Luis Rubio

When Alexander Pope, the great English poet of the XVIII Century, was on his deathbed, his physician ensured him that his breathing, pulse and other vital signs were improving. “Here I am,” Pope said to a friend, “dying of a hundred good symptoms”. The government runs a similar risk. When a country is small and lives next to a large and powerful one, it has no alternative other than to adjust when the larger one changes the game. The Mexican Government cannot afford the luxury of ignoring what is happening in the North. The issue of immigration is already on the table and the government can either help or be in the way but cannot sit with its hands in its pockets.

The U.S. is a nation constructed of successive waves of immigrants. For nearly a century and a half, immigration was formally welcome and promoted. However, from the beginning of the XX Century, the view changed and in 1924 a quota system was adopted that gave rise to bitter and interminable debate with respect to its migration policy.

That debate changed the manner, actors and characteristics, but the content remained the same: those who see immigration as a threat as opposed to those who view it as an opportunity. The “bad guys” tend to change over time: during one of those times it was the Italians, during another the Jews, then the Cubans, now the Mexicans. There’s always someone, in every era, who rationalizes his opposition with arguments relative to the specific origin of the migrants, but if one observes nearly one century of debate, what’s left is that basic confrontation: threat vs. opportunity.

The recent presidential election, in which Obama gained overwhelming support from the Hispanic community, reintroduced the theme to the legislative agenda. Although both views prevail, legislators of both parties are well aware that they cannot evade it, thus the debate promises to be rich and transcending. The question is what, in the face of this reality, are the options left to the Mexican Government.

Similar to the internal debate of the U.S., in the government as well as in Mexican society there are two very clearly differentiated positions: that of those who consider the migratory theme to be an internal matter of the U.S. and those who consider it to be a matter of national interest for Mexico. The former would prefer to put on blinders; the latter would embark upon a crusade. The problem is that both are right in their position, therefore the government can do no more than act, albeit with an intelligent, appropriate, active and discrete strategy.

On the one hand, it is evident that the migratory issue is of an internal character because it involves what is most essential to any nation: the composition of its society. In addition, what is at play is the authority of a sovereign government to decide on the legal treatment of a population that violated its laws at the very instant of entering the country or when it remained within its territory beyond the time permitted by its entry stamp. The Mexican Government has nothing to offer in these fields nor can it run the risk of putting its presidency at play in a decision where it can wield little or no influence. Also, previous experiences of undue dependence on decisions made in Washington have taught the current administration to be cautious and remain distant and aloof.

On the hand, we are speaking of over 10% of the country’s population, of a constituency directly linked with over 50% of the population (siblings, parents, children) and that, in some states, represents more than one half of the total number of its inhabitants. It is impossible to ignore the internal political transcendence of the decision eventually adopted by the U.S. Government. Nor is the impressive impact of remittances on an enormous number of Mexcian families. Finally, although improbable, a scenario in which prodigious numbers of persons who now live there would end up forced to return is not inconceivable. As much as the government might wish to lie low, in this debate there are vital matters that cannot be skirted.

The Mexican Government must develop a strategy that is suitable to the circumstances. The conditioning factors are very clear: a) this is an internal affair, thus the strategy must be discrete; b) Mexico would be enormously benefitted by the legalization of those already living there today; c) these Mexicans are not now nor will they ever be a political “instrument” for the Mexican Government: they are persons of Mexican origin who aspire to live in the U.S. as citizens with their legal status in order; d) there are powerful sources of opposition to any migratory liberalization and their arguments are both legitimate and respectable; e) the U.S. society is highly decentralized and the ideas as well as sources of support and rejection – and fears- in this matter derive from below; and f) the immigration debate itself provides opportunities for a reencounter between the Mexican Government and Mexicans who opted to migrate, but also between the two societies and their governments.

These conditioning factors establish the parameters within which it is imperative to act. There are two key elements: one, to define, in private, a formal position before the U.S. Government and to develop and maintain all of the channels of communication open and fluid with its Executive branch and Congress. The Mexican Government should present itself as an actor respectful of but interested in the results and willing to assume its part for these results to be favorable. The remaining element is that of acting discretely but deliberately in order to attend to, undermine or eliminate opposition sources at the root.

The latter is crucial. When the NAFTA negotiation was launched, the Mexican Government, directly and through diverse actors across the society, devoted itself to catering and paying attention to the oppositional sources, above all in the states most vulnerable to the trade agreement, particularly those related to the manufacture of textiles, automobiles and other similar products. The objective was to explain, seek options and to join together to neutralize the opposition to the extent possible.

The migratory affair is similar to NAFTA except for being monumental in size. The government must develop a strategy to look after the complainers, the Right, the aggrieved, the employers and to the communities of Mexicans. The objective: explain, join forces and show the benign effects of migrants already there illegally, to calm Americans’ fears. A grand effort that, paradoxically, does not need to be very public (meaning in the national media), but broad and everywhere. A great low-profile political operation: with the proper budget allocation and with the appropriate redefinition of the role of the consulates. Above all, going beyond the formal structures and involving the society and the diverse actors, here as well as there. Not, by its nature, too PRIist a strategy, but indispensable nonetheless.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

 Luis Rubio

No government, however powerful, can do it all. In fact, its core function is not, nor should it be, “to do things”. Its prime function is making it possible for the country to prosper and for this to create a favorable atmosphere for prosperity, to keep the population safe and to guarantee the protection of the latter’s rights, in the broadest sense. To achieve this implies choosing: defining priorities and facilitating the achievement of its objectives with the participation of the entire society.

The government of President Peña has come in with enormous and overwhelming impetus and has achieved changing the tonic of Mexicans’ attitudes and of public opinion in general. This said, it is brandishing so copious a surge of programs, projects and initiatives in all ambits, that it runs the risk of losing its concentration on the essential. Not only that: the need to maintain the initiative in the media is leading it to daily pronouncements that, while having the benefit of “making it felt” that there is a government in place, it entails the risk of losing its sense of direction.

Just to illustrate, in the ambit of investment and expenditure projects, governmental officials have announced programs to combat hunger, to construct railway lines to Querétaro, Toluca, and another in Yucatán, and they propose modifying the pension regime, developing oil and gas projects and constructing new infrastructure projects. In addition, they will be required to confront the matter of state and municipal debt. In concept, none of this can be criticized: what is doubtful is whether the government has the financial capacity to achieve this. On taking advantage of high oil prices and low interest rates, public expenditures have grown significantly in recent years, leaving little elbow room for the many projects that the new government proposes to undertake.

The point is not to find fault with the projects, but to propose the need for focusing its energy in another direction: instead of pretending to fulfill these projects itself, why not create conditions for private investors to carry them out?

Some months ago, for example, the country began to experience the scarcity of natural gas for industrial uses. It turned out that there was no lack of gas but rather of infrastructure to transport it from the wells where it is produced to zones where there is a demand for it. PEMEX has developed numberless projects for laying gas ducts, which implies, in many cases, that the tracing of these already exists as well as the rights of way to these. Because there are no constitutional restrictions in this matter, I ask myself whether it wouldn’t be logical to offer concessions throughout the country to take advantage of the already advanced state of things in this area and to create myriad regional development engines. The fact of having gas at extremely competitive prices entails a unique opportunity for promoting a new era of industrial development. From this perspective, it is absurd to accept the bottleneck represented by the lack of gas ducts as a done deed. The solution is obvious. And urgent.

The same could be done in all ambits of the infrastructure and, if a serious reform in matters of energy does indeed advance, up to the exploration and exploitation of deep-sea deposits, shale and the whole gamma of petrochemicals that are at present reserved for the State. It would be relevant for the government to develop a true capacity to set and enforce rules through its attributions of regulation and concession granting. Much more intelligent and productive than the use of scarce fiscal resources.

At heart, the great theme of economic development is to be found in the enormous amount of bottlenecks that exist in all activities and that, typically, respond to two types of circumstances: operative or financial incapacity on the part of the government (including the parastatal sector) or poor decisions in matters of previous privatizations and, in general, of economic regulation. These two factors have become apparently unsalvageable chains that bind.

The existing bottlenecks have to do with the way entities such as the CFE and PEMEX operate: their objectives and priorities are not devoted to creating a competitive environment for growth of the economy. Both act as if they were entities independent from the rest of economic activity. On its part the government is confused with respect to its own functions and objectives. Einstein said that “confusion of goals and means seems, in my opinion, to characterize our age”. This without doubt has been the case of the Mexican Government for decades.

The Mexican Government has been an entity wrapped up in itself, devoted to satisfying the interests of its own bureaucratic, political, vested interests and clienteles. This takes place, on some scale, in all political systems, but in Mexico the concentration of this is infamous and translates into lower economic growth rates. Historically, the government has purported to do it all –starting with that which all politicians love to talk about, the “rectorship” of the State, but which they have never done well- and has ended up scoring very poorly as a project promoter, market organizer or company privatizer. Despite the trade liberation, which has been in place now for more thirty years, the country continues to endure the lack of competitive markets, competition in the services area and a clear strategy for growth.

The central matter is that now that there is a government with a renewed sense of authority and with the decision of transforming the country there exists the extraordinary opportunity to redefine its priorities for acting and the very nature of their act. Effective economic rectorship implies the establishment of rules of the game that generate competitive markets, thus opportunities for private investment. It also implies conceiving of the government as the entity responsible for the creation of conditions for prosperity. Margaret Thatcher stated in an interview that the key lies in the government’s not being a burden on society but rather the factor that facilitates its development. This makes all the difference.

Politics is not defined on the plane of intentions but on that of results. As the case of the gas ducts illustrates, there are so many opportunities literally within arm’s reach -low hanging fruit as it were- that a good development strategy and a well-established set of priorities could constitute the transforming factor in the very short term. Henry Hazlitt says that the art of governing “consists of looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists of tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups”. Here’s a good place to start.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

What’s the problem with Mexico’s development? How can we direct the economy so as to recover its vitality, generate wealth and satisfy the population in general? Part of the answer lies in understanding the nature of the problems that we are facing and the context within which these occur. The other part resides in constructing the political capacity to deal with these. One without the other turns out to be irrelevant.

On thinking about this I found myself with an unvarnished diagnosis of our problems. This is it in sum:

• It is the fault of the country’s failure to adequately modernize its governing institutions and its economy -its public sector and its private sector.
• The problem is that the people are unprepared for the future, and the situation is not so much the cause of that problem as the embodiment of it.
• It will not be easy to regain our old trajectory. Economic growth is in essence a function of two factors -workforce expansion and productivity improvement- and the growth of the past half-century has involved both in roughly equal measure.
• This suggests that economic growth in the coming decades will depend decisively on productivity growth. If we are to experience anything like the prosperity of the postwar era, our economy will need to be more productive than ever. Efficiency must be the watchword of our economic policy.
• The private economy is not exactly getting geared for efficiency either. The failure of education reform makes it difficult for too many younger people to gain the skills that they will need to compete with foreign workers in tomorrow’s economy.
• The key is driving productivity and innovation but nothing is advancing there.
• The tax code, meanwhile, undermines the competitive position of local producers and imposes immense efficiency costs on the entire economy.
• Economic policy is increasingly dominated by an ideal of state capitalism, in which regulators prefer to work with a few large players in each industry -functioning essentially as public utilities- while making the lives of small competitors and innovators next to impossible.
• By using the government’s immense leverage to drive innovation and contain costs through competition (rather than to drive volume and inflate costs through price controls), it would be possible to reform the health system.
• Finally, we should pursue a human capital agenda to help supply the labor force our economy will need if we are to pull off a productivity revolution.
• The real heart of a human capital agenda must be education reform.
• Productivity and efficiency need not come at the expense of financial security and social cohesion; indeed, they have often gone hand in hand throughout our history.
• Economic growth driven by competition and innovation has been easily the most effective means of lifting people out of poverty, particularly when coupled not with an empty promise of material equality but with a fervent commitment to upward mobility.
• Mexico needs more than economic growth. But without growth, we cannot hope to take up our other priorities.

This summary of the study highlights many of our weaknesses and illustrates the challenge confronting us. What is significant about the summary is that it does not refer to Mexico. It is an analysis of the U.S. and the only thing I did was to insert Mexico where it said “America”. The message is that, in a globalized world, the challenges of development are not exclusively of our country. The reality is that, despite the reforms of the past decades, the country has become stiff in the joints and has not broken free of its vicious circles.

In the economic ambit, there are two factors that characterize the Mexican economy. One is the existence of two, radically different, industrial sectors, one focused on productivity and exports, and another entirely focused on the internal market. Typically, the former compete with the best in the world, the latter live precariously, protected, in some cases, by tariffs and subsidies, but the majority by means of traditions and ancestral forms of consumer behavior. The other factor that characterizes the country in general, and not only the economy, is the fact that the government, at its three levels, has not modernized itself. This has produced an exceptional circumstance: we have first-world enterprises but a fifth-world government.

This is not the result of chance. The reforms of the eighties forced the private sector to compete, but they did not do the same for the government-owned corporations. They opened up importation of goods, which forced the manufacturers to compete or die, but nothing similar happened with services, what the energy monsters produce or the government itself. Now, fully engaged in the XXI Century, we must deal with the consequences of what was not done. That is, at the core, the argument of Yuval Levin, the author of the previously cited text*.

The grand question for the new government is whether it will have the disposition and the capacity to reform the system of government that characterizes the country. That is where our greatest problems lie, where the pettiest interests hide and where the status quo is preserved as if it were the government’s and the country’s raison d’etre.

The risk at this moment of change is that we will fall into the willfulness that is the product of arrogance: “the ones before us were very inept; we’re the ones who really know how”. In reality, the country’s problems transcend parties and cannot able to be resolved with nothing more than will. What is required is vision (clarity about what it’s necessary to do); power (the capacity and disposition to sway the interests that they defend and benefit the status quo and that, in their overwhelming majority, are an integral part of the PRIist coalition); and the what for: that is, understanding that the historical objective of the PRI (to protect the interests of the revolutionary family) is unsustainable and that the only thing that’s relevant at this time is to create a wealth base that fortifies the country, generates jobs, makes development possible and recognizes that only a private sector that is competitive and not protected will be capable of achieving this.

The country needs a radical transformation. It’s been decades since such a possibility has been in the cards, the reason why the opportunity is so extraordinary and why the cost of not advancing would be so high.

*Our Age of Anxiety (http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/articles/our-age-anxiety_645175.html).

www.cidac.org
@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

The great myth of Mexican politics is that there was in the past a strong and competent government that successfully guided the national destiny and that the only thing lacking is a return to that idyllic past for all our problems to be solved. The reality is that the “old regime” was an authoritarian system that imposed order and, for a good number of years, imposed an economic policy in keeping with the times and successful in that regard, but that ended up creating a crisis. The combination of political stability and economic growth allowed for development, until the crisis undermined the system’s legitimacy and cast open Pandora’s box. The great but weak state ended up producing crisis, violence and the dislocation that characterizes Mexico today. Mexico needs a new State, not the reconstruction of one that was neither successful nor one that can even be recreated.

The return of the PRI has generated much nostalgia for the old system and has revived the notion that the country’s success depends on the will of he who governs. Unfortunately, what is involved is an institutional, not an individual, challenge. The old system worked under internal and external conditions that are inexistent today where the population feared, not respected, the government. In reference to a similar process in present-day Russia, a few years ago Martin Wolf wrote that “The KGB-state is incapable of understanding that fear and respect are antitheses, not synonyms.” What Mexico requires is a new institutional structure that permits enforcing the law possible, maintaining order and constructing a new political reality. An effective government can be instrumental in achieving this, but the key resides not only in that things function but also in the development of institutions –checks and balances- that confer upon it legitimacy and permanence. The alternative would be sheer effectiveness without modifying the essence. While not proposing this as such, it is what the past two governments tried and, judging from the result, failed to accomplish. Independently of their ability, their main problem lay in accepting the status quo and making it their own. The challenge today is to transcend the (indispensable and welcome) efficacy in order to achieve a strong institutional foundation from which emanates a strong, functional and effective State. As well as democratic.

The difference between an effective and institutionalized government is enormous. An effective government can impose order, modify the terms of the system’s functioning, and carry out diverse reforms. The best and most successful example of the latter is without doubt former Mexican president Carlos Salinas. His government proposed the transformation of the country’s structures and achieved the redefinition of the relations between the government and the groups now denominated “the de facto powers” and imposed a series of reforms that breathed life into the economy for the ensuing decades. However, as successful as this was, it also unearthed the limitations of a project based merely on effectiveness it lasts as long as it lasts, summarily collapsing because everything depends on one person commandeering an authoritarian government. This was worse yet when his own actions undermined the power of the structures devoted to supporting the system.

An institutionalized government implies constant negotiation, the power of persuasion, conflict and permanent complexity. That is what we have witnessed in the legislative ambit and in the relations between the states and the Federal Government in the past few years. It is to be expected that this same dynamic will characterize the relationship with the “de facto” powers: the Mexican National Educational Workers Union (SNTE) is the most obvious, but surely not the last. The Peña-Nieto government has assumed the responsibility of pacifying the country and of creating conditions for economic growth. Both are necessary but will not be sufficient if these do not entail a radical transformation of the nature of the government itself.

That is where the relationship between the Executive and the other branches of government becomes crucial, but very particularly with regard to the opposition parties. The Pact signed in December is an excellent beginning but insufficient, as illustrated by the internal crisis produced by the participation of the PAN and the PRD. That crisis revealed another of the myths of our current reality: in Mexico we have not achieved the institutionality from which there emanates a loyal opposition, a term implying that a party recognizes the legitimacy of a government’s origin although it competes head on in the electoral realm.  Some politicians  –beginning with the signers of the Pact- are operating in this manner, but others advance agendas that evidence them as disloyal in the previously noted sense, if not inclined to adopting anti-institutional strategies.

These realities derive from two processes. The first has to do with the peculiar nature of the political transition that, on not being the product of a broad political agreement with precise definitions of objectives and processes, allows each political actor to define it as best suits himself. The second is the product of old political rivalries that decades of electoral competition have proven insufficient to resolve. One of these is that which dominates left-wing politics, where the exPRIists, now in the MORENA movement, have become the main source of disloyal opposition. The PAN is not far behind: its current divisiveness brings to light the discord between its constituents born into anti-PRIism par excellence and those attempting to construct a new politico-institutional foundation.

The government could take advantage of (and even foster) these divisions and rivalries to construct temporary coalitions and promote the confrontation of one opposition cadre against another to advance its agenda. The question is whether this would afford permanence and transcendence. The example of the reform era of the eighties and nineties shows that that this could be a functional strategy, but one that is short-sighted and liable to engender crisis. The alternative strategy would imply submitting the Executive to the rule of law, something that has never existed in Mexican history. In the era of the Magna Carta, Henry de Bracton wrote that “The King is under the Law for it is the Law that maketh him a King”. To accept this premise and to convert it into a principle of action would entail not only a revolution of conceptions, but also the opportunity to construct a political system with long-term viability.

According to Fukuyama, the three components of a modern political system –and a precondition for a flourishing capitalist economy- are a strong and competent State, subordination of the State to the rule of Law and accountability to the citizenship. The new government has demonstrated that it is capable of achieving functionality and efficiency in its daily undertakings. Now what’s missing is its advance toward consolidating the foundations of a modern country.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

It never fails. As dawn heralds each new day, on the initiation of each governorship or municipal presidency complaints begin to flow on the excessive debt that the previous administration acquired. The scene is typical: the new governor arrives at his post with enormous plans and projects, only to find himself with empty coffers and, worse, that the funds that the entity will receive were already mortgaged by his predecessors. This structural problem will not be resolved until the conditions that create it change.

The perennial discussion reminds me of a Hindu legend that I once read. According to the tale, apparently deciphered from a photograph of the Krishna deity playing chess with the Radha, the local king, the latter had an inclination for challenging his guests to play a round of chess. One day there appeared a wise traveler who accepted the challenge, modestly asking the king for a few grains of rice were he to win: one grain for the first square and later double the number of grains per square in each of the following matches, until the gaming table was filled. The king lost and ordered payment to the wise man according to the terms established and it was then that he noted the trap that had been set for him. What the wise man had requested as payment was none other than the exponential growth of rice grains that, after sixty four filled squares, represented 210 billion tons of rice. In other words, what half of humanity would consume for some centuries to come…

Large or small, state and municipal debts are the result of a structure that rewards the today at the cost of the future. Worse, it rewards the first local government that had the opportunity to put its entity in debt, in order to usually squander it in the most unproductive ways. Let’s take this by parts.

Credit serves for carrying out works that benefit the population. In theory, these works permit better lifestyles, attract investment, therefore jobs. Just as a businessman who requests a bank loan to expand his productive plant, the state government seeks to construct today an infrastructure project that will be of service in the future. However, in contrast with the company, whose credit would be paid off with the additional production generated by expanding the business, public works –if carried out well- involve very long maturation times and, in the majority of cases, do not generate direct revenue. That is, even though the project is well conceived, the credit afforded to a state or municipality depends on the income obtained by the entity through taxes or federal transfers that are not related with the public works themselves.

In recent years, the states have discovered new instruments for obtaining resources, all of these tied to future income deriving from these two sources. In this manner, countless states have committed these resources for the next three generations. That is, they obtained resources today that will be paid for with the product of taxes and transfers in the upcoming decades. The first state governor or municipal president who contracts the debt enjoys the benefit; all of the others and, of course, the locality’s inhabitants, suffer the consequences.

The first structural problem derives from the very fact of a governor even being able to shamelessly mortgage the future in such a way. Independently of how meritorious his projects are (and many of the latter, perhaps the majority, are not), the fact is that the future is compromised. The evident consequence of this situation is that all of the governors implicitly dream, suppose and expect that the federation will absorb their state’s debt; thus, with this, a new vicious circle begins. And that is the second structural problem: instead of constructing a healthy fiscal structure, everyone prefers to negotiate (or blackmail) the federal government rather than collecting taxes directly.

Credit, whoever the beneficiary, is granted depending on capacity to pay off of the potential debtor. This payment capacity is determined by the current income sources that whoever requests the credit possesses. As illustrated by the contrast between a company and the previously cited government, the problem of state governments in Mexico is that they do not collect taxes. That is the basic problem; the rest is just acting.

The discussion about state and municipal debts brings to the fore other much more transcending angles than the money itself. Although formally the country possesses a federal structure, that is, one that separates the attributions and responsibilities of each of the three levels of government, the objective reality is that, throughout the greater part of the past century, the federal government claimed unto itself all of the functions and left local-level political and administrative structures weak and undeveloped. Worse yet, it created a culture of petitioners among the governors and impeded the development of a system of checks and balances between local legislative powers and the respective executive power. With the decentralization of political power in the last decades, the governors acquired huge amounts of resources with no supervision whatsoever. The indebtedness was not the product of chance.

But the consequences of this reality can be observed, among others, in the violence characterizing a good part of the territory. During the era that the federal government controlled all political and police activity, security was in its charge. With the decentralization of power, the federal government no longer had the ability, power or resources to maintain security and, in general, the governors have not taken charge of constructing modern and effective police departments as well as functional judicial system. The security crisis did not occur because of the decentralization of power, but it did take place within this context: it came about simultaneously with the growth of the mafias of organized crime in the national territory. The result has been that the country does not have the mechanisms to deal with the phenomenon.

Debt and criminality are only two symptoms of the fundamental problem. Today’s federal structure is very good in theory, but is dysfunctional in the present reality. The problem goes back to the fiscal structure lying at the heart of federalism. In a word, states and municipalities must collect the taxes that will allow them to carry out and pay for the services (including, of course, the police and the judiciary) that their inhabitants require. Without a healthy fiscal structure that is sufficient for resources and expenditures at the local level, safety or prosperity will be impossible.

Instead of controlling the resources, the federal government should create a system of incentives for this change to occur, which would entail the greatest political revolution of our times.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

Everything changed but everything stays the same. That’s the sum of nearly two months of government. In less than a week, the new government installed itself and changed the political dynamic of the country: the professionals had returned and, with them, formality in politics. Forms are without doubt an essential part of a country’s political life but, without substance, forms do not suffice. Perhaps the greatest risk for the new government –and for the country- is that it perceives that its initial success, as enormous as it has been, leads it to conclude that it’s not necessary to do anything, that the problem was the incompetent actors of before and not the reality.

In a few weeks something unusual has take place: the sensation returned that there is a government. It has advanced towards restoring state rectorship and showcases efficiency. It didn’t take the new team more than a few minutes to displace the former, to wipe off the map –or from the media- themes that get in its way (such as criminality) and to make itself felt as a preeminent and omniscient presence.

Even with the difficulties it has encountered in the legislative arena, the old practices are back. Money flows like water. No vote is too expensive: everything and everyone may be bought. When money is no longer effective other instruments will come into use, less palatable. The media are finding out that the era of “license” is coming to an end. Now there is authority that is willing to employ its means and resources to reward and punish. Like before. Similarly, there are signs that another of the old vices is returning: self-censorship.

The existence of authority is an enormous asset if employed for carrying out relevant changes. Form is fundamental as long as it serves for something. The PRI of yesteryear constructed a modern country but afterward the party became stagnant, lost its compass and nearly destroyed the country. While that was happening, the forms continued to be impeccable: the same as the proverbial story of those who discussed the menu on the Titanic as it sank. The government has reestablished a sense of authority and possesses the capacities and skills to convert that enormous asset into a source of transformation. If it opts for watering down its reform proposal and lives off the assets that prior administrations constructed (which, with all of their limitations, were not few), in a couple of years, if not sooner, it will begin to see the limits of control without substance. Or it will end up running straight into a wall. By that time it will be too late to begin. The time is now.

The central matters are evident: public safety, economic growth and political stability. None of these is new and the three constitute basic challenges that are not resolved by the fact that there is a credible government in place, although without this it would be impossible to confront or resolve these.

Public safety is much more than fighting organized crime or, as many propose, ignoring it and allowing it its space, as long as it doesn’t get in the way. The country existed for centuries with weak judicial and police structures, all subordinate to the central power. Violence and crime were growing during the eras of weak central power (the XIX Century) and diminished with strong powers at the center, as occurred during the era of Porfirio Diaz at the end of that century and in the PRI era. This observation has led many to conclude that it is evident that what is required is the recentralization the power. The problem is that decentralization did not take place by will but rather through the evolution and growing complexity of the society and the globalization of the economy. While it is evident that a new political structure is required, the notion of centralizing would not work there either. The country urgently needs strong institutions that respond to the citizens and to resolve their problems.

Economic growth has been the objective and concern of all governments since the Porfirio Diaz era, but in recent decades –within a complex and highly competitive international context- it has been fleeting, when not slippery at best. Although there were moments and actions of great vision, such as the NAFTA, an integral strategy for transforming the country never developed. The contrast with Canada, which converted the same instrument into its ticket to development, is impacting. Of course the circumstances and characteristics of both nations are very distinct, but the main difference lies in the capacity, and above all, the willingness of the Canadians to define their objectives, construct strategies likely to reach these and to do everything necessary to achieve them.

Economic success will require a radical change of vision: to accept that the required transformation will entail costs but that once carried out, these become sources of investment, employment and wealth. In the past few decades, we have witnessed moments of vision but an environment of risk aversion: it is no coincidence that so little has been harvested. The results that we have seen are the product of the limitations of the objectives as well as of the strategies adopted. Even at the most visionary moments, enormous benefits were promised but the actions undertaken -like privatizations, deregulation and economic liberalization- were never themselves visionary or decisive. The easy way was always chosen, that of short term benefits and maintaining the status quo. If the government wants to be successful it will have to take the bull by the horns with a long-term perspective because everything succumbs when there’s an attempt to dodge the immediate costs.

The political stability that the country has experienced has been propped up by structures that gave out a long time ago. The “federal pact” doesn’t work and the best evidence of this can be noted in the inexistence of modern and functional police and judicial institutions at the state level, and in the way the public expenditure is exercised. The easy way out was also chosen in this ambit: leave things to take their course without authority or, as they now and once again phrase it, without rectorship. Our system of government is dysfunctional, weak and out of phase with the needs of public safety as well as those of a modern economy: there is not a sole check and balance. Without checks and balances, no country can be successful. Viewed from this perspective, it’s incredible that we are not worse off.

It’s been decades since the country has had an opportunity as enormous as the current one. A competent government and one capable of exercising authority is indispensable, but it is not sufficient: it if wants to transcend or, even, end in peace, the government had better begin utilizing its skills to transform the country. In its previous era, the PRI went astray because it allowed itself to be dominated by “de facto powers” that paralyzed the country. If it doesn’t get rid of them, they will snuff out the new government.

www.cidac.org
@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

Perhaps there is no greater evil, or one more despised by the Mexican society, than that of impunity. Impunity, the twin sister of corruption, is not the product of our culture or customs: it is the direct daughter of the way that Mexicans have chosen to organize themselves. The problem, as in other similar societies, is that one ends up believing that it’s something natural. In a recent article on Russia, Misha Friedman, a NYT photographer, affirmed that “corruption in Russia is so pervasive that the whole society accepts the unacceptable as normal, as the only way of survival, as the way that things ‘just are’”. Mexico is not so distinct.

And with good reason: observation of the daily panorama shows that impunity reigns above all. The examples are vast and very diverse. There’s a candidate who has run in four elections in his lifetime, but who has only accepted the results in one of these, the one he won. In the remaining three, he didn’t lose: the victory was stolen from him. We witness a farce between a communications enterprise and the government in which the only thing that’s clear is that nothing is transparent in the management of spectrum concessions and, worse yet, that all of those involved in the business (politician and media mega companies) appear to like the system. There are thousands of deaths, “disappeared” journalists, citizens who have been abducted but only a handful of judicial investigations. And all that seems normal to us.

Corruption is no more than a mechanism that allows the functioning of a society within a context of impunity. In the face of the impossibility of resolving the problems, the citizen adapts and corruption is a means of achieving this. That’s how daily problems like a traffic fine are solved, or a permit from the authorities or a visit from an inspector. The problem is not the corruption itself but the impunity that makes it possible and, from another angle, inevitable. And impunity is the product of our institutional weakness.

One of the myriad myths of the old political system is the supposed strength of the country’s institutions. Our image of institutions is that of great monuments and edifices or the way that politicians were disciplined before the presidential authority. However, the relevance of institutions resides in the rules of the game that they entail. An institution, noted Nobel Prize winner Douglas North, are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. The more these rules are clear and defined, the greater the institutional strength and the lesser the potential for arbitrariness of the authority, thus the greater the impunity.

Echeverría’s foreign investment law was a monument to discretionary actions and a perfect example of the source of corruption in our country. The law established a set of precise rules on limits for foreign investment, national and foreigner shareholder rights, and differences among sectors of the economy. Although the law was highly restrictive, one of its articles conferred upon the authority full discretionary powers to act distinctly from what was disposed by the law in cases in which it considered it necessary. That is, the law established very rigid rules but subsequently a space of absolute impunity was generated. This same principle exists in all of our legislation and comprises what generates permanent uncertainty, in addition to spaces for impunity. When the authority possesses faculties so vast that it is legally immune to punishment, corruption becomes a natural survival mechanism.

Three examples illustrate the costs and the opportunities available towards the future. Some years ago I had the opportunity of attending an apparently normal process. A lawyer friend of mine accepted the case of some brothers who wanted him to help them separate the businesses that they had inherited. The legal and the business part followed its own dynamic, but what stood out for me was that the most complex and extensive part of the process was the way in which the clients would pay him for his services. Under normal conditions, the lawyer would have sent them an invoice for his work and they would pay. Period. However, the concern was that after arduous work involving multiple expenses, the clients would end not paying him, hence the need for a cumbersome arrangement that would guaranty payment. This was the extent of the distrust but, above all, the weakness of the institutions that we have. The difficulty of making someone comply with a contract generates absurd distortions.

This example contrasts with the way that building inspectors act in the US. For example, the rules regarding the number of spaces in a parking lot per foot of construction is clear and specific, not subject to negotiation. The inspector is invested with no faculties other than to establish whether this number of parking spaces exists. Because he does not have the faculty to modify (or “stretch”) the rules at will, his decision is binary: yes or no. It is not by chance that we Mexicans frequently clash with Americans in affairs of great transcendence: our frame of reference is radically different.

Fortunately there are examples that it is possible to diminish or eradicate corruption: when the spaces of arbitrariness and impunity are eliminated, corruption stops being possible or inevitable. That’s what happened at the end of the eighties at the then SECOFI (now the Ministry of the Economy) where a change in the rules modified the entire nature of this ministry devoted to commerce and industry. Historically one of the spaces of greatest governmental corruption, the SECOFI bureaucracy lived from the exploitation of their discretionary faculties in the awarding of investment, import, export, and other similar permits. With the liberalization of the economy (which, essentially, consisted of the substitution of permit requirements with tariffs or rigid rules), the entire industry of corruption at this ministry disappeared. Thousands of bureaucratic paper shufflers (or impeders of papers being shuffled) had no reason to exist and the ministry was reduced to less than 10% of what is had been. In that world corruption simply disappeared. It is noteworthy that many prefer the old system…

The day that Mexicans have clear rules in migratory affairs, electoral issues, radio and television concessions and property rights in general, as well as an authority disposed to and invested with the faculties to make them stick without looking back, the country will be another. The issue is to end the discretional faculties that render arbitrariness and impunity permanent: all the rest is mythology.

www.cidac.org
@lrubiof

JANUARY 2013

In the Lurch between Government and Chaos: Unconsolidated Democracy in Mexico

By  Luis Rubio

https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/lurch-between-government-and-chaos-unconsolidated-democracy-mexico

According to an old saying, one is what one reads. Reading is one of my passions and occupations: through books, articles, and assays I learn from others, I reflect on what’s happening in the world and I shape my ideas and judgments. Some readings offer a profound and broad view, others are characterized more by a central idea. As the famous essay by Isaiah Berlin on hedgehogs and foxes, some authors observe the world from the vantage point of many experiences and perspectives (the foxes), while others concentrate on a great idea, the hedgehogs. For Berlin, Plato, Hegel and Nietzsche exemplify the latter, while Shakespeare, Aristotle and Pushkin illustrate the former. Something is learned from all, although some are more enjoyable than others.

This year I read novels, books on history, economics and even psychology. What follows is a series of brief comments on those that appeared to me to stand out more not only because of their excellence, but because they allowed me to learn new things or to reflect on ideas or perspectives that I saw the need to go over. There is no order, only ruminations.

Perhaps the most novel book for me this year was that of the recipient of the Nobel Prize for Economics, Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist who devoted himself to studying the way people make decisions. The book, Thinking Fast and Slow, encompasses an enormous spectrum of themes, but the heart of the argument is his theory on how the human mind thinks. For Kahneman there are two systems that drive the way of thinking: one is fast, intuitive and emotive, while the other is slower, the product of deliberation and more logical. Fast thinking offers enormous possibilities, but it is also the easy prey of prejudices and errors, in addition to its resting essentially on intuition more than on reflection. From this analysis, the author devotes himself to studying the impact of systems of thought on happiness, trust, the perception of risk and the way to come to a decision. Fascinating book.

Carlos Elizondo devotesWith or Without Money to the dilemmas of government spending. He explains with an extraordinary clear mind the dynamics of spending, with particular emphasis on two criteria; what is government spending good for, and whyit is not just a matter of raising more taxes. He dwells on the consequences of taxation, their impact on economic growth and the problem of a weak State that cannot even enforce the law. If you read only one book about Mexico or budgets and taxes this year, this should be it.

Six Months in 1945, by Michael Dobbs, is a wise and well told history of the last six months of the Second World War, a period that began with the meeting in Yalta of the “big three,” Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, when victory over the German Army seemed imminent. The avowed objective of these conversations was the construction of a lasting peace, but what really happened was that during those months the foundations were built of what would end up being the Cold War: the spheres of influence of the two super powers, the nuclear competition and the dividing of Europe. At the second summit of these three personages, in Potsdam, at the end of those six months, Churchill was already speaking about the “Iron Curtain.” What’s interesting about this book, a little like Barbara Tuchman’s famous work on the beginning of the First World War, The Guns of August, is observing how things can go in one or another direction and that a few things can make an enormous difference. In his most recent book, On China, Kissinger has a stupendous epilogue precisely about this: he writes of a brilliant document prepared at the British Foreign Office in 1907 on the evolution of Germany after its reunification in 1871. That analysis ended up forging the positions of the German as well as of the British side despite its being mere speculation: the consequences of the lack of communication, the example that Kissingeruses as a warning about the relation of the U.S. and China at present.

Unintended Consequences, a book by Edward Conard, defies the generalized concept on the cause of the current economic crisis. The author begins by posing some simple questions but ones with enormous depth: “Ifthe U.S had become a nation of reckless wasteful consumers rather than investors, why did productivity soar in the years leading up to the meltdown?If predatory bankers took advantage of home owners, why did down payments decline, thereby shifting risk from home owners to lenders? If the risks were easy to spot, why did top political and financial advisers encourage lenders to make unsound investments? This is a book that plays devil’s advocate to conventional analysis, that does not skirt complex matters and that presents a sensible framework of economic recovery that won’t be much to the liking of those who prefer the government to resolve all of the problems.

In Left Behind: Latin America and the False Promise of Populism,the Chilean economist Sebastián Edwards offers a refreshing view of the avatars of the region’s economic policy. Eras of disproportionate hope, followed by periods of disillusionment, all due to the historical nature of the dominant economic policies, which favored regulation, corruption and manipulation over competition, markets and the rule of law. His main argument is that there is no way to cut corners to on the way to development: if a country wants to achieve it, it must adopt a strategy that makes it possible. In his analysis, which is concentrated above all on Chile, Mexico and Argentina, Edwards explains with devastating logic the reason for which populist policies, attractive as they seem on the surface, will never end the poverty that characterizes the region.

In closing, Karen Elliott House has just published a book that took decades to research. On Saudi Arabia is a journalistic marvel that permits one to insert oneself into the Saudi clans and families –from the Royal Family to the commoner population- and to have a glimpse into a complex and distinct world that is experiencing the death rattles of regional revolutions, a generational transition and a key industry, all this in the midst of a religious fervor that does not augur obvious success.

Happy New Year to all!

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

The avatars of the bill on labor matters are suggestive of everything in which Mexico has advanced but also of the enormous distance it has yet to cover. The very idea of a preferential bill indicates that there is awareness of the need to adapt existing institutions, procedures and mechanics to times distant from those of exacerbated presidential power. But the way that the “preferential” procedure was likewise constituted patently demonstrates the insufficiencies that persist or the disinclination to take a leap toward a society with real developmental potential.

The specific issue of the preferential bill is that it lacks teeth. In France, where the procedure was conceived, when the president sends upan bill under this heading the legislative power has a peremptory period during which it can act but, if it doesn’t, the bill is automatically approved. This confers on the president an instrument for forcing the legislature to respond to his proposals, avoiding key issues going into deep-freeze, thus advancing the development of the country. In Mexico the idea was adopted but not the mechanism: peremptory time periods are established but nothing happens if the legislative power fails to vote or becomes paralyzed, as occurred. That is, there is no guillotine, the name commonly used for the procedure in France. Also, à la mexicaine, the problems that inevitably would present themselves in a bicameral system were not resolved. It advanced but didn’t reach the finish line.

A few hours prior to writing this text I had the opportunity of watching a documentary on the 1982 expropriation of commercial banks in Mexico. Beyond the topic of the documentary, what was extraordinary is the contrast between a Mexico that has disappeared and the one that exists today. Amazing the manner that the functionaries and governors, the politicians and, in general the society, conduct themselves. Despite the shortages and insufficiencies, such as that illustrated by the preferential initiative, there is no doubt that the country has advanced dramatically.

What hasn’t changed is the notionthat everything can be controlled from above, that the concentration of power is good and that any limitation of this constitutes an affront to the country’s development. Judging by the performance of the country in recent years this would be considered, at least in some measure, absolutely logical. For many, the problem is the weakness of the presidency, a concept that is somewhat strange given the history: it’s not as if the country developed by holding itself up as example to the world during the years of the PRI’s authoritarian rule that then, suddenly, under different management, everything collapsed.

The equation at which Mexico must arrive is very simple: it requires State capacity –the possibility of deciding, acting, foreseeing and resolving problems- and it requires institutional counterweights. The former won’t work if the latter don’t exist and vice versa: the capacity of the State is crucial for development but for this to come about checks and balances are required in the society so that it favors decision-making without excesses or abuses. Today we have two good examples of how pernicious a misunderstanding of these fundamental balances can be: we have  the amparo, sort of habeas corpus, that is so broad that it ends up paralyzing governmental action and a preferential initiative without teeth or transcendence.

Our situation is not exceptional; there are dozens of nations that have attempted democratic transitions with neither plan nor compass and that, like Mexico, have ended up stuck at the middle of the river. Given an effective, capable and convincing leadership it is feasible to build the institutional scaffolding required, above all because there are many examples of success stories in the world.  For that Mexicans would have to do away with the propensity, if not a collective decision, to imitate the poor examples.

There are many sources of counterweights in the country, but there is no balance among the branches of government, which is what comprises the concept of checks and balances. The de facto or vetopowers, the amparo,the unions and other power factors constitute formidable counterweights for the functioning of the political system. So formidable are these that they have ended up by paralyzing it. What is lacking is thecounterweight that the other component of the binomial represents. For example, it is clear that the original intent of the preferential initiative was that of imitating the French case. With this logic a counterweight was supposed to have been created for the legislatives arena; however, at the last minute, during the approval process of this law, the key factor was removed: the so-called afirmativaficta (automatic approval). The problem is that one thing does not work without the other. We ran only to remain in place, but now saddled with enormous potential frustrations.

In the absence of the “checks and balances” binomial, many of the instruments, motives and mechanisms of the old authoritarian system persist,making it impossible for the government being able to be functional and effective. One party having the legislative majority does not guarantee, as illustrated by seventy years of PRI rule in the 20th century, that they will make good decisions or that the country will prosper. I have no doubt that a government more dexterous in political operation will make it possible to dodge the pitfalls that were impossible for recent administrations to resolve. However, in addition to the capacity of political operation solid and functional institutions are required that permit governing in a normal manner.

In an article entitled “Fragile Constitutions”, W.H. Hutt affirmed that “the essence of an effective constitution is that it is built on distrust, not on faith”. In Mexico we tend to do exactly the opposite: we shore up everything on the faith that everyone will behave according to a preconceived plan, a reasonable concept in the era of hard presidentialism, but incompatible with the size and diversity of the Mexican society of today. Thus the most important task of the government, but above all of the entire country, resides in the construction of an effective system of checks and balances.

The back and forth of Mexican politics will not disappear until there is a system in which everyone loses when they don’t do their job, that is, when none of the political actors can elude their responsibility without their fault being evident and costly. The lack of a system of balances rewards conflict, fosters paralysis and is a permanent source of intrigue and distrust. As long as we continue to live in an environment that rewards the one in which, because of the absence of balances, some systematically boast of defeating others, newspaper columns will be filled to overflowing,but Mexican democracy, and the development of the country, will continue to be paralyzed.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof