorder become rampant”. Such is the tessitura.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

INFOLATAM – Luis Rubio

Mexico is experiencing a paradoxical moment at present. On the one hand, barely a day goes by that without a new milestone in legislative matters: the reform agenda that sat immobilized on the shelf has suddenly acquired uncommon impetus. On the other hand, political crises mushroom in all quarters: political parties splinter, some rural communities endure popular uprisings and, in multiple regions, local authorities collapse. Are these exceptional circumstances or faces of the same coin?

President Enrique Peña-Nieto came into power nearly like a hurricane. Even prior to its formal inauguration, the new government had already showcased its caliber of political operation in the processing of law initiatives during the time of the transition between governments. In fewer than 24 hours after it was inaugurated, it had announced a Pact for Mexico with the main opposition parties, including a detailed agenda of reforms on which consensus had already been reached. The media, very militant and critical right up to the day before his assuming office, abruptly began to sing his praises. A few weeks later, the country’s erstwhile teachers’ leader was in jail. No one seemed to have foreseen the possibility of Mexico having a government in shape: from the Zapatista uprising in 1994 to the arrival of Peña-Nieto, Mexicans had become accustomed to the incompetence and mediocrity of the presidency. Now, all of a sudden, everything seemed to be changing

The advent of Peña-Nieto in the presidency was akin to relief, a breath of fresh air, after years of the absence of leadership. In effect: Peña-Nieto heads a power project inspired by Adolfo López-Mateos, the last Mexican president (1958-1964) who concluded his mandate happily, presided over an economic growth period of nearly 8% annually on average, handed over the administration without crisis and exercised undisputed power. With Peña-Nieto there returned the forms of power and formality to the office and in relations among politicians. His legislative agenda in the first months has included diverse matters (education, telecommunications, the appeals law), but the common denominator is a very specific one: concentration of power. Step by step, the presidency has become stronger not through illicit acts or unilateral decrees (widespread practices in the past), but by means of legal tools that grant instruments of control to the government over key groups, entities and institutions and, especially, over what we Mexicans call the “de facto powers”, that nucleus of union leaders, entrepreneurs and politicians who, with the PRI loss of the presidency in 2000, became at-large powers, without the most minimal control and possessing veto capacity to safeguard their economic and political interests.

The paradox of the new government is that its project is more one of power than of development and that its vision is to recreate the PRI world of the sixties. During that era, the presidency and the PRI maintained a symbiotic relationship, the economy –closed and protected- functioned with the demand generated by governmental investment in infrastructure. The president was the central figure of domestic politics and the government was the factotum of development. As history is witness, the model’s success is irrefutable. However, the circumstances sixty years ago are radically distinct from those valid at present: a population four times larger, a political reality of fragmentation and decentralization, a globalized economy, the world of the Internet and a demanding and militant society. In a word, although the greater part of the population has welcomed a government in form, capable of reestablishing a sense of order, the prevailing reality is not compatible with an attempt to recreate the relatively simple world of a half century ago.

In this context, it is not surprising that, in parallel with the order that the administration imposes and the systematic progress of the legislative process, political crises abound in all parts. It’s not that one thing brings about the other (although this is so in some cases) but that  the institutions characterizing the political system are, to a goodly degree, those of before that are not up to processing the conflicts and demands of a radically changed society. In contrast with Spain or Chile, which underwent a clear break with respect to the old regime, Mexico never experienced a breaking point. For whatever reasons, the old PRI never had to reform itself and thus returned to power as if nothing had happened in the intervening years.

There are at least three sources of political conflict at present. One derives from the combination of political decentralization (and of budgetary spending) with the concentration of power of organized crime: governmental power was decentralized but the governors did not construct police corps, prosecuting capability and, in general, the State capacity that would replace the vertical control that the federal government used to exercise and that, for a long time, allowed maintaining a semblance of order. This occurred precisely when the Americans had closed illegal drug access by way of the Caribbean, when the Colombians had recovered the control of their country and, after 2001, when the Americans beefed up the border. All of this created a lethal mix: brutal strengthening of the criminal mafias and a weak system of government in general and of law enforcement in particular. The challenge is thus phenomenal and cannot be resolved merely with a revitalized federal government, although without one it would be impossible to succeed.

The second source of the clash has its origin in -often ancestral and mostly rural- community conflicts (land property, regional control, local bosses or caciques, exploitation of natural resources) that have always existed but that for some time were controlled and more or less managed by a strong and centralized political system that never occupied itself with resolving the wellsprings of conflict but that merely avoided the latter from detonating. As the capacity of control disappeared in the past two decades, the conflicts flourished. In many cases, this has to do with deep-rooted social movements that cannot be resolved through repression, but that demand novel forms of political participation. Inevitably, above all when this involves illegal drug trade routes it is not unusual to find that community-based movements are interwoven with organized crime, sowing the seeds of what eventually leads to the collapse of any vestige of order and functional government. Guerrero, Oaxaca and Michoacán are paramount examples of some of these circumstances.

Finally, the third source of conflict is the result of disagreements that in turn are the product of an old political system that refuses to transform itself: a pre-modern political system, medieval judicial structures and non-democratic forms of political action. The legislators protest what they perceive in the Pact for Mexico as the usurpation of their functions and responsibilities. The governors exercise the budget with no accountability. The three branches of government have no well defined limits and there are no effective checks and balances. In a word, old institutions and forms that are incompatible with a transformed reality remain in place and, formally, in charge.

Mexico is living a time of paradoxes and effervescence. For nearly twenty years, the country was transformed little by little without a government that imposed a trajectory upon it and with no coherent strategy of institutional or economic reform. Although many things advanced, disorder grew all over. In the absence of political leadership, the country marched to its own drummer, but without the capacity to take advantage of opportunities and accelerate the pace of economic development. Now that there is effective leadership the big question is whether the government will be able to take advantage of the moment to construct modern institutions and forge a different future or whether it will limit itself in an attempt to recreate a world that is no longer possible.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

INFOLATAM – Luis Rubio

Mexico is experiencing a paradoxical moment at present. On the one hand, barely a day goes by that without a new milestone in legislative matters: the reform agenda that sat immobilized on the shelf has suddenly acquired uncommon impetus. On the other hand, political crises mushroom in all quarters: political parties splinter, some rural communities endure popular uprisings and, in multiple regions, local authorities collapse. Are these exceptional circumstances or faces of the same coin?

President Enrique Peña-Nieto came into power nearly like a hurricane. Even prior to its formal inauguration, the new government had already showcased its caliber of political operation in the processing of law initiatives during the time of the transition between governments. In fewer than 24 hours after it was inaugurated, it had announced a Pact for Mexico with the main opposition parties, including a detailed agenda of reforms on which consensus had already been reached. The media, very militant and critical right up to the day before his assuming office, abruptly began to sing his praises. A few weeks later, the country’s erstwhile teachers’ leader was in jail. No one seemed to have foreseen the possibility of Mexico having a government in shape: from the Zapatista uprising in 1994 to the arrival of Peña-Nieto, Mexicans had become accustomed to the incompetence and mediocrity of the presidency. Now, all of a sudden, everything seemed to be changing

The advent of Peña-Nieto in the presidency was akin to relief, a breath of fresh air, after years of the absence of leadership. In effect: Peña-Nieto heads a power project inspired by Adolfo López-Mateos, the last Mexican president (1958-1964) who concluded his mandate happily, presided over an economic growth period of nearly 8% annually on average, handed over the administration without crisis and exercised undisputed power. With Peña-Nieto there returned the forms of power and formality to the office and in relations among politicians. His legislative agenda in the first months has included diverse matters (education, telecommunications, the appeals law), but the common denominator is a very specific one: concentration of power. Step by step, the presidency has become stronger not through illicit acts or unilateral decrees (widespread practices in the past), but by means of legal tools that grant instruments of control to the government over key groups, entities and institutions and, especially, over what we Mexicans call the “de facto powers”, that nucleus of union leaders, entrepreneurs and politicians who, with the PRI loss of the presidency in 2000, became at-large powers, without the most minimal control and possessing veto capacity to safeguard their economic and political interests.

The paradox of the new government is that its project is more one of power than of development and that its vision is to recreate the PRI world of the sixties. During that era, the presidency and the PRI maintained a symbiotic relationship, the economy –closed and protected- functioned with the demand generated by governmental investment in infrastructure. The president was the central figure of domestic politics and the government was the factotum of development. As history is witness, the model’s success is irrefutable. However, the circumstances sixty years ago are radically distinct from those valid at present: a population four times larger, a political reality of fragmentation and decentralization, a globalized economy, the world of the Internet and a demanding and militant society. In a word, although the greater part of the population has welcomed a government in form, capable of reestablishing a sense of order, the prevailing reality is not compatible with an attempt to recreate the relatively simple world of a half century ago.

In this context, it is not surprising that, in parallel with the order that the administration imposes and the systematic progress of the legislative process, political crises abound in all parts. It’s not that one thing brings about the other (although this is so in some cases) but that  the institutions characterizing the political system are, to a goodly degree, those of before that are not up to processing the conflicts and demands of a radically changed society. In contrast with Spain or Chile, which underwent a clear break with respect to the old regime, Mexico never experienced a breaking point. For whatever reasons, the old PRI never had to reform itself and thus returned to power as if nothing had happened in the intervening years.

There are at least three sources of political conflict at present. One derives from the combination of political decentralization (and of budgetary spending) with the concentration of power of organized crime: governmental power was decentralized but the governors did not construct police corps, prosecuting capability and, in general, the State capacity that would replace the vertical control that the federal government used to exercise and that, for a long time, allowed maintaining a semblance of order. This occurred precisely when the Americans had closed illegal drug access by way of the Caribbean, when the Colombians had recovered the control of their country and, after 2001, when the Americans beefed up the border. All of this created a lethal mix: brutal strengthening of the criminal mafias and a weak system of government in general and of law enforcement in particular. The challenge is thus phenomenal and cannot be resolved merely with a revitalized federal government, although without one it would be impossible to succeed.

The second source of the clash has its origin in -often ancestral and mostly rural- community conflicts (land property, regional control, local bosses or caciques, exploitation of natural resources) that have always existed but that for some time were controlled and more or less managed by a strong and centralized political system that never occupied itself with resolving the wellsprings of conflict but that merely avoided the latter from detonating. As the capacity of control disappeared in the past two decades, the conflicts flourished. In many cases, this has to do with deep-rooted social movements that cannot be resolved through repression, but that demand novel forms of political participation. Inevitably, above all when this involves illegal drug trade routes it is not unusual to find that community-based movements are interwoven with organized crime, sowing the seeds of what eventually leads to the collapse of any vestige of order and functional government. Guerrero, Oaxaca and Michoacán are paramount examples of some of these circumstances.

Finally, the third source of conflict is the result of disagreements that in turn are the product of an old political system that refuses to transform itself: a pre-modern political system, medieval judicial structures and non-democratic forms of political action. The legislators protest what they perceive in the Pact for Mexico as the usurpation of their functions and responsibilities. The governors exercise the budget with no accountability. The three branches of government have no well defined limits and there are no effective checks and balances. In a word, old institutions and forms that are incompatible with a transformed reality remain in place and, formally, in charge.

Mexico is living a time of paradoxes and effervescence. For nearly twenty years, the country was transformed little by little without a government that imposed a trajectory upon it and with no coherent strategy of institutional or economic reform. Although many things advanced, disorder grew all over. In the absence of political leadership, the country marched to its own drummer, but without the capacity to take advantage of opportunities and accelerate the pace of economic development. Now that there is effective leadership the big question is whether the government will be able to take advantage of the moment to construct modern institutions and forge a different future or whether it will limit itself in an attempt to recreate a world that is no longer possible.

@lrubiof

www.cidac.org

Luis Rubio

“Confusion of goals and perfection of means”, wrote Einstein, “seems, in my opinion, to characterize our age”. It appears he was thinking about Mexican politics. Today nothing is clear: what’s the role of the political parties and what’s that of the government? What’s the relationship between the executive and the legislature? What’s the function of the Pact? What relation should there be between party leaders and the legislative contingents? How should the state governments interact with the federal government and where do their respective responsibilities begin and end? What is the role of ex-presidents in active politics? In a word, what is Mexican democracy and to what does it aspire?

The confusion and contradiction of concepts that characterize the public debate (or dispute) is infinite and reveal a very simple circumstance: the country has not adapted itself to its current political reality. During the years of what now could end up being an interregnum -from 1997 to 2012- the craving for revenge and to move the borders of power would appear to explain and justify the bickering that was the norm of the period. Today, with the return of the old PRIist ways and some of their discipline, what before seemed like confusion is now open conflict.

What’s taking place within the parties is not distinct from what is observed between the executive power and the governors. The forms may be different, but the phenomenon is the same: the country is facing profound disorder in matters of power and there are no appropriate mechanisms to resolve them. Worse yet, the conflicts intensify and deepen, putting at risk not an agenda of reform, but the stability of the country. Left behind are those so very absurd show offs by legislators that tried to present themselves as heroic players, suddenly independent of the president when the PRI lost the legislative majority; today it’s no longer about arm wrestling but about the clear manifestations of a dysfunctional system. What worked under the old system no longer works and what barely worked in recent years no longer tallies with the present reality.

The problems are not limited to the relations among branches of government or levels of administrative responsibility. It’s the same situation with the communications media, union dissent, the obstructionist groups that emerged from the sewers of society and politics (as in Guerrero and Michoacán), and the criminality that reappears simply because the idyllic past cannot be recreated.

Everyone knows that the power arrangements of the past are unsustainable and that the absence of institutional development lies at the heart of the present-day conflictivity. The question is what is to be done about it. Proposals abound for responding to and resolving the disagreements. Some make sense, others sharply mirror Einstein’s observation. Most privilege the objectives being pursued, while the means typically proposed for reaching these are nothing but a string of hackneyed scenarios that, frequently, are not coherent with or conducive to the desired objective. The key is functional means, not grandiose objectives.

The problem is obvious: the reality has changed much faster than the institutions whose place it is to govern it.  In the context of it’s an ill wind that blows no good, as the saying goes, to the most experienced go the spoils, but lasting solutions do not prosper. The country progressed from a centralized regime and one with vertical controls to extreme decentralization in which all of the groups, sectors and interests did whatever possible to expand their spaces and attributions without there being institutional means for channeling the conflicts arising from this. From this derived a rebellion against the old, vast, presidential powers, its rules and forms, with the consequent excesses. Not everything was ill willed: many were the honest attempts to find practical solutions to basic problems in which the forms of yesteryear clashed with a globalized economic reality that did not admit many deviations. The fifteen years that followed the 1997 defeat of the PRI in Congress was a stage of political fits of pique: everyone attempted to impose his preferences that with a little luck would take hold. It lasted while it lasted.

Although there were (and are) many solution proposals, the reality is that political and intellectual leadership did not exist, nor did the capacity or political disposition, to construct the new institutional structure that the reality cries out for. Instead of solutions came occurrences: although there have been serious proposals, the majority of these have not been more than unconnected recipes. The result is there for all to see: interminable -and internecine- disputes, crime, reforms meant to serve private objectives and a weakening of the system’s legitimacy. What didn’t change was the reality. The conflict continues to seethe, acquiring ever more worrisome undertones.

Within this context, one can do no more than welcome the inherent order of the forms and actions of the new government. Beyond the content, the sole fact of the existence of a sense of order implies notable headway. However, order is not a substitute for solutions and much less so of formal institutions that can respond to the issues raised in the first paragraph.

The country demands nothing less than a change of regime, that is, a redefinition of the essence of the relationships among branches of government, entities and functions. A change of regime can be as ambitious as construction from ground zero or as pragmatic as redefinition of the existing relations. What will not work is the pretense of employing rules of the game and criteria that have clearly proven to be dysfunctional or that do not lead to the strengthening of the structures of governability, security and economic performance. The specific nature of the institutions and rules that would be required to give viability to the country depends not on big intellectual concepts, as useful as they may be, but rather on a negotiation at the interior of the power structures. The key to this is that, once the new rules have been agreed upon, all participants would commit themselves to comply with these and that the government, at all levels, would possess effective capacity for enforcing them.

We all entertain our preferences as to how the regime should be and what the role of each actor would be in the process. However, this isn’t about preferences but about negotiation. The only thing that’s indispensable is the existence of effective leadership that is clear on the objective to pursue and dedicated to constructing it. Institutions do not arise from an intellectual vacuum but rather from political praxis. “Men”, said Machiavelli, “never do good unless necessity drives them to it; but when they are free to choose and can do just as they please, confusion and disorder become rampant”. Such is the tessitura.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof