Luis Rubio

It is rare day that our politicians realize the effects of their decisions. Assured of the infallibility and bonhomie of their ideas, they rarely consider the possibility that their choices and actions might give rise to opposite outcomes from those sought or radically different from those imagined.  Politicians think in terms of their own frames of reference (usually access to power and to their next means of livelihood) and not with respect to the consequences of their actions; like a thief who thinks everyone is out to steal from him.

Protected from the mundane complexity of the life of the Mexican everyman, their perspective does not in any way resemble what the citizen needs. The citizenry wants the basics: safety, certainty, services that work, the means to develop their daily life, that is, nothing out of the ordinary: they only want to live and prosper the best way possible. Politicians, however, know better: progress does not consist of having a good life, basic services and everyday safety but rather radical transformations.

The case of “A Day Without the Car” in Mexico City is paradigmatic because everyone, except for its promoters, knew that limiting the use of the automobile for millions of inhabitants without having an effective and reliable means of public transportation in place would engender the inexorable result of causing an increase in the number of vehicles: the population began to buy an additional car to be able to move to work every day. But that case, of a quarter of a century ago and, inexplicably repeated a few months back, is only a sample. The country has changed drastically in the last decades in great measure due to governmental decisions, some on target, many terrifying, which have altered not only the physical aspects and the statistics, but also the populace’s perceptions and expectations. The result is not pleasant.

Although there have been truly transcendental and transformative strategies (for example, the economic liberalization of the eighties and the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]), the majority have had null effects and, on occasion, have been counterproductive. But beyond the great reforms, what is noteworthy is the absence of the “little” things, those most important ones in day-to-day life. Many are contemptuous of the liberalization of the economy and propose canceling it, but it is obvious that they ignore a very simple fact: the SOLE engine of growth of the Mexican economy at present is NAFTA; the notion of placing it in question is, first, absurd, but after that makes one’s hair stand on end. Thus the concern about Trump.

Perhaps there is no better test of the last four governments’ lack of success than the fact that, however much growth they promised, they did not achieve adding anything to NAFTA and, in contrast, at present, have placed financial stability once again in doubt, the very financial stability that, as we learned in 1994, lies at the heart of economic viability.

Despite the lack of success of the last three administrations as well as the present one, some states and regions have procured something that is not currently recognized: the growth rates of states such as Aguascalientes, Guanajuato and Queretaro are more similar to those of Asia than Latin America. That is, today there are many Mexicans undergoing a radical transformation which distances them from those who, thanks to the worst governments devoted to corruption as their raison d’être, have left their populations in poverty and ruin. Parts of Mexico have come to prosper, others have become poverty-ridden. What is the difference? Quality of government. There is no other answer.

Some local governments have been able to do something out of the usual: they govern. Something as patently obvious is inexistent in the majority of the nation. More common are governors dedicated to power and profit than those committed to development. How unfortunate it is that the majority quest after power and personal gain.

The result is pathetic. For the ordinary citizen what is important is that there is food in the stores, gas at the respective gas stations, safety in public conveyances and certainty in the economy. The reality is another: as if it were a natural and not a political disaster (created by the radical teachers union CNTE), the federal government organized an airlift to transport basic goods to Oaxaca; rather than being the guarantor of safety, it grants privilege to delinquents.

What is the result? Instead of winning over a prosperous, content and satisfied public, the country is characterized by growing uncertainty. The workaday Mexican lives in fear of assaults, robberies at their homes, their children’s safety, uncertainty regarding job permanence and, as if this were not sufficient, the absence of hope. Our politicians do not understand even the most elementary: without stability and trust the future is impossible.

“Broken Windows” was a concept coined by Wilson and Kelling to describe the way a society deteriorates. When no one repairs a building’s broken windows or a city’s potholes, deterioration accelerates because no one cares about the state of things. Little by little, people become accustomed to everything perennially getting worse.

Mexico possesses enormous assets and virtues, but the quotidian reality discloses precisely the opposite. The key question is: who benefits from this?

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@lrubiof

 Luis Rubio

Mexico is experiencing a growing universe of “little” civil wars that can end up with it in ruins. By the same token, the dynamic that this is creating could in like manner finally generate a country-wide platform for transformation: it all depends on how these processes are channeled or, more appropriately, whether there is someone in charge willing to lead such a transformational venture.

The open fronts are multiple and implacable. Some have been left ajar by the current administration, others have accumulated from before, but if the criterion to focus on the opportunities and risks is one of stability, viability and peace, all entail consequences. The nation is experiencing a growing civil war, or better said, an ensemble of mini civil wars, each one different in origin, circumstance, and dynamic, but the ensemble nonetheless puts in evidence the weakness of the government and that the propensity for toward anarchy grows. What is pathological about all this is that many of these “little wars” are the product of the incompetence and impaired vision of the promoters of these very wars, in many cases those most committed to exactly the opposite of what they are engendering.

A “snapshot” of the general panorama says more than a thousand words:

• The most useless (and, in fact, ludicrous) of civil wars is that which President Peña fostered with his initiative in terms of egalitarian marriages. I have nothing against each couple resolving their lives as they see fit, but it seems to me that the presidential initiative in the matter was foolhardy, counterproductive for him and for his party but, above all, absolutely unnecessary. The war that the Catholic Church started in the wake of that decision can bring nothing good, and all the more so when, à la Mexicaine, the problem was “solved”: Mexico City permits everything; why change a status quo that works? As the phrase attributed to Talleyrand says, “it was worse than a crime, it was a blunder”. An enormous blunder.
• Corruption corrodes everything, but has opened many fronts, all costly. Above all else, there are the protagonists, first of all the governors, who exhibit not the least decorum: they interpret an electoral triumph as a license to steal and, if they can, to arrive at the presidency. This war is not going to go away, even if the political parties reach an agreement on what corruption is and thus, who goes -or does not- go to jail, and in exchange for what. Justice? Up against the wall. Even worse: it provides incentives for the next breed of corrupt governors.
• Then there are the new Torquemadas, now dedicated to corruption or witch-hunts where the last thing that matters is justice, legality or due process. To denounce, to abuse, to attack and to evidence is the new mantra. What is important is not to eradicate corruption but to light bonfires, many bonfires. López Obrador will thank them profusely.
• The PRD and Morena, the two political parties on the left that split, like Cain and Abel, are undergoing the most Bizarre of the disputes. Everything for power, all of the power of before and all of the power of now, but above all that of the future. What is important is to mutually finish each other off: what that entails for the people in the turfs that they formally “govern” is least in importance. Ask the denizens of Condesa, where a war is brewing between the two currents, throwing open the door to organized crime and all of what that implies: murders, extortion, abductions. Morena trades in the future but is stuck in the past because it has no other option: its “product” is even more archaic than that of the present federal government: a return to the Stone Age. In the meanwhile, the inhabitants of their demarcation pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. What is important is power. Long live corruption.
• The tax “reform” that was promoted three years ago by the federal government spawned a little war with the taxpayers; the government won, but the economy is now stagnant. A Pyrrhic victory. In one of his many extraordinary and unforgettable readings of the reality, Winston Churchill stated that “I contend that for a nation to try to tax itself into prosperity is like a man standing in a bucket and trying to lift himself up by the handle.” Taxes are necessary, but not as a trade-off for prosperity.

Wars, affirmed Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War, start because of fear, interest or honor. Civil wars, or little civil wars, are not very different, but their essence is quite distinct on one very important regard: instead of adding, they divide.

Mexico is enduring an accumulation of grievances and conflicts, some out in the open and others entombed, but all conducive to greater divisions, if not to open war. That is the risk, the one that is exacerbated inasmuch as the federal government disappears from the map. In contrast with other nations (Spain, which functioned quite well without a government for more than a year, is a good example), Mexico cannot live without an active arbiter: an arbiter devoted to propitiating dialogue and social concert. The divisive factor in Mexico is power: without dialogue, conflict lurks just around the corner.

Minxin Pei has just published a book on corruption in China*. His argument is that the Chinese system renders corruption inevitable and that corruption will be the cause of China’s eventual collapse. It is evident, by any reckoning, that there is no proportion vis à vis China: with all of Mexico’s shortcomings and defects, the problems here are aired out and are public. That means they could be dealt with. One must maintain a sense of proportion that allows for a terse transition, whether or not it takes another decade. But someone has to lead it.

*China’s Crony Capitalism

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@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

Concern is in vogue with regard to China’s growth rate and its potential implications for the world. However, the same phenomenon can be observed in the U.S., Europe and other nations, including of course Mexico: the pace of economic growth has been descending. The question is why.

The simplest explanation for the tendency toward a lower growth rate is that as societies become wealthier, their incentives and needs that must be satisfied, change. The argument sounds reasonable: it is obvious that what an Indian who lives on less than a dollar a day requires is very distinct from the demands of a Swiss citizen, rendering it natural that India’s growth rate would be superior.

In his famous book The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Daniel Bell affirmed that growth laid the base for its own destruction because it generated people with little hunger for greater growth. In recent years, Edmund Phelps published a book* that follows that argument but leading to a very different conclusion: it is not that people stop having aspirations and needs, but that the environment has changed, making growth increasingly difficult. That is, it is not that capitalism engenders antibodies against growth but that the society tends to develop a form of new corporatism that impedes change.

Phelps’ argument reminded me of what Galbraith said on the subject of the “military-industrial complex”: it tends to paralyze development because it entails arrangements among enterprises and the government that make it difficult to change the status quo, the latter a condition necessary for the growth of the economy. Phelps denominates “corporatist complex” this type of corporatism, in which he includes the government, the legislature, the banks, companies and unions. For Phelps, there an implicit alliance among all of these interests to conspire against competition and innovation.

According to Phelps, there are phenomena known to all that stand in the way of growth and that have a bearing on the companies’ incentives, the conditions for competition, the way in which the granting of bank credit has changed and the search for wealth ad hominem. However, what appears crucial to Phelps, and what is his true contribution to the discussion on growth, is that economic policy (in the broad, not the budgetary sense) is an institution in itself that reflects the values of the society and those very values bestow privilege on the preservation of what is. In a word, people do not want to take risks and that translates into social mechanisms that cause change and innovation to be impossible.

Those values procreate subsidy and protection mechanisms for enterprises and persons that have the effect of hindering the rise of new companies and development projects. In this manner, the laws, the regulations, the taxes, and the pension plans end up protecting what exists, making it unattractive for there to arise entrepreneurial spirits like those that forged wealth in former generations.

Phelps analyzes matters such as the following: bank credit was easier to procure decades ago than it is now, the creativity that is inherent in humans and that translates into the ability to identify new markets, solve problems and explore, does not prosper in an ambience of rigid rules, regulatory requirements and insurmountable fiscal issues; the enterprises that already exist and that have deciphered those pitfalls (typically a long time ago) entertain an incomparable advantage with respect to the individual attempting to create a novel venture. This adds up to people ceasing to be creative and to their adapting to the jobs or opportunities already in place instead of undertaking new ones.

If one were to go back in time to the histories of the growth of the world economies in the XIX century and the beginning of the XX, an era in which there were a lot fewer rules and regulations for everything, it is clear that innovators would run immense risks. An uncluttered comparison between the transportation systems of then and now sheds light on the different conceptions of what is safe:  carts pulled by horses vis-à-vis automobiles equipped with every kind of protection. Phelps’ proposal does not involve returning to that time, but rather to focus attention on the costs implied in that entire world of protections and subsidies that has been constructed and that is, from his perspective, the explanation for the sinking growth rate.

If one extrapolates Phelps’ analysis to Mexico, it would seem obvious that the strange collection of tariffs and subsidies that persist in a broad swath of the industrial sector is a factor that hinders innovation and, thus, growth. However, it is possible that the main explanation for the country’s poor economic performance dwells elsewhere: nobody wants to assume risks because of the low probability of success, a circumstance that become more acute when there is so much uncertainty: part of which is caused by factors of the moment, like the recent American election, but above all by the physical and patrimonial insecurity that characterizes the environment. The pathetic performance of our economy is not the product of chance.

*Mass Flourishing

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@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

Western democracies are in crisis. One country after the other undergoes radical changes in the conformation of their electoral structures: voters appear to be fed up with the traditional solutions and begin to opt for alternatives that previously seemed inconceivable. In France, the Extreme Right advances without cease; in Spain the old Spanish Socialist Workers Party–Popular Party (PSOE–PP) duopoly  collapsed and it took more than a year to get a government in place; in England the Radical Left took control of the Labor Party. The U.S. broke all the historical cannons. Beyond the specifics, it is reasonable to ask whether in Mexico we will continue in the “nothing’s going on here” mode or, sooner or later, alternatives impossible or unthinkable until now will see the light.

The heart of the disenchantment exhibited by the electorate in the most diverse countries is the same: there is exhaustion, despair and a consequent rejection of traditional politics that promises but doesn’t deliver the goods. Citizens are tired of politicians who steal, provide increasingly less credible explanations, do not solve problems, pass the time dealing merely with ghosts and symptoms, without ever creating the conditions for the economy to satisfy the needs of the population or for democracy to serve as an effective mechanism of representation.

It is entirely possible, even likely, that the solutions adopted by the electorate in any of these countries ends up solving nothing, but the message is clear: patience with poor government has limits.

Over the past few decades, Mexico has undergone increasingly more vice-ridden, petty and dysfunctional electoral reforms that do not even appease the very parties that promote them. And that doesn’t even address the citizenry standing dauntlessly before the spectacle of the political parties’ businesses and their endless waste. It is possible that the El Bronco phenomenon in Nuevo León heralds a new political era, but there is no doubt that what made it popular, above all in the absence of a credible government program was its vow to put the former governor in jail. The spurning of “politics as usual” is patent.

Although each country is very distinct, two ambits dominate the citizenry’s ire: the economy and the corruption. The Mexican economy has for decades been split in two: one functions and grows like a meteor, the other contracts and becomes impoverished. Instead of tackling the causes of these differences, the political debate revolves around the past (that is, abandoning what little there is that does work) or following the same course of action (that is, don’t change anything, even for the better), although this does not fix the problem. With regard to the corruption, scandals accumulate but the responses to these are always rhetorical: new laws are drawn up because in Mexico there is no problem that does not merit a new law that, of course, will never amount to anything relevant or solve the problem.

The peso experiences its greatest devaluation in decades and this is always the fault of others. The problem seems evident but the justification is always the same: the bad international situation. In the past thirty years there have been periods of extraordinary economic growth in the world and others of recession, but in the Mexican economy, with the exclusion of a pair of really bad years, things have continued exactly the same: a pathetic average annual growth rate of around 2%. What is emblematic is that no one is responsible for this: when things go poorly in the outside, the problem is the U.S. or the Chinese economy, the international recession or the oil prices. When things go well elsewhere, the fault is of the previous administrations or of the opposition political parties. There is no lack of excuses but responses and actions likely to confront the problem are non-existent.

The marvelous part is that, when faced with adversity, the Mexican always responds with a joke and in that things have indeed changed: it is affirmed that the difference between dictatorship and democracy lies in that in the former the politicians laugh at the citizens while in the latter it’s the other way around. Measured under this yardstick, the Mexican democracy is a consolidated one:  there is no affair or corrupt practice, however insignificant, which does not occasion a regenerative witticism. Were Mexicans only to devote that creativity to technological innovation, the development of new products or the improvement of productivity, the country would be Switzerland.

Creativity is not absent among politicians either. For decades, the famous quip, now mythical, about when the new president gets stuck, he finds his predecessor had left to him three envelopes. The first says “blame me”; the second, “change your cabinet”; the third reads: “write three envelopes”. The point is clear: do anything but solve the problems.

As illustrated by the electorates of countries like those mentioned at the beginning, the problem is universal in character: the world has changed but governmental and political systems no longer solve the problems.  At the same time, many of the problems are not so difficult to solve because their causes are obvious. Reagan sketched out the problem clairvoyantly: “For many years you and I have been shushed like children and told there are no simple answers to the complex problems which are beyond our comprehension. Well, the truth is that there are simple answers. They just are not easy ones”.

In effect, there are no easy solutions, but the answers are obvious. The question is whether the traditional political system will make them theirs or whether others, outside of the system, will come to try.

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@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

The general tone is one of catastrophe: the world changed and no one is going to be able to save it. The Trump victory may not have been desirable, but it certainly was probable. The manner in which the government and many opinionators have reacted suggest that “the end is near”, but that need not be so. The atmosphere reminds me of one of the passages from War and Peace: “The strongest of all warriors”, Field Marshal Kutuzov explains, are these two:  Time and Patience.” With Napoleon’s army advancing, Kutuzov wisely wanted to wait for reinforcements before engaging in battle. When Russian generals demanded that Kutuzov attack Napoleon at his strongest, the field marshal replied, “When in doubt, do nothing.”

The election of Trump as the president of the world’s superpower and our main trade partner does not furnish us with many options but it obliges us to contemplate, with a cool head, the implications and opportunities that this entails. At this time it is impossible to know what Trump will actually do, but we already know that he will submit NAFTA to an evaluation at the Interstate Trade Commission -an agency with serious analytical capabilities- with an economic, labor and geopolitical mandate, in other words, seriously. Obviously, no one knows what will happen once the government is duly integrated, but nothing is accomplished by speculating. What is certain is that Trump brings with him an enormous sea change, but, once he is functioning in office, the reality of the power and of the institutional structures will sink in and make him recognize that there are limits to his agenda. What is crucial is to work to attempt to remove our issues from the line of fire, something not easy, but not impossible either.

If one reads his “Contract with America,” a pamphlet that was prepared for his campaign, there are no limits to the risks that we are confronting; however, if one analyzes the realities of power and of geopolitics, the options that the new president will face are very distinct from the agenda that he proposed when he faced no restrictions. One thing is the rhetoric and another is the reality, which does not mean moderation.

Everything indicates that our greatest risk (that Trump might sign a letter annulling NAFTA upon arriving at the White House, a possibility foreseen in Article 2205 of the agreement) has diminished. The assessment by the ITC will be the centerpiece of the process. While that’s settled, the government should maintain -actually, accomplish- unity and discipline of message and clarity of objectives. It also must understand better the panorama of the new team as it takes shape in order to identify opportunities but also to develop strategies that show Mexico’s strengths and chips -which are not few- in this relationship. Managing the political process will be crucial. Of course, we could and should aspire to a much more profound understanding of the immense complexity, diversity and two way benefits inherent to the bilateral relationship –the benefits that both of us derive from this in matters of security, stability and economic development-, but first things first and that is that NAFTA is the only engine of the Mexican economy.

The government can congratulate itself about its foresight (the invitation to today’s President-Elect), but the reality is that this does not change by any means  the disaster and the vulnerability under which the country was placed with an economic and fiscal policy of the seventies that is unsustainable in the globalization era and, maybe, even with the invitation itself.

The second stage will begin, at least formally, as soon as the new government begins to function. That is where will be able to see tensions on various fronts; first, between the two governments due to incompatibility of views, perspectives and objectives. The government might have saved itself from the “punishment” that Clinton probably had planned in the form of a merciless attack in matters of human rights and corruption, but there will indeed come a clash of visions for which Mexico certainly is not prepared. The point is not who is right, but who possesses the capacity to impose an agenda. The key during these months will be to “educate” the new government concerning the importance of the relationship, a principle that includes making them realize, in practice, that they too benefit from the relationship, that it is equitable and that they need Mexico’s cooperation.

However, Mexico’s image in the U.S. will not change until reality changes. Trump took advantage of Mexico because that something easy for his potential voters to understand: that our way of acting -corruption, impunity, bad government, bureaucracy and systematic abuse- are what is visible about Mexico. It does not matter whether that photo is fair or not, what is important is that it is real. Until we do not change our reality, that will be the image that remains in the mind of our neighbors: Trump did not invent the image; he just took advantage of it.

The government has two options: one is to bring itself up to accept the new reality and act consequently; the other would be to let someone else do it because the nation cannot wait.

Cantinflas understood this moment better than anyone: “The most interesting thing in life is its being simultaneous and successive, at the same time.” The question is whether this government has that capacity.

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@lrubiof

 Luis Rubio

“History teaches by analogy, not by identity”, noted Kissinger in an interview. His proposal was that there are no two identical historical situations, but that some indeed present important similarities that transcend the time and space in which they have occurred.

It is evident that Trump and Andrés Manuel López Obrador are very distinct in origin, personal profile and political orientation, but their similarities are equally astounding and, now that the U.S. elections have taken place, it is this on which Mexicans will inevitably focus in looking toward the future.

Donald Trump was born in a working class suburb in New York and never left it. His economic plight was transformed but his political conception was forged in the place of his birth; although he was always a businessman, his televised star quality allowed him to express –for decades now- the political postures that he now raised as a candidate: he was always ostentatious and vain, and exceedingly thin-skinned. Everything indicates that he entered this electoral contest in reaction to what he perceived as an attack, an offense by Obama during one the most famous roasting sessions of mutual insults and self-flagellation that U.S. presidents engage in annually with the press.

On his part, López Obrador emerged from a modest background and always focused on social and political mobilization; he has for decades confronted the established powers-that-be, recurring to the media to achieve his task, first in his native state of Tabasco and later as Head of the Government of the Federal District. His activism was always pragmatic: from the construction of the second-level roads in the city to his relationship with businessmen and the Church. When he registered his protest against what he termed a fraudulent election for the governorship of Tabasco, he took over the oil wells of the region, never permitting his followers to touch the valves or other sensitive equipment; it was one thing to protest, another, very distinct one, to engage in unnecessary risks. In that vein, there is nothing more in contrast with Trump than his personality: modest and measured, always flaunting his humility. But likewise there are coincidences and resemblances that cannot be overlooked.

It was not difficult for Mexicans to understand the inherent risks in the Trump discourse. It is not only what he said about Mexico and Mexicans throughout his campaign, but also the context, vision and discursive style. It was his very nature that we Mexicans beheld with consternation and scorn: the rejection of all that exists, his ignorance of the most elementary things, the implicit threat that he must be elected or the arrival of the deluge would transpire and, above all, his willingness to annul what does work, independently of whether there are so many other things that would merit changes. When in the last of the three debates Trump refused to commit to respecting the electoral result, we Mexicans were reminded of the 2006 post-electoral moment when Lopez Obrador took control of the city’s major thoroughfare for months. It would appear to be a caricature, but it is not.

The two personages share a series of very clear values and preferences: their anti-systemic discourse, the absence of specifics in their public stance (they scan solve it alone, as if by magic) and the arrogance inbred in their personality: there is no reason for them to render accounts to anyone. Various journalists have scratched the surface of the discourses of both, finding a Pleiad of practically identical sentences, making up the obvious: it is not that they derive from the same roots, but that they are the same in political proposal and that is the core matter. I doubt that they have ever met, but philosophically they are indistinguishable.

This is about a deeply conservative political vision that does not emerge from the search for social transformation but rather from the protection of losers and the preservation of the old social order; hence their ever-nostalgic manner of thinking: everything worked fine before… In this, both profess an acute nationalism as well as contempt for institutions, the market, international agreements and any rule or law not serving their purposes. In the face of the incompatibility of their discourse with the mundane reality, their response ends up being messianic not only because it entertains no concrete proposals but also because the solution is they themselves. A Messianic perspective allows “ignoring the reality” as often as necessary, building a fantasy sustained on lies that, in their mind, are not.

Now we must wait and see how Trump will react to so brutal a defeat and, above all, how the American institutions will resist the pummeling that he represents. What is certain is that his victory is the result of something we Mexicans understand full well: a series of governments devoted to not governing, to promising but not delivering and, above all, to ignoring the needs, preferences and complaints of the population. Obama’s government has been disastrous and the American people are now paying back.

Mexico’s government refuses to understand a similar reality: that people are fed up with the lack of government response to their needs, with the violence, the constant loss of value of the peso and the lackluster economic performance that affects most people, all of which entails consequences.

I have no doubt but that the worst-case scenario for Mexico would be that of Trump in Washington and AMLO in Mexico: two nationalists seeking to distance their countries from each other, a lethal combination for the Mexican economy.  With its paralysis or, rather, with its disdain and misguided actions, the Peña administration is making the Messianic vision ever more likely.

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@lrubiof

 Luis Rubio

Whatever happens in the U.S. election next Tuesday, it is imperative for us to redefine our way of seeing our neighbor to the North in order for us to never again confront the risks that were evidenced during this long electoral season. The first part of the nightmare ends now, but the true challenge has only just begun.

Trump has been the protagonist of an ill-tempered anti-Mexican narrative, but despite its being insulting and offensive, it entertains a broad base of credibility: it is not an accident of history but a product of the latter; the campaign merely evidenced the symptom of deep rooted issues. That comprises the hazardous venture: one sector of the U.S. citizenry –that which Trump has managed to attract- is direct and blames Mexicans for all types of wrongdoings; but the other, while not finding Mexico and Mexicans blameworthy, coincides in the fact that Mexico is not a democracy. In other words, the story is the same; what changes is the interpretation. In both cases, the Mexican is good, the government bad. Our challenge is to win their respect notwithstanding our differences.

The challenge does not lie in fighting the literal statements of the Republican candidate, but rather in creating a base of legitimacy for Mexico and Mexicans, including of course Mexicans residing, legally or illegally, there. Modifying prejudices and attitudes is not something easy because, as Trump demonstrated, those biases are deeply rooted. Additionally, the prejudices are unilateral: the average American does not view the Mexican as his peer nor does he understand that his or her own well-being is inextricably bound to Mexico and that the more successful Mexico is, the more secure Americans will be and the greater the economic and commercial interaction, accompanied by jobs, low prices and better quality. The success of any strategy that Mexico decides to undertake in the U.S. in the future will be measured in these parameters.

The dominant narrative there, weightier in some ambits, less in others, but ubiquitous in all, is very simple and very clear: Mexico exports drugs, expels Mexicans, consumes subsidies and steals jobs from Americans and does not know how to govern itself. This summary trivializes the argument but it is accurate and constitutes the essence of the rhetoric that Trump articulated and with which he capitalized on the support of a none-too-contemptible share of the U.S. electorate; more than exaggerated, this narrative is meager, all flesh and bones.

It is obvious that each of the components of the narrative can be supplanted in an instant with analytical and rational arguments, but the discussion there has not been rational but instead gut-level and emotional. Even in the most benign quarters, the so-called “sanctuary cities”, where illegal migrants are not prosecuted, the point of departure is that this is about persons with no alternative, who flee the problems of Mexico. In that discussion there is no job market, no recognition of what is most apparent: that migrants go where there are jobs and not because one day they get up in the mood for putting their lives on the line by crossing the river. That perhaps occurs with the Syrian refugees who have no better option for saving their skins, but that is far from constituting a photograph of the North American region.

Nor is there comprehension in the U.S., even the knowledge, of how intimately intertwined the two economies are and how that implies better prices and quality for the U.S. citizen or that the neighborhood of the three nations has achieved the optimal concentration of relative forces to benefit the consumer and that Mexico is the third largest destination for their exports. The same takes place with the matter of security in that Mexico is a key piece, as part of the so-called security perimeter, to secure its southern flank. In sum, Mexico and the U.S. are irredeemably integrated through their peoples and merchandise as well as agreements and projects that are essential for stability and regional security.

After the election, whoever the victor, our commitment should be very transparent and absolute: ensure that never again will Mexico and Mexicans be treated as they have been in this season. To achieve this, it will be necessary to build an intelligent strategy that, far from confrontational as if we were very macho, makes inroads into the U.S. collective subconscious and situates Mexico among the friendly, partnering and legitimate nations.
The challenge is enormous because it implies modifying the premises of that entire narrative that are, at the end of the day, prejudices accumulated over a long time. If one examines the surveys, those prejudices are neither universal nor absolute: there are many differentiating factors. For example, the surveys reveal an exceedingly benevolent attitude toward things Mexican: the culture, the food, the Mexican mind set and friendliness, the pyramids and artisan handwork. Likewise, there is merciless repudiation of everything associated with the government: security, migration, the governing process, corruption.

The problem with the U.S. narrative on Mexico is that, although false in much of what refers to Mexico, it is bolstered by a set of real factors –such as corruption, the lack of competent governance and the insecurity- which will have to be addressed in order to change reality itself, not just perceptions. That is, if we want our image to change, however distorted it may be today, we have to change the reality. As in so many other fronts, the real challenge is domestic.
Culture is Mexico’s major asset and should be taken advantage of as a vehicle to present and project the country positively there. It is not difficult to imagine the essence of a strategy: visitations of the cultural and artistic assets such as chefs, musicians, writers, businesspeople as well as exhibitions, films, Mexican actors in popular televised programs; a social, cultural and academic deployment of our consulates in the U.S. society, etc.

The point is to grasp the nature of the problem in neutral fashion to begin to chip away at it. It will take time, but Mexico must never again be the whipping boy of a candidate for the presidency of that country. We have to start by cleaning house.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

The election that will be over in nine days has not been the most polarized in history; whoever recalls the Vietnam era knows that there are cycles in this respect, but also an enormous capacity of regeneration. That is one of America’s strengths and characteristics and there is no reason to suppose that something similar would be impossible in the medium-term future. The question is what kind of relationship will ensue between the two nations.

Mexico ended up being an involuntary actor and (nearly) absent in the U.S. elections; many factors came into play to create the current electoral scenario: from technological change to migrants, by way of lousy U.S. support programs to adjust for commercial and technological change and, not at all trifling, the political scorning of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the U.S. Each and every one of the approaches and outcries that arose in that electoral race –from Sanders to Trump- are analytically disputable, but the political fact is that Mexico was, at the end of the day, an easy target of the criticism.

There are two post-electoral scenarios for Mexico and both are complex. In first place is found the possibility that Mr. Trump will win: this is the least desirable scenario from the Mexican perspective for the simple reason that it entails prodigious uncertainty, the latter aggravated by the explosive and impulsive temperament of the personage-in-question. The principal risk of a possible win by Trump lies in the actions in which he individually, in his character as chief executive, could engage, particularly with regard to NAFTA. If Trump wins and he does not act impulsively in this matter, we would enter into a period of uncertainty that would probably involve extensive negotiations and lobbying within the U.S. and, on a second plane, in bilateral matters, regarding which steps to take.

The second scenario, the Clinton triumph, although more benign, would not be free of risks and complications. Clinton has not headed a proactive campaign, which would deny her what the Americans denominate a “mandate”. In contrast with Trump, her campaign has instead been obscure and defensive, thus (with the possible exception of foreign policy) it would not be distinct from that of Obama and, in that regard, it would become a third presidential term, similar to what occurred with Bush Senior in 1988. Clinton has had long experience with Mexico and understands the complexity of the relationship; therefore we would not have to anticipate much ado except for her obvious wish to penalize the Peña government for the invitation to Trump.

The greatest risk of a Clinton government would reside not in Clinton herself but in the Congress. Were the Democrats to win control of the Senate and, on an extreme scenario, of the Congress, Clinton would fall into the hands of activist legislators determined to step up financial, labor and trade regulations, much of that with potentially grim consequences for NAFTA. Viewed from the most benevolent side, under this scenario it would be conceivable for a migratory reform initiative to prosper.

It seems to me that there are three lessons to be derived from this election. The first is without doubt that the Mexican government should acquire better understanding of our neighbors in order to avoid episodes of maladroitness such as the events that transpired with the Trump invitation to Mexico: there are well-established procedures for contacting candidates, thus eschewing the need to reinvent sliced bread.

The second is that the Mexican government cannot and should not intervene in the internal affairs of another nation, but it definitely should advance its interests. In the case of the U.S., this fine line is somewhat difficult to draw, if not artificial, due to the fact that the two societies and their economies are so profoundly intertwined. Although the Mexican government should articulate a strategy that would redress the poor reputation of Mexico exhibited in this electoral contest, it is clear that it is the Mexican society, and not the government, that should respond to the insults heaped upon us by Trump. It is sufficient to remember that the declarations of Fox as well the invitation issued to Trump inflated his electoral stakes. Better for artists, literati, entrepreneurs and chefs to stalwartly defend and advance a fairer picture of Mexico than our beleaguered -and ignorant-politicians.

The geopolitical reality obliges Mexico to get along and build with the Americans and we are the ones who, in the absence of visionary leadership on their part, will be required to take the initiative. Thus, whatever the electoral scenario of next November 8^th, Mexico will have no alternative to that of seeking out the best way to attenuate electoral broadsides and to correct its own dearth of strategic lucidity in the relationship.

Finally, much of what was addressed in the U.S. elections and its effects (for example, on the peso) have to do with what has not been accomplished within Mexico itself. Mexico continue to be a society dependent on low salaries to be competitive, we have returned to financial policies that render economic stability vulnerable and we have not grown up to the need to agree on a political process to settle disputes in general and over the economy in particular. Hence the unending disputes that consume the country and that proved so dangerous through this campaign. As long as we do not attend to these issues, Mexico will continue to produce risk factors that feed into those originating in the outside.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

In his comedy The Knights, Aristophanes groups the population into a personage called Demos who, on being led by the nose, is coaxed with flattery and beguiled by adroit demagogues. The Athenians who applauded and celebrated the comedy did not appear to recognize that the fable referred to the audience itself. Surely something like that gave rise to the expression that nations have the governments that they deserve. Unless the citizenry of Mexico City wakes up, that very saying will have been exhibited by the political elites with what they denominate a ”constitution.”

The first problem with the attempted constitution is that no one requested it. This touches on an old demand by the elites of the Left that do not discern any value in the collective of denizens they pretend they govern. The document that the Head of the City Government presented is nothing more than a complex, dyslexic and very poorly written platform that has nothing to do with the daily reality; rather, it is a pretext to bring political bases on board, incorporate unconnected groups and consolidate interests and demands. Rights are addressed but it is not appreciated that a right comprises the obverse side of an obligation. Both must exist for there to be a social order; but no, in a political platform order is the least of it: the only thing that matters is to win and retain the power.

Defined in this way –a platform to retain the power- the constitution undertaken makes all the sense in the world and is perfectly explained as a document that does not claim to inspire; it is, strictly speaking, a reflection of ideological and political infighting among gangs, thus the text does not have to be inclusive. It is, in a word, an authoritarian and bureaucratic platform from which the current City Government Head can launch his candidacy for the 2018 presidency.

“What is a constitution?” asked Ferdinand Lassalle after the 1848 revolution, perhaps the most astute and practical observer in this matter: “The constitutional questions are not in the first instance questions of right but questions of might.” The content as well as the form in which the constitutional process has been administered for Mexico City (CDMX) evidence the clairvoyance of Lassalle: everything is about power and nothing is about rights, the latter nonetheless cited ad nauseam. What are important are compacts among the owners of local power and the safeguarding of their interests.

A constitutional process of consequence would have begun with two elementary queries: the first, a vigorous debate on the principles that would hold the constitution aloft -with the widest and most diverse citizen participation- about the future of Mexico City. The second is an intelligible argumentation and one directed toward the citizenry of the rules that would give shape to a “new” city. A process of this nature would have situated the CDMX, and its government, at the vanguard of the country. What has been done is to convert the government and its constituency into the laughingstock of the entire nation.

It is evident that among the document’s drafters the citizenry is conceived of as a nuisance on which rights should be imposed more readily than incorporating it into the discussion. That is what happened in Europe in the nineties and what those politicians are reaping at present is Brexit and a series of votes that are starting to scale back the European Constitution.

A bad constitution is much worse than no constitution at all. What the CDMX government has presented is an unintelligible mess that reveals more about the mobs in the bowels of power than of the future that, one would suppose, is aspired to for the city and the country. Worse yet, a constitution like that which has been proffered entails a poor system of government and, inevitably, would lead to a still worse performance of the city within the context of the nation. It is obvious that none of the esteemed writers has asked himself or herself why the CDMX has lagged behind in economic matters while states such as Querétaro, Aguascalientes, Yucatán and Nuevo León -let alone Singapore- grow at rates of nearly 7%, some of these for decades. Might it not be that the rights consecrated at such insistence (but that for some time have existed in practice) are obstacles to investment, job creation and city development?

Living in a fantasy world undeniably has its benefits and that is what the published text brings to light. However, this is not the recipe for political success, and all the more so when its main characteristic is aversion to democratic accountability. Surely the populace is far from being endowed with the drafters’ sophistication, but it is this very citizenry that maintains them and makes it possible for them to busy themselves with authoritarian exercises such as these.

The objective of a constitution should be to ensure a good government, not allotting monies and public posts among politicians. An earnest, honest constitution would establish the rights and obligations of the citizens and the limits of the authority, while simultaneously defining the rules of the game for interaction between the two. There is none of that in the published text.

The text is irretrievable: the process must be set into motion anew with a little more humility and a lot more vision.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

What is novel in the U.S. electoral contest does not lie in the polarization of that society which is reflected not in the personages themselves, although there is much to be said about them, but rather in the fact that both monopolize a generalized rejection on the part of the society. In the post-war era, there were many polarized disputes -we recall as a paradigmatic example the Vietnam era- and the U.S. society exhibited an extraordinary capacity of regeneration. That is one of their strengths and characteristics and there is no reason to suppose that something similar is impossible in the not-too-distant future. What is exceptional on this occasion, particularly for us in Mexico, is the fact that Mexico is one of the central focal points of the dispute.

Regarding this commentary, I would like to concentrate on three aspects: first, on the fact that we are involuntary protagonists in the dispute; second, on the potential scenarios and their impacts on Mexico; and, third, on the possible responses on our part. First off, please allow me to set forth my conclusion: the relationship between the two nations today is so complex, profound and diverse that it could only become more accentuated, but the political factors that encompass it can turn into exceedingly disruptive elements if not managed intelligently by both parties. The geopolitical reality obligates us to deal with and build with the U.S. and we are the ones who, in the absence of visionary leadership on their part, will need to take the initiative. Therefore, whatever the scenario of next November 8, Mexico has no alternative other than to seek the best way of attenuating the electoral broadsides and to correct its own clarity in the relationship.

First, Mexico ended up being an unwilling as much as an absent actor in the elections; this happened due to endogenous as well as exogenous factors. On the one hand, the years of rapprochement between the two societies practically coincided with the moment of the greatest technological disruption that the modern world has experienced, particularly in the heavy and manufacturing industry, which has translated into structural unemployment, economic insecurity and disenchantment, in addition to drug addiction and uncertainty; additionally, the growth of Mexican migration has exerted an outstanding social impact on the most recondite quarters of U.S. society: it is not sufficient to argue that this concerns the virtual integration of the labor market; that fact has come to light hand in hand with a growing and, in many localities, overwhelming presence of foreign persons and, in an alien language, demanding minimal satisfiers that, within a context of job insecurity, implied the automatic identification of a scapegoat. On the U.S. side, their support programs for those affected by international trade have been a failure and that explains, in part at least, Trump’s social base. Finally, the trade deficit that Mexico possesses in this bilateral relationship had made the argument easy that Mexico wins and the U.S. loses.

Each and every one of the proposals and outcries that arose in this contest -from Sanders to Trump- are analytically disputable, but the political fact is that Mexico was in the end an easy target of the criticism. That occurred, in good measure, because, in contrast with China or with technological change, Mexico is right there, and from the time of the dispute regarding the approval of NAFTA it turned into an internal political factor. This is something that is not similar in the case of China. Our deficit in this matter is evident. At the same time, not any type of action would have been favorable.

Second, there are the electoral scenarios and their potential impact on Mexico. Beyond what the surveys indicate at the moment, there are two scenarios and both are complex. In the first place, there is the possibility that Mr. Trump will win: this is the least desirable scenario from the Mexican perspective for the simple reason that it entails enormous uncertainty, which would be aggravated by the explosive and impulsive personality of the Republican candidate. The main risk in a possible Trump triumph lies in the actions that individually, in his capacity of Chief Executive, he could take. NAFTA, the principal engine of growth of the Mexican economy and one of the constant objects of the Trump rhetoric, is plainly our main asset, but also our greatest vulnerability. In legal terms, there is a dispute over whether NAFTA, as an agreement and not as a treaty, can be cancelled by the Executive branch without a vote of the Legislative power. There are more than 200 agreements of the most diverse order and never has one been cancelled, thus the risk that Trump would act impulsively, initiating a legal process that, however potentially disputable, would signal immediate damage to the Mexican economy in exchange rate issues as well as in investment flows. While the legal situation was elucidated, the economic and financial impact on Mexico would be striking.

If Trump wins and does not act impulsively in NAFTA matters, we would enter into an uncertain time that probably would entail extensive negotiations within the U.S. and, on a second plane, with respect to bilateral matters, concerning the steps to be taken. Much would depend on the makeup of the Congress and the Senate, but we may anticipate that all of the key actors of the bilateral relationship would be on the playing field and that this would in return, perhaps in somewhat comedic form, to the scene of the dispute for the 1993 ratification of NAFTA. The unions and companies with investments in Mexico would be at the ready to exert an influence on the manner of acting in this matter and the arrangements they would reach would have a real impact, in contrast with the media impact, on Mexican economic activity. The great pains taken with these processes would become our chief challenge.

The second scenario, a Clinton win, although more benign, would not be absent from risks and complications. Clinton has not headed a proactive campaign, which would deny her what Americans call a “mandate”. In contrast with Trump, her campaign has been more obscure and defensive, thus she would not embrace a project distinct from that of Obama and, in that respect, hers would become a third Obama presidential term. The most evident parallel in this scenario would be that of George H.W. Bush, who found himself with an exhausted governing party, one without motivation and with few initiatives. The principal risk of that presidency would be the potential search for scapegoats; however, Clinton has had long experience with Mexico and it is highly improbable for that to be her drive, which would not exclude a review of NAFTA and other similar actions. That said, the strange and unprecedented way that the Mexican Government attempted to be in closer proximity to Trump could entail, as took place in 1993, a lengthy period of formal distancing.

The major risk of a Clinton government would lie not in the person herself but instead in the Legislative power. Should the Democrats win the Senate and recover the Congress, the Democratic Party would probably be overtaken by legislative activists who, taking advantage of the roiling river of a project-less administration, would seek to incorporate aggressive regulations in financial, labor and trade matters. On the more benevolent side, in this scenario it would be conceivable that a migratory reform initiative would prosper. Whichever way, given the surveys at this moment, this should comprise the most disturbing factor for Mexico.

Beyond the election itself, it is important to understand that U.S. politics is much more violent, much more hardball, that Mexican politics but, simultaneously, it enjoys a singular capacity of regeneration. This is a society with scarce historical memory, but with more ample flexibility than this year suggests. At the same time, its institutions are strong and obey logic of continuity that is much more true that it would seem. With regard to the positive, this implies that the capacity for adopting radical decisions (as could be represented by the cancellation or the renegotiation of NAFTA) is much more demarcated than what is apparent due to the counterweights that the Legislative power embodies and to the capacity of action of all types of the U.S. society’s groups and interests. In the same fashion, the U.S. is a highly institutionalized country, suggesting that the damage could be great but not infinite. As to the negative, there are policies, such as the systematic deportation of illegal immigrants, which will continue independently of who leads the next administration. Inertia in this matter, such as in budgetary matters, is obvious.

Of prime importance for the future will be the size of the Trump defeat, in case this is the result. A marginal defeat would surely intimate that the Trump legacy in ideological and political terms would be returned to by other candidates in the future and would permeate the proposals of the Republican Party. A more comfortable victory by Clinton would diminish this effect.

With respect to Mexico, it is easy to speculate on the potential impact of the U.S. elections on those of Mexico in 2018, but the usefulness of these speculations is not evident. To date, the sole well-defined candidate, Andrés Manuel López-Obrador, has not been benefited by Trump’s strength. In the case of a Republican win, the policies that a Trump government would decide to espouse would certainly impact Mexican decision making and political rhetoric, but it is not very probable that the latter would be modified by much. That said, it appears evident to me that the worst possible scenario for Mexico, for the bilateral relationship and for the region would be the combination of Trump and López-Obrador in the presidency of each of these nations. Two nationalists seeking to distance their countries from each other would certainly be lethal for the Mexican economy.

Finally, the core matter is what can and the Mexican response should be in the face of the U.S. elections. In the immediate term, the governmental response can be only one and that comprises attempting to reconstruct the relationship with the winning team. While the bureaucracy that oversees the relationship maintains course within its own normal inertia, the key will be to building a new political relationship that would permit the skirting of danger, avoiding damage to the relationship. The first impulse should be perfectly planned to begin a working relationship in which the criteria ought to be very simple: a) keep the ship afloat; b) avoid an executive decision from being made in NAFTA matters;  c) align the forces favorable to Mexico in the business as well as social and academic ambit; d) maintain the posture of NAFTA not being negotiable, but allowing it to be understood that, in the extreme case, any negotiation can be external, complementary agreements to NAFTA itself; and e) without adopting an inflexible position, make it very clear that Mexico also has interests and objectives and that it will not cease to protect and advance them. The central point is that the U.S. will not be the ones conducting the political or bureaucratic processes that affect Mexico: it is Mexico that must have the clarity of vision and provide ideas for the process so that these will become the decision of the U.S. This is how that country functions and we have to act under the logic that they have a multiplicity of interests and focal points, while they are a clear and vital one for us.

The Mexican government cannot and should not intervene in the internal affairs of another nation, but it should advance its interests. In the case of the U.S., this separation is somewhat difficult, if not artificial, due to that the two societies and their economies are so profoundly intertwined. In the last year a wide-reaching political debate has ensued in Mexico about what Mexico’s response should be in the face of Trump’s improprieties; while the government was lukewarm in its initial responses and subsequently incorporated itself in full into the electoral dispute, non-governmental actors demanded decisive action on the part of the government. It is not evident what the Mexican response can and should be in circumstances like these. On the one hand, to illustrate, the interventions of former President Fox had the effect of strengthening Trump’s numbers in the nomination process within his party; on the other hand, innumerable persons insisted on the defense of the national dignity. One way of responding could have been by the society and not the government: in fact, there were diverse efforts through texts, videos and other types of participations that achieved this objective at least partially. The heart of the matter is that a government cannot interfere in the electoral process of another country without there being costs and consequences. The difference between the acting of the society and of the government is definitive and decisive.

On a second plane, it is imperative to devote efforts and resources to understanding the U.S. society better, its social and political processes and the manner in which Mexico has become an integral part of these, whether we like it or not.    This is imperative in order to avoid clumsy -and even dangerous- behavior such as those that occurred recently, but also to develop a long-term strategy that avoids falling into a situation of extreme vulnerability like that evidenced during these months.

In this matter, it is necessary to understand that the campaigns of Trump and Sanders were not irrational, that they were not about new or recent phenomena, but that they were, yes, predictable; thus, we should have acted with vision some time back. Among the lessons to be learned from this contest, there are the following: first, there is great appreciation by the U.S. society for the culture, the language, the history, the traditions, the art, the cuisine and the attitude of the Mexicans; second, there is enormous contempt for the corruption, the bureaucracy, the insecurity and, in general, for Mexican politicians. This infers that the basis of any long-term strategy can be founded on the development and deepening of the links between the two societies, this by the Mexican society: that is, backing of the long-term relationship in terms of artists, chefs, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, students, etc., and not on what the U.S. society reproaches that, in general, is related with the government and the politicians.

I conclude here with two considerations. Before anything else, the geographic and geopolitical reality obliges us to act on and protect our interests and that, in this matter, denotes conquering the American society. Seen from the surface, it is difficult to understand the depth of the links that exist today between the two nations, the mutual dependence in an immense diversity of issues that cover everything, from the economy to security, the supply lines of basic goods and the personal and familial ties. The industrial integration is remarkable and key for the employment and salaries of Mexicans. And it would be impossible not to emphasize how crucial it is for us to realize as a country that we must, never again, become the scapegoat of the political discussion in that country.

Secondly, much of what was discussed in the U.S. elections and its effects on the process (for example, in currency exchange matters) concerns with what has not been done within Mexico. We continue being a society dependent on low salaries to be competitive, we have returned to financial policies that render economic stability vulnerable and we have not solved fundamental political processes to the degree that they impede our always being in dispute about the essence of the functioning of the country’s economy. As long as we do not attend to these factors, we will continue engendering risk factors that feed into those originating in the outside.

www.cidac.org
@lrubiof