Luis Rubio

Any solution must always address a specific problem. However, one of the peculiarities of Mexico’s political life rests on the propensity to turn into mantra half cooked ideas that do not necessarily respond to the problem that needs addressing. Such is the case in the presidential elections’ second round or runoff.

The runoff in France was the product of two rounds of reform after the Second World War -the Fourth and Fifth Republics-, which resulted in a process of trial and error regarding the specific conditions of that country. Copying the mechanism does not guarantee that the problems that Mexico faces will be solved.

The political reform of 1977 had a precise, specific and clearly defined objective: it sought to incorporate into the world of institutions a segment of political life that, for decades, had existed under the cloak of clandestine life. On not engaging in formal participation in the political institutional framework, diverse forces of the Left had become radicalized: some had opted for the guerilla path and, even, terrorism. The objective of the reform was, in consequence, very clear and very simple: to bring into the fore, and to legitimacy within a formal political existence, all those forces living in the underground. The reform was a great success.

The electoral reform of 1996 was more diffuse because it attempted to solve diverse problems at one and the same time. On the one hand it endeavored to create consensual and transparent mechanisms of access to power. On the other hand, it procured the creation of conditions for a political transition, that is, for an eventual defeat of the PRI. There does not necessarily have to be a contradiction between these two purposes, but the reform only solved the first part of the equation, giving rise to the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) and establishing rules for the political parties to interact compete and entertain the same possibility of acceding to power.

What that reform did not solve, as is patent today, twenty years later,  was the structure of the government: it did not occur to any of the parties -government and political forces- that a change in the rules of access to power could be enormously disruptive to daily life, for example, in security matters.  Likewise, it was not considered that the country had maintained its (declining) stability thanks to the centralization of power in the presidency and that, when the PRI was defeated, that power concentration would disappear, engendering a crisis of governance.

What we are faced with at present is a chaotic situation in security, absence of checks and balances, above all at the state and local levels, and the inexistence of institutional mechanisms to make public officials accountable. That is, we have a governability crisis: what there is does not serve to solve the problems currently afflicting the country, ranging as they do from security to the regulation of the economy.

In addition to the latter, since 2006, Mexico has undergone a grave (and paradoxical) problem of legitimacy. Approximately one third of the electorate does not recognize the legitimacy of the electoral results, despite the exceptional solidity and professionalism of the administration of the elections and of the mechanisms of conflict resolution. The obvious question is: What would happen if the candidate favored by that crowd fails to join the second round? Unless one were certain that the legitimacy problem would end, the second round would not solve this essential problem.

In this manner, we have two problems and now a magic solution. Advocates of a runoff argue that the second electoral round will solve all the problems and that, on adopting it, we would enter into a political nirvana. However, the second round comprises a possible solution to a problem, not to all of the problems. Thus, it is indispensible to define what the problem is whose solution is quested after. The political reforms of 1977 to date have attempted to solve the problems of the political parties, but not the one about 99% of Mexicans who daily experience the consequences of the dreadful system of government.

The second round deals with the problem of perception: a triumph with 29% of the votes is not the same as one with 51%. If the problem is one of legitimacy –that is, of the acceptance of the electoral result by all Mexicans (and the certainty that this stands for all)- then the second round is the most fitting response.  On the other hand, if the problem is one of the institutionalization of power –that is, of establishing counterweights to future presidents so that they, by such means, are unable to act capriciously, and making the Congress accountable to the citizenry- then the second round may or may not form part of the solution, but it would have to include many other elements. In one word, there is no magic solution or silver bullet.

On the other hand, if the problem is one of governance, solving it should be the objective. The incipient Mexican democracy finds itself in problems because it has an electoral system that is much more advanced than the system of government.  It is urgent for Mexico to undertake a reform of the government so that the elected officials work for the citizenry, solve the problems and create conditions for development. None of that is of an electoral nature, nor would it be fixed by a runoff. It is imperative to start by defining the problem well. Will continue.

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Luis Rubio

 From “perfect dictatorship” Mexico became the “imperfect democracy.” Over the last decades, the old system collapsed but did not disappear: while today there are regularly held elections that are impeccable in their operation and management (independently of one of the candidates and his party disputing them), Mexico´s government is far from being functional, effective and at the service of the citizenry. The consequences of this new reality are tangible.

The old system gradually lost its capacity of control fundamentally as a result of its own success in pacifying the country after the Revolution and establishing the bases for growth. High growth rates throughout various decades (1940s–1960s) generated enormous differentiation in Mexican society, extraordinary urban growth and the development of professions, universities and all types of factors that, in time, emerged as incompatible with the old system of control. Little by little, Mexican society was freeing up spaces in the face of centralized power control, weakening the traditional structures that, additionally, proved excessively rigid for it to adjust and adapt.

One must not lose sight of that the system was created to appease the country and to establish an institutionalized process of decision making after the feat of the Revolution. The mechanism of attraction –the carrot- for the leaderships that were incorporated into the new organization was the promise of access to power and/or wealth through the system; the cost of being incorporated consisted of relinquishing freedom of operation outside of the system, given that belonging to the new Party -PRI’s grandfather- entailed acceptance of the system’s “unwritten” rules whose essence comprised submission to the presidential power. The system was so effective in terms of compliance with its discipline that Mexico engendered a caste of affluent and powerful politicians as a result of their appertaining to the exclusive club. The so-called “Revolutionary Family” took care of its own and compensated them generously.

The presidency of Carlos Salinas was illustrative of the incentives found: a modernizer president, the only statesman that we living Mexicans have known (in terms of constructing a long-term, visionary, development project, affecting important interests along the way), dedicated himself to transforming the foundations of the country’s economy with the objective of raising its growth rate. Innumerable reforms followed in matters of foreign trade, in addition to the privatization of enterprises that were up to that point state-owned, such as telephony, television and the banking system. Reforms in economic matters were ambitious and thoroughgoing but, at the same time, limited because of the ulterior objective that, while not explicit, was nonetheless obvious: it procured elevating the growth rate of the economy to avoid a political change, that is, loss of control of the system and the benefits that the latter bestowed on its beneficiaries. The price of that duality came to be evident in the crisis of 1995 and has yet to be eradicated.

The era of Salinas coincided with that of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union: both presided over reformist moments in their countries. Gorbachev headed a process of political liberalization (Glasnost) that he conceived as necessary to bring about the economic transformation (Perestroika) possible. The outcome was that Gorbachev lost power and the Soviet system collapsed. In that context, Salinas, a keen observer of what was occurring in those latitudes, concentrated on economic reforms, even though these were limited in view of the political conditioning. The consequence was two-fold: on the one hand, the reforms sowed the seeds of a new economy, competitive and productive, but one limited in its reach, leaving an immense number of Mexicans in the old industry, distant from modernization processes and with very low productivity levels. On the other hand, in one of the ironies of history, that of Mexico as well as that of Russia, each in its own manner and its own historic tradition, eventually rebuilt part of their old political systems.

The relevant fact was that the Mexican economy underwent a profound transformation but not a generalized one; by the same token, the old political class, much of which opposed the reforms of these decades, has pursued a gradual but systematic process of re-concentration of power, guided to a greater extent by nostalgia of the old system than by a new political model or an economic alternative. The question is, Can this change?

There are innumerable signs of extraordinary effervescence throughout Mexico. In some cases, groups of women have risen to eradicate narco traffickers from their towns; in others, entire communities have organized to search for their disappeared relatives, victims of the violence of the last years. There are many more examples of citizen mobilization than one would imagine from the outside. However, it isn’t obvious that from these cases a serious, systematic capacity to exact change could emerge, but that is probably the only opportunity Mexico will have to break away, in an institutional, non violent way, from the obstacles that today keep the population in such state of anxious unease.

* Extract from the book: A World of Opportunities http://bit.ly/2supStM

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Luis Rubio

Everyone assumes that the president will have the possibility of imposing the candidate of his preference to the presidency, as if nothing had changed in Mexico and in the world during these last decades, but especially since PRI’s defeat in 2000. The old system began to deteriorate -and produced endless crises- not because of the capacity or incapacity of individuals, but rather due to that the system conceived after the Revolution had become already incompatible with a modern, big and demanding country. Now, after the pathetic electoral result of last week -it just got through by the skin of its teeth and with an enormous conflict brewing-, the mere pretense of being able to decide on a candidate from the lofty heights of the presidency seems ludicrous. As Marx remarked, history repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, then as farce. In the face of this scenario, perhaps there is no more important question for the upcoming 12 months -and, likely, for the next decade- than the way the PRIists will act.

The history of the PRI is the history of being handpicked by the President (the dedazo), of the concentration of power –of unipersonal power-, of peace exacted from the center and from vertical control. That is the model that President Peña has attempted to create anew during these years, but its unviability has been the result of the new political, -as well as social, economic and technological – reality that characterizes Mexico and the XXI century. Today’s PRI is no longer that of before, because Mexico has changed and the control systems of latter day produce only confusion and then chaos.

The new panorama, just one year prior to the ensuing presidential elections, is not encouraging for such an unpopular government and, above all, for such a sensitive and delicate moment, both internally as well as externally. It is not only the anger of the populace, the criminality that the politicians ignore and disdain or the poor economic performance for an enormous number of Mexicans, but also the evidence of corruption and the flagrant impunity. It is not obvious that these circumstances are distinct from those of the past, but the perceptions indeed are. As David Konzevik says, “the poor are currently rich in information and millionaires in expectations.” For whatever reason, the PRI that is gearing up for next year’s presidential contest is not living its best moments.

The problem of the PRI is certainly nothing new, but the present government has made it worse. To begin with, it has alienated the PRI base: the governing coalition includes essentially politicians from the State of Mexico and excludes practically everyone else, a situation that has riled up PRIists left and right. In second place, perhaps the most impacting trademark that distinguished the PRI has disappeared: its discipline -almost Leninist in nature- in the quest for power. In the 2015 elections, for example, the government played against the PRI in a palace intrigue but with unmistakable consequences for the party. Third, so distant from the reality has it become that it lost itself in petty tactics to fragment the electorate, ending up becoming the finest promoter of its Nemesis, the Morena -i.e. Lopez Obrador’s- political party.

Wherever one looks, the government has turned into a headache for the PRI itself. It is under these conditions that the PRI Party Assembly next August draws nearer. Given the performance of the government and of the party, everything heralds an enormous rebellion among the PRIists, a rebellion against the government or, more specifically, one about how will the new presidential candidate be nominated and by means of which mechanism or criterion. That is, a mutiny against being tapped by the President’s finger.

A rebellion does not have to imply shouts or blows of necessity, but it can entail a radical transformation of the Mexican political system and therein lies its transcendence and complexity. Transcendence because the system that prevails in governing us, the one that Plutarco Elías Calles built employing as his model -Roger Hansen would say- Porfirio Diaz, remains essentially the same despite the immense transformation that the country (and the world) has experienced in the last century; that is, an anachronism. On the other hand, the complexity of a rebellion such as the one I anticipate resides in that some of the “rebels” would seek to preserve the old system and its privileges, but without the dysfunctionality that the presidential imposition of a candidate entails. In other words, they want to have their cake and eat it too. Others, however, probably a minority, would be promoting a radical reform of the system.

There are to come, consequently, complex months during which the foundations could be set in place for the reconfiguration of the old political system or for its final collapse. Anything is possible, above all because it is easy to start a rebellion, but much more difficult to control its outcome: once it starts, nobody knows how it will end. In a scenario like this, the PRIists would have in their hands the opportunity to create conditions for the construction of a new political system (and initiating the funeral rites of the old one), or to generate chaos by attempting to preserve the privileges without economic or political viability. The difference would be found in who or, rather, what wins: the edification of a novel institutional structure that the country badly needs, or the attempt to preserve, but under new rules, the world of corruption, privilege and impunity that has been the house insignia from the outset.

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Luis Rubio

Mexico has spent decades confronting the past with the future without wanting to break with the former to decidedly embrace the latter. The situation is overwhelming and particularly visible in the interminable collection of governmental actions oriented toward pretending to change without there being any change.

In the two ambits in which politico-governmental activism has been greatest in the last decades -the electoral and the economic-trade- the country has been characterized by enormous reforms with relatively poor results. I doubt whether there are many countries in the world that have undergone so many electoral reforms in so few years and, despite an extraordinarily exemplary and professional system, emulated around the world, we continue to live through an uncontainable electoral dispute and, above all, one of credibility, whenever there are elections. In the economy, the country has striven to orchestrate trade agreements all over the world and has carried out ambitious reforms that never end being thoroughly implemented.

It would not be exaggerated to affirm that, thanks to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the job opportunities that U.S. economy contributed for decades, the Mexican political class has not had to change its customs or diminish its privileges. While the average economic performance has been, to say the least, mediocre, it has been sufficient to keep the ship afloat. In the political arena, the many electoral reforms have not changed the nature of party interaction, although they have made it much more complex: rivers of money continue to flow, outgoing governments and the Federal Government persist in manipulating the results and the elected positions continue to be sources for the acquisition of wealth, not for good government. All these reforms have failed to produce an effective system of government, as illustrated by the security crisis.

Another way of saying this is that the country goes on living in the past while paying homage to the future. Deidre McCloskey expressed this idea in a most revealing way: “The Left and the Right join in opposing the future: the one because it is not a planned future, and the other because it is not identical to the past.” The future that everyone promises ends up being a mirage because no one has the least intention of building it.

Today, Election Day, it is necessary to reflect on the candidates’ promises vis-à-vis the lags, lacks, problems and gaps that persist and that are the product of a past that created them but that is incapable of solving them. How can these two realities, these two sides of the same coin, be reconciled?

Historically, Mexico has been the spoils of war –to steal or to construct another, future, post, but the spoils nonetheless- for the parties and the politicians, begging the question of whether the ongoing and unstoppable exercise of postponing solutions is sustainable. That is, although the economy has grown at a rhythm of more or less 2% in recent decades, that number, like any average, conceals more than it reveals. Some states and regions grow at almost Asian rates while others contract. The potential for social conflict in the latter is infinite and, in many senses, constant. Despite this, governments come and governments go but the lags –and their consequences- linger on.

The worlds of the past and of the future do not communicate, but one depends on the other and it is there that governmental activity clashes. The problems of the past -insecurity, poor education, lousy infrastructure, absence of authority- impede the future from being built, a future that would require conditions for individuals to be able to develop their capacities to the maximum. It should appear obvious that it is necessary to deal with the past for it to be possible to construct the future, but that obviousness is not within the terrain of governmental action because that would imply undermining vested interests: insecurity or poor education can be solved, but the solution involves corralling the political groups, unions and, in general, interests beholden to, and benefitting from, the status quo. Therefore, the past –abiding as it does in the present- sabotages the construction of the future.

A new government would have to think about moving from the past towards the future. It is not possible to deliberate on attracting investment –the State of Mexico (Edomex), for example, has been driving it out- unless the problems of security are tackled. The insecurity (a by-product and the disagreeable aftertaste of the old political system) can only be confronted with a new system of government, founded on the concepts and realities of the XXI century, not those of the old PRI inherited from the era of Porfirio Diaz in the XIX century. Without security, the future is inconceivable. The same is true with education: education conceived for control and for the benefit of the Teachers’ Union is incompatible with the knowledge economy and is the main cause of substandard jobs and low salaries. It is not by chance that the union’s bastions are the principal supports of the most reactionary summons to vote in the election of the Edomex of today.

With Trump, the old system has been stretched to the limit. The question is who offers a better alternative.

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Luis Rubio

There’s hardly more contrast than that of Singapore and India: order and disorder, government and the absence thereof, planning and chaos. Two radically distinct worlds that, notwithstanding this, have more in common with Mexico than would appear on first glance. After a week of participating in a study group on these two countries, it seems to me that there are tremendous lessons for us, above all one of immense consequence: development can be planned, in millimetric way as in Singapore or China, but it can also be the product of a few well-made decisions that, little by little, create a breeding ground for change that later becomes unstoppable and to which the entire population teams up with convincingly and enthusiastically.

My first lesson in the study group was the scale and depth of the integration that the region is experiencing. Were it not for the fact that there lies a vast sea in between, the productive processes give the impression of being indistinguishable from what transpires in North America. Components produced in Japan merge with others deriving from Taiwan and Singapore for their subsequent integration in Vietnam and Bangladesh for product assembly in China.  Although there are many economic activities and sectors that function independently from the rest, the numbers reveal a history of growing industrial consolidation that evidences an increasingly productive regional economy, raising the income levels of all of the countries.

Not by chance do Trump’s attacks on China scare everybody, to the point of hysteria. The fear is perceptible because a change of trade patterns would disproportionally affect Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam, all of these close allies of the U.S. The words of a Japanese participant in the group said it all: it is paradoxical that the country historically devoted to building and maintaining stability in the region would now comprise the major factor of instability in the world. All of us Mexicans can sympathize with that.

But the most interesting of my learnings this week originated from India. While the contrasts between rich and poor continue to be as brutal as ever, what’s perceptible and ubiquitous is a social milieu of expectation that is in radical contrast with Mexico. At one of the schools of engineering that has become key in explaining both the sustained growth rate of 7.5% that has been achieved as well as social mobility, 90% of the students come from families found within the first two deciles of the population, that is, the poorest fraction. One million engineers graduate each year from these schools.

India, a highly democratic nation and impoverished at the same time, is perhaps the most complex country the world. Its diversity of ethnic groups, religions, regions and resources is impacting. Each state has its own tax regime and there are customs barriers on every highway at the crossroads between the states, paralyzing internal commerce. In contrast with China, where vertical control is implacable and has permitted the implementation of reforms and the planning of economic development from above, India is exactly the opposite: a country that is complex, diverse, disperse and nearly ungovernable. At the same time, whereas any reform tends to take years to be approved, once that occurs, putting it into effect is much less complex because its components have already been negotiated and processed. For example, this year a general tax (a VAT) will enter into operation that will make internal customs inspections obsolete. This reform took more than fifteen years of negotiations…

While India’s complexity is infinitely greater than that of Mexico, there are many lessons that are applicable. To begin with, India has not undergone “great” reforms that are approved behind closed doors. Instead, although there have been important reforms, the most transcendental changes were the product of disperse actions that, taken together, have triggered growth. Many argue that the recent reforms of Prime Minister Modi were possible because everything else was happening at the time and that his genius had consisted of becoming a key leader at an essential moment. His dedication to solving problems (e.g., the fiscal one) has made it possible to clench deals that were long in the making, but had failed to consolidate. That is, his has been a very effective leadership not because he is enlightened or comes from high, but rather, because he has been effective in resolving ancestral hangups along the way.

These schools of engineering and of the sciences, some governmental, many private, are not centers of academic excellence, but are factories of talent and technical skills on which an impressive service economy has been constructed. Despite that the number of beneficiaries of the growth is yet small in relative terms, the middle class is estimated at almost three hundred million persons, a huge number that is still diminutive in a nation of 1,300 million souls. What is patent in many indicators, chiefly in the number of applicants for admission into these technology polytechnics, is the spirit of transformation and contagious optimism that these graduates exude, and which recently showed enormous electoral benefits. In this the contrast with Mexico is astounding.

My greatest learning: it is the little things that make an enormous difference.

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Luis Rubio

The only facet of life that is implacable is time gone by and, in political matters, Mexico is nearing the start of presidential succession. Positions are beginning to be honed, candidacies are cropping up everywhere and, little by little, the last stage of the sexennial cycle is emerging. As Miguel de Cervantes would write, “Neither good nor evil can last forever… so thou must not distress thyself with the misfortunes which happen…” The panorama is becoming clearer, evidencing the lacks. Up next is to understand why, after so many decades of reforms and good wishes, the country continues to be held back by ups and downs, unable to take that great leap forward that characterizes so many successful societies in the world.

In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Albert Camus foresaw what has occurred in our country during these decades: “Each generation doubtless feels called upon to reform the world. My generation knows that it will not reform it… Heir to a corrupt history, in which are mingled fallen revolutions… and worn-out ideologies, where mediocre powers can destroy all yet no longer know how to convince…”

All governments come to their inauguration with the certainty that they will know how to change the world, that all of their predecessors were torpid and inept. No one like Trump in that regard, but the phenomenon is universal: no promise is ever too great for a candidate to make: they all believe that they will leave an indelible footprint, the bedrock of the future. That is how the government of President Peña commenced, who, rolling out all the fanfare, launched a series of initiatives and strategies, both of reform as well as of how to govern, which ended up producing a mixed balance: legislative advances (almost) without precedent, but an everyday reality ensnared in the throes of growing deterioration. Part of that was the product of the contradictions inherent in this government itself, but much of it was not distinct from what has transpired in the country during the last half century.

The contradiction at the core is not peculiar to the current government: it is the same stone over which all of the governments since the eighties have tripped. In recent days we have been provided with a window of opportunity that permitted us to observe one of the many examples illustrating the incapacity to extricate ourselves from the old political system. The case of the pipeline thieves, the so called huachicoleros. The existence of these gas and petroleum-pilfering groups is suggestive of the fundamental problem; beyond the enormous cost both economic as well as of illegitimacy for the system of government that represents the impunity in this and in all the rest of national affairs, the reality is that there is no incentive to limit, impede or punish those who engage in this crime for a very simple reason: there are huachicoleros who are apprehended up to two or three times in the same day and who, after paying a symbolic fine, are set free to continue their criminal activities. They do this because it is not considered a crime of consequence, not one involving jail time; consequently, even with the police that we have, the incentive to catch these criminals is negative because their crime entails no consequences. The relevant question is not why they steal the gasoline (that is obvious), but instead why it is not a serious crime that would serve, at least in principle, as a dissuasive factor. The evident response is that there are powerful political, union and criminal interests that benefit from the status quo and that wield the sufficient power, or the threatening capacity necessary, to preserve it.

The same is true in all ambits of national life: there is no reform -economic, political, labor or of civil or human rights- that does not affect the powers frozen in time, those that have embezzled for decades from the system and directly or indirectly pillaged the Public Treasury. The existence of these powerful interests has meant that the reforms, from the most modest to the most ambitious, never deliver all of their benefits, because that would imply altering the status quo from which they benefit; thus, the reforms neither advance nor confer feasible benefits, creating a vicious circle: the reaction -and the reactionaries- in this world discredit the reforms, vowing a return to the idyllic world of the past. And this is where the ongoing succession process crosses paths with daily life.

The recent French election established a new paragon. In contrast with the U.S. election last year, in which Trump embraced increasingly extreme stances every day and Hillary did nothing other than promise the same thing but a little less of it (e.g. TPP), the candidates in France did not waste any time: Le Pen proposed a return to the past while Macron presented an ambitious, proactive and bold agenda, the past vs. the future, nostalgia vs. hope. I ask myself whether there will be some candidate in Mexico who will be capable of advocating a distinct future, a promising opportunity for a society plunged deep in that sinking feeling. Break the vicious cycle.

We already know the past, which is precisely that which lies behind the interest of the power of the old political system and which, as the huachicoleros exemplify, were not perturbed even by the governments run by the PAN. Mexico needs a new political regime: would that the aspirants who fight with such zeal for the candidacies, also possess the vision and the courage to break with the old regime that eats away at everything.

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Luis Rubio

Mexican reformers remind me of that much-publicized prediction of Michael “Sugar” Ray Richardson, the basketball player who made himself famous for once having told a sportswriter that his team, the New York Knicks, was “a sinking ship”. When the writer asked how far the ship might sink, Richardson replied, “The sky’s the limit.” Contradictions are inherent in our system of government, designed for everything to change so that, at the same time, everything would remain the same.

From the eighties, the country embarked upon a process of reform with a very clear public objective, but with a private agenda on the side. The public part was to raise productivity with a goal of, by that means, increasing investment, thus the generation of wealth and well-paid jobs. The project was technically impeccable because it revealed a flawless understanding of the nature of the problem, at least in economic terms.

At that time, the country found itself at a standstill because it retained an endogamic economy where public and private monopolies proliferated, in which the politicians’ enterprises drove the decisions on economic matters, where the labor unions determined what made progress and what stayed the same. The so-called “system” labored to reach a sole objective: preserve and increase the privileges of the political class, of the “Revolutionary Family” lineage that, due to its having won that epic battle, felt itself to be the owner of the country, its resources and its future.

Although it is evident that much has changed, what survives from that world is enlightening. Examples abound: we have many persons looking for work and demanding it at any cost and we have an infinity of companies requiring employees in order to make headway; it would appear to be a perfect match between demand and supply; however, it does not work for a simple reason: thanks to the Teachers’ Union (in all its variants), education in the country continues to devote itself to perpetuating poverty, controlling the population and impeding progress. The recent educative reform comprises a move forward but, to date, only in concept: the reality is the same as always. Another example: thanks to the business of some unions and politicians who had the monopoly on the distribution of PEMEX products (by truck), the nation now possesses many fewer gas pipelines than those required by an economy aspiring to rapid growth. One last example: I do not know whether any Mexican has thus far perceived that we have a small security, justice, corruption or impunity problem, but it seems evident that the latter is not obvious to those responsible for national affairs at all levels of government; those who have been in charge, and their candidates, see these issues as a mere distraction.

It is within this context that reforms such as those of energy, education and NAFTA itself would have to be evaluated, not to mention matters such as corruption and the judicial reform: the condition sine-qua-non for investment to grow is legal and patrimonial certainty, which is impossible to the degree that the old political system and the criteria that moved it –in legal and bureaucratic practice- endure. The challenge in matters of energy is particularly acute in this regard. Justice, security and economic growth go all hand in hand.

Mexico is recognized worldwide for reforms that, since three decades ago, began to be adopted. Be that as it may, compared with other countries that are also reformers, our progress has been less because of the private agenda that has accompanied the reforms: everything is all right as long as it does not threaten the interests and privileges of the beneficiaries of the political system of old. So deeply rooted is this criterion that even the two PANist administrations upheld it. The way that the federal government has conducted itself in the State of Mexico electoral campaign is suggestive: anything goes so as not to threaten the status quo.

“The end may justify the means”, wrote Trotsky, “as long as there is something that justifies the end.” The problem is that the end implicit in the reforms involves nothing changing; thus the reforms end up being weak and insufficient, at least in terms of their implementation. Of course, all reforms, in Mexico and in the rest of the world, de facto incorporate the realities of the power and, in this sense, we cannot compare reform processes such as those of Korea, Chile or China with those of Mexico, because in those nations there were hard governments that imposed their law.

Mexico’s case is peculiar in another sense too: it in fact undertook a political transition that did not change the political arena. There is a new electoral reality and freedoms but not a new political regime.  From this perspective, the implicit objective of the reforms –preserve the privileges- has been absolutely successful.

The question is, at what cost: the country has for decades entertained a meagre 2% annual growth on average; the population calls for better life levels but, thanks to the privileges, has not had access to the schooling that would allow the achievement of these; investment grows, but very much below potential; the insecurity destroys business concerns, families, expectations and, above all, the trust that is key for progress. All this, in exchange for what?

The dilemma is clear-cut: Mexico either takes the step forward or perseveres with the pretense of change but the reality of corruption and impunity. Worse: however little or much the reforms have advanced is in question due to the external and internal threat and without a population willing to defend what it does not feel is its own.

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Luis Rubio

In the film The American President, the President confronts a brutal fall in popularity and a strong contender who saturates the media. Confused, the President says that people have the right to listen to whom they want. Lewis Rothschild, his assistant, answers him: The people, “they don’t have a choice! [The contender] is the only one doing the talking! People want leadership, Mr. President, and in the absence of genuine leadership, they’ll listen to anyone who steps up to the microphone. They want leadership. They’re so thirsty for it they’ll crawl through the desert toward a mirage, and when they discover there’s no water they’ll drink the sand.” President Andrew Shepherd finally responds that  “People don’t drink the sand ‘cause they’re thirsty. They don’t drink the sand because they don’t know the difference…”

All presidents, in the world, in every country, assume the office to save their respective nation and, sooner or later, become bogged down by the reality, which obligates them to rework their objectives. Some respond with astuteness, like Bill Clinton; others act savagely as in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Some succeed in transforming themselves, others end up collapsing.

The government of President Peña arrived at the zenith of his project at the end of 2013; thenceforth began his fall. Despite the assertiveness of his initial performance, in reality he did not have a flight plan beyond the legislative approval of a series of reforms that were passed in record time. Once that threshold was traversed, the government left the implementation of those reforms to the individuals responsible for each of the respective areas to decide on them. Peña’s true plan was not the reforms, but rather the recreation of an imperial government, in the manner of the fifties and sixties of the past century. That is, the project was the government and nothing more.

The problem was two-pronged: on the one hand, it was impossible to create anew what no longer existed and that had disappeared because it was not functioning. On the other hand, on presenting himself as the sole mortal responsible for everything that happened in the country, the President ended up taking on all of the problems that arose: from Ayotzinapa to corrupt governors. His aloofness relayed him to the gallows and he did not know how to respond. Worse: in the face of his incapacity to understand the nature of the problem, rather than building a way out, he continued to dig himself deeper into the hole in which he found himself.

The form of his leading the government reminds me of an anecdote that a friend related to me: “Many years ago, in my college years, I attended an experimental theater presentation that, I believe, was called “Chaos on the Stage”. It was a parody of an orchestra director who could not define which work to interpret. Thus, all of the first interpreters [for example, the First Violin] tried to convince him of which score to play, that in which the individual’s instrument would appear to greatest advantage and, to prove it, there were small selections of the recommended pieces heard on playback. Because the director was unable to decide, the pressures of the first interpreters and of the music that they endorsed began to accelerate until the play concluded in utter stage and auditory chaos.” That is what the government seems like, with dissonant speeches, unconnected actions and, above all, a total absence of clarity of course.

What Mexicans require is certainty of the future, something for which many of the reforms can be highly relevant. However, the presidential discourse is totally alien to that citizen demand and, as the film passage evokes, the only person attempting to provide that certainty is the contender, who is doing so, and what’s more, with enormous skill.

The crucial question involves what the President can do to avoid an uncontainable crisis at the end of his term, just when the months of frank downturn of presidential power set in. First, the president has nothing to lose in that his popularity is so low that it can only go up. To date, he has exclusively accomplished one essential thing that will allow the avoidance of a crisis yet greater than what now seems inevitable: on correcting the fiscal aggregates, his government has dramatically reduced the risk of a new crisis.

In the political ambit, it would be much better for him to stop attempting to manipulate the electoral processes that are underway, in that everything will revert against him. Similarly, he should dedicate himself to all Mexicans and not only to his party brethren or pals: each governor whom he protects becomes an additional burden that he must shoulder; it would be better for each to face up to his own deeds (and crimes).

Finally, the country encounters a phenomenal challenge  in the relationship with the U.S., which changes continually and that has become eminently unpredictable. The population has been absolutely willing to join forces with the President in this process, but he has shown himself to be partisan and has not taken advantage of the largest source of strength that there is in the face of the U.S.: the innumerable daily contacts that exist between Mexicans and Americans for business, family relations, exports, imports and every species of exchange that the government does not control, thus rendering these connections more legitimate. If the President desires to emerge from the hole in which he finds himself he has to start to add and add more and more.

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@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

Beyond the aspirants to the Mexican presidency in 2018, perhaps the crucial factor that determines the way electors will act derives from their perceptions of the current reality.  According to Pankaj Mishra in his new book Age of Anger, those who have not achieved inserting themselves into modernity and take part of its promises –freedom, stability and prosperity- are always easy victims of demagogues, likewise Left and Right. Realities and perceptions are interlaced to the point that they often end up indistinguishable: wins the one who creates a propitious environment for his perspective and vision.

In all corners of the globe, the upset of traditional life could scarcely be greater. Telecommunications has engendered a universe of immediacy; governments, former proprietors of the truth through control of information, today comprise one more mere actor in the discussion of public affairs; job sources have been transformed mercilessly: partly due to competition, partly because of technological change. In this context, there no longer are permanent moorings of stability to which to cling as sources of certainty. The impact, worldwide, has been extraordinary.

This type of disturbance, says Mishra, is not new in history: anger and discontent are factors that are repeated throughout time when high-flying political or technological transitions take place. His argument reminds me of that brutal phrase that Tony Judt makes: “Few in the West are old enough to know just what it means to watch our world collapse.“ In the last years we have seen disturbances in the electorate of Poland, England and the U.S. In a few weeks we will see whether something similar happens in France. The response of anger and hatred, as well as self-justification of the violence, are not very different from the messianic and revolutionary movements of Europe in the XIX century or from the Russian anarchists of that era.

Some assert that the growing inequality is another explosive ingredient in this cocktail. Walter Scheidel has just published a massive book in this respect,* arguing that, all through history, only revolutions, epidemics, collapse of States  and the mammoth destruction of riches that leads to generalized impoverishment,  constitute factors of social equalization, perennially downward, that is, because they ravage the existing wealth. One of his most important contentions is that no country has diminished inequality through structural reforms because these are, at the end of the day, arrangements among those in possession of the power. Ian Morris, an old scholar of these questions, explains why inequality is not a relevant factor in this era: despite inequality, the average industrial worker lives more years, eats better and is richer, freer and better educated than nearly all of the human beings who preceded him.

That is, following Morris, to the degree that the perceptions and expectations of the population are positive –that their life level will improve- the voters do not entertain any initiative to modify the status quo in a radical manner. The day before the U.S. and Brexit elections, there were many possible scenarios at play: in both cases, the result could have gone either way, because both were very close. In this regard, while the political fact of who wins and who loses changes the panorama, the explanations about why it occurred tend to be excessive: more justificatory than analytical.

My point here is that there are factors that influence the spirit of the voter and that all politicians (with the exception of the President of Mexico at this moment…) ply exploitation in an attempt to sway the will of the electorate in a given direction, creating an environment of certainty. No one has been more skillful and virtuoso than AMLO in these leagues.

The changes undergone by Mexico in recently times have also been enormous. Part of the country has been transformed in impacting fashion and part has remained shackled to the past.  Those in the first group surely have a positive perspective of the future, while those persisting in ancestral forms of life and production probably have not modified their manner of perceiving the world in many decades. The most volatile electorate is the third group:   that of those who have seen the world change without getting a grip and reliable sources of certainty. Part of that derives from the uncontainable process of change, part from the absence of responses and solutions to daily problems –from poor infrastructure, passing through corruption- but taken together, this generates conditions that are naturally well-disposed to ire, anger and malaise. The lack of certainty with respect to NAFTA clearly does not help.

None of these elements is novel in Mexican politics. What is new is the absence of presidential leadership. Without party distinction, all of the recent presidents attempted to channel to the process of change to make sense to and provide direction for the population. Today the only one attempting that leadership is the main opposition candidate. Thus, it is not difficult to account for his position in the polls.

*The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century

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@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

One of the most foreseeable reactions and consequences of Trump’s discourse throughout the last year and a half would have been a rapid growth of anti-American sentiments in Mexico. And, without doubt, that has occurred, but with nuances that are significant. To being with, however much the new American President has referred to all Mexicans, the principal reaction of those living in the U.S. illegally is simple and natural:  fear, if not terror. Those in the crosshairs have no time to hate.

A few days ago, I heard a California legislator describe the new reality:  empty schools and children keeping silence at home while their parents go to work, typically leaving very early and returning late, not because their work demands it, but rather because obscurity offers them a greater hope of being able to avoid the manhunts. The Trump discourse and the emboldened police charged with migratory affairs have changed the world for the Mexican communities, creating a new reality in their daily life.

In Mexico the intellectual and political protest is active, emotive and decided, but very distinct from that of the man in the street. Particularly revealing is the fact that Anti-American or anti-Trump sentiments are concentrated in the world of discussion but not so much in real life. Those with families in the U.S. are afraid as much as for the risks that their relatives run at present as for the uncertainty regarding their sustenance. The remittances can be understood as an item in the balance of payments or as an income that sustains millions of families in the country. Those families depend on the earnings of their relatives, who left in order to provide a better life for those that they left behind.  For them the matter is one of basic subsistence, not of politics or emotions.

It is in this sense that the manner in which distinct nuclei of Mexicans here and there have reacted is paradoxical. For those for whom the relationship with the U.S. is an everyday affair, the basis of their bread and butter –the same for those who emigrate as for those who depend on exports- the reaction is fear or worry, not hate: visceral anti-Americanism has not arisen there. Perhaps those who have emigrated do not have a thorough understanding of the history or of the deep-rooted causes of the circumstances that obliged them to leave, but they do know well that something here in Mexico does not work. The same is true for those working in the industry linked with NAFTA and exports; everyone knows that Trump is a problem, but the regime from which they fled is much worse than the one under which they live: in the U.S., there are rules and here everything is uncertain, from the safety of their lives to the continuity of public policy. It is not black and white.

The average Mexican is infinitely wiser than the politicians (or the intellectuals), who believe that they represent them. For them it is about life or death; for the others it is a matter of positioning, ultimately ethereal. Minimizing the causes of leaving or, in the case of NAFTA, of the sources of certainty that the treaty generates, is to lose sight of the fact that reality at the ground level is clairvoyant. People emigrate because there are no opportunities here and those who have jobs in NAFTA-associated companies (or ones related with its “philosophy”) put up with it because they know that the alternative is infinitely worse. These are inexorable manifestations of the quality of the Mexican government, the government of today and that of the last century. Few dare to ask: Why don’t things work here?

It is paradoxical that even the most affected individuals do not blame Trump or the country that gave them shelter, because they well know that the alternative is much worse: more of the same. Trump, a personage who lives from exploiting his brand (in hotels, clothes, condos and every sort of product of mass consumption), has undermined the trademark of his country in a manner that would have been inconceivable only a few months ago. Many hated George W. Bush for his warmongering, but they drew a line between the person and his country. Today this is impossible. Trump won thanks to a divisive discourse and one founded on hate. Despite that, those who work for a living, independently of their legal status in the U.S., pray, not hate.  They know (or trust) that, in contrast with the Mexican Government, this is something transitory; that which in Mexico has been going on for two hundred years and will last for a good while longer.

In one of his famous paintings, Roy Lichtenstein sketches Donald Duck fishing and telling Mickey Mouse “Look, Mickey, I’ve just hooked a BIG one”, when he in truth had hooked himself…. Something like that has happened in Mexico: it has hooked itself and this could not have come about at a worse possible time.

The outgoing government appears to have decamped, leaving the field open for a potential successor who represents its worst nightmare.  Instead of taking advantage of this time to erect the scaffolding of a viable nation and one sure of itself, it has opted for passivity and acquiescence. That may not be its objective –as its obsessions prove-, but that is what it is in fact doing.  In comparison with Mexicans linked to the U.S. in diverse ways and who are attempting to find a way out of the predicament, the government has entrenched itself. A gallant way to govern.

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@lrubiof