While we here in Mexico are, literally, eaten up inside by trifling infernos and washerwoman infighting, the world moves ahead with extraordinary celerity, creating and changing realities and futures in its wake. Whoever has observed the dynamic by means of which many of the pillars of worldwide stability have changed over the past two years could do nothing more than be astonished by everything that has been upended.

Following the sage advice of the great baseball player and manager Casey Stengel, who said “never make predictions, especially about the future”, I would like to share a series of observations on themes that are in our surroundings and that could affect us and oblige us to rethink what is important for our development. These are reflections on facts and tendencies whose sole common denominator is the depth and rapidity of the change that is taking place.

• The generalized perception is that we are overwhelmed by BRICs, the complex of countries identified by an investment bank as the most probable nations to achieve high growth rates in the coming years, i.e., Brazil; Russia; China, and India. However, as Macario Schettino aptly notes, the Mexican per-capita Gross internal product (GDP) is higher than that of three of these nations (the fourth, Russia), despite that our economy has grown much more slowly than these. This resolves nothing, but it obliges us to put our stagnation into perspective, which is certainly more mental than physical or economic.
• It is in vogue to see Brazil as the country that “did it”. However, it must be understood that while there is much that is enviable in the economic dynamic that it has acquired, the reasons for Brazil’s success are very concrete and its forthcoming risks are very real. In Brazil, several reforms have been carried out, and the Brazilians have been much more intelligent than we in some themes, for example, in the manner in which they privatized their telecommunications. But the main source of recent Brazilian success does not rest upon great reforms, but rather, on the clearsightedness and continuity of its leadership. The Brazilians have had two very distinct presidents in the last 15 years, but only one development strategy. Cardoso carried out reforms, the majority of which were less ambitious than ours, and Lula afforded them continuity. It is difficult to imagine two leaders so contrasting in ideology or in personality, but the success of their country resides in the intelligence that they had to do what was imperative, so that the second of them would be able to continue the project of the first, whether or not it would imply breaking the second’s campaign promises. Brazil has many outstanding industrial assets, including airplanes and machinery, but its recent exporting success lies in the apparently insatiable Chinese demand for raw material and foodstuffs. One question that is not at all irrelevant is what would happen on changing the tendencies in a country that has generated all of this demand for Brazilian goods?
• In the popular imaginary, China has become the world power -or threat- of the future. Within this context, it is interesting to listen to what is being said by Chinese Premier Wen Jia-bao, who has been unusually frank in warning of the risks of an economic collapse. Not long ago, he noted that “the greatest problem in the Chinese economy is that its growth is unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable”. More recently, a periodical quoted him as opposing new investment projects because there was an excess of investments that were creating a bubble and because the overwhelming majority of the stimulus package that his government organized has been used to subsidize banks and government enterprises, which cannot have another effect but to continue inflating the bubble. Although China has currency reserves upward of two trillion dollars, it cannot utilize these to solve the debt problem of its enterprises and banks because this would impede financing its buyers (essentially the U.S.). At the same time, China’s exports have diminished because its main client, the U.S., has been importing much less than before. To go from being a fundamentally exporting nation toward its internal market will have to occur in the next years, but it is not obvious that China will achieve this without mishaps. Recent evidence suggests that it will be very difficult for China to continue growing at the rhythm of the most recent decades, which would affect the rest of the world.
• The U.S. economy is changing swiftly. While some of its old industrial sectors languish, other recuperate, but what is most significant is the exceptional growth of activities that could become major indicators of its future growth, above all in matters of biotechnology, communications and other areas, such an innovation and technological development, in which the economic situation represents no restriction.

Perhaps the strangest thing in this entire scenario is the fact that we appear to be content with the panorama that encircles us, or, at least, resigned to our sluggishness. The political as well as the economic change taking place in our principal business partner, the U.S., (and in our main competitor, China) has enormous consequences for us and opens immense opportunities that no one appears to be contemplating. For example, the ever more quarrelsome nature of its trading strategies has been translated into conflicts and compensatory taxes on Chinese and Brazilian products that we probably could replace. The same is true in the area of health, an issue that has consumed more than one year of political debate in the U.S. and in which we could perhaps be part of the solution by offering U.S.-accredited health services at a lower cost. Despite this, we possess no strategy to seize the opportunities or, at least, to attempt to take advantage of them.

One way to overestimate our difficulties -as well as overestimating our partners and competitors- is to underestimate our assets. The Mexican economy has not grown considerably in per-capita terms during the last two decades, but the financial stability that has been achieved has enormous advantages, above all if we compare it with the crisis situation that other nations around us are experiencing and those that follow these will. Although we appear to be incapable of reaching it, the sources of success of other nations appear to be much more attainable than is commonly believed: with a few legislative and executive fixes, each within its own confines, Mexico could procure the initiation of a great transformation process. Brazil has shown that the most important thing for achieving this is to have convincing leadership, one with greater convictions than interests.

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“The devil is in the details” counsels an old refrain. In the case of the political reforms that are being debated at present in the public forum, something very peculiar has taken place: from a rotund negative for reform, we have proceeded to the logic that what is important is to approve a reform, any reform at all, independent of its content. As if it were a process of mass production, what is relevant is that Congress get the job done, not that the agenda contribute to improving the life of Mexicans, or, at the very least, to facilitating decision-making in the political system. This sounds more like an effort to satisfy the chorus than an attempt to transform and improve the system of government that we have.

What is important in a reform is the objective that it pursues and the probability that this objective will be achieved with the changes that are carried out. Changing just to change is not only senseless, but is also dangerous because it contributes to continuing to undermine the institutions, and, above all, because it can exert unanticipated effects that are much more damaging than the status quo. Worse yet when voices are few and interests are many.

In the abstract, many of the reforms proposed make absolute sense. But our history is rich in abstract discussions that on coming alight upon a law, a decision or the creation of an institution, frequently do not achieve the objective that these proposed. In the 19th century, many of the debates sustained by monarchists and republicans, liberals and conservatives regarding how the nature of the country desired was to be constructed, in many cases had more to do with the preference for imitating Europe or the U.S., respectively, than with understanding the reality of Mexico and responding to it. In a certain manner, the system that engendered the PRI was the first autochthonous response in more than an entire century of independent life.

The present discussion recalls much of the 19th century: the importance of adopting this or that institutional design because it functions well “there”. In stating this, I do not wish to suggest that Mexico is in any way a unique country, so distinct from the remainder of the human race that it cannot imitate or adapt successful institutions from other latitudes. Instead, my concern resides in the pretension of adopting institutions or institutional designs without adapting these to our reality. In too many cases, the proposals respond not to what works in other latitudes, but rather, to very-short-term electoral and political calculations. When this is the tonic, it would be better to begin by negotiating deep-rooted political agreements among the actors themselves rather than to bring about legislative processes that will never be fulfilled or that, from the out start, will never enjoy full legitimacy.

There are, of course, diverse reform proposals that possess all the sense in the world and that certainly would enjoy broad agreement. For example, who could object that the line of succession be precisely defined, in black and white, in the case of “absolute” absence of the President of the Republic, a theme that, for explicable reasons (more than one President was assassinated to make way for his Vice President…), the Constitution never achieved.

On the other hand, there are proposals that simply have no reason to be. The notion of converting the Public Prosecutor into an autonomous entity not only has no beginning or end conceptually or in the existing reality, but also can even be extremely destructive. The Public Prosecutor must respond to the State authority, whether it be the Executive (as in the case of the Attorney General (PGR) at present), or to the Judiciary, or to both (as in the U.S.), but not to itself. I share the idea that it is fundamental to end the monopoly of penal action in order to professionalize and de-politicize the office of the Public Prosecutor, but that would not be equivalent to leaving it to its leisure. Can someone imagine that would occur with a Chapa-Bezanilla (a former Public Prosecutor that was inspired by his own vendettas) without a boss or control?

Some of the proposed reforms have sense in the abstract, but clash with reality. In a democratic and civilized country, one would expect that the Cabinet would be ratified by the Senate. But Mexico has not reached this stage of development, and ratification could become a negotiation process aimed less at developing a proper check on presidential power than at limiting the president’s powers through the back door. This is the perfect example of the type of reform that is necessary but that is not conceivable until broad and profound agreement has intervened concerning power: how it is distributed; how it is recognized, and how it is legitimized. In the absence of this, the only thing that would be achieved would be heightened paralysis, or the de facto transfer of the executive power to the Senate.

There are reforms that possess no greater purpose than that of satisfying the critics and faultfinders. Reducing the size of the legislative chambers cannot, nor should it, be an objective in itself. It would first be relevant to respond to questions such as whether the type of hybrid that produces the direct and proportional election is adequate for our circumstances, whether a Senate should have a component of proportionality, or whether the present distance between the legislative power and the citizenry contributes to better government. Setting our sights on the numbers implies beginning at the end and obviating the themes at the core: accountability; who nominates -in real life- the candidates; and what is the best way to distribute responsibilities, monies, all of this within a framework of broad legitimacy. None of the proposed reforms advances in this direction.

What is important does not lie in the specifics of the reforms, but rather, in the fact that the rationality that lies behind these is greatly concerned with the short-term political calculations of the relevant actors (calculations that could well include satisfying the critics), and has very little to do with the construction of a better decision-making process, with a fairer and more effective system of government, and above all, in a framework within which the population can develop and enjoy the benefits of their own efforts. None of this appears in the reform proposals.

It is not necessary to regress too far in time to observe the manner in which a reform process set forth in the abstract and without recognition of the day-to-day reality can end in disaster. Many of the economic reforms and privatizations of the 80s and 90s sounded logical and sensible, but the required scaffolding was never constructed: the details for these to be successful. As in the fairy tale Alice in Wonderland, the entire country entered into a process of transformation that, with few exceptions, many extraordinarily positive and important (like NAFTA), did not end well.

As Charles De Gaulle would have said, reforms are too important to be left in the hands of politicians. There are times at which paralysis is not the worst that could be happening.

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In a bitter exchange between a Soviet police commissar and an intellectual described by Elie Wiesel in his play The Madness of God, the commissioner demands his listener to speak up and take a public stance to criticize his brethren on the grounds that “the word was given to man to use it and express himself.” The intellectual took less than a second to respond and said “and he also gave us silence comrade, also silence.” The same holds true in politics.

Few politicians can be associated with silence. Rhetoric, demagoguery and verbiage are much more common among them. Politics is a function and profession devoted to convincing and negotiating and the spoken word is its prime tool. As in everything else, balance is what matters: there are moments when a great speech is what is required, but in others, it is silence that becomes more valuable. Those who talk too much or those who remain silent when they need to take a stand end up becoming irrelevant.

There are politicians who are excessively fond of speaking (and quoting themselves) and believe that this is the way to maximize their impact. Others are more frugal and careful. Some have opinions about a few issues, others have opinions on everything. Some need the podium and the microphone more than they need oxygen and food. In public life, timing, circumstance and nature of the audience, all together, set the framework within which politicians operate. A speech in the Zocalo is not the same thing as a wake, and an intervention at a hearing of the congress is not the same as a state of the union address. Each circumstance requires its own form and content. But in each one can appreciate the difference in style and personality: those who speak profusely, those who remain silent and those who utter just the right words. As politics is full of narcissists, they all think they are unbeatable. But the relevant question here is which are more effective, which achieve a greater impact: which are worthy of respect.

Many believe that words are carried by the wind and therefore have no great value. But in politics words are sublime because they entail trust and bridge-building or distrust and animosity. A timely word can brighten a life and transform a nation while a misguided word expressed at the wrong time can destroy years of effort. Words imply commitment and involve responsibility. Those who abuse words loose all credibility. The success of politicians that history holds dear lies precisely in the value of the words that they uttered. Cicero, Churchill and Roosevelt are three examples of statesmen who turned words into leadership and, to a large extent, the reason for their success. Some of our recent presidents are remembered less for their discourse than for the abuse of it.

The case of former presidents can shed some light. Felipe Gonzalez, a Spanish president endowed with exceptional rhetorical skills and who had the ability to lead a successful political transition, tells that the day he ended his mandate, he decided to make a vow of silence to leave his successor unburdened, free to succeed but and also the freedom to fail. He illustrated his choice with an anecdote: a large Chinese vase placed in a museum can be an extraordinary piece to watch and appreciate, but the same vase placed in the living room of a house is nothing but an obstacle. A former president who talks too much is like a large Chinese vase in the middle of the living room.

Word and silence, the traits and tools of politics, are what make the great heroes of public life. When Don Miguel Mancera, the then director of the central bank in Mexico gave a speech, everyone awaited anxiously because he did not give too many and when he did, he was clear and blunt. Everyone listened. Every word counted, each sentence had a meaning and everything constituted a message that nobody in the financial world could afford to ignore.

Conversely, some of our legislators, governors, mayors and presidents assume that nobody is aware of the number of promises, observations, and accusations, all vain, that they put forth. The abuse of words among some of them is boundless. Unsubstantiated in real life, their statements -and excesses- all end in the gallows of credibility. The impunity they enjoy when they abuse with their rhetoric and speech (when not outright lies) largely explains the very low esteem people have for them. It is perhaps not a coincidence that many of the politicians who take the podium day after day are the same ones who remain silent when they should be speaking. Silences are as unforgivable as incontinence in the praise: both suggest masked complicity.

Although polls put all politicians together and show an almost generalized contempt for them, there are still many cases of exceptional dignity that show well earned respect. Don Luis H. Alvarez has made silence and prudence virtues that far outweigh the speeches of belligerent presidents. Cuauhtémoc Cardenas is meager in his words and generous in his silences. His transit through Mexican politics since he chose to break with the PRI has been incomparably richer and more powerful than that of his verbose peers. Francisco Labastida could have led a large encampment in the Zocalo and Reforma but opted to remain silent and be responsible, and today has become one of the nation’s most respected politicians. When he speaks, the rest listen. Not many senators can say the same thing.

Of course there are many more politicians more committed to demagoguery than to doing their jobs, but those who stand out and those who have reason to feel satisfied are those that make use of words and silence because they understand them as a commitment and as a means to accomplish something relevant, not as an end in itself. When describing Chou Enlai, Kissinger wrote that he exemplified the essential character of a statesman. The use of the word is undoubtedly one of its core components.

In their interchanges with the media, cheap politicians “leak” secrets, gossip and lies to discredit their enemies. Statesmen inform, explain and try to convince. Perhaps one of the reasons why we lack world-class investigative journalism across the spectrum is precisely because we have many more demagogues than likely statesmen.
Words and silence are worthy when they are treasured and when this happens they acquire a higher value, a moral strength that transforms societies and changes the world. Hopefully, one day we will have one or two of those,

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In his famed television program ¿Qué Nos Pasa?, Héctor Suárez showed us up, but he was unable to change the reality. The gist of the program was to place our incongruities on exhibit, above all, our disinclination for problem solving. Our difficulties are known to everyone, they are easy to identify, and it does not require a genius to face up to them.  But the fact is that we do not confront them: we remain stuck along the way without reaching a resolution.

We Mexicans have become accustomed to salvation at the hands of third persons. Decades of PRI governments have made us dependent upon receiving a summons from the authorities. The president was the leader in, owner of, and expert on everything. In an admix of features of the Aztec kingdom’s tlatoani with corporativism, the PRI created an entire culture of subordination, submission, and dependence that has made us incapable of acting on our own.  And we are not overcoming this stage. Everyone criticizes the president for his inability or reluctance to assume the leadership function that traditionally fell to the tlatoani during the six-year term, but the extraordinary thing is that alternative leaders do not emerge who assume the responsibility, replenish the shortfalls, and relieve the wants. In nations like Brazil, the U.S., France or Chile there is no dearth of leaders ready and willing to raise their heads and call for action. Here only those looking for personal gain come out.

How is it possible that in an avowedly modern country, with exceptional aptitudes of leadership in persons, politicians, enterprises, organizations, and institutions, no leadership emerges to afford opportunities for development? The majority of our politicians understand the themes and problems perfectly well, but when they act, they do so self-interestedly or within the space allowed them by their group or corporatist interest. The PRI culture continues to permeate everything: political parties; the media, business: with honorable exceptions, all express themselves in the plural, but are solely concerned with themselves. In the country, there are hundreds of competent leaders who engage in a multiplicity of activities, regions, and sectors, yet no one emerges to smite the paralysis.

The country has been stuck for years, unable to promote and achieve economic growth and the generation of wealth. Rather than advancing the theme on which the whole population is in agreement, including the most reactionary and recalcitrant interests, the only thing that has been achieved is expanding the prerogatives of the bureaucracy and corruption and exacting less and less accountability. Because that, and nothing else, is what is manifested by the energy reform, which conferred still greater privileges on the union or in the case of the government’s capitulation to the teachers’ union. The parties in the government change, but populist obscurantism persists: rather than a clean break with the status quo, everything contributes to entrenching the latter and prolonging its existence. Instead of promoting prosperity, we have perfected the art of paralysis. As a group, practically no politician or party today assumes the essence of its responsibility: that wealth must first be created, not only regulated, curbed, or distributed.

Our problems are not difficult to diagnose, and there is an infinity of proposals for solutions. Although the existence of a problem is acknowledged ‒the rhetoric that emanates from the mouthpiece for the parties, entrepreneurs, union leaders, and intellectuals of all stripes exhibit this‒ what is important is to satisfy the personal or group agenda, not the urgency to transform the country. Everyone appears to take to task what already exists, but there is no connection between the complaints and the proposals for a solution. The political proposals and diagnoses that arise from these are rife with content but sparse on insight. There is no point in proposing a grand strategy for transformation when none of the solutions that are therein visualized or proposed are susceptible to changing the reality for the good.

Above everything else, it is evident that the country lives with fundamental political as well as economic contradictions and dysfunctionalities. No matter the numbers of diagnoses, practically none recognize the guises ‒and veiled interests‒ that prevent proposals from being viable solutions. In the economic as well as in the political arena, there are concrete proposals for confronting the reality, many of these excessively wise and reasonable, but we live a paradox in which their adoption would not resolve the problems. For more than two decades, reforms have been approved that have not achieved breaking the impasse that characterizes us. Something must be wrong.

The country needs many reforms, but lacks the capacity to absorb and process them; thus, it would better not to pretend that a Band-Aid is going to cure a migraine. It is not that many of the proposals entail bad ideas: it is, simply, that the solution cannot vie with the real problem.

The PRI culture that was imposed for many decades bequeathed to us a legacy of mental myths and vices that we appear unable to surmount. In economic matters, the array of obstacles to the generation of wealth is fundamental. This is not corrected, for instance, with additional taxes or better expenditure of monies, although  both might be necessary, but rather with the elimination of obstacles to the installation and operation of commercial undertakings, investment in infrastructure, generation of conditions of true and effective competition, and the breakup of union structures that, as does the teachers’ union, maintain the populace submissive, mired in an educative system that inhibits the individual’s creativity and development. It is not at all worthwhile to remodel fiscal structures, or privatize businesses, or negotiate free trade agreements, all of which are very necessary, if everything is designed to impede the economy from achieving its principal mission: to generate wealth with equal opportunities for all.

The same is true of the political system: it is evident that it is bogged down, but it is also evident that the proposed reforms would not end the power monopolies, the distance between the citizenry and those who govern, or the failure to recognize the winners of an election. To the contrary: given our political reality, many of the proposed reforms would not only uphold the present power structure, but would also discredit the notion of and the urgency for reform anew. The problem of power and the lack of agreement as to how to distribute it, contain it, and be accountable for it must precede any legal reform. These are issues of leadership and political prodding, not of legislation. First things first.

We are all aware that the president has been unable to exercise the leadership that his function commands in our system. However, what is pathetic is that alternative, credible leadership does not arise, which says what is obvious about the country and the political-economic system: that is, as in a Hans Christian Andersen fairy tale, the emperor is wearing no clothes. Mexico does not need first-rate leaders in all spheres, but none appear ready to assume this function outside of their own sphere: it is easier to complain about the incompetence of others, of the worst government, or of how bad things are. It is urgent to break with Orwell’s groupthink, which kills the country little by little…

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“Politics according to John Kenneth Galbraith, is the art of choosing between the disastrous and the unpalatable.” The problem for President Calderon is that in the absence of a government strategy, he is unable to distinguish one from the other. In its early years, his administration sowed what they could but now that he is approaching the final stretch he hesitates and confuses his responsibilities: to be party or to be government?

A question of this nature would not be relevant in a consolidated democracy where institutions are strong and are beyond the inevitable vagaries of individual or party interests. A developed country can overcome the mistakes of a president or the vicissitudes of a crisis. The nations that have not reached that stage are more fragile and require extra care; this is why, for example, a European premier or an American president have no qualms about promoting their parties and successors while in our country that constitutes a fundamental violation of electoral laws. When nations have managed to build strong institutions, men go into the background. Not so in countries like ours where every act and every decision entails consequences.

The current debate is about the potential removal of Fernando Gomez Mont as Secretary of the Interior. In a presidential system, cabinet officials are appointed and removed by the person who appointed them and, therefore, respond to their choices and preferences: they serve at the pleasure of the president. From that perspective, beyond idle gossip, the decision to replace the secretary is only a purely administrative matter. However, current circumstances are far-reaching and warrant serious analysis.
There were two significant moments in the process that led to the current situation. One was when the government was negotiating the 2010 budget, and the other one when government and party discussed the possibility of joining PRD in an electoral alliance for several of the upcoming state elections.

Given the results of the past midterm elections, the PRI was in the privileged position of practically being able to approve the budget all by itself, something that would have left the government completely marginalized, almost with no discretionary spending, as happened to Fox in 2005. However, government and PAN negotiators in the House were very skilful and succeeded in reaching a consensus budget that was extremely close to what the president had originally proposed. Today we know that, in exchange for their willingness to act as loyal opposition, i.e., opposition that acknowledges the legitimacy of the government, the Secretary of the Interior offered the PRI that the PAN would not partner with the PRD in the 2010 state elections.

The second moment took place in the past two months when the PAN and the government debated the PRD proposal to jointly form an alliance to contest the state elections in Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Puebla, Hidalgo and other states. The theme of the government’s commitment not to form an alliance was discussed in public and it was no secret to anyone except, apparently, to the president.

In abstract terms, an alliance with the PRD to try to win some governorships held by the PRI has an impeccable logic, if we were talking about an era prior to 2000. Everything was fair game when the opposition’s only goal, of all parties, was to defeat the monopoly of power (i.e. PRI) and, even under such conditions, the PAN won in 2000 without alliances. As a citizen, I deplore the continued absence of competitive conditions in various states of Mexico: the PRI has managed to preserve oppressive power preserves and a level of control that only benefits the local chieftains. The issue today is that the PAN is just not any party, but the ruling party and the central responsibility of government is to govern and more so in a country with weak institutions.

Certainly, part of the duties of a government committed to democracy should be to strengthen institutions, fight chiefdoms and develop institutional and legal frameworks for the benefit of the citizens. However, forming an alliance with its main rival to defeat its main counterpart and partner in the important issues of governance of the country constitutes an unequivocal irresponsibility. It is understandable that the PAN wants to defeat the PRI in its bastions of power, and it is entirely legitimate that the PRD propose such partnerships to achieve this. What is not reasonable or logical, is that the government risk the stability of the country for the sake of an electoral adventure which, by the way, could also end up losing the elections.

Back to the individual in question. The secretary is being accused of having committed the government in a decision that was not up to him to make but one about which no one complained of when it went well (i.e., when the budget came out as the president wanted). A secretary is not a mere employee: if making choices that are clearly responsible in terms of his or her institutional mandate involves the risk of being accused of insubordination, then no person would work for this government. An official can only function when the goals are clear and so is his or her responsibility. The risks are infinite when there are no margins to make a decision and when the objectives are unclear, contradictory or, worse, when they fluctuate.

In a country characterized by weak institutions, individuals become crucial and their word essential.  More importantly, in the absence of a government strategy, the daily and systematic political operation, of which the Secretary of the Interior is responsible, becomes fundamental to avoid a shipwreck. So, basically, what Mr. Gomez Mont is being accused of is fulfilling his responsibility to maintain stability and help the government to survive.

Over the coming months we will have the opportunity to observe, first, if the electoral alliances were fruitful, at least in terms of having won some governorships for the PAN and the PRD. Then we will have to assess whether the cost in terms of the daily political operation and governance were worthwhile. But the turning point will come at the end of this year when next year’s budget is negotiated, as it will surely be then when the PRI decides how to respond to the unfulfilled promises. Entering the crucial year in which presidential candidates will be nominated, the PAN may end up on the defensive and without discretionary spending capacity. All this due to the lack of strategic vision and for a few alliances of doubtful viability.

Jorge Luis Borges used to say that Peronism was neither good nor bad: it was simply incorrigible. Every political party is what it is, but the PAN seems unable to understand that government and opposition are two entirely different things.

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The U.S. border has always been a reason for substantial concern with respect to the rulers of the federal government. Distant enemies, distant enmities, in close proximity to the traditional foe -and the historic loss of territory- the borders have adopted the myths and realities that are often difficult to understand for those of who do not live along the border. Today, with Ciudad Juárez at the forefront, the themes are more mundane, more specific: the people in this city live with daily violence that appears to have no end and that, little by little, eats away at families, birthrights, and values. Many would rather go to the U.S., others demand solutions; the majority only aspire for the installment of a local government that works, not one composed of so-called aviators, whose names are on Juárez payrolls, but who fly in from the state or federal capital to collect paychecks for work not done, their interest not transcending the proverbial fifteen minutes of media fame.

I Juárez Mexicans came to see what a perfect storm looks like: an economy growing at an extraordinary pace, huge inflows of people from the rest of the country, absences of the minimum social, physical, security and governmental infrastructure, and on top of this all, the sudden collapse of the federal government’s structure of political control. The mixture translated into criminality, destruction of the social fabric, disappearance of the family as a basic social structure and of any sense of community. Only under this framework can one explain the hordes of youths becoming hired assassins roaming through the streets as if they own them. Only this way can we fathom the world of cruelty, violence and death that saw them come to life and grow. Juárez long ago ceased to be an organized and functional society.

The political war that we are experiencing in Mexico makes it difficult to elucidate the central from the peripheral. If we guide ourselves by the newspaper headlines, it is impossible to determine whether 1) an army battle is being waged in Juárez against the population, 2) the narcos are battling against the government, 3) it is the population against violence, or 4) whether it is the country against the narcos. There is no doubt, however, that the Juárez population is satiated with violence, lack of government, narcos, and above all, the most basic criminality: that which coerces, steals, and kills, that which is not necessarily linked with narcotrafficking, and that for which none of the three levels of government has an answer.

Criminality began its destruction of the tranquility of the country from at least the early 1990s; nonetheless, 15 long years later, we have not been able to see concrete and definitive answers. Ciudad Juárez is without doubt an extreme in the wave of insecurity, but it is not atypical. The number of kidnappings, thefts, and extortion strategies spout forth like foam. The number of entrepreneurs, big stores, and Mom-and-Pop operations that have to cough up (“protection” money) or be held up ‒the sale and purchase of protection, or extortion‒ is increasing throughout the country and affects even the large retail enterprises, those which one would imagine would enjoy a certain immunity. Governments come and go, but criminality hangs tough.

President Calderón launched the war against the narco, not because he had to legitimize himself, although this was certainly a circumstantial benefit, but rather because the country was engulfed in narcotrafficking, narcoretailing, corruption, and violence, and recovering the national presence was critical. The criminality to which neither this government, nor its predecessors, has neglected to respond is that which exerts an impact on the average citizen. Yes, this is a local, and not a federal, theme, but for a country emerging from the era of PRI hypercentralism, the distinction remains imperceptible for the populace. All of a sudden, from the 1990s on, federal authority began to erode until, with the defeat of the PRI in 2000, the entire historical structure of power was distorted: criminality took root, and a police and security structure was never created for the new era in which we live. The federal government stopped controlling the state governors and municipal presidents, and the majority of these never developed an effective governmental structure. The result is that the criminals -to a even greater extent than the narcos- call the shots, as it were, if not in reality govern a good part of the national territory.

Federal concerns are poorly focused. Many border zone inhabitants have migrated to the “other side”, not because they prefer to live there, but instead, because they are sick of the criminality. This delinquency is the product of change in the political realities that the country has lived through but not attended to: there is no political structure that is capable of dealing with delinquency; the war against the narco possesses its own logic, but it does not resolve the criminality of every day. What we have is weak, incompetent authorities who do not understand the loss of their own legitimacy and who lack instruments to counteract the pain to which the population is being submitted in the wearing away of their lives. The government’s weakness has been more than matched by the muscle and makeup of organized crime: the latter, with greater clarity of vision, filled the void left by the absence of authority.

In Juárez, a battle is now being conducted that, unfortunately, compounds the theme affecting the voting population in view of the contest among political parties for the upcoming state election. Many Juarenses find themselves fed up amid a surfeit of abuse and lack of attention. One of them declared that now that his son has died, he would be able to go to live on the U.S. side of the border. Some months ago, the Latinobarímetro survey reported that more than one half of Mexicans would go to the U.S. on being presented with the opportunity. For many people in Juárez, moving to the other side of the border is not an issue of opportunity, but one of survival.

Many people are concerned about the loss of identity. However, all of the surveys show that the identity of the Mexican is extraordinarily deep-rooted. Deriving from difficult historical moments such as the U.S. invasion, national identity does not appear to be in doubt. What indeed is openly repudiated by the population is governmental incompetency, at all levels. The population is no longer able to confirm their own concerns each time that the illicit cohabitation of some authority -governor, municipal president, or police official- with organized crime comes to light. And, regrettably, new liaisons of this nature are reported every day. Although dictators like Stalin conveniently identified authority with government, in a democracy legitimacy must be earned by those who govern every day of their political lives. And many decades have elapsed since Mexican governors abandoned the citizenry to their fate in the matter of criminality.

If something does unite Mexican governments over time, it is their singular capacity to respond to the wrong problems. Several decades ago, in the face of fearing excision at the northern border, the government in power devised the National Border Program to “rescue” Mexicans in the region. What would be ideal today would be to transform the police and security systems so that cities like Juárez could regain peace. In an ideal world, this would imply the accelerated development of municipal capacities, but there are few examples in the country that permit contemplating a project of this nature in optimistic fashion. The alternative would be a type of protectorate, a supramunicipal authority, that would attend to, not only the blatant security problem, but also to the nonexistence of infrastructure –not only physical, but also educational, social, community and otherwise- for the city that has provided the country more jobs than any other in past decades. Notwithstanding this, it has occurred to no one to provide succor for the one and the same city of Juárez.

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In reflecting on British politics, Bertrand Russell said that generations of voters follow a predictable pattern that inexorably leads to frustration. They first vote for the party of their dreams, only to find that they do not find the solutions that they seek there. Therefore, they vote for the alternative, in the belief that this ‘other party’ is that which could bestow fortune upon them. Thus, a vicious circle of disillusion sets in. For Russell, the problem resided in the need for each party to impose its preferences instead of convening the majority of the population for a national project that transcends partisanship*. Mexican parties would have a hard time passing the test proposed by Russell.

There are two groups of Mexican voters: those who swear by one party and are only willing in the exceptional case to take leave of their trenches, and those who decide their vote according to the occasion, with a project oriented more toward constructing a future than to awaiting immediate answers. For the party in office, the theme is key: the PAN has been in the presidency for nearly 10 years, but the impact it has exerted on changing the reality for the good has been rather modest.

The 2000 election changed the reality of power, but did not lead to a novel institutionality. We are at present living a moment in which the struggle between parties and candidates is, nearly in its entirety, concerned with the past. The irony is that all appear to have their sights set on the same era, although for different reasons. The PAN appears resolute in recreating the Priista Presidency of the seventies. The PRD is split between ex-priistas who want to return to the economic policies of that era, and those born into the parties of the left and who now attempt to erect a modern social democracy. The PRI solely aspires to return to power and forget its two defeats. No one poses the idea of edifying a different future, one that is capable of checking out the desires and needs of a young and critical population that is in want of instruments, beyond that of the vote, in order for them to be something more than mere onlookers.

While the case of the PRD is the most complex due to the dissimilar genesis of the forces and traditions that consolidate it, the PAN party is perhaps the most paradoxical. The cabinet changes that took place at the end of 2009 were excessively revealing of the profound nature of the PAN. Instituted as a reaction to the Revolutionary Party, panistas have remained in the cryo-image of the all-powerful party of yesteryear.

From the time Fox became President, the panistas supposed that due to the sole fact of their having defeated the PRI, all of the power of the old presidency would flow toward them. Instead of recognizing the new political reality, the upshot of the panista victory, they soon began to criticize the President for not having thrown off the yoke of Hacienda, the Ministry of Public Finance. The obstacle had hitherto been the PRI; now it was Hacienda. In view of the cabinet changes, with Hacienda in the bag, the panistas could indeed be sure that the power was now theirs. They soon would be required to confront an evident dilemma: attempt to reproduce the PRI of the 1970s (spending left and right to carry the elections) or safeguard the economic stability. The dilemma is real, as priistas learned after 1994, but this will not impede their trying. Sooner or later, they will find a new scapegoat who justifies their inability to initiate the transformation that they have been promising for decades.

It would perhaps not be difficult to anticipate that this grandstanding will be directed toward the Bank of Mexico, the ever-appropriate bad guy. Legislative debate has set out to modify the central bank’s statute for incorporating into the entity’s mandate, not only the fight against inflation, but also economic growth. The supposition behind this idea is that higher inflation is a necessary condition for achieving a high growth rate, and that the mandate of the bank thwarts this. Any serious analyst knows that there is no contradiction between these two submissions and that, in fact, price stability is the sine qua non for sustainable economic growth. Notwithstanding this, the irony is that the opposition parties, as much as many of the legislators of the governmental party, embrace the same party line.

The growth problem is concerned with a lack of certainty in the economy and with an economic structure that does not contribute to opening opportunities for saving or investment.  But the panistas appear to be in the throes of another logic: rather than construct a development strategy, they are caught up in reproducing the old PRI. If they wish to return to power at some juncture, the PAN will have to offer something better than not being the PRI.

The worst predicament for the PAN is that their governments have been plagued by all of the vices for which they previously criticized the PRI. From the frivolity of Fox to the absence of continuity between the two six-year programs, the panistas have shown themselves to be a party of six-year terms. Similar to priistas, panistas have been deficient in a development program, long-term vision, or governmental strategy. In some cases, they have provided a pathetic sample of their vices, such as the recent decision of Demetrio Sodi’s delegational government to forsake roadway construction projects that were already in progress and for which the PAN had paid a high political price. Incapable of defending their programs, the panistas have not been different from other governments, except perhaps that they are less skillful in perpetuating themselves in power.

It is evident that the PAN administrations have launched some exceptional programs, even better than those that the PRI was ever able to bring about; among these, for example, the Oportunidades effort was converted into a politically neutral instrument to avoid rendering the fight against poverty a partisan one. It is impossible to ignore that the 2000 defeat of the PRI released Mexicans from the vise of priista authoritarianism. In the last analysis, however, and farther than these benefits, which are in no way irrelevant, the promise of the PAN has remained just that: a promise.

The great theme is what this tells us of the present reality and that of the future of Mexico. The two PAN administrations show that the problem of the country’s functioning is not linked with the party in office, but instead, with the development program in place and the capacity of the government in turn to carry this out. As citizens, top priority resides in how to right the wrongs before the potential return of the old PRI, with more ability—but no less a scarcity of ideas and convictions- to build something better.

*The Need for Political Skepticism, in Sceptical Essays

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Nehru, the great Indian statesman, said that “the moment has arrived, something that rarely takes place in history, when we take leave of the old and proceed toward the new, when an era ends, and when the cry of a nation, long suppressed, achieves its expression”. If ever there were something that unites Mexicans, it is the need to organize ourselves better in order to be capable of confronting the challenges of the future. This does not imply that it will be simple, or even feasible, to forge a consensus with respect to how this organizative structure should be, but it is clear that what we have is not working. Power reform has become an inexorable necessity, and, nonetheless, it is not obvious whether it will be possible.

The problems are enormous and the number of proposals for a solution, even greater. From the political end, approximately a year ago, the PRI party leader in the Senate postulated a proposal of reform drafted under the title of “The Eight Rs of the PRI”. At the end of that same year, the President dispatched a series of initiatives to the Senate directed toward reorganizing relations among the branches of government. With distinct areas of emphasis, each set of proposals responds to the difficulties and complexity that the country encounters in its decision-making processes.

Something similar occurs on the fiscal-economic plane. Although a discussion regarding the need for an “integral” fiscal reform (whatever that means) has been on the back burner for decades, the fall in petroleum prices has rendered this reform inexorable. At the same time, from the moment that the PRI lost their majority in Congress and later the Presidency, the reality of power has changed. This has been reflected in the relative power of the state governors, who currently exercise control over the greater part of the public expenditure. The meetings of the so-called conago, the confrérie of governors, were nothing more than an indication that the former power of the Presidency had broken into fragments, and the new reality of power would be reflected not only at the voting booth, but also in the distribution of monies.

In other words, the post-revolutionary pact launched by the PRI era resolved power problems and the distribution of finances throughout the seven decades that its reign endured. This age ended with the decision of the voters at the polls, but the institutions charged with administration of power relationships and expenditure distribution did not reform. This, and nothing else, is what lies behind the proposals for reform, both institutional and financial.

The clamor today is not due to a series of electoral, institutional, or fiscal reforms, but rather to an integral power reform. However profound and intelligent the proposals marauding around in the public debate, there is the risk of addressing a nonexistent problem, or, more precisely, that the problem is not being dealt with at its root. The risk that a package of reforms that does not clear up the problem will be approved should be of concern to us all. If the problem is one of power, it will not be resolved with new legislation, but instead with a deep-seated agreement –a broad political pact- that is subsequently codified into laws. In this instance, the order of the factors does indeed modify the outcome.

A power reform implies redefinition of what is fundamental in a society. Everyone is aware of the dysfunctional relations between the congressional and the executive branches of power. No less important are the distortions in the power relations between the federal government and those of the states: the old rules no longer work. The reality of power has made possible an evident disability at the Federal level (Congress and Executive) for the governors in terms of accountability.  The public expenditure pours forth, but responsibility does not. In the same fashion, the capacity has disappeared that characterized the former political system to articulate agreements and consensuses that rendered the country governable. Part of the present situation reflects the disabilities of specific notables, but the structural problem is real.

The citizenry, who for the first time have a voice, albeit limited, also clamor for their rights. The rejection of tax increases is not only a reflection of steep living costs or limited incomes, but also of deep-rooted dissatisfaction with the performance of the economy, of the government, and of their own exclusion from the decision-making processes.

All of these points of conflict, controversy, and displeasure speak of a country whose day-to-day operation has ceased being functional and requires a new pact that establishes, or re-establishes, equilibrium among public powers and between the Federation and the States. There would be several ways to come to grips with this problematic: One, that which has been exercised to date, with proposals and counterproposals that do little more than lard the legislative agenda, without offering the least possibility of resolving the basic problem. A second would comprise setting forth a great political pact, of the sort that comes about only once every century, one that establishes the foundations of a general transformation of the country. The third, which entails the greatest pragmatism of all, is that which has oriented dozens of nations facing similar situations (watch Brazil and India, China and South Africa as obvious examples), and would imply sufficient rectification in the short term to enable a break-through of the current impasse to create the conditions for a more durable long-term arrangement.

In general terms, politicians prefer the former, because it provides them with an exceptional starring role, whereas academics and benchwarming politicians prefer the second, because they take in the panorama as a whole and prefer a complete solution to a patchwork approach. And finally, the third is the option of governments in functions that opt to favor the daily functioning of their society rather than magic solutions that, in politics, rarely exist.

The case of Brazil is enlightening. The Brazilian political system is as dysfunctional as ours (although this is attributable to very distinct reasons and characteristics), and notwithstanding this has achieved pragmatic continuity among governments of distinct credos and, more importantly, has entered into a process of movement that stands in contrast to our paralysis, and one that compels it, due to the very fact of its being in movement, to reform to the least extent necessary to sustain the momentum.

It would be extraordinary to be able to achieve a great foundational pact, but it is evident that the conditions under which this could take place do not exist at present. As Roger Bartra recently explained so brilliantly, in Mexican politics coincidence does not exist even concerning the times in which we live, and there is much less synchronicity for laying the foundations of anything relevant. It would be better for us to seek out the repairs that would make possible getting the machine into running order, to facilitate an integral power arrangement in an opportunity at which this would be feasible.

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According to Ambrose Bierce, a famous satirical writer of the nineteenth century, alliances are “the union of two thieves who have their hands so deeply inserted in each other’s pockets that they cannot separately plunder a third.” Now that we are in electoral-alliances season, Bierce is worth remembering not only for his wry appreciation of life and wit, but also because of the comedy that characterizes this discussion in our country.
Alliances and coalitions are the bread and butter of parliamentary politics. But in Mexico they have taken amazing dimensions. Here go some thoughts, considerations and opinions:

1.  PAN (Partido Accion Nacional) members are divided on the idea of an alliance with the PRD (Partido Revolucion Democratica) and other parties, particularly the PT (Partido del Trabajo), because they think they belong to a different social class. For its part, the PRD, already fractured into two large blocks, can’t decide what is better: an alliance with its archrival or to continue being in the opposition.

2.    The members of PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) have no doubts: for them the potential alliance between their opponents is “perverse” and “unnatural”, presumably because PAN and PRD do not recognize each other as a legitimate political player (“fascists” say some members of the PRD about PAN; “a danger to the country” say members of PAN about PRD). However, behind the PRI’s stance one can see the concern that a potential alliance, even one that is not altogether saintly, could undermine some of its state strongholds such as Oaxaca, Puebla and Veracruz.

3.    By definition, the aim of an electoral alliance is to defeat a more powerful opponent. In countries with multiparty systems, especially those characterized by run-offs (such as France where there is a proliferation of parties and candidates before the first round that go on to build alliances and coalitions in order to win in the second round), or parliamentary systems with low thresholds for access to parliament, alliances and coalitions are the daily bread of politics. For over sixty years Holland has not had a government without a coalition because no party has reached an absolute majority: alliances are the element that makes it possible to constitute a government.

4.    The problem with such partnerships in Mexico is that our parties do not perceive each other as equals, as partners in a process of nation building. They see each other more like enemies than as adversaries capable of joining efforts, except when it comes to defeating the PRI. In one word, there is an obvious contradiction between want is fundamental and what is comforting.

5.    It is clear that the agendas of the PAN and PRD are different, because if they were not they would be the same party. The problem is not that their agendas differ but that they don’t inhabit the same planet. If their differences were only about social or economic policy, an alliance could help mend differences and develop common ground, such as is the case in all modern democracies. Their differences on abortion or homosexuality are important in terms of partisan philosophy, but they would not necessarily exclude an electoral alliance in which they all agreed not to address those issues. In any event the issues of social policy that divide them are mostly not relevant outside Mexico City, so the notion of building an electoral coalition for other states cannot be dismissed on such grounds.

6.    Electoral alliances have two stages: one is aimed at elections and another at governing. When two or more parties form a coalition they do so because that is the best way to advance their projects and strengthen their electoral and political position. In our context, the first aim, winning an election, has proven successful in several instances; but when it comes to governing, what has happened is that the party of the candidate who won ends up governing and excludes the rest. The experience in this area is extensive and almost overwhelming: the alliances and coalitions in Mexico are always temporary and limited to the specific goal of winning an election. Is it worth it?

7.    The parties that participated in the winning coalition but did not provide the successful candidate become alienated from the daily exercise of power. Those within the parties who oppose this type of opportunistic alliances argue that someone else always enjoys the benefits. The truth is that if there are several simultaneous elections in which the same parties coalesce and the distribution of nominations is equitable, none should feel are left on the fringes. Much more serious, relevant and interesting are the concerns of those who envision the possibility of failure, even if a coalition seemed formidable and likely to win at the outset of an electoral process. Where are the parties left after a failed election?  If instead of obtaining an overwhelming victory as they had hoped, they end defeated, could this lead to a self fulfilling prophesy that delivers the whole country to the PRI in the presidential elections of 2012?

8.    It is obvious that the only goal shared by the PAN and the PRD in the proposed alliance is to defeat the PRI. There is nothing inherently evil in a coalition that pursues an aim of this nature. It could be argued that at least one of the reasons why democracy has not flourished in Mexico is precisely because of the strength of the pre modern strongholds enjoyed by the PRI in several states, starting with the southeast. Under this line of reasoning, the PRI’s defeat would have the effect of fragmenting power at the state level, just as it has happened at the federal level. In this context the potential benefit of disabling those fiefdoms would seems quite clear. However, it is also understandable that even in the most benign scenario of victory, the costs would not be unimportant. As pyrrhic a victory as the current legislature has had in passing the president’s bills (or almost any bills), all of those passed were due to the existing understandings, whether explicit or implied, between the PRI and PAN, both of which accept the legitimacy of the other. Could the proposed PAN-PRD coalitions endanger the only factor that has allowed the country to be governed over the past few years? This is not an argument meant to reject the idea of these alliances, merely a description of the bigger picture.

9.    What really matters is whether there is a deeper content to the proposed alliances designed to defeat PRI. Defeating PRI might be a desirable goal, but it is not the relevant one from the perspective of the citizenship. Many members of the PAN viscerally reject an alliance with PRD in Oaxaca on the grounds that it would mean bringing into the coalition a series of radical organizations that paralyzed that state three years ago and do not recognize President Calderon. Put in this vein, it would clearly make no sense to proceed. However, what if the real goal were to be deeper? What if an alliance like the proposed one advanced towards bringing all political actors, including these organizations, into the institutional side of politics? The benefits would then be immense.

10. In stark contrast with the nature of coalitions in truly democratic nations, an alliance such as those proposed must be appreciated for what they are: an attempt to change the rules of competition and control within the political system. If they are successful in overthrowing some of the PRI feudal strongholds, they would bring oxygen to the system and also to the modern side of PRI that has been unable to reform the party even if its leaders are unwilling to admit it. However, the only relevant benefit for the citizens would be to start building a common agenda to develop the country. That would really seem “unnatural.”

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Saint Augustine said that time is present in three facets: the present, as we experience it; the past, as present memory, and the future, as present expectation. For President Calderón, time is ever shorter, and what is not already built today cannot be harvested, whether after or during his 6-year term of office. Given the manner the current government has evolved and the complexity of the era in which we live, the President must define himself with full clarity: whether he will employ the time left to him in an attempt for his political party to win the upcoming 2012 election, or to confront the problems beleaguering the country. At this point, it is no longer possible to accomplish both.

This is decision time. The time to think, plan, and sow has gone by. Although the presidential term comprises solely 6 years, the political dynamic is not divided into two halves. At its initiation, a government has time to set forth its plans, to place them on track, and to trust that it will be able to harvest these before the end of the term. After the mid-point, which in political terms is marked by the federal elections, the country enters into electioneering dynamic in which everything is defined in terms of the next presidential contest. Each and every theme in Mexico is measured and appraised in light of its potential impact on the approaching joust.

Throughout history, Mexican presidents have done what they could in their first three years in office, and thereafter have devoted themselves to prepare for their succession. During the PRI era, this implied positioning their chips in competent arenas, negotiating with the diverse interest groups, and attempting to drive their preferred candidate. They engaged in the latter by means of innumerable mechanisms: programs with dedicatory and implicit support, transferences, and subsidies for the projects or themes that would benefit the specific individual and similar others. The sole example of the PAN era, Vicente Fox, displayed deficient learning from the PRI system: President Fox supposed that only by his desiring it, everything would come together for the benefit of his anointed one. But, as we well know, the candidate in another’s court won. Due to his way of acting, as President and as Ex-president, Fox was left with the two assets with which he began: his charisma, and the defeat of the PRI. His presidency not only credited nothing to his merits, but also subtracted from these.

President Calderón has had to deal with a much more complex period. From its precipitative initiation to the international crisis, his government has bounced back and forth. Incapable of delegating authority to competent people, it has solely accomplished what its extremely narrow margin of control permits. All of this has earned him relatively low popularity, great disapproval in key sectors, groups, and persons, and very few achievements upon which to secure his personal and political future. Because of his personality, Calderón tends to exclude rather than to include, to alienate rather than to co-opt. His critics may be very ignorant, but they are not always wrong.

He is now caught in the clutches of time. We are at 20 months of defining the presidential candidates and at 1½ years of the next election. The President must define whether he will maintain course, which could well translate into a defeat for the PAN, potentially at the hands of the PRI, or whether he will redefine his project. If he opts to follow the traditional logic—to devote himself to ensuring the election of his favored candidate— he will abdicate all possibility of advancing any reform agenda and achievement for the country. A defeat by the PAN would nearly be ensured. If, on the other hand, he redefines his project, he will be presented with the opportunity of making a difference that would place him on a new personal platform at the end of his term. This is not a minor dilemma. The theme is political, but also personal, i.e., how he wishes to be perceived by history: as a president who, whoever wins, left a better country, or as one who resolutely persisted in a failed project.

Although there is nothing definitive in politics—Yogi Berra, the famous baseball player, is quoted as observing “It ain’t over ’til it’s over”—current tendencies do not favor the governmental party. The wear-and-tear is patent; conflicts at the interior of the PAN are rising; young people have lost faith, and more importantly, there is not much that the current government has at hand that would allow us to suppose that it will glean something relevant in the next 30 months. What was not sown in timely fashion can no longer translate into political or electoral benefits.

This circumstance will force the president to measure his own strengths and possibilities. To devote himself to driving a potential successor would constitute a mainly risky venture, and it would even be possible to argue that it would contribute to the candidate’s defeat. The experience of Calderón himself is relevant here: a good part of the credibility that led him to win the 2006 election was concerned precisely with the fact that he was legitimately able to situate himself as independent of Fox. The worst of all worlds for Calderón would be that in which he persists in nominating and in making his candidate the winner of the election, only to end in defeat and permanent ostracism himself. It would be better for him to pledge his future to something transforming that, ironically, could be salubrious for his party.

The alternative would be to imitate the manner in which Ernesto Zedillo conducted himself during the second half of his presidential mandate. Instead of devoting himself to the PRI political grid or fervently espousing a determined candidate, Zedillo opted for a great electoral reform, in which he assumed himself to be Head of State, and not a PRIista. This distinction was key to the success of the 1996 reform, which led to the successive electoral and political transformations experienced by the country. Zedillo was able to accomplish this because he decided that the country was more important than the PRI, and this allowed him to negotiate with PRI party members with an endowment of freedom and credibility that no individual committed to a short-term electoral result could confer upon him.

The theme for Calderón would not be electoral in ilk, but the dilemma is exactly the same. His alternative lies in being solely one more PANista come to naught and perdition, or in becoming a Head of State who drives political and financial reforms that permit him to bequeath a transforming, generational legacy that anchors the future of the country to a new stage of opportunity. The problem is that both things cannot be done, because he would not possess the credibility necessary to achieve robust negotiation of the radical changes that the country requires in the political-institutional dimension, as well as in that of income and expenditure. Both are transcendental matters of power that do not coalesce well with short-term party partisan interest. It is decision time.

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