The Sicilia march began as a cluster of bereaved victims justifiably angry due to the violence that is stalking the society. There was no agenda other than that of expressing and giving testimony to anguish and suffering on encountering the worst pain that a parent can endure. He sought to exact answers from the authority: the responsible instance in a civilized country. But it has not remained there. Diverse elements have converted the march into a novel political factor that could either wither on the vine or transform the national political reality.

Two circumstances explain the turning of events. The first is that, little by little, the march became a magnet that has attracted all sorts of groups, interests, and causes whose sole common denominator is their opposition to the government of Felipe Calderón. Among the organizations present, we find SME Mexican Electricians Union members, machete wielders from Atenco, strikers from the UNAM, and other organizations, groups, and parties. The gamut of petitions says it all: change the economic policy; remove the Head of Public Security; legalize drugs; democratize the electronic media; stop the war; reform the political institutions; and reconstruct public institutions and the social fabric. Each of these motions has its logic and support base, but taken as a whole suggests at least two things: that that the society is in effect fed up with the derangement of daily life and the violence; and that there are organizations that are always ready to exploit any chance to chop firewood from the fallen tree. Important to note that, for the marchers, the drug mafias and the criminals are not an issue.

The other circumstance that explains the veering off the course is that, surely without proposing it, the President transformed the march into a valid spokesperson: on directing his message to its claims, he gave life to a potential movement, effectively changing its nature. The march stopped being only one of thousands of demonstrations swarming in the streets to acquire, at least potentially, the dimensions of a political movement. What remains now is to await and speculate on the potential consequences.

This is not the first spontaneous movement to acquire strength and power. Nor will it be the last. What has the potential of making it distinct is the combination of factors that drive it. It is noteworthy that what likens it to the White March of 2004 is that, if for no other reason, it had the effect of losing millions of votes for López-Obrador precisely due to his arrogance on branding it a “plot”. Instead of showing compassion for the essence of the claim –the pain of those who had lost what was most dear to them-, the authority, then and now, responded with technicalities and scorn. The rough-riding river is always risky for the status quo.

Could this be an opportunity for the government? According to Fukuyama in his new book*, the wars that China experienced obliged it to devise a system of government that would adjoin the distinct states, monarchies, and leaders to give form to what ended up being a national State. The needs of war imposed the necessity of unity, while those of peace pressed for attention to mundane affairs, such as those of collecting taxes, registering the population, and creating administrative structures to respond to the acquired commitments. I ask myself whether this will be the opportunity for the government to begin to weave a security structure at the level of the entire nation, granting privilege to what is conspicuously absent in the march’s claims (and in the federal government’s actions during these five years): competent local governments and police forces that are capable of providing the population with the security that the old system (that centralized everything) did not provide, and that the narcotrafficker (who control everything) has purloined from it.

Will this be an opportunity for the citizenry? Many voices, in the march and in the press, have advanced the idea of the opportunity that this circumstance represents for the construction of a grand citizen pact that would be capable of demanding from the government, and of those competing in the upcoming election, a plan to end impunity and to throw light on the murders and abductions. It is a great opportunity to challenge the three levels of government and the legislators: what is their proposed solution for emerging from the pothole?

A march such as this agglutinates many people and many causes and has no need of becoming violent or politicized. Its attractiveness lies in two very evident things: the population’s desperation, and the incapacity or indisposition of the government to explain, much less convince, them of the logic of its strategy against the narco. After forty thousand deaths, García-Luna’s affirmation that the government would win the “war” in seven years triggered the citizens’ uproar. Another seven years with no explanation whatsoever. What will follow will depend on the ability of the government to break up the movement that it inadvertently activated.

As in all such movements, purity is not what leads to laurels. Javier Sicilia was clearly a peaceable man devoted to his tasks and causes until violence rapped at his door.  He now finds himself at the helm of a march that may well take on force or that may well disintegrate. Its fate will depend, on the one hand, on the capacity of the activists who have imbedded themselves in its bosom to manipulate the process without losing the signature halo of the original essence: the pain of the victims and the generalized grievances of the society, without which it would be impossible to attract the citizenry and civil-society organizations susceptible to affording it structure and the capacity of permanence. Its fate also depends on the success or the bungling of the government and that are the factors that could similarly provide fresh air for or an out to those who are “up to here” and who cry “basta”, much like those who, in an old Mexican saying, saw a donkey and summarily decided to take a trip. I do not doubt that in upcoming weeks this will grow or disappear. It is paradoxical that the professionals are on the marchers’ side.

The basta mood of the society is real and fear of a collapse because of the violence is worse. What is surprising is the inability of the government to understand the quandary in which it has placed the society: rather than placing itself at the helm or the protest march as part of its security strategy, it feels resentful and spiteful. What the march placed in evidence is the absence of solutions, the lack of leadership, and total incomprehension. The citizenry deserves an explanation. It is possible that the governmental strategy is the correct one given the givens, but if the population does not understand it as such, the bad guy of the movie will be the government. That’s why this march caught on.

*The Origins of Political Order.

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According to Lord Byron, “A thousand years may scarce form a State. An hour may lay it in ruins”. Our problem is that, despite what the PRIists –and everyone else- always thought, an institutional system was never consolidated in Mexico. Everyone spoke (and speaks) about institutions, but what the PRI defeat revealed is that the country had lived under a system of authoritarian features that imposed control but that never consolidated an institutional system that would manage power and check on its exercise. In this regard, our dilemma concerning the future is not distinct from before the time of the alternation of parties in government and this is a true tragedy.

The end of the PRIist era was not accompanied by the end of its main characteristics and forms, except that many of these stopped being functional, if not frankly dysfunctional. With its virtues and defects, that system maintained control and stability and, for decades, but not always, made relatively high economic growth rates possible. The PANist governments did not change the basic structure of the system, but the latter ceased being operative not (only) because the new governments were incompetent, but also because the “divorce” of the PRI and the presidency involved a migration of political power toward the governors, the parties, and what we now call the “de facto powers”. The political reality changed not because of the alternation of parties in the presidency, but because of the profound transformation that the reality of political power experienced within the society. The pretense of many PRIists to return to the status quo ante may in no way be differentiated from attempting to put the genie back into its mythical lamp.

In retrospect, the great surprise of the 2000 election was that one of the most important and ubiquitous rhetorical “truths” of the PRIist system that emanated from the Calles era in the 1920’s turned out to be false: Mexico never was a nation of institutions. As it turns out, it was an authoritarian system that employed discipline in order to maintain control and did so with diligence and care, in such a way that repression was utilized only exceptionally: the system achieved widespread legitimacy for many decades, and this led to that the distinct actors, and the population in general, would accept discipline not because of the threat of punishment as occurred in dictatorships, but because of rational but implicit calculation. In a manner of speaking, as Vargas-Llosa accused so clearly, the “perfect dictatorship” was attractive because it disguised its real nature very well. Much more than democracy and its complications, the true discovery that came with PRI’s defeat was that the country has no consolidated institutions, and perhaps from this emanate many of its current challenges.

Does this matter?  Many of those who most actively promoted democratic change affirm that this is an inevitable process of change and transformation and that what is exceptional in such transformative situations is an agreed-upon transition in which formerly authoritarian institutions become democratic: typically, this situation is complex and requires that political actors sooner or later recognize that democratic consolidation will only be possible through collaboration and the establishment of accords and bridges. On the other end of the spectrum, above all on the side of the PRIists and among ex-PRIists of the PRD, the conclusion is much more taciturn: for them, the democratic experiment failed and the course should be righted. Of course, in a world of political correctness, no one would dare to express this concept in such transparent fashion, but it is unnecessary to scrutinize too closely in order to understand how to read this. A candidate endeavors to modify the so-called “governability clause” in such a way that the threshold is lowered for achieving an artificial legislative majority, that is, to attempt to revitalize the old system through the back door. Others are even more forthcoming when they assert that Putin restored the order and viability of his country after a decade of supposedly democratic chaos.

Reflecting on the avatars of our reality, I retrieved an article that I had read in 1980 and that seems to me to be to be extraordinarily clairvoyant. Susan Kaufman Purcell and John FH Purcell* analyzed the Mexican political system and arrived at a series of conclusions that are useful for explaining to us the origin of our reality and, if fortune shines, for illuminating us about what must be changed. Some of their appreciations in this celebrated article are the following:

-“The Mexican state is a “balancing act” because it is based on a constantly renewed political bargain among several ruling groups and interests representing a broad range of ideological tendencies and social bases.”

-“The Mexican state is unique, however, in that it has never evolved from its original bargain into an institutional entity.”

-“The system is held together not by institutions, but by the rigid discipline of the elites in not overstepping the bounds of the bargain. It is therefore less a set of institutionalized structures… than a complex of well-established, even ritualized, strategies and tactics appropriate to political, bureaucratic, and private interaction throughout the system.“

-“ We view Mexican political stability as resting primarily not upon institutionalized structures such as the party of the presidency, but upon the interaction of two principles of political action: political discipline and political negotiation.”

-“Ideology is a mechanism both for linking elites to, and insulating them from, their potential constituencies.”

-“Herein lies the great paradox of the Mexican political system: it is simultaneously an elitist and a mass-based system. The constituencies of the rulers run the gamut from the richest to the poorest in society.”

-“The political system established in the 1920s was essentially an alliance among elites for the distribution rather than the redistribution of wealth. It was a system concerned with ratifying existing political and economic relationships, not with changing them.”

-“The structured institutions of Mexican politics which receive the greatest attention -the dominant party, the presidency, and the bureaucracy- are simply convenient formal formal frameworks within which the true balancing act, so necessary to the survival of the heterogeneous Mexican state, is performed”

-Mexico is less institutionalized that it might seem, given its history of stable government. In times of crisis… uncontrolled conflict and political breakdown are possibilities.”

The past cannot be changed, but we can learn from it. We came from an authoritarian era and not from an era of institutions. This difference explains, to a considerable degree, the complexity entailed in decision-making processes at present and their frequent paralysis. It is also an invitation to ponder that only close and intense interaction among clairvoyant and visionary leaders can make possible the construction of agreements and, eventually, of institutions that are likely to afford direction and stability to the system and, with this, viability to economic development. In other words: we have no functional institutions, thus, only the interaction of persons capable of and willing to surmount the daily wrangles would permit us to emerge from the hole in which we find ourselves.

*State and Society in Mexico: Must a Stable Polity Be Institutionalized? World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jan., 1980), pp. 194-227.

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Whatever’s the rage rules us. Referendum, revoking mandates, and popular initiative are grandiloquent words that enthuse politicians and scholars. The idea of constructing a direct democracy holds enormous allure because it allows one to imagine an engrossed citizenry and immense respect among political actors, all at the service of the citizens. It would appear unnecessary to declare this notion ludicrous in our reality. It is with difficulty that we are able to abide, and often not that well, democracy’s first echelon: the electoral. At present, incorporation is being proposed of a composite of mechanisms oriented, in an ideal world, toward providing the citizen with instruments for more active participation. Is it possible for us citizens to believe that everything will change all of a sudden?

The difficulties in establishing a direct democracy are mammoth, chiefly for a country that is so large, diverse, and disperse as ours. It is not by chance that, save exceptions (some cities and very few nations, such as Switzerland), the manner embraced by all nations that call themselves democratic is that of the representative democracy, which is none other than a way of delegating decision-making required to take a society to a group of dedicated professional politicians devoted to this. Some countries have endorsed measures oriented toward limiting the potential for abuse or for excesses into which popular representatives could incur, above all through means such as the referendum (that submits determined decisions to the consideration of the population) for these to be supported or rejected by those who would be directly benefitted or affected.

If one studies countries that have adopted forms of direct democracy, the first notable thing is the manner in which these are divided into two groups: those that possess a consolidated democracy, and those that feign being democratic. The first group includes countries such as Denmark and Switzerland, while the second unites such bastions of democracy, like Venezuela and Libya. It is not difficult to appreciate the differences and contrasts: the first are nations in which politics serves the citizenry and the citizenry in turn maintains the right to exact accountability from the politicians, from their representatives. The second group comprises nations in which politicians control the decision-making processes and utilize diverse mechanisms, that is, forms of direct participation, as means to legitimize their modus operandi. The first are accountable to the people; the second serve themselves. The first see the citizenry as their raison d’être, while the second negate their existence and manipulate the citizenry at whim. The difference is not slight.

The question for us is, who are we more alike: The nations with a consolidated democracy, or those in which the politicians do not desist in their zeal for exploiting the population? The response seems obvious, which permits a doubt to arise concerning the ulterior motives or objectives, undisclosed, of those promoting this type of initiative.

Bet let us suppose that it is not like this: let us suppose that there is a deep conviction among those who promote this type of mechanism as a means for effectively democratizing our country. If one begins with this supposition, each of the proposals must be analyzed separately to evaluate the implications of adopting the set of initiatives under discussion in the Congress. The easy part is to dream of a good democracy and to suppose that, by the mere fact of ratifying a set of mechanisms that work in another area, Mexico will be transformed overnight.

To understand the complexity and possible implications of taking a route such as that proposed by the advocates of a direct democracy, it would be worthwhile to study the case of the state of California in the U.S. This state, as have others in that country, adopted diverse mechanisms of direct democracy at the beginning of the 20th century. California was a new state, sparsely populated, very homogeneous, with thoroughly entrepreneurial people and endowed with a colossal disdain for politics. The forms of direct democracy meshed well with the reality of a new frontier brimming with effervescence. In this way, a relatively small and disciplined population utilized instruments of this type to maintain its Governor and State Legislature under control. The situation changed during the second half of the past century. At the end of the 1970s, California was the state with the largest economy and population of our neighboring nation, and was characterized by huge demographic, ethnic, and ideological diversity. What had previously been a homogeneous and committed electorate was recast as a polarized and competitive space.

The problems began with a popular initiative in 1978: that of limiting property taxes. This initiative was as popular as it was irresponsible, not very distinct from those in Mexico who rally around the elimination of taxes, such as the new IETU (a control tax on income) or the excise tax on vehicles, without meditating on the consequences on the expenditure side: the voters in California succeeded in limiting property taxes without reducing the budget. The result was permanent fiscal disequilibrium. But the transcendental dimension was not this, but rather, the political effect that it wrought: from that moment on, an entire industry developed that was devoted exclusively to the promotion of popular initiatives and referenda and to obtaining the signatures of the citizenry. As a result, practically all of the legislators represent extreme groups in the ideological or political vernacular, with an exclusive commitment to the group that promoted them. We ourselves fell victim to this process in the form of Initiative 187, whose objective was to delimit the rights of the children of undocumented workers. The point is that the direct democracy that worked so well in a small and disciplined population has become a nightmare that impedes the act of governing.

Mexico must transform itself and create mechanisms of political participation that confer upon the population the capacity of supervising and demanding accountability from legislators. But the forms that are proposed would not have this effect; if adopted, even all of the provisions that the prototypical cases would recommend, we could easily end up like California. Our reality of political polarization guarantees this. It is more probable that endorsement of this type of initiative would end up creating new instruments of manipulation at the service of the worst interests. This is known by those who propose these mechanisms: The question is, why? What for? What is the true objective being proposed by advancing this? These questions are not irrelevant. The genie of direct democracy is hard to rebottle when released, even if the results are rotten.

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Poverty is one of our worst blemishes and also one of our greatest mismatches. Beyond the quotidian polemics (similarly originating from political, ideological, or, simply, conceptual differences), I doubt that poverty is not a cause that all Mexicans would wish to defeat. In contrast with other controversial themes, in this one the differences do not lie in the objective, but rather in “the how”. Marcel Proust once wrote that “the journey to discovery is not in seeking new landscapes but in having new eyes”. With this focus, a group of Mexicans has come together to procure a novel route toward combating poverty.

In the struggle against poverty, there are many conflicting postures and many angles and perspectives to be found. A first discrepancy resides in the function of the government as cause and response: some perceive the solution as originating in public spending aimed at equalizing conditions and to conferring material opportunities on those who are poor. Although many agree –with more or less caveats- with this very simplistic diagnosis, the proposals to address the issue vary greatly: for example, the Solidaridad was a spending program by means of which the government constructed local leaderships and transferred funds to families, all with an inevitable client-oriented logic. In contrast, its successor program, Oportunidades, privileged the decision of families in the use of resources and eliminated all sources of dependence. The former program granted funds through the leadership, while the latter, from a suite of comparable, objective criteria. But in both cases, it involved the government employing public resources to modify the families’ material reality. In combination with improvement in the localities’ physical infrastructure (streets, electricity, water, drainage) and attention to education and health, these programs focused on reducing poverty by changing the environment and consumption potential of the target population.

The previous paragraph might suggest that there is agreement among scholars, activists, analysts, and public officials with respect to what to do. However, the contrary would be closer to the reality. The mismatches not only refer to how much to spend or to how to spend it, but to who should exercise control over the expenditure, and above all, what role corresponds to the authorities. In addition to the fight against poverty, Solidaridad had an evident political objective: that of creating mechanisms for the strengthening of local leadership that would contribute to stabilizing urban zones that, as the result of migration from the countryside, had created districts with a high degree of divisiveness and the potential for instability. That this leadership could in addition contribute votes was not of scant interest. On its part, Oportunidades was conceived of as a State policy that did not create opportunities to develop political clienteles, although, indubitably, its promoters entertained hopes that a decrease in poverty would translate into votes.

Neither of the two ways, in itself, is good or bad. What is paradoxical is that both were shored up on at least a meager realistic supposition. I refer to that of education. Solidaridad as well as Oportunidades mandated that the children of families who benefited from the programs would go to school, where the objective was to break the chain of poverty that implied that children from poor families continued to be poor because they did not develop the human capital necessary for incorporation into the formal economy. That is, reasonably enough, education was contemplated as a natural mechanism to break with the historic determinism of poverty. Unfortunately, it was never recognized that much of the educational system that we have is explicitly devoted to preserving poverty, dependence, and political control. Perhaps this explains, at least in part, how it is that programs as distinct (and even dissimilar) achieved raising the consumption levels of the most impecunious families of the country but did not do away with, or begin to do away with, poverty in the nation.

A recently published book affords a perspective that suggests that the main problem resides not only in the manner in which the public spending is exercised or who exercises it, but above all, in the way in which the individual participates in the process. In Breaking the Poverty Cycle: The Human Basis for Sustainable Development*, Susan Pick and Jenna Sirkin propose that it is not sufficient to resolve the context or the milieu within which poverty is generated and preserved, but rather, it is necessary for persons to take control of their lives and to be capable of making decisions that allow them to break with the vicious circle. The book narrates not only a technique, but also a history of decades of experience of a Mexican institution devoted to doing exactly that: to developing public policy programs designed to generate alternatives and to developing the capacity to make decisions in informed, autonomous, and responsible fashion. The programs that the book describes have advocated that people stop being the objective of poverty-fighting programs in order to become the agents of change that make the programs successful. The implicit proposal of the book consists of adding the dimension of individual choice to poverty-fighting programs that are not contemplated in traditional economic development theories or programs.

In other words, the authors, who launched their model by attacking other human development themes, found that the transformation of persons into agents of change, into individuals capable of talking charge of their lives, is not only possible, but that when this takes place within the context of the availability of resources, such as those comprising the central component of programs such as Solidaridad and Oportunidades, the potential of breaking with poverty multiplies dramatically. It is evident that, independently of the political or ideological perspective of the politician or party promoting a determined perspective for combating poverty, this objective requires vast public resources. What this book demonstrates is that success is not possible only with public resources, that it requires the modification of the context within which the individual functions: that is, it requires that the individuals themselves take charge of the programs. This clearly will not appeal to those who are aiming to develop electoral clienteles or to those who prefer statist solutions because they are just that, but it opens up an extraordinary opportunity for those who see in the citizenry –and in the development of a responsible and decided citizenry- the future of the country.

*Oxford University Press

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In one of his many memorable moments, on sitting down to play a game of dominoes, Cantinflas asked: “Are we going to play like gentlemen, or like what we are?” We have been playing for many years as what we are and not as gentlemen, that is, with rules of the game that always change. Without rules, without political agreement, there will be no reform worthy of the name. In a country in which the law is accepted solely to the extent to which it serves the interests of each person, group, or party, the point of departure must be that of agreeing on the rules of the game. Only in this manner can we aspire to obtain legislation or reform that might transcend the sheer vanity of its promoters. If there is something that proliferates, it is laws, but these do not modify the reality: they only complicate it. We have laws for everything, but their enforcement is always discretionary, therefore becoming a permanent source of arbitrariness; thence, of uncertainty.

It is evident that diverse reforms are urgent for the country. However, proceeding to approve them would constitute a futile exercise until and unless the point of departure is addressed: a political covenant to which all political actors are committed. This absence need not deter us from conducting a debate on the necessary reforms, but it does not guaranty any relevance either. In this spirit, the following are some of the conceptual themes that cry out for reform.

The first group refers to the functioning of the system of government. It is indispensable to redefine the government’s function, as well as to construct the checks and balances susceptible to making it work efficaciously. The first great theme that is necessary is to strengthen the presidency of the Republic. The presidency tended to be strong, but more because of its tie-in with the PRI than due to its Constitutional powers. Today, an institutional redefinition is required for the executive branch, as well as for its relationships with the other two branches. The three branches require equilibria in the form of checks and balances within a democratic context.

Next comes federalism. We went from a centralized system of control from the presidency to a libertine system –in politics and in the exercise of public spending- in which there are neither rules of play nor accountability. In this same regard, it is imperative to reconstruct public security, encroached upon during these years, precisely when the growth of narcotrafficking experienced runaway rhythms. The distinct levels of government must devote themselves to structuring an efficient system capable of restoring the safety of a population and of building the foundations of the Mexico of the future.

A second item is that of the economy. Just as in the political arena, there is an untold number of proposals for economic reform ranging from the fiscal to trade. If one accepts that it is essential to create an effective system of government, its equivalent within the economic milieu would be to create conditions for productivity to rise dramatically. This would imply three great approaches: first, integration of the national market; second, the creation of an environment that would make savings and investment propitious; and third, consolidation of public accounts. Each of these approaches is a world in itself, but the conceptual content of each is easy to elucidate.

Integration of a national market is what was not put into effect when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was set into motion, that is, the existing economic structure was preserved, leaving it to businesses or individuals with personal vision to exploit the perks of the new system. Creating a national market entails two processes: eliminating the barriers to access, and driving the transformation of the productive plant. The first would include conversion of the educational system into the platform for the development of social and human capital, elimination of the biases that create inequity, and creation of mechanisms that support restructuring companies that continue to function under the closed-market paradigm. In this same respect, effective rules are required to promote market competition, to submit the entire productive plant –including that of public enterprises- to competition, to eliminate mechanisms that protect the productive plant in order to favor a non-discriminatory environment, and to construct effective mechanisms in defense of consumer interest. The final objective would be to raise the general productivity of the Mexican economy. The fundamental means for achieving the latter would be to eliminate rent seeking, i.e., the tendency to prosper not because of productive capacity or innovation, but rather, as the result of political connections or regulatory barriers.

The creation of an environment that makes saving and investment propitious involves acting on all of the other fronts to create certainty, predictability, thus confidence, in the population. Although there are myriad specific actions and reforms that could be encapsulated under this section, in reality  this involves that resulting from actions on the previously mentioned fronts herein: effective checks and balances; effective government; equitable economic conditions; effective mechanisms for conflict resolution; continuity in governmental policies, and accountability. In the last analysis, all of the reforms undertaken must eventually create surroundings that are favorable for saving and investing, or they do not fulfill their mission.

Consolidating public accounts implies shoring up the government’s fiscal base, reducing its dependence on income from oil, and inspecting the spending structure of all government levels with the goal of achieving three central objectives: to eliminate the government’s fiscal vulnerability; to reduce superfluous, unnecessary, and electorally motivated expenditures (which leads to more spending than investment), and to distribute the fiscal burden, not only in fairer fashion, but also, for it to contribute to raising savings, investment, and productivity.

The great theme at present in Mexico is that of recognizing that the old system is no longer adequate for guiding the fate of the country, and that orchestration of this does not depend on persons themselves, but rather, on the strength of the institutions that they design, construct, and adopt. Recognizing the urgency of an institutional redefinition implies commencing with the latticework of political accords that are necessary so that a broad political-economic reform can be implemented. That is, the precondition for the series of reforms that are necessary is an accord among the political forces that recognizes the new realities and relations of power. Once this is resolved, legislation will consist of nothing other than putting it into writing.

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President George H.W. Bush’s adviser, the fearless southern political strategist Lee Atwater, once said to Dan Quayle, Bush’s vice-president at that time, “You were the best rabbit we ever had. Let them chase you and they’ll stay off the important things.” From the time that I read this anecdote some years ago, I kept thinking about whether it might be the same with the crime wave that we are living through today. Might it be that the violence is distracting us from the essential, from the factors that make peaceful coexistence possible in every community?

There have been several studies, arguments, and discussions that over recent months have begun to advance our understanding of the phenomenon. Beyond the specific arguments, what seems important to me is that the debate, above all that which has taken place in the pages of the periodical Nexos, but also in other forums, throughout the last two or three years, knowledge has truly advanced. The following is my own learning in this regard.

In the first place, it appears to me that there continues to be an enormous lack of understanding of the profound causes for the relatively sudden growth of criminality, without which it is impossible to turn back the current situation. For starters, I have no doubt concerning the confluence of two factors, more or less simultaneously but nonetheless independently, which produced the phenomenon. One factor was the decentralization of power that began to occur from the mid-nineties: perhaps the key year was 1994 when, at the apex of PRIist power, the first rash of abductions and killings was unleashed. There was insufficient power in the presidency to halt or prevent it. From this moment to the PRI defeat in 2000, power migrated to the states and municipalities without the latter having the most minimal understanding of its implications. From a system controlled –but not institutionalized- from above, ours proceeded to generalized decontrol. States and municipalities rejoiced in the inebriation of money and freedom that they began to enjoy, but did not invest this in public security, investigative capacity, or in an effective system for the procurement of justice.

While the fiesta was in full swing, the narco traffickers, and other criminal groups, began to grow in accelerated fashion. This growth was due to circumstances that, in retrospect, appear to be clear: a rising demand for pirated and stolen goods; the development of the consumer drug market in the country (small but mushrooming at exponential rates); the declining profitability from narco trafficking in the U.S., and the impact of 9/11 on the manner of introducing drugs into U.S. territory. Each of these factors generated a rapid ascent in criminal activity in Mexico. It is possible, although doubtful, that had this occurred during era of harsh PRI government of the old regime, strongly centralized and controlled, the system would have been able to impose rules and continue with its history of the administration of crime, as it always had. Truth to tell, everything suggests that the new phenomenon turned out to be infinitely more complex and powerful, in addition to that it transpired precisely when the political system was falling to pieces. The combination of these two factors could not have happened at a worse moment.

In analytical terms, it is important to determine whether the army caused more violence, or whether there were other factors. What is not in doubt is that the crucial factor in the rise of criminality and violence was not the army, but rather the disappearance of local government. As Ana Laura Magaloni and Antonio Azuela argue convincingly, strong or weak, local government achieved the maintenance of an equilibrium that controlled the criminality. It was not a perfect scheme of legality, but it fulfilled the most elementary function of government, which is to keep the peace. The sudden attack of organized crime and the brutal imbalances in the political power structure destroyed these equilibria. The presence of the federal government only dealt with the funeral rites. The problem was already there.

From this perspective, the way the action taken by the federal government can be one of “winning” or “losing” in front of the criminal mafias and its diagnosis can be correct or in error, but while local governments are not fortified, there will be no possible way out. That is, given the weakness of both the judicial and police institutions throughout the country, without decided action on the part of the federal government, it would be inconceivable to confront organized crime. However, to create a new platform of coexistence, social harmony, and control of criminality, there is no alternative to a strong local government endowed with the appropriate and relevant instruments for embattling crime at every corner. Neither of the two efforts is sufficient in itself, but without the second of the two, success is impossible.

The problem is that there never has been, at least since the Revolution, strong local government in the country. The old system was not created for there to be effective instances of state and municipal government, but instead, came into being to control the political groups and the population in general. That system never developed an institutional capacity that possessed even the slightest possibility of acting independently; in fact, its specialty was to sever the head of anyone attempting to do so. Observed in retrospect, this is the heart of the tragedy that we are smarting under at present.

Mexico requires answers and proposals that see through to the heart of the problem, and not its symptoms. That is why either the preferred solution of many PRIists (to return to centralization and control) or that of the pro-alliance actors (to exclude the PRI and to pretend that governance can be achieved without governmental structure and political ability) is simply absurd. Politicians of both stripes benefited from power decentralization, but neither of these assumed responsibility for its consequences.

What has worked in other countries, beginning with Colombia, is the combination of the following: strong local government and one that is duly outfitted in institutional terms; a police structure in which the population can trust; an integral economic development strategy which turns the local government into the heart of the economic flourishing and that generates employment having nothing to do with organized crime; and a concerted effort among the three governmental levels to fight against corruption. Evidence derived from Colombia suggests that without a frontal attack on corruption, the population will quite simply not believe that any advance has been achieved.

With all of the “what ifs” that one wishes to assign, the actions taken by the federal government and the army comprised a necessary response when faced by the risk of integral collapse of the government. But this effort cannot be the raison d’être of a government, nor is it sufficient. Lacking at present is what comes next and, it cannot be overstated, it would be better to begin now.

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“The more corrupt the state, the more it legislates.” Thus said Tacitus, Roman senator. In Mexico, the government is weak, weighty, ostentatious, and very noisy, but not at all effective although it, yes indeed, has an interminable proclivity for legislating. The evidence is everywhere: in the poor performance of the economy; the violence; the lack of punctuality; the insecurity; the traffic. Our representatives and senators promote themselves on the radio, issuing statements such as the following: “In the Senate of the Mexican Republic, we recognize that there is much criminality and so we legislate one thing or another,” as if legislating itself would resolve the problems.

In the last decades, we have gone from a heavy and abusive government, but one with some capacity (though waning) of action, to one that is simple heavy and useless. The government has a presence everywhere but that does not make it functional or effective. To the contrary: what the country urgently needs is a redefinition of the governmental function and the development of the capacities that would allow it to confront the monster of crime that stalks the population, to create conditions for getting the economy up and running and, in general, to improve coexistence in the society.

Here are three examples of the absurdity that characterizes us and that evidence how far we are from possessing an efficient system of government:

• In the fiscal ambit, governing is driven by circulars sent at any and all times. Ministry of Finance functionaries emit these for everything, never recognizing the uncertainty that their acts of authority generate. Stable surroundings comprise a necessary condition for economic development, and this is altered when the rules of the game change without prior notice, explanation, warning, or justification.

• Discretionary powers are an essential instrument of the governmental function: it is the means by which the authority adapts to the changing economic, electoral, or political environment. Given that it is impossible to anticipate or legislate on every possible contingency, governmental functioning would be impossible without discretionary powers. The problem is that, in Mexico, there is no difference between discretionary powers and arbitrariness: they are de facto synonyms because the authority employs its discretionary faculties with no restriction. That is what allows a governor to manipulate the elections in his state, or in any other; that the regulatory entities impose sanctions with no legal foundation; or that there can be thousands of deaths without a sole judicial inquiry. Authority in Mexico is absolutely arbitrary.

• In the case of the regulatory entities (Telecommunications, Competition, Energy, etc.), we have everything but clear rules. These entities make decisions based on the commissioners’ criteria, while the powers of their president in each of these are so vast that their personal preferences tend to prevail. The case of the Federal Competition Commission is paradigmatic because the theme is so central for our development:  laws come and laws go, but the only things that advance are the whims of those who define the priorities. It is evident that we require appropriate legislation, one that is comparable with those of the developed nations of the planet, but we also require a structure of authority with proper checks on their power, such as that existing in those countries. The theme is the same as in the rest: our problem is not one of laws, but rather one of the propensities for abuse of the powers of the authority, which situates them on a plane of permanent arbitrariness. Without limits, any authority becomes just another excuse for arbitrary decisions, the opposite of what a modern and institutionalized country requires.

To institutionalize implies limiting authority, that is, establishing rules that delineate and pre-establish the limits of its action. Discretionary powers are indispensable, but for governmental acting not to be arbitrary, it must be mapped out by rules known to all a priori.

Likewise, the dynamic history that has preceded us cannot be ignored. Thanks to the hyperinflation of the Weimar era, in Germany the Bundesbank is highly orthodox and focuses exclusively on combating inflation. The history of England is very distinct: memories of the poverty described by Dickens and inscribed on the collective conscience of that nation led to that, for the Bank of England, inflation may be important, but it should remain on a par with growth. Our history is not as extreme as that of these European nations, but the era of financial crises marked the country and became an essential definition of the financial function, the reason for which the central bank takes inflation control so seriously. In contrast with other governmental functions, this illustrates that there is a capacity for learning.

In the world there are many governmental models, each emanating from its own social reality. In France, the government possesses a very broad presence in the economy as owner and administrator of the most diverse of enterprises. In England, the government commands a much more modest presence. But both countries share a common characteristic: they have an effective and functional government. We debate and legislate a great deal about the nature of government, but we do not have a functional government. The old system was characterized by a government that worked under these circumstances but, as illustrated by the political and economic crises that have confronted the country since 1968, it left off being effective until it ended up practically in collapse.

At nearly two sexennial periods from the first alternation of parties in the presidency, it would be time to give form to a new system of government. This could be done in two ways: with a great restatement of its structures, or with a correction of some of its most dysfunctional parts. In a perfect world, it would be ideal to effect a grand redefinition, as the Spanish did in their Constitution of 1978. However, the Spanish example is not applicable because Spain had a functional government to begin with; what the Constitution did was to modify the relative weights of the distinct components of the State. We must start from the recognition that our system of government does not satisfy even the most basic of needs. Attempting to modify everything via the legislative pathway would not resolve the problem.

Electoral times are always propitious for discussion of the challenges facing us. Perhaps there is nothing more grave and pernicious than the disorder emanating from the disorder in the organization, structure and legitimacy of power in society. Everything derives from that: until limits to the politically powerful are not established and the powerful develop the capacity and vision to institutionalize that power, our governmental system will continue to be what it is: dysfunctional and ineffectual.

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Control or responsibility: That, as Hamlet would have said, is the question. But this is not a literary digression; rather, it is a central question of the nature of power, the responsibility of those of who govern, and their relationship with the citizenry. For some, the citizen is a mere peon in the social dynamic: for others, the citizen is the touchstone of this latticework. The difference is not small; thus, the profound controversy. What is at stake in the discussion concerning the modifications to Article 41 of the Mexican Constitution is precisely this: the leading role of the citizen in the development of the society.

The question is whether the citizen is just one of many components of democracy or its raison d’être. This dilemma defines it all. Some argue and defend the notion that the Mexican voter is a minor, unable to decide about the great affairs of our reality. Others, including myself, believe that these are complete citizens who have the right to drive the value of their perspective and to be at the center of decision-making on transcendental publics affairs. For the former, the function of the government and its institutions is to control, regulate, influence and shape the information so that the voter would know what is convenient and desirable for him. For the latter, the citizen is fully capable of deciding for herself and does not require the information to be filtered. Here lies the difference between a subject and a citizen.

According to Charles III, king of Spain in the XVIII Century, subjects are born to “to be silent and to obey and not to reflect nor opine about the high affairs of government”. Act II, it is imperative to filter –if not shape- the advertisements, commentaries, opinions, or criticisms that can arise from a very diverse society: little information, duly supervised. This is the perspective that inspired the 2007 electoral reforms in which society’s freedom to express their ideas, purchase media time, or receive information by means of publicity was curtailed. This reform raised the political parties, together with the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), to the rank of the official and absolute controllers of the information that citizens should receive. Nothing other than what these entities produce, manipulate, or exert an influence over can be read, seen, or heard by the citizens.

Mark Twain, the great philosopher of life, had another idea: for him, “Citizenship is what makes a republic; monarchies can get away without it”. This is the tessitura that we have run up against: do we want a free citizenry that develops and that makes itself responsible for discerning and choosing among the postures that are presented to them, or do we want a set of voters who are incapable of anything except receiving instructions. I recognize that I am being absolute in this distinction, but I have no doubt that this involves a fundamental, even foundational, definition. The theme is whether we wager on a citizenry capable of discernment, or on an inert mass that only receives messages and acts according to the instructions implied therein.

This is not a lesser debate. Terms such as “controlling State”, “directed democracy”, and “strong government” were used throughout the PRIist era to legitimatize the abuse that the authoritarian system imposed on the citizenry, always considered as minors. During this era, the government was there to substitute for the supposed absence of an organized society, one capable of assuming itself to be the heart of the future. The current paradox is that the future is unviable without a strong citizenry. Restrictions such as those of the Reform of 2007 do nothing more than subjugate, submit, and control the citizenry. How is it possible for more transparency and account-rendering to exist if citizenship does not? Unless the objective comprises making up a group of experts (most assuredly integrated by those who support this vision) to conduct surveillance over the information and judge for the citizens, a democracy without citizens is not conceivable. The pretense that it is sufficient for the political parties to participate in the election and for citizens to be mere spectators says it all.
Stalin once affirmed that the persons who deposit their vote in the urn do not decide anything: those who decide, stated the Soviet dictator, are those who count the votes. The reconfiguration of the IFE at the mid-nineties attempted to respond to a quasi-Stalinist reality: the supposed Mexican democracy did not allow for certainty in the counting of votes. With the citizen IFE, Mexican democracy began to flourish in the electoral terrain. The IFE achieved what had appeared impossible: winning the trust of the electorate. But Mexican democracy was not designed for the citizenry. In present-day Mexican politics, sovereignty lies in the political parties. Citizen disillusionment has to do with this fact: the monopoly of power in the hands of the political parties and the corruption inherent in the control that they exercise. The average citizen may not have deep knowledge, but they understand perfectly that the vote is theirs and that it should be exercised with responsibility. Attempting to mold the information impedes this from occurring.

The 2007 Reform would have made Stalin proud. The autonomy of the IFE was left behind, along with public discussion, and electoral propaganda and opinion regarding the election were severely restricted. From once being an independent referee, the IFE was relegated to an auditing role. Heretofore the IFE’s concerns would not be concentrated on the equity of the election, but instead, on the content of political messages, the duration of spots, and the imposition of fines and admonishments on a growing number of actors. In another Stalinist fit of pique, everyone could be subject to an electoral crime. It was a new way of recentralizing power, not under the presidential yoke, but under that of the political parties and their administrators. This could be anything, but democracy it is not.

The dilemma is very simple: do we want a society structured and controlled by the political parties, or do we want a strong citizenry that is capable of demanding accountability and deciding on who would govern it. For some, the dilemma is equivalent to choosing a car in a dealership, but in reality it is about a fundamental difference: coming as we do from an authoritarian system, we require the entire force of the citizenry to discern without conferring so much power on the political parties. The parties are key entities in a democracy, but no substitute for a strong citizenry, capable of exercising the vote in serious, responsible, and informed fashion. Restrictions to freedom of expression are noxious to a citizenry that is alive and desirous of growing and transcending.

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“You have been sitting there too long for any good you have been doing,” Oliver Cromwell, the British Republican who defeated the throne, told the nobility. The same could be said for many businessmen and their respective chambers who cannot see further than their particular and immediate interest, even if that is entirely legitimate.  The rationale of our public servants and legislators must be the opposite: throw open spaces to the citizenry and the consumers.

The country finds itself in the throes of a complex bind in economic matters.  If we wish to view the glass as half empty, all sorts of problems, difficulties, and wrongs can be found that impede the optimal functioning of things.  However, there is also an alternative vision: if we are disposed to seeing the opportunities and possibilities, all we have to do it start making them possible.

With the excuse that things are not perfect, one part of the industrial sector has specialized in placing obstacles along the path of trade liberalization. This is an impossible way to proceed. If we desire the predictability of a Swiss timepiece, we will have to accept Switzerland’s rules of the game and its discipline. As long as we are not Switzerland, we will have to change things little by little, and be willing to pay the necessary price.

The issue of the day is trade negotiations with other countries. There are negotiations to deepen existing trade arrangements with  Colombia, of free trade with Peru and, still in the fledgling stage, ambitious treaties with Brazil and Korea. Many ask, some insistently, what the reason is for negotiating additional treaties if the internal problems are not resolved first. Those who think this way have an exceedingly valid point, but one that is not justifiable. Were we to have to wait until everything were resolved, the dream of the just would slip away before we can start moving towards development. Trade liberalization is a necessary means.

Unfortunately, the debate over commercial liberalization and free trade negotiations has been very poorly focused. From the beginning of liberalization in the mid-eighties, permanent confusion has reigned concerning the objectives to pursue and the role and function that corresponds to the economic agents and to the government, respectively. It is absolutely logical and legitimate for businesses to defend their interest and for them to pressure the authorities and legislators for their positions to be heard. But the function of the government is not to watch over these interests, but rather, those of the collective, that is, those of consumers and citizens in general. Even then, it is evident that in recent negotiations with Colombia, the modified treaty with which awaits Senate ratification, the interests and concerns of producers were incorporated.

Trade liberalization, which started in 1985 with the elimination of import permits and their substitution by duties, and in the free trade treaties that followed, it represented a fundamental sea change in the logic of economic development. Until the eighties, the entire emphasis had centered on protection, promotion, and subsidy of the producers. This scheme functioned well between the end of the thirties and the middle of the seventies, but ended in stagnation. Liberalization came about for a very simple reason: because domestic investment was no longer sufficient to generate high rates of economic growth and benefits in terms of the wealth and employment deriving from these.

The rationale of trade opening revolves around the consumer, whether a person or an enterprise. The objective is to force the productive plant to become competitive, to raise productivity levels, and to offer the consumer the best quality and market price, all by means of the competition that imports represent. Of course, the swing in strategy implied affectation of many businesses, but, for example, today the percentage of their income that Mexican families devote to clothing or shoes is a fraction of what it represented thirty years ago, and the quality is much better. That is, Mexican families have improved their level of living thanks to trade liberalization. What is better: millions of families with lower costs or a privileged company that enjoys the monopoly of high prices for these same families? Liberalization has transformed the lives of millions of Mexicans and has allowed the middle class of the country to grow. This should be the objective over which our Senators keep watch.

It doesn’t take a genius to argue that the opening has been unequal, that it has not included all of the sectors, that services continue to be expensive and inefficient, and that some producers have suffered because of competition. The truth, simple and straightforward, is that we have not dared to pursue the logic of the liberalization and deregulation to other indispensable ambits, such as the bureaucratic, the political, the monopolies, and that of privileges. But these are arguments for even more opening, not for preserving the ludicrous circumstances that characterize us.

The alternative for the future is very simple: we delve deeper and advance for the sake of achieving competitive producers and satisfied consumers, or we withdraw into our shell as we have to date and pretend that things will resolve themselves. If we enter into the logic of protecting a little thing here and there, we will end up with a collapsed economy. We must continue forward or we will go backward.

If one observes import and export patterns, the concentration that we have with the U.S. is evident, which leads many to conclude that we should not persevere liberalization. There are two reasons for thinking differently: first, each treaty that is signed implies greater benefits for the consumer, more competitive producers, and what economists refer to as “disciplines,” that is, well defined, trustworthy and predictable rules of the game for all, which are key for development in the long term.

The other reason for thinking distinctly is that the concentration of commerce, although explainable in geographic terms, entertains no logic. The concentration exists essentially because we the rules of origin that characterize the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which make us highly competitive in that region, take away competitiveness outside of it. The solution to this does not lie in closing other doors, but instead, in attracting the production of inputs for competing successfully with all. That is, it is urgent for us to develop a world-class supplier industry. More treaties and greater liberalization are necessary conditions for this to develop.

There are solutions to the problems of the country, but only if we are willing to take the necessary steps. In matters of trade liberalization, it is imperative to privilege the interest of the consumer because the alternative is to remain stagnated. As simple as that.

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In his essay on the origin and significance of America, Alfonso Reyes writes that “Before being this firm reality, which at times enthuses us and at others makes us uneasy, America was the invention of poets, the charade of geographers, the hearsay of adventurers, the greed of enterprises, and, in sum, an inexplicable appetite and impulse for transcending the limits”. Over the past several decades, Mexico lost the ability to transcend limits and to construct a solid base for growth. However, truth to tell, efforts have not been, nor were they, few to erect the foundations of sustained growth. But at any rate, these never materialized.

Explanations of the phenomenon abound, some interested, others the product of more serious and profound analysis. Many industrialists attribute it to what they call contraband, while others, to the inequality of conditions confronting enterprises with respect to other markets. From the Left, the basic criticism clings to the government’s supposed abandonment of its function as promoter of development, essentially through spending and public investment. Microeconomics scholars touch upon specific market-access and competition problems in general, as well as with the low levels of productivity growth. The federal government studied the World Bank’s scoring methodology and addressed specific issues to improve Mexico’s grade in the “ease of doing business” category. Each of these perspectives contributes to explaining the nature of obstacles to growth but, after decades of mediocre performance, perhaps it is time to rethink the entire approach or, as Alfonso Reyes would say, to reanimate the appetite and impulse for transcending limits.

The environment that characterizes the public debate tends to be too ideological to allow for a healthy discussion regarding the nature of the problem. In fact, the discussion is frequently so absurd that there is not even agreement on when the problem began. If one abides by the numbers, it appears evident that the problem of growth emerged in the mid-sixties when, for the first time, the country ceased to have surplus corn for export which, together with other raw materials and grains, had been a fundamental source of financing for importing machinery, equipment, or supplies for industry. That moment triggered the debate on the opening of the economy: the very same debate that would be won by those who championed statist solutions that, underwritten as they were with debt and oil exports, dominated the panorama during the seventies. Later would come the reforms of the eighties and nineties that, although weighty in many respects, never fully reverted the “deeds” consummated throughout the seventies into the form of regulations, government-owned enterprises, and other subsidy, protection, and control mechanisms.

After more than four decades of unexceptional economic performance, it seems to me that the focus should change radically: rather than pursuing ways for the government to PRODUCE a sustained economic recovery, it is time that the government MAKES POSSIBLE the recovery. Although this appears to be a mere play on words, the focus is radically distinct: in the first case, the government assumes the responsibility of growth making use of the expenditure, investment, regulations, state-owned ventures, and other instruments within its reach. That is, everything that has not worked in 45 years. The alternative would be for the government to create conditions under which growth would be possible. Although many of the instruments would be the same, the manner of deploying them would be very different: instead of protecting some and favoring others, the government would create general rules, the same for all; instead of indulging the producer, it would launch a decided defense of the consumer; rather than changing the rules and regulations at every turn, it would create a permanent regulatory framework that is shored up on solid property rights; rather than making exceptions for government-owned corporations such as PEMEX, these would be required to respond to the consumer and to competition like any other company, independently of the nature of the ownership. The governmental focus of recent decades creates an ambience of uncertainty that discourages investment, savings, and production.

Some months ago, Gordon Hanson published a study* on why Mexico is not a rich country. His point of departure is that the country has carried out many reforms and that, in general, these are much more extensive than those of the majority of countries at a similar level of development but, unlike these, it has not achieved a rise in its growth rate. His analysis is also interesting because it excludes many of the clichés and myths that persist in the milieu: Corruption? Yes, but many countries that do grow are equally corrupt; Hispanic heritage? Yes, but, with the exception of Venezuela, Mexico is the country with the least growth in the region; Government-owned firms? Yes, but there are many in Asia and Latin America and these enterprises do not have to be an impediment; Cultural rejection? Perhaps, but not at all distinct from that of the remainder of the continent that grows with celerity. Hanson’s conclusion is interesting because it does not pretend to attain the philosophers’ stone. From his point of view, there are five factors that interact negatively to impede the growth of productivity, but it is very difficult to know the relative importance of each, which is why there is the risk of overestimating a specific cause only to later find that the problem lay elsewhere. The factors are the following: extremely poor allocation of credit; high incentives for the informal sector; a poor educational system; control of some key markets; and vulnerability to external shocks. However, the core of his conclusion is that there is no governmental capacity, that is, that the government is barely effective, that it generates too many distortions, and that it does not contribute to resolving the problems of the economy despite having attempted to so with such diligence.

Mexico has endeavored for decades to set economic growth aright. Along the way, solutions were tested that plainly did not achieve it, but a deep-seated wake of uncertainty has been created. The only lesson that is clear to me is that a strong government is required with a great capacity of action to render market functioning possible. Today we know that we have a weak system of government that has done its best to attempt to regulate, if not substitute for, the functioning of markets. Perhaps it’s high time to make possible for these to work.

*Hanson, Gordon, Why Isn’t Mexico Rich? NBER

http://www.nber.org/papers/w16470

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