Injured Parties

Luis Rubio

When Don Quixote discovers windmills, he says to his squire “Fortune is guiding our affairs better than we could have wished. Do you see over yonder, friend Sancho, thirty or forty hulking giants? I intend to do battle with them and slay them. With their spoils we will begin to be rich for this is a righteous war and the removal of so foul a brood from the face of the earth is a service God will bless. What giants?” asked Sancho Panza. “Those you see over there,” replied his master, “with their long arms well nigh two leagues in length.” Take care, sir” cried Sancho. “Those over there are not giants but windmills. Those things that seem to be their arms are sails which, when they are whirled around by the wind, turn the millstone.” He then proceeded head on, screaming: “Fly not, ye cowards and vile creatures! For it is only one knight that assaults you.”

The “fourth transformation” advances in the same manner, rapidly and without surcease, leaving injured parties everywhere. As with Don Quixote, the advance is neither smooth nor free from conflict, though there is no doubt that creating conflicts to confront comprises part of the plan. But inasmuch as the injured partied mount up, the sources of anger, economic lag and eventual opposition also grow.

The list of the injured is mushrooming and impacting: with the cancellation of daycare, children who are being deprived of a place to stay during the day safely and creatively while their mothers work, as are their mothers who are unable to work outside the home, affecting the family’s sustenance. Avocado exporters who watch their product going to waste due to the slowness with which the U.S. Customs operates in this regard, without the Mexican Government doing anything. The residents of the border regions who see tens of thousands of Central American migrants arrive without there being the infrastructure for lodging them nor the opportunities for hiring them. Those fired by the government who, without rhyme nor reason, were thrown out on the street without compensation nor alternative opportunities. Those who have seen their salaries decimated, losing their acquired rights by a decision hastily announced in one of the President’s daily morning press conferences. Women who undergo intra-familial violence and who no longer have safe havens to go to. Newborns who have no opportunity to ensure them a successful life -newborns with  correctable birth defects- thanks to the termination of neonatal screening. The organizations of the civil society that, complying with legitimate functions, are attacked and under-cut. The citizenry that stops being able to count on means of protection with the disappearance of key counterweights for the functioning of the economy –in matters of energy, hydrocarbons, competition, education- and now with the potential loss of a Supreme Court independent of the executive branch. The concessionaires in matters of energy that, fulfilling their commitments, find themselves under threat. The children who will not have the opportunity of a better education, all to serve abusive unions whose interests have nothing to do with education itself and even less so in the digital era. The decline of consumption, which affects the poorest. The attempt against economic growth by the elimination of sources of certainty and investment. The former top-level government functionaries -in their majority honest and upright, responsible professionals- damaged in their person and their reputation, who suffer consequences that the President cannot even begin to understand.

The injured parties multiply and are many more than the President himself imagines, many of them –in fact, the overwhelming majority- part of his natural political base. Those who suffer most because of the multiplication of attacks are precisely those who urgently require an increased economic growth rate and the benefits accruing from this in the form of incomes and jobs. The president is absolutely committed to achieving a better economic growth rate but, as an old Irish joke goes, you can’t get there from here.

There is no way to get there attacking, undermining, destroying and setting land mines in place at each step. As a political project, attack is a way to advance, but not so as an economic project in this era of the worlds’ history. Growth is built on investment and the latter depends on the investor’s willingness to assume the risk that his project will be successful, that there is a market for her products, that new barriers are not erected against the growth of his enterprise, that the borders will not be an obstacle to the exports of her goods or to the importation of his inputs, that the bureaucracy will not invent impediments to his progress and that the workers, employees and proprietors of the entity will not be unjustly besieged and reviled. It is not by chance that literally all of the world’s governments dedicate themselves to attracting new investments and companies, with carefully articulated strategies and resources. The exceptions, such as North Korea and Venezuela at present, say it all.

The lists of injured parties and the values and counterweights that erode or are eliminated day upon day endeavor against the economy and the country in general. We won’t get there from here.

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Ending the Violent Order

Luis Rubio

“The solution to the problem, says Rachel Kleinfeld, lies in re-civilizing society and the political system.”  Violence has very clear and distinctive explanations in each specific situation that can be reverted if the problem is focused correctly. The author* affirms that it is possible to restore peace and order if a leadership is disposed to join forces and confront the problem that produces the “violence of privilege” with a middle class capable of mobilizing itself to obligate the government to act.

Violence destroys civilizations or transforms them.   It begins because of the structural weakness of a government or due to the complicity existing among the members of the government with the criminal organizations that, notes the author, is commonplace. Typically, criminality involves those who govern, it seduces them and corrupts them, to the degree of making the accomplices, thus closing the circle. Once the government forms part of the criminal order, the entire structure of the police, prosecutors and judges ends up becoming weak because it then comprises part of the problem and not part of the solution.

At the heart of the argument appears the concept of the “violence of privilege” that arises from the established order that is devoted to preserving what exists, characteristically in very unequal and polarized societies. Authorities can become accomplices because they want to benefit directly or because they respond to greater interests committed to the status quo. In practice, the difference is small because, once complicity is the order of the day the violence starts and the governmental apparatus ceases having the capacity to protect the citizenry.

The most interesting facet of the book, at least in Mexico’s experience, is that it engenders a very discerning distinction between governments that have been outpaced by criminality and those in which the authority has entered into collusion with organized crime. Although the latter can lead to the former, there are experiences, as in Afghanistan, in which very powerful forces can impose their law. In the case of Honduras and Mexico, for the author there is no doubt that this is about the second case: the authorities were corrupt or were corrupted by organized crime and that’s what brought about the collapse of the whole apparatus dedicated to the protection of the citizens and to the procurement of justice.

Once that happens, the options are few and not very difficult to elucidate. To begin with, states Kleinfeld, as soon as the authorities are accomplices, deterioration occurs in all ambits, despite that they do not appear to be linked together because they lower the behavioral standards in everything. For example, persons whose past conduct was impeccable, now see nothing wrong in stealing something from the supermarket; electricity inspectors become virtual extortionists not very distinct from those who extort “dues” –protection money- from businesses; the political discourse acquires an aggressiveness that never before existed. When civilization deteriorates, the sole possibility resides in reconstructing it, but that can only take place when a new government assembles that is willing to break up the networks of complicity and impunity in conjunction with a society that demands it.

The text almost seems like a script: a new government arrives and finds itself enmeshed in an extenuated governmental set-up, one that is incapable and finds itself in pieces because the out-going authorities had surrendered to enjoying the pleasures associated with crime, instead of combating the latter. The new government has no choice other than to make arrangements and engage in agreements with the criminals to avoid a sudden surge of violence. It is at that moment that the future is defined: the fledgling government has two possibilities; on the one hand, it can accept the new status quo (a pact) as an end in itself and proceed as if nothing had happened. The alternative would be to utilize that truce to gain time and to employ that time to build a new capacity of the police, of the judiciary and of the prosecutors. The majority of governments get bogged down in agreements and the result ends in more violence.

The difference between a benign result and the other is the civil society. When the society exacts accountability from the government, supervises its acting and keeps watch over it and exhibits its weaknesses, the government preserves a compass towards what the author calls “re-civilization.” When the society does not apply pressure or possess the capacity to do so, the government is inexorably intimidated and gives way to everything.

The new government must decide whether it wants to resolve the problem or merely own it: this is not the same. “The solution to the problem of the Mafia,” says Italian anti-Mafia district attorney Paolo Borsellino, “is to make the State work.” Will the AMLO government restore peace and security? The President is wagering yes, through the Army. The evidence that this book yields is that this will not work: only the conjunction of society and government can achieve it.

Leoluca Orlando, the Mayor of Palermo, phrased it lucidly: The fight against the Mafia was like a cart with two wheels: police and culture. Only one wheel leads to the cart spinning around; only two wheels functioning together can make it work.

 

*A Savage Order, Pantheon, 2018

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@lrubiof

 

Why NAFTA Is Critical for Mexico

 Americas Quarterly

  LUIS RUBIO | APRIL 15, 2019

 

The not-yet-ratified USMCA has already impacted Mexican institutions, beyond the economy.

 

For Mexico, the North American Free Trade Agreement as originally designed was much more about politics than trade. The George Bush administration that negotiated the agreement understood that and, in fact, saw NAFTA in geopolitical, rather than economic terms. A senior adviser to the White House at that time once told me that it was “a no-brainer: a prosperous Mexico is in the best interest of the United States.” How times change.

The importance of NAFTA cannot be overstated, which is why uncertainty over its replacement, provoked first by Donald Trump as a candidate for the presidency and now by the Democrat-held Congress, is so dangerous.

NAFTA was conceived as a mechanism through which the Mexican government obtained a kind of certificate from the U.S. government as a guarantor that the rules of the game would be preserved, that an open trading regime would be maintained and that the commitments made in the agreement would be strictly adhered to. In this sense, NAFTA constitutes an anchor of stability, a source of certainty that enjoys international support and recognition. This certainty is key both for internal confidence and for attracting foreign investment.

Mexico proposed the trade and investment agreement in 1990 after having gone through a series of economic reforms that streamlined the federal government’s finances, liberalized the economy and modernized its regulatory framework. The objective was to attract investment in order to foster fast economic growth. However, potential investors, both domestic and foreign, worried about the country’s propensity for changing the rules, carrying out unlawful expropriations and making capricious decisions without notice.

Through NAFTA, Mexico’s government committed to preserving the rule of law implicit in the agreement and submitted itself to the procedures established by Chapter 11 on dispute resolution. The result was an extraordinary source of certainty for investors, which led to the establishment of new ventures, plants and operations in the country. Mexico’s expectations for attracting investment were far superior to what actually materialized, not because of NAFTA, but because of a new player in the field to which neither the Americans nor the Mexicans had given even the slightest thought: China.

But over the past quarter century, NAFTA fulfilled its political role beyond expectations. Mexico accepted dramatically limiting the latitude of future governments for making changes to the basic framework of economic policy (the open trading regime) in the event that a president with a different economic philosophy came to government. In this regard, NAFTA was fundamentally a political act, a proxy for a lack of checks and balances that are present in the United States. It is thanks to NAFTA that Mexican economic policy was not altered in the midst of the massive crisis of 1995.

In contrast with the geopolitical clarity that motivated the first Bush administration, Trump’s rhetoric and actions altered Mexico’s politics in a dramatic way. First, by putting the existing NAFTA in doubt in 2016, it created a political vacuum that was filled by the winner of Mexico’s presidential contest in 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Second, and most importantly, it opened the way for a series of decisions that slowly but surely will eliminate or neutralize autonomous regulatory agencies that were created over the past two decades in energy, competition, telecoms and, now, the Supreme Court. Put simply, NAFTA’s erosion has had an immense impact on Mexico.

Despite the rhetoric, NAFTA has fulfilled its core objective of supporting Mexico’s political stability through the creation of a framework that made it possible to attract investment and for about half the country to grow above 6% and, in some states, such as Aguascalientes and Queretaro, at Asian rates. Surely, NAFTA did not transform all of Mexico, for that would have required much deeper reforms for which the Mexican establishment was not ready. In fact, NAFTA (and migration to the U.S.) helped preserve the status quo, an unintended consequence of a trade and investment agreement that nonetheless served its core purpose.

One could speculate what might have happened had China not become such a powerful force in the world trade arena, but the one certainty is that Mexico lost significant opportunities as a result.

The USMCA, which resulted from last year’s renegotiation of NAFTA, updates some key components – particularly as it incorporates rules for intellectual property, online commerce and the like – but dramatically waters down the key political element from Mexico’s vantage point, Chapter 11.

The challenge for Mexico lies in the fact that it has not developed internal sources of certainty that would make it less dependent on NAFTA or the USMCA to attract investment and maintain stability. That challenge would have been easier to face with an administration less willing to undermine each and every reform that has been carried out over the past three decades. However, without either NAFTA or the USMCA, the risks, for both the U.S. and Mexico, would be staggering, precisely the opposite of what the Bush administration hoped to accomplish.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

 

Luis Rubio is chairman of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations. He writes a weekly column in newspaper Reforma,and is the author and editor of dozens of books. His most recent book is A World of Opportunities, published by the Wilson Center.
https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/why-nafta-critical-mexico

Restrictions

Luis Rubio

The handiest hypothesis on the causes of the electoral result of the past year refers to the population’s being fed up, the evident corruption of the government of the moment and, above all, the paltry outcomes of decades of reforms in terms of incomes, poverty and equity.  All of this is doubtlessly valid, but it does not explain the truly extraordinary change exhibited by the electorate between January and July of 2018, in which the preferences of the body politic for today’s President mushroomed from 30% to 53%.  Part of the explanation surely lies in the poor conduct of the other two presidential candidates (each in his own way) and, especially, of the former President, but it appears evident to me that a high percentage of voters decided that the promise of “more of the same” would not improve the economy of the country.

The proposal of Andrés Manuel López Obrador to alter the course seemed attractive to more than one half of the electorate and, from the day after the election, he has devoted himself to implementing his vision through decisions, many of which have been controversial and costly. The result to date, scarcely a few months into the new government, is not commendable: instead of a project, the evidence reveals that the President and his complicated –and strikingly diverse- coalition entertains more obsessions, occurrences and opposing agendas than a plan structured and headed toward constructing a platform for development.

For several years, AMLO has been very clear in his conviction that the country lost its way from the beginning of the reforms in the eighties: his central approach is that the government should be the rector of the economic process, that is, the conductor of the country’s development because “neoliberalism” has done nothing other than produce poverty and a growing inequality.

While it is evident that the reforms have not solved the country’s problems, an integral evaluation of the phenomenon that Mexicans experienced during these years in which Mexico incorporated itself into the world’s commercial, technological and financial circuits, requires understanding the international context within which all this has come about, in that the phenomenon is, in general terms, global in nature.

Three books attempt to explain what happened and why. Each of the works has its own objective and bias, but together, they create a very interesting patina. Charles Dumas* offers an essentially technical analysis of what took place in the decades during which world commerce accelerated and in the way productive processes were altered (concentrating on the production of parts and components to raise the quality of goods and services and reducing their cost), but above all the incorporation of India and China, especially the latter, into the industrial process. From Mexico’s vantage, China purloined from Mexico the export market that NAFTA promised; without China having competed for the industrial production that withdrew from the U.S., the past thirty years would have been very different.

Robert Kuttner** contributes a diagnosis that is very consistent with AMLO’s vision:  the world worked well when the unions were powerful and had the capacity to defend the interests of their members, the welfare state satisfied the interests of the population above that of the capitalists, the economy was focused on the internal market and there were no short-term financial flows across borders. Although he refers to the U.S. (and admixes Europe along the way), Kuttner’s argument –more political than economic- is nearly indistinguishable from the vision that AMLO has sketched in his books and speeches. Like AMLO, Kuttner’s vision is nostalgic: he says that there are no easy ways out, but that what exists is not good and that the mainstays of development that worked in the past must be recuperated.

Barry Eichengreen*** studies the evolution and future of populist movements over time in the U.S. as well as in Europe. Assuming an analytical stance, this author observes that behind citizen anger and disillusionment with the Western democracies lies the combination of economic uncertainty, governments incapable of responding to the populations’ demands and needs and the threats to the integrity of the identity of the citizenry. His reasoning is lucid with regard to the causes as well as the consequences:  he concludes that the “technical” solution is not difficult to elucidate, but that governments generally do not have the political capacity or vision to do this, while populist governments do not see the need for attending to the causes of the phenomenon.

Where there is an absolute coincidence between AMLO and these authors concerns the unpopularity of the bank bailouts in Mexico and the U.S., respectively. For AMLO, the bank rescue comprised a catapult in his political vision and in his perspective about what is wrong with the country. The other coincidence is that relative to migration: for Trump’s Americans, migration constitutes a menace to their identity; for AMLO, migration represents a failure of Mexican economic policy.

Eichengreen concludes that non-conventional governments are typically indifferent to the restrictions imposed by the markets, the availability of labor, or the needs of private investment.  The latter will probably end up being AMLO’s greatest challenge in the years to come.

*Populism and Economics. **Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism? ***The Populist Temptation

 

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@lrubiof

 

 

If Not Progress, What?

Luis Rubio

At the beginning of this century, Russia found itself at a crossroads. The end of the Cold War had opened limitless opportunities, but its process of transition -from an economy that was controlled, centralized and one without private property to a market economy- had been disastrous. Instead of spreading the property among millions of families and potential entrepreneurs, the enormous Soviet industries had been overtaken by a group of plutocrats who sold off the public resources, beginning with the oil, as if they were theirs. By 1998 the contradictions of the privatization and adjustment process had become uncontrollable, giving rise to one of those financial crises that Mexicans have long known. The backlash led to power the individual who to the present day continues to be the acknowledged ruler, Vladimir Putin, who, with prodigious skill, concentrated the power once again and submitted the so-called oligarchs.

Armed with a new plan and with centralized control, Putin reorganized the economy and reestablished economic stability, gaining with this the support of the public. Great changes, ideas and projects followed to reactivate the economy and transform the productive base, attempting to move it away from its (nearly) sole source of wealth, the oil.

Years later, Viktor Chernomyrdin, once Putin’s Prime Minister, aphoristically encapsulated the country’s often tragic past by saying, “We hoped for the best, yet things turned out as usual.” Will the “fourth transformation” end up the same?

The point of departure for the AMLO government is that everything done from the eighties until now was bad. Everything is corrupt, nothing works and those who led to this are traitors. The names vary, but the tonality is the same: the country was better when it was worse. A placard outside a restaurant summed it up impeccably and relentlessly: “We are worse, but we are better because before we were well, but it was a lie; not like now that we are bad, but it is true.”

The grand plan of the government is easy to discern: concentrate the power, go back on all the reforms –as much as possible- which advanced from 1982 on and, with this recreate the nirvana that existed in the seventies so that, perhaps, the President can be reelected. It is not a complicated plan, although the political management with which it is conducted makes it look so. The objective is clear and moves ahead step by step. The tactics are modified along the way, but the core project goes ahead.

What is relevant is that an extensive portion of the population is convinced that the project is worthwhile and that the President is heading it up without conflicts of interest and without looking back. That the economy is going downhill, consumption being at a standstill (or diminishing) and that public finances can undergo problems in the medium term appear to be of consens to no one. The majority of the population is spellbound believing that it is possible to achieve what one wills without having to work or construct it. The President is convinced that just desiring it will make it happen. If something is going poorly everything will be resolved –or a shortcut may be taken- with the emollient of more transfers to clienteles and identifying the guilty as scapegoats.

Given that the causes of the disaster evidenced by the robustness of the middle class (and of a country that, with all its defects, did advance), those who had some participation in the government during the last thirty years, the wellspring of potential conservatives, poseurs and turncoats, is literally infinite. If to that one adds all of the companies –and their employees- who are increasingly more productive and successful, the potential to identify those who caused that national disaster of which so many of us are so proud (and that is the sustenance of the economy), is doubly infinite.

There is not the least doubt that the country is undergoing many ills and that the sum total of an unstoppable technological change with an (almost) totally integrated global economy renders it difficult to resolve all of the problems in one fell swoop. It is likewise certain that the solution does not lie -it is not possible for the solution to lie- in the fact of concentrating the power or in revitalizing the cadaver of Pemex, since the core problem consists in the rejection of the future that is evidenced in the government’s incapacity –this and all of the former of the last half century- in carrying out an educative reform that privileges learning in the digital era above union blackmail. The political project is transparent, but the difference between the seventies and the present is that the economy is open and this in itself alters all the premises.

A dear friend says that “Mexico will never be a developed and civilized country, at least, not in the next 100 years” because rather than building a consensus that allows for broadly-approved decisions, “the government endorses discord and polarization, strategic arms in its arsenal of destruction of the present.  What we will indeed be in brief –quicker than a cock crows- is a less civilized country, more primitive, more unjust, more polarized, one with more spitefulness, one that is less desirable…” Up until now, more than 70% of the citizenry has given AMLO the benefit of the doubt. The experience of the last half century is less generous: when the fiscal, political and civilization equilibriums break down, the crises will not be long in coming.

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The New Masters

Luis Rubio

There is nothing like showing the true colors of a government and in Panavision. When one of the most emblematic members of President López Obrador’s coalition threatens the citizenry with sanctions, it is clear that the government is not there to govern or, in the old sense of the term, “serve” the population, but rather to use and abuse it.

In a tweet attributed to a key member of the Morena coalition, the politician warned the citizens: “I am about to formulate a law that prohibits citizens from and penalizes civilians for insulting Federal Representatives. Wait and see.” Shamelessly, this personage modifies the function of the Congress, conferring on it superiority with respect to the citizenry. According to Article 39 of the Mexican Constitution, “the national sovereignty lies originally and essentially in the people,” implying that the Representative is proposing to limit the freedom of expression of the citizenry because their commentaries or criticisms are a source of annoyance to him. This is an inherent part of the Mexican political system, but it is not often that it displays a jewel as preeminent as this, because it spells out, in black and white, its true nature.

For Mexicans this is not surprising: the government has never worked for the citizens, to the degree that more than one president has employed the rhetorical resource that civil servants “are here to serve and not to serve themselves,” thus acknowledging the phenomenon. However, the solution to the public debate regarding the criticism to which the Morena-Party Representative resorted does not fall on deaf ears: it makes plain, unblushingly and without beating around the bush, the overarching conception it has of the world, of the government and of the population.  He does not conceive himself as a representative of the people (who in fact maintain the personage), but as a beneficiary of the political system.

The problem is not particularly Mexican in nature: although democratic theory states that the legislature represents the citizenry and that the executive branch governs in tune with this, the universal practice is simpler than that: governments govern and, as Churchill said, so do the bureaucrats, who form part of the executive proper. The British statesman affirmed that in place of civil servants, what these in reality are uncivilized masters who are not accountable for their actions. The citizenry is not one of their central concerns, which is why the government has devoted itself to curtailing any vehicle of popular representation and all of the mechanisms that, in the last decades, were constructed to limit the powers of presidents with too many cravings for power and self-important bureaucrats, all this to ensure that the objectives advance for those laws and procedures duly approved in matters such as voting, energy, competition and transparency.

Mexican democracy is far from being a consolidated one that   responds to the people, but it is also not a feeble one either. The senators themselves understood this some weeks ago when, in deliberation over the National Guard, this body accepted that it was indispensable to include in the debate, and in the final content of the bill, the postures and concerns of innumerable citizen organizations that represent ideas, victims, analyses and experiences that the government (any government) can ever have because it is not, cannot be, everywhere. What a mother has suffered in the loss of a son or daughter in the drug wars or what a specialist has studied over decades are invaluable and inexorable goods for the advance of a society, and a government would be very inept to decide to ignore them.

A particular paradox of the present government lies in the extraordinary contrast between the enormous popularity and legitimacy of the President and his imperious need to disqualify and discredit any instance of criticism, counterweight or opposition. In frank discord with the old Mexican tradition of that “he who resists supports,” in the unforgettable words of Jesús Reyes-Heroles, President  López Obrador is insistent upon eliminating all resistance and all support. The history of recent decades suggests that the best way is exactly the opposite of this: the things that last in a presidential legacy are precisely those that, at their time, enjoyed far-reaching social, partisan and legislative support, because that creates long-time stakeholders, thus becoming permanent. The things costing AMLO a great amount of opposition to dismantle are those that resulted from broad-ranging backing and consultations, something that should surprise no one. After the actions of the Senate in the National Guard affair, it looks likely that the resulting law will acquire permanence, in contrast with those of AMLO’s bills which have been imposed as if coming from a barbarian charge from the Southeast.

The contempt for the people that the Representative exhibited is not novel; many presidents were the butt of criticism and jest because the latter is the sole recourse the citizenry possesses to exert an influence on the government’s actions. What the politician does not recognize is that the citizens have a great asset in their favor and they know something that self-important politicians easily forget with regard to presidential terms of office in Mexico: there is no ill that lasts six years, nor a populace that will stand for it.

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Referendum. What For?

Luis Rubio

The objective of Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador with his referendum proposal is to eliminate the existing mechanisms of representation –the legislature- from the process of decision making.  In his vision, the “people” should ratify his decisions, which were previously taken, because in that way he would maintain, and elevate, his control over political life and the citizenry. “Revocation of mandate,” part of the same scheme, secures the vision: the objective is control, not citizen participation. The legislators, beginning with those of the president’s Morena party, should understand their role in this matter is that of representing the electorate and acting as a counterweight.

The issue is very simple: Who can believe that the citizens are going to vote in favor of raising their own taxes or against jailing the rapist of a girl in Ciudad Juárez? Both are decisions that correspond to the authority –legislative and judicial, respectively- when the circumstances demand it.  Submitting that type of decision to the “people” is nothing more than a cunning maneuver to avoid responsibility or, more frequently, to impose the preferences of the one who submits the decision to poll, knowing full well that the population is really evaluating the president because it does not have the capacity to nor the interest in analyzing the alternatives and implications of their decision.

The referendum is an instrument that is utilized with regularity in some nations and their experience is illustrative. In Switzerland, a nation with a feeble central government, every year an infinity of decisions is submitted to the popular vote. The citizens read the materials and engage in serious discussions. The issues are announced months beforehand and the postures in favor and against are made public and their proponents not only respect their contraries, but also assume these as advocates, not enemies.

The case of the state of California in the U.S. is very distinct. There, the referendum acquired popularity when a group of citizens proposed the establishment of property tax limits, which opened Pandora’s Box. A measure as popular as that was immediately accepted by the voters, which produced two consequences: on the one hand, it drastically reduced tax collecting, affecting the providing of municipal services; on the other hand, it initiated an avalanche of incidences of polling that, typically, are decided not by the substance of the issue but rather by the charisma of the proponent or by the interest of the media.

I have no objection at all to lowering taxes or to laws and decisions being revised; what seems dangerous to me is the procedure inherent in the referendum because it is a deception.  In the state of California, as well as in Mexico, the citizens lack the willingness of the Swiss to evaluate each decision at length and discuss it with knowledge of the facts. The experience of the European nation must be understood within its context: the national government is extraordinarily weak, presidential terms last two years and citizen participation is not only committed, but also transcendental. There the referendum is not utilized as a (biased) means to decide on the continued construction of an airport without contextual information that, in addition, is a construction already underway.

The experiences of Switzerland and California illustrate the kid-glove nature –and the danger- of implanting a decision-making mechanism such as the referendum. The British themselves have not yet emerged from their astonishment at the manner in which their leave-taking from Europe was decided. That referendum ended up a Russian roulette. More to the point, while there are always opposing opinions, what we Mexicans have been able to observe since the first of July is that the polling mechanism is understood as an instrument of manipulation and legitimization and not as a means of the development of the citizenry, the improvement of democracy or the promotion of higher living standards. Under these conditions, the referendum is in the last analysis a mechanism of control and not of participation. Worse, plebiscites are divisive and what Mexico needs is a coming together.

The idea of the plebiscite or referendum is good and healthy: it derives from the supposition that the citizens, as the beneficiaries of or the payee in the result of public decisions, should have greater participation in the decision-making process regarding things that could come to affect them.  The experience is very distinct: these mechanisms wind up in the hands of politicians and the media that possess an enormous capacity to manipulate public opinion in order to legitimatize previously made decisions. With that rationale, a referendum in Mexico would lead to the perpetuation of a president in the government, which is, at the end of the day, the idea of revoking the mandate: that it never be revoked.

Mexican democracy is young and precarious in the extreme, in addition to that, as a county, Mexicans have not broken with the old political system based on control and manipulation. On adopting the referendum as the official mechanism, would do nothing other than consolidate, through the rear door, the post-revolutionary authoritarian regime. The legislators must recognize that they themselves would be the first to lose in such legislation, in that they would disappear as a relevant power. It is not good for anyone for the power to be in the hands of a sole individual.

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China and Mexico Ahead

 

Luis Rubio

The 2008 crisis was a watershed for China. Up to then, the great Asian nation underwent an accelerated transition from the socialism of Mao Tse-tung toward the liberalization headed by    Deng Xiaoping, which yielded more than thirty years of annual growth rates of more than 10%. The expectation for the West was that, sooner or later, China would converge with the rest of the world not only in economic development, but also in political opening. Independently of the internal political dynamics, what appears clear today is that in 2008 a new path was defined inside China, one much less opening-oriented economically, more authoritarian politically, and much more assertive in the international arena.

The direction that China is adopting goes hand in hand very well with the retraction of the U.S. on the international arena, which furnishes a scenario of enormous transcendence for Mexico. During past decades, China, emerging power that operates with absolute geopolitical determination, has avoided Mexico; while there have been some industrial installations (the majority assembly plants) and at least two infrastructure projects, both failed ones, the Chinese presence in Mexico is minimal, above all when compared with that in other countries in the South of the continent or in Africa. China has always recognized the geographic location and economic links that characterize Mexico, the reason for which it has maintained itself relatively to one side.

Two circumstances have altered this: on the one hand, the new U.S. tone under the Trump administration has re-opened discussion within Mexico concerning the elevated concentration of economic ties with the U.S.  In addition to this, there are protectionist undertakings such as that relative to steel but, in the main, the permanent threat to cancel NAFTA demands a review of Mexico’s national priorities. Although I have no doubt that the logic of industrial integration will continue to dominate entrepreneurial decisions and that this, in turn, will persist as the principal growth engine of the economy in general, we Mexicans should review the constellation of possibilities with a view toward the future.

On its part, the new Chinese assertiveness follows an implacable rationality: take advantage of the weakness of the U.S. in order to establish new geopolitical realities. If one observes the manner in which artificial islands have been constructed throughout the South China Sea, to the degree of formalizing them as a new province, China’s way of acting leaves no doubt with respect to the clarity of vision, and the continuity of same, which is reinforced with the new internal tonic of a new “permanent” unipersonal leadership. The decision of Xi Jinping to circumvent regular elections says everything about his objectives both political and international: while it entails the evident complexity of the succession (that tends to be the weak link because it exhibits a tendency to be unpredictable, like what happened to Mubarak in Egypt and now to Putin in Russia), it permits a continuity of command and of vision that no other country can achieve.

Mexico has had a long relationship with China: from the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1972, the political relationship has been profound, albeit not so the economic one. Certainly, Mexico imports merchandise in the dozens of billions of dollars from that nation (in addition to others via the contraband route), but it exports relatively little. The same is true of the capital balance:  several Mexican enterprises have a presence in the Asian giant and there are Chinese companies in Mexico but the aggregate is relatively modest.

Over the last year, Mexico has been reviewing its international relations, part by design and part due to the way things have come to pass. The greatest surprise comes not from China, but rather from Brazil, a nation that for decades has regarded Mexico with suspicion and as a competitor; however, in recent times, Brazil has sought to intensify its economic and political bonds.  While the two nations -Brazil and Mexico- have assumed radically distinct strategies over the past decades -Brazil entertains a strong protectionist bias, Mexico has embarked on a marked liberalizing approach- the rationality of carrying out more exchanges and developing greater cooperation in the political realm is evident.

The question is what is possible and desirable with China. On the one hand, Mexico is firmly anchored in the North American region –especially through the industrial supply chains, but also in strategic political logic- and that establishes an outright limit to any exchange, in addition to obligating a triangular conception –Mexico, the U.S. and China- in the relationship. On the other hand, within this framework, there are many opportunities to deepen the relationship and develop novel ways of interacting, in political as well as economic spheres.

What plainly makes no sense in terms of reality is the notion of there being a “Chinese playing card” in the relation with the U.S. China would never accept being a bargaining chip, but its thrust as a major world power obliges Mexico to define its own priorities and establish frameworks of possibility in the relationship with the U.S. as well as with China. There is no way out of this triangle, but there is one of progressively amplifying it.

www.cidac.org
@lrubiof

The denial

Luis Rubio

A few years ago, when Beijing was getting ready to receive the heads of government that make up APEC, the city government closed hundreds of factories and banned the circulation of millions of vehicles, all in the interest of reducing air pollution and trying to give it a less dirty facade to the city. Despite these efforts, a telephone app that published the pollution index of the big city showed scandalous numbers, far superior to those tolerable according to the World Health Organization. The government did not take long to solve the problem: it blocked the use of that application and with that it gave a holy sepulcher to the pollution.

This is how President López Obrador appears to act. Instead of solving the country’s problems, he is determined to destroy everything that already worked and, in many cases, worked extraordinarily well. The country was on the right track, even with huge shortcomings and unresolved issues, but significantly better than it was in the seventies and eighties. Now the objective seems to be to break the dishes, destroy everything that exists and pretend that the problems are solved by themselves.

The strategy of labeling everything as evil and corrupt already paid off in the form of increasing unemployment, an economy that is going down and a total absence of new investment, which only worsens the first two indicators. The president is not willing to acknowledge that his strategy is causing these phenomena and that, if it continues, it will not succeed but to plunge the country into a crisis of immeasurable dimensions. The signals sent by the financial markets regarding the reliability of the Mexican debt are not promising; rather, they anticipate risks that, if not addressed immediately, will cause just what the president says he wants to avoid.

The problem is not Pemex’s finances, even though that is a huge problem. The problem is the whole conception of the government, which wants to destroy what exists, when what the country requires are actions that resolve current and ancestral problems that nobody has wanted to face for a long time and for which the President has the legitimacy needed. The economic strategy of recent decades is the only one possible, although it would have to be carried out better: it is no coincidence that, literally, all the nations of the world have gone down a similar path. The exceptions are precisely the examples that we should not want to imitate, such as North Korea and Venezuela. Even Cuba has entered into the logic of globalization, albeit modestly.

The starting point for AMLO is that everything that was made after 1982 was wrong. That premise errs on two fronts: first, he does not recognize that the crisis of 1982 resulted from prolonging for too long -and, in fact, exacerbating- the strategy of stabilizing development, to the point of provoking a debt crisis that took decades to control. Secondly, he does not accept that the strategy of introspective, almost autarchic development ceased to be sustainable because it did not meet the needs of an increasingly demanding population, and because the world changed with communications, technology and the way of producing. The strategy adopted after 1982 has many shortcomings and errors, which need to be addressed, but it is the only one possible.

President López Obrador has the legitimacy and leadership to do what governments of past decades could not or would not do: eliminate the obstacles to development that were preserved and protected and which lie at the heart of the low rate of growth (in average) that the country has sustained for too long. The problems that the country faces have to do with stagnant political and social structures that favor what Luis de la Calle* calls the “extortion economy,” where authorities, unions, monopolies, bureaucracies and criminals extort money from citizens, businessmen, students, proprietors and merchants, thus preventing companies from growing and the country from developing. If the president really wants to trigger high growth and give opportunities to the most disadvantaged Mexicans, his strategy should be to break with this impunity.

What he is doing is exactly the opposite: he is strengthening fiefdoms, encouraging (and rewarding) trade unions that hinder everything and cultivating and captivating companies that impede competition. Causing union conflicts, attacking companies that generate energy and stoking a polarized environment will only achieve less growth, less investment and, if the destruction of everything existing persists, a crisis of the dimensions of 1995. Or worse.

Oaxaca does not progress because the social, political and union structures all interfere and create obstacles to development. One needs no more than to observe what drives successful places like Aguascalientes or Querétaro to see what a favorable political, social and business environment can create. The question is whether what President López Obrador wants is to convert the whole country into Oaxaca, the path he has adopted, or to confront the problems of Oaxaca and, in general, of the south of the country (although not exclusively) so that the whole country can join in the high rates of growth of the aforementioned states, the only way the most disadvantaged citizens may end up having the same opportunities and rights as the most successful. In a word: leveling the field from the bottom up or from the top down?

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/extortionomics-and-ideas-to-leverage-the-digital-revolution

 

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

 

The vision and the power grab

Wilson Center    Mexico Institute

                                                                                  by Luis Rubio
@lrubiof

 One hundred days to consolidate a power grab. That seems to be the rationale and, gradually, the reality. López Obrador arrived at the presidency with an agenda but not with a plan: the agenda is to backtrack on anything and everything that was built and created after 1982. The plan does not go further than centralizing power in order to recreate the old order and, maybe, to introduce reelection into the Constitution. This is no mere change of paradigm, it is the beginning of a new era, not necessarily for the good.

There is a clear vision behind López Obrador’s thrust, although it is somewhat of a caricature: the notion that the presidents of the 1960s were all-powerful and could get their way at no cost. He represents the revenge of the statists against the technocrats in the fight that began in the late 1960s and early 1970s over the direction Mexico should take when the economy began to falter. The economic side of the government argued for gradual liberalization; the political side, which won the day in 1970, argued for a greater role of the government in the economy. The strategy appeared to work, at least at the beginning; however, by 1982, the government had gone bankrupt and the country was burdened with an extremely heavy foreign debt. López Obrador has fond memories of that era, when the economy grew at close to 7 percent on average and there was no violence, but he dismisses the risk of leading to a similar financial crisis. Thus, he is plowing ahead at the fastest possible rate.

While the scheme is clear from the very beginning, the oddity of the moment is that he enjoys a level of popularity previously unknown in the country. He exerts an exceptional leadership, and people want to believe that things will get better; this combination has produced spectacular results. The flip side of the coin is that private investment is completely stalled, and the government is not trying to attract more. In fact, the president’s party is even threatening to limit foreign investment. Furthermore, by cancelling the construction of the Mexico City airport, new ventures in energy, and reneging on existing contracts, the damage being caused is exorbitant.

The financial situation at the start of 1982 was bad enough, but it took a turn for the worse, and became a full-fledged political crisis, when the government expropriated the private banks. It took Mexico at least two decades to recover from that blow, and it was only possible thanks to NAFTA, which created political and legal guarantees to overcome the fears among investors. López Obrador has not gone that far, but unless he corrects course, Mexico could end up in a similar position not too far down the road.

The views expressed here are those of the author.

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-vision-and-the-power-grab