Luis Rubio

In one of the great gaffs of the Second World War, France assumed that, when a new confrontation would come about, Germany would repeat the invasion pattern of 1914. France prepared with that logic to respond to the failures of the prior confrontation, and ended being invaded. I ask myself whether our focus -of Mexico and of our two North American partners- could be sinking into something similar.

Mexico has become a manufacturing power on a worldwide scale, a circumstance that has permitted the reduction, though not the elimination, of the restrictions that historically had imposed the balance of payments upon us and that were the last cause of many of the financial crises and debacles of the past decades.  Exports have changed the face of Mexico’s economy and have created a powerful growth engine, well-paying jobs and opportunities for development. Those exports, the product of the change of course that the country took in its economy in the eighties and that was consolidated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have alleviated some of our problems, but this obviously comprised only one element among many that should be attended to in the national panorama.

The strategy of economic liberalization, insertion into the commercial, technological and financial circuits of the world –all of this discernible in the exports- continues in such force today as thirty years ago. Many of the wealthiest nations on the planet have been following that strategy, achieving enormous stability and progress, the latter not limited to nation-states, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, nations totally incorporated into those circuits, but instead including countries like Chile, Korea and Taiwan, in addition to the more developed countries. From this perspective, it is evident that what is required is greater and better incorporation into those circuits and not retraction from them. That is to say, our challenge is to be found in the enlargement of the framework in which the modern economy of the country functions: incorporating the part lagging behind, and those who have not had the opportunity to break with the traditional forms of producing, into the successful part.

The challenge is not merely economic or regulatory, although there is much to solve on those planes, but it also encompasses a massive complexity of situations in ambits such as the educative, the infrastructure and, without doubt, the political. Oaxaca and Chiapas have not fallen behind because of lack of infrastructure and the old Mexican industry that continues to lag has a plethora of political contracts that protect it, thus condemning it.  As in so many other milieus of national life, our main obstacles are internal and, in nearly all cases, perfectly visible and explainable in the form of special interests, benefits and privileges.

However, I fear that the challenge is greater and more complex than what these matters involve. A recent visit to a factory in the northern Mexico led me to reflect on the more generalized version of the triumph of Trump a year ago: according to that narrative, the lower manpower costs in places such as China and Mexico have displaced U.S. manpower. That would imply, to be consequential, that job losses in states like Michigan and Ohio would translate into job wins in other latitudes. Some of that has doubtlessly occurred, but what I observed in the plant that I visited was an impressive proliferation of huge robots that are operated by a handful of workers. The hundreds of thousands of jobs that have been lost in North American industrial regions in recent decades are not in Mexico. No way would the ten or fifteen employees that I saw have had a cascade effect the size of which occurred in the U.S. for the Democratic candidate to have lost in traditionally industrial states.

My point is that the great challenge does not lie in the manufacturing industry in which Mexicans have placed their hopes but rather in that this industry is not going to be the solution to the employment problem, as it has not been in traditionally industrial countries for some time. Manufacturing plants and exports will continue to grow, but not so employment, a distinct affair. That is, the technological change is dragging Mexican employment down as it did before with European and American employment. With things going this way, the question is what are we doing in this respect and, in any case, what should be included in the NAFTA negotiations in order for the region’s three nations to adapt with haste to this new era, without negative political consequences for Mexico.

The digital revolution is imposing itself on Mexico’s economy in unanticipated ways with a population that is not prepared to assume it, to benefit from it and to come out on top.  In contrast to former revolutions, such as the Industrial Revolution, the capacity for adaptation in the digital era entails a new focus not only of the educative and the health apparatus, denominated human capital, but also of the manner in which the person is conceived in political terms. Industrial-era workers were organized into unions, citizens of the digital era employ social networks and are highly mobile.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

 

 

 

Luis Rubio

The proposal of Enrique de la Madrid makes it imperative to discuss the matter: recognize the reality and make our tourist destinations safer by removing one of the causes of insecurity, the one caused by the illicit and highly violent market of drugs, especially marijuana. The mere mention of a proposal as serious, but controversial in our political environment, has led to connect two things that have no connection, at least not the one the critics of the security strategy started a decade ago claim.

There are two relevant issues: on the one hand, the liberalization of the drug market and its potential effects; on the other, the potential links between security and drugs. These are two distinct issues that, although obviously linked, follow different dynamics: the factors that regulate the functioning of the drug market, whether legal or illegal, are not what determine the behavior of the drug trafficking mafias and their peers in organized crime in general.

The starting point is obvious because only now has an authority dared to say it: the consumption of drugs in Mexico exists and is easy to access. That is, although drugs are prohibited, there is a market in which it is easy to buy some drugs, especially marijuana.

The countries that have walked the path of legalization offer valuable lessons: when liberalizing, consumption increases because the previously existing, but unrecognized, market becomes transparent. These experiences show that the risks associated with consumption decrease because the product becomes standardized (eliminating toxic substances that are often associated with the black market), as well as that, this now being an open and legal market, the violence and risk inherent to the process of acquiring the product disappears. In other words, the advantages and virtues of liberalization in terms of consumption are obvious.

The problem of international references is that they are not very relevant to the  Mexican reality in a crucial aspect: all the significant experiences, starting with the Netherlands, Uruguay and more recently Colorado and California, presuppose the existence of a government capable of regulating the market that is now liberalized. In all these cases, the government has assumed the role of supervisor that ensures the quality of the product, the limits to consumption and the requirements that the consumer must meet, especially age.

When one assumes the existence of a functional government, capable of supervising a market and maintaining the safety of citizens, the discussion about drugs acquires an essentially moral nature: either the government must take care of the health of the citizens or it is the responsibility of the citizens themselves to take care of their own lives. That is an essentially philosophical discussion that quickly acquires an ideological connotation that generally becomes impossible to break.

In Mexico we are peculiar because we have a double moral regarding drugs or a great confusion regarding the relationship between these and safety. The discussion about liberalization generally supposes that public order would be restored as soon as the ban was removed. And there lies the fallacy of the drug-security binomial.

My position is that drugs, at least marijuana, should be legalized, but not under the expectation that this would solve the problem of security. Undoubtedly, the elimination of rents (excessive profits) enjoyed by drug mafias would reduce their power and, therefore, help to balance the relationship between police and gangsters. However, beyond the immediate space (it is certainly possible to improve security in a neighborhood or city), the relevant market for these purposes is not the local one, but the American one, and the most important one is not that of marijuana (of which Mexico exports ever less), but that of the most profitable drugs for the cartels, such as cocaine, heroin and methamphetamines.

It is crucial to recognize that Mexico’s problem is not drugs, corruption or violence per se, but the absence of government and that absence is due to two factors: one, that the centralized political system of yesteryear was created a century ago and nothing has been done to adjust it to the era of political decentralization. In one word, the now very powerful governors have not built police, judicial and administrative capacity to improve the lives of their citizens. The other cause of the security problems is due to the enormous power that the mafias derive from their billionaire businesses in another country. Thus, the liberalization of drugs in Mexico would not change the dynamics of the cartels or affect the industries of kidnapping, extortion and theft.

Therefore, the insecurity stems from the absence of government and the enormous power (corrupting and violence) of the mafias and that would not be affected more than marginally by the legalization of marijuana in Mexico. We must discuss these two issues -drugs and safety- as two independent matters and be honest about the urgency of attending each of them in their proper dimension. Liberalizing marijuana is necessary, but it is not a panacea.

www.cidac.org
@lrubiof

 

 

 

@lrubiof

 

Luis Rubio

Presidential elections nearby
by Qrius,  January 28, 2018
in Evening Edition, Recent Articles, World

Mexico is currently going through three simultaneous social shifts that feedback into each other and may change the face of the country. First of all, it is undergoing a lengthy economic, political, and demographic transition. Second, the country is experiencing a difficult relationship with the US, its main business partner and, through NAFTA, Mexico’s principal source of stable trade. Finally, a presidential race is underway, which will take place July 1. All this is occurring in a context of unusual physical and political violence and great anger among the electorate.

Political instability as Mexico democratises

Mexico’s ongoing and drawn-out transition to democracy has often been compared with Spain’s, but the differences are vast. Spain began to change after the death of a dictator and with the support of its European neighbours while, in the case of Mexico, the change was never about a person but rather about a political regime personified by the PRI. This political movement created a system of political control that has exhibited an extraordinary capacity for adapting to the times, which is why it never disappeared.

In this way, Mexicans have experienced a process of political change that has been largely reactive in nature and with no clear aim in view. In consequence, despite significant advances, elements of the old political system continue to remain entrenched. Instead of opening the system to true competition, the opposition parties, PAN and PRD, were incorporated into the old system of privilege. All of this creates an environment of conflict, especially with regard to economic policy.

A three party system

The electoral scene in the country is dominated by three people. First is Andrés Manuel López Obrador (called AMLO) who, in his third attempt to win the presidency, is running ahead of his opponents. José-Antonio Meade, the candidate for the PRI, is distinguished by his successful experience as a public servant under two governments of different political parties, but his primary characteristic is not having being a longterm member of the PRI; the party put him forward in order to distance themselves for their unpopular current president, Peña-Nieto. Finally, Ricardo Anaya, the candidate of the so-called Frente or Front—which groups together the more conservative PAN, PRD, and MC—has begun his campaign with a progressive approach that has moved the party little by little toward a rhetorical position not so different from that of AMLO.

To these three candidates, one may add two or three independents who, although without any chance of winning, could exert an important effect on the outcome by drawing votes away from the main presidential aspirants. It is still too early to be able to anticipate the result because, given that there is no run-off in the Mexican system, the weight of the party machines to get out the vote can be determinant as the country enters the last five months before voting day.

The rise of left-wing economics

Disagreements with respect to whether the Mexican economy should be an open one or should move more towards autarky, lie at the heart of the presidential race. In the eighties, Mexico opted to liberalise its economy and join various commercial alliance around the world, which led to the country’s accession to NAFTA. An offshoot of the PRI party has rejected those reforms and continues to do so as the Morena party.

All of these strains have been exacerbated by Trump’s threats to cancel NAFTA, which is the main engine of the economy and a crucial stabilising factor in promoting the Rule of Law in Mexico. Thus, Mexico is going through a unique and very sensitive moment that, with or without NAFTA, would obligate it to deal with international uncertainty by establishing stability at home. However, a huge challenge for Mexico’s system of government is that it endows the winner with enormous, even excessive powers, which does not help in overcoming the country’s internal conflicts.

Featured Image Source: Flickr

La Razón -España –
Luis Rubio

Mexico is going through three simultaneous, but different, processes that feedback onto each other. First off, the country is undergoing a lengthy economic, political, social and demographic transition without anyone managing it, but one that has consequences in all ambits. In second place, the country is experiencing a difficult relationship with the U.S., its main business partner and, up to now, through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico’s principal source of stability and legal certainty. Finally, next July the citizenry will vote for a new president, in a context of physical and political violence and great anger among the electorate. Each of these affairs entails its own dynamics that, on interacting, generate imbalances and clashes of expectations.

In Mexico the changes that the nation has sustained during recent decades are often compared with the Spanish political transition. However, the differences are much more considerable than the similarities: to start with, in Spain the death of Franco determined the initiation of a new political era; in the case of Mexico, this was not about a person, but rather about a political regime personified by the PRI, a system of political control that has exhibited an extraordinary capacity for adapting to the times, which is why it never took its leave. In this manner, Mexicans have been privy to a process of political change that has been reactive in nature, without even having presented a clear definition by consensus with respect to the end of the process. In consequence, although it has adopted diverse initiatives in electoral matters, and of transparency and of justice, including a set of formidable electoral institutions, the political system continues to remain entrenched and protected regarding the citizenry. Instead of opening the system to true competition, the PAN and the PRD (in their prime the parties positioned second and third after the PRI) were incorporated into the system of privilege that hallmarked the old regime. All of this creates an environment of conflict, one at the razor’s edge and that involves feuding concerning the country’s future, especially with regard to economic policy.

The electoral contention has three personages who define it. In first place, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) who, in his third attempt, it at the head of electoral preferences with a persistent accusation of inequality, corruption and poverty. José-Antonio Meade, the candidate for the PRI, is distinguished by his successful experience as a public servant of two governments of different political parties, but his core characteristic is not being a member of the PRI, the party putting him forward; this fact constitutes evident recognition of the discredit typifying the government of Peña-Nieto. Finally, Ricardo Anaya, the candidate of the so-called Frente or Front (which groups together PAN, PRD and Movimento Ciudadano) got underway with a liberal proposal that has been moving little by little toward a rhetoric not very different from that of AMLO. To these three candidates one may add two or three independent candidates who, although without possibilities of winning, could exert an important effect on subtracting votes from the main presidential aspirants. It is still too early to be able to anticipate the result because, given that there is no run-off election, the weight of the party machines can be determinant and there is as yet no way to gauge the latter five months before voting day.

The tensions and disagreements with respect to whether the Mexican economy should be an open one or one with a tendency toward autarky and, in particular, with regard to the role of the government in the management of public affairs, are outmoded and not very productive, but they lie at the heart of the presidential race. In the eighties, Mexico opted for liberalizing its economy and incorporating itself into the commercial circuits of the world, from which the NAFTA negotiation derived. An offshoot of the PRI party rejected those reforms and continues to do so to date under the Morena party placard, whose owner is AMLO.

All of these stresses and strains have been exacerbated by the threats of Trump to cancel NAFTA, the main engine of the economy and the crucial stability factor in that it represents an exceptional space where the Rule of Law reigns. Within this context, Mexico is transversing a unique moment, one that is so remarkably sensitive that, with or without NAFTA, would obligate it to construct internal sources of certainty, that is, limits on the arbitrary powers of the government, something that one administration after another in the last half century has refused to do. The challenge is enormous particularly because of the excessive powers that tne new administration will have in its hands.

www.cidac.org
@lrubiof

https://www.larazon.es/damesuplementos/Otros/2018-01-31_DossierGlobal2018/48/

 

 

Luis Rubio

In an interview once, Woody Allen said “I am astounded by people who want to ‘know’ the universe when it’s hard enough to find your way around Chinatown”. That’s how many of the changes that the country has experienced in recent times appear to have been.

In the past five decades, the country has undergone a great collapse and two incomplete responses. The political and economic system that was constructed at the end of the revolutionary feat had given its all, even to the point of ending up in collapse. Those who lash out today at the diverse changes faced in these decades assume that the reforms in political as well as in economic matters were voluntary when in reality, they were the product of the lack of an alternative. In the seventies, the country commenced living through the beginning of the end of the old system. On the economic side, the balance of payments braved the havoc that emerged as the consequence of the accelerated diminution of grain exports, the latter key for financing machinery and equipment imports. In the absence of that source of financing, the whole strategy of import substitution stopped being sustainable. On the political side, the 1968 Student Movement heralded the instigation of the vehement tensions that had accrued over time, until the monopoly of the PRI hegemony was extinguished.

In this manner, with greater or lesser clarity of direction and common sense, from 1970 the country began to experiment in both terrains, but it was not until the eighties, after populist crazes whittled away at the government, that a process of reforms was initiated in earnest, first in the economy (with the evident intention of rendering any political reform unnecessary) and later, when that premise resulted unsustainable, in the electoral ambit. In both ambits, but above all in the economic, Mexico was exceptional in taking the bull by the horns, at least in terms of vision.

The two great reform processes embarked upon in the last thirty years speak volumes about our way of being and conducting ourselves: enormous ambition for dreaming, but little disposition for grounding these dreams; grandiose objectives but modest goals; comprehending the urgency for change but without altering the essential; grandiloquent discourse but tolerance for interests closest by; understanding that the status quo is untenable but lack of conviction, or capacity, for actually delivering on the reforms that the country embarked upon.

That is how Mexico has ended up with incomplete reforms, many of these extraordinarily relevant and transcendent, but notwithstanding this left unfinished in the end. The transformative vision, in the 1980s and 1990s as well as in these past three years, culminated in being outrun by the dogged reality. Some reforms became bogged down because they encountered powerful interests that squelched them; others were trounced due to the pettiness and/or errors of the implementers, the conflicts of interest to which they gave rise and, in general, due to the perception of excessive costs impacting the beneficiaries of the status quo, in many cases the selfsame reformers and their allies. Reasons for the reformist stagnation are many, but the consequences are few and specific: the economy does not grow and the costs of the paralysis in the form of poverty, growing informality and unemployment, all this adding to the contempt for the governors and their growing lack of legitimacy.

In the political milieu there never has been a visionary and integral project like that which, from the eighties forward, was present in the economy. In the electoral realm, the process was one of partial negotiations that finally sanctioned a platform of fair and equitable competition from the year 1996. While talk of transition was bandied about, it was never understood that a transition requires a precise and consensual definition of the point of departure and that of arrival. For all practical purposes, no one knows when the Mexican political transition began nor is there agreement on when it will end. The prevailing levels of conflict are not the product of chance.

The heart of the matter is that, whatever the cause, we Mexicans have not been able to carry off “the great leap forward.” This contrasts with the findings of Hillel Soifer in his historical study on State building*. According to Soifer, Mexico excels, together with Chile and in contrast with Colombia and Peru, in having built a strong State, the result of the abilities of their elites for organizing themselves, imposing an order and developing a common ideology that would afford coherence to the nation. Soifer’s study also suggests some of the grounds for which some states or regions of the country (for example the South) never consolidated an effective system of government. But the essence, what is of interest about the book, is that from the end of the XIX century there was a great capacity for State building, which was resumed after the Revolution. The question is why we are paralyzed now.

The decision-making paralysis of the government –some call it ochlocracy- is a frequent theme worldwide. Consolidated democracies have been enduring the phenomenon of the existence of interest groups that, to defend their positions, have paralyzed the taking of decisions. Examples abound not only in Mexico but also in the U.S. and in many European countries. It is within this context that the Pact for Mexico was so highly acclaimed throughout the world because, while not very democratic, it appeared to make possible a breakthrough of the state of paralysis. It is now obvious that, to achieve this, we must acquire the knowledge of something more than navigating through Chinatown. And only the society will be able to do this.

*State Building in Latin America, Cambridge, 2015

 

www.cidac.org
@lrubiof

 

 

Luis Rubio

Mexico has been paralyzed ever since the Trump novel (tragedy?) began. During his campaign, the US president used a series of symbols -like the wall and NAFTA- that were easy to visualize by the electorate, and which proved critical in winning his election; many of these were contrary to Mexico’s interests and demeaning to Mexicans. During the electoral stage, there were good reasons for not responding to his accusations and insults, thus avoiding giving more powder to his threats and insults. In fact, there was an analysis by Nate Silver that showed a correlation between the statements made by Vicente Fox and Trump’s performance in the polls: when Fox raised his voice, Trump’s numbers improved, a factor that was further enhanced with the odd invitation by the Mexican government for him to visit during the campaign. The strategy of not responding during the campaign had an impeccable rationale but, once that contest was resolved, it no longer makes sense. Despite that, this conception seems to persist in the way Mexico is conducting the negotiations on NAFTA, which, clearly, is not working.

In the novel To kill a Mockingbird there is a passage in which somebody spits on Atticus Finch’s face (the lawyer), to which he does not respond, in fact, remains undaunted, without any reaction. Later he explains that it is preferable to let himself be spat on that to have his client -the victim of a racist rape- beaten. In contrast to Finch, who understood perfectly the context with which he had to deal, the Mexican government does not seem to understand the powerful symbolism that the wall and the call for cancelling NAFTA represented for Trump and his base. In a word, Trump has to achieve a victory, even if it is symbolic, that allows him to tell his base “I delivered.” The Mexican negotiating team does not seem to recognize this element in its strategy.

The Mexican team (in tandem with the Canadian government) has acted in an absolutely professional, organized and intelligent way along this process. It studied each of the proposals and claims raised by Trump and the US negotiating team with care and depth and has sought solutions within the context of a technical negotiation. In this regard, it has proposed ways to improve trade, eliminate obstacles and improve the numbers related to the trade deficit that lies at the heart of Trump’s obsession with NAFTA and, thus, his characterization of it as a failure. Along the way, it has made intelligent and creative proposals to improve the existing NAFTA and take it to a new stage that will make exchanges more efficient and facilitate trade and investment. That is, it has done an impeccable and absolutely professional job. However, many months into these negotiations, it seems evident that Trump remains dissatisfied, repeatedly threatening with the cancellation of the NAFTA.

Some believe that these threats are nothing more than a negotiation ploy and, undoubtedly, they are right. His book, The Art of the Deal, summarizes a whole way of being and seeing the world: in essence, everything is negotiable and all in life is a permanent negotiation in which some win and others lose, so every interlocutor has to be put against the wall. From this perspective, there is no doubt that much of the theater that surrounds the negotiation rounds entails a continuum of attempts to “soften” the negotiators. But, beyond the specific issues that are on the table, this negotiation does not refer to the acquisition of a property or a hotel; rather, it involves an innumerable set of actors and interests -including many of the states that concentrate Trump’s hard-core base- and before which he needs to save face. That is, even though the negotiation refers to technical issues -trade deficit, dispute resolution, rules of origin, government procurement, intellectual property, online commerce and so on- behind it lies a political commitment that was key to its electoral triumph. Without his rioting about the wall or his promises to end the NAFTA, Trump would never have been president. Consequently, he needs more than technical solutions: he requires symbolic satisfactions that respond to his campaign promises.

It is clear that Mexico is not going to provide funds to build a wall or compromise on the key factors that make trade and investment flow efficiently. However, just as there has been enormous creativity on the technical side of the negotiations (something that has characterized the Mexican negotiating teams ever since the first negotiation began in the early 1990s), it is imperative to find ways to satisfy the symbolic requirements. First of all, Mexico must recognize that these are at least as important to the US government as the rest. Maybe more.

A few months ago, Paco Calderón, my neighbor on this page and a dear friend, proposed that the negotiating team adopt a purple cow -as if it were something sacrosanct- as a means to have a credible asset to give up during the negotiations. It is time to recognize that Trump has very large purple cows in his mind and that Mexico must find a way to let him give them up without, on the way, losing his credibility with the electorate. This is certainly not rocket science.

www.cidac.org
@lrubiof

 

 

Luis Rubio

The presidential race hasn’t even started and it’s already running at full steam. The candidates do their best to grow their presence, attract new voters and respond to the challenges (and tight spots) in which their contenders put them. Despite the excessive noise produced by the interminable spots in the electronic media that the law mandates and all the fuss, this is part of normality in a democratic process. The candidates do what they have to do to raise their visibility, hoping to get the additional vote that would allow them to win. The question is what are the citizens doing to demand answers from candidates. Noisy campaigns without an active citizenship are nothing more than an invitation to the perpetuation of impunity.

Perhaps the most relevant question is where is Mexico today, because only that clarity would allow us to respond to what’s truly the transcendent: how do we fix it. Each of the candidates goes out of his way to advance his message and attack his contenders, but that does not answer the core issue that interests citizens: how is Mexico going to get out of the hole.

By the sheer nature of things, the candidate that emerged from the party that is in the government today has the difficult situation of having to propose something different without moving away from the administration, but has too many heads, none of which understands the anger of the electorate. For their part, the two contenders have the greatest ease to attack the latter and denounce the outgoing administration, without having to propose anything new. Andrés Manuel López Obrador has distinguished himself over all these years for raising some of the most fundamental dilemmas and problems facing the country; his proposals to solve them are vague, many of them absurd and almost all a-historical, but that does not take away the merit of focusing his batteries on real problems such as poverty, inequality and corruption. Ricardo Anaya brought with him a more modern and innovative discourse, but he has dedicated himself to competing for the anti-systemic vote, losing with it his comparative advantage: the liberal legacy of his party, which is what makes him (it) different from the other two. José Antonio Meade has the experience and the vision that would allow him to break with the wrongs that keep the country bogged down, but he can only get there by breaking away with much of what he’s inheriting from the government that he served. None has it easy.

But that perspective is in the abstract. In the real world, the contest is very different from what the polls suggest at this time. A contest of more than two candidates without a runoff has very specific characteristics that determine much of the evolution of the electoral process. The first effect is that of the fragmentation of the vote; a second implication is that some portion of the population, typically close to 10% in our recent past, abandons its candidate if he or she is in the third or fourth place, to avoid an unacceptable result: that is, a portion of the electorate de facto acts as if there were a second round. The third effect is the most transcendent: with the fragmentation of the vote, the threshold of victory decreases, which gives an enormous weight to the hard core vote; that is to say, the contest becomes one in which the partisan machines become critical.

Although all the political parties have their operators and machinery, none has the organization that the PRI has, which, for obvious reasons of Mexico’s history, has a presence even in states and localities where it has not ruled for decades. This implies that if Meade manages to consolidate the PRI base, his probability of winning far exceeds the appearances that the polls reflect.

Of course, the machinery is not everything, but in a contest in which the hard-core base of the electorate is crucial, the machinery acquires an exceptional importance. AMLO has its hard base (which, according to various surveys, hovers around 25%) in a region historically saturated with political operators, clienteles and organizations: the Federal District, the extended Mexico City (mostly in the state of Mexico), parts of Guerrero, Michoacán, etc. The PRI, with the most oiled and spread out machinery, represents a hard core vote, if all those voters actually go to the polls, of around 18%, while the PAN has around 15%. If the PRI vote is joined by the Green and the PANAL, the PRI candidate practically matches AMLO. With these numbers, the real contest would actually concentrate on the additional 5%-6% that the winner would have to achieve straight from citizenship.

This analysis assumes that Meade manages to add up to 100% of the PRI members, starting with those who do not feel represented by the candidate, who is not a member of the party that nominated him, and that all of the PRI operators would act in a coordinated fashion on election day. Without the hard-core PRI vote, the probability of Meade’s success decreases sharply because the citizen vote would be very much dispersed and almost certainly would not be enough to replace the hard core base.

In this context, the Front (PAN and PRD) is faced with a situation that explains the anti-systemic discourse that emanates from its candidate, Ricardo Anaya, as well as the way the Chihuahua governor is playing with fire on (likely) trump charges. With a smaller machinery and a smaller hard-core vote, the only chance of success of this coalition, as was the case in 2006, is that one of the other two candidates fails, commits a blunder or collapses.

None of this guarantees a specific result -in fact, at this point anything is possible- but it does suggests that this race will be nail biting.

www.cidac.org

@lrubiof

 

 

Pacific Council of  International Policy
Luis Rubio

JANUARY 8, 2018
By: Luis Rubio
In: Americas  Economics & Finance  Foreign Policy & Diplomacy

The presidential election of 2018 will be the first to be held in Mexico without an international anchor that guarantees the continuity of economic policy since the era of competitive, democratic elections was inaugurated back in the 1990s. That anchor has proven to be key to attracting investment and conferring certainty to the population as well as to investors and hence, to the gradual evolution of the country. This does not necessarily mean that there will be radical changes in the government’s strategy.

However, for the first time since NAFTA came into effect in 1994, the decision of how to conduct the country’s destiny will no longer be constrained by international commitments and, thus, whoever wins the upcoming election will have unbound power in this regard. The whole political point of NAFTA—an established framework to work under any electoral scenario—will no longer be there. Mexico is living a completely new political reality.

The rhetorical attacks on trade matters and, particularly, NAFTA that President Trump launched since his campaign in 2016 and his insistence on the possibility of canceling it, has had a decisive impact on Mexican politics. By eliminating the “untouchable” character of the deal within Mexico, the certainty that emanated from it has also evaporated. Even if NAFTA were to continue (in my opinion, the most likely scenario), the damage already inflicted is enormous—as the high domestic political costs that a withdrawal at Mexico’s behest would have entailed no longer exist.

In a context of uncertainty regarding the future of NAFTA, the dispute over economic policy could be the main issue of dispute in the coming electoral platforms.

All presidential elections since 1994 took place within a context that took NAFTA as given; therefore, the inherent risks in those contests turned out to be, in retrospect, limited. Now, in a context of uncertainty regarding the future of the agreement, the dispute over economic policy could be, as in the 1970s and 80s, the main issue of dispute in the coming electoral platforms.

Regardless of the economic policies that the next government adopts, its main challenge will be to convince the Mexican population and the international investment community that there will be economic stability and not radical change. Moreover, it will have to develop internal sources of credibility and certainty to counter the weakening of NAFTA.

The challenge is not minor: one must not forget that NAFTA emerged as a response to the lack of confidence that existed back in the 1990s regarding the continuity and permanence of the reforms that Mexico had undertaken in the late 1980s and early 90s, and to which the U.S. government assigned critical importance to its own security.

NAFTA was looked upon as a bulwark of stability. Now that this anchor has been weakened, the challenge will be to create new ones, which cannot come from anywhere else but from within Mexico.

Given the absence of internal sources of certainty, NAFTA was looked upon as a bulwark of stability. Now that this anchor has been weakened, the challenge will be to create new ones, which cannot come from anywhere else but from within Mexico, through the consolidation of the rule of law. For this to happen, however, the government would have to surrender the enormous powers that it actually enjoys—which are known as “meta constitutional” because they vastly overstep what the constitution confers upon it—so that effective checks and balances can emerge in both the legislative and judicial branches.

This is an enormous challenge in any circumstance and even more so when it depends on the government itself to accept limits on its own powers, not an easy feat to accomplish, therefore unlikely to take place. In other words, the key prerequisite for the rule of law to come about would be that the political system emanated from the 1910 Revolution would cease to exist in its present form: a structure centered on the presidency exerting vertical control.

These elements shape the environment that will characterize 2018 and will imply enormous electoral effervescence, important definitions regarding economic policy and governance (the rule of law), as well as a rocky bilateral relationship with the United States, the world’s foremost super power and Mexico’s largest trading partner by any measurement. All of this within the context of a lame duck presidency that loses credibility and capacity to operate at an accelerated pace.

Just as Mexico has become an issue of domestic politics in the United States, the United States and President Trump are issues of domestic politics within Mexico.

Regardless of the electoral preferences of the Mexican voters on July 1, the year that now begins promises enormous volatility. It is not only that there will be three very active presidential candidates running under the flag of the country’s major political parties, but that there will most likely be at least one independent candidate and maybe two.

Also, the way the United States—particularly President Trump—conduct themselves within the next several months could easily have an enormous bearing on the result. Just as Mexico has become an issue of domestic politics in the United States, the United States and President Trump are issues of domestic politics within Mexico.

In sum, the next few months will be of great complexity and the end result could be any. All three candidates have a fair chance of winning and each has strengths and weaknesses. Whatever the result, it is not only Mexico that will suffer the consequences, but so will the United States; after all, there is no country in the world that will impact the United States in the future as much as Mexico. Our destiny is bound together whether we like it or not.

_______________________

Luis Rubio is chairman of Mexico’s Center of Research for Development (CIDAC) and of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI).

The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Pacific Council.

https://www.pacificcouncil.org/newsroom/mexico-2018-completely-new-political-reality

In  ¿Y ahora que? México ante el 2018.
Penguin Random House

Luis Rubio

We have been destined to live in a complicated world and in a stage of history in which complexity and change, within and outside of Mexico, are the determinant characteristics of well-being and development.

The pace of change could hardly be exaggerated:  technology has transformed not only the way of producing, communicating among ourselves, and interacting, but also but also our way of life. At the same time, the geopolitical changes that we have observed during the last decades –from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the “Great Recession” of 2009 and moving right along past the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., the factotum of world power and our neighbor- have created very distinct surroundings from those that Mexico experienced in the second half of the XX century.

 

Now that the country finds itself immersed in a new electoral contest, it is imperative to analyze how to take advantage of the current world situation to advance Mexico’s development. What is evident is that, despite the evolving international scenario, the country’s main challenges are to be encountered in its heart of hearts.

 

Since at least 1815, the world powers of each epoch have attempted to build situations of stability based on a balance of power be it at the world or regional level. For Mexico, the world order emerging from the Second World War allowed it to accelerate its economic growth rate, opening new opportunities for development. This growth generated a strong middle class, enormous urban expansion and an industry that, over time, has become one of the world’s manufacturing powers, above all in the automotive, aviation and electronic sectors. Liberalization of the economy from the eighties on conferred new life on the nation’s economic activity and established the bases for potential development, only to be limited by a complex network of regulations that have made the process of liberalization unequal, thus forestalling the integral progress of the country.

 

The changes undergone during the post-war order have affected Mexico’s way of functioning, the region in which we live and the world in general. The institutions, national as well as international, have proven inefficient in dealing with the challenges that come to present themselves, engendering recurrent crises and permanent instability both in the internal and external ambit.

 

At the same time, the proliferation of disruptive technologies has modified the way that societies relate to each other, altering the old forms of governing, converting the citizen into the heart of the economic development process. Old norms and criteria no longer work and, in general terms, a novel manner of visualizing the future has not surfaced.

 

That is, there are no longer across-the-board rules but rather perennial processes of change, which furnish opportunities as well as risks.

 

There are contradictions that have become the norm.  Hyper-productive companies and employees on the one hand vs. enterprises that go bankrupt. Burgeoning incomes for some segments of the population but declining and uncertain ones for others. Fewer costs for accessing markets, but a greater demand of human capital for achieving success in these markets. Greater income inequality vs. greater chances for development. Obsolete political systems in the face of a citizenry with more information than their governments and a greater capacity of action.

 

The new norm comprises polarization on all fronts, explaining the electoral phenomena that have materialized worldwide.

 

For Mexico, the victory of President Donald Trump in the U.S. represents an additional obstacle, since the main motor of economic growth is that of the U.S., in terms of the exportation of industrial goods (including the agro industry) as well as the remittances that Mexican residents in that nation send to their relatives in Mexico.

 

What is true is that the country evolved during these decades without a socially accepted flight plan. The structural reforms have created new opportunities, opened new markets and spawned previously inconceivable sources of income. In parallel, these reforms have been partial, in many cases insufficient and, in practically all cases, are curbed by the objective to not affect the interests of the traditional political system. Thus it is that, despite the reforms, many of these transcendental, Mexico is not prepared to cope successfully with the hazards of the metamorphosing international scene and the demand for skills that the economy demands in this knowledge era.

 

The segment of society that has become modernized enjoys opportunities that were never before possible and is well equipped to seize them, but the sector left behind not only does not enjoy those opportunities, but there is not even a plan to help them join the modern economy and society. Perhaps there is no better evidence of the political backlogs than the situation in which the country currently finds itself: Mexico has fallen behind because the political system has closed itself off and has become a hindrance to development.

 

Past and future

 

Mexico has been confronting the past with the future for decades, without being able to break through the former to decidedly embrace the latter. The evidence of this is overwhelming and particularly visible in the interminable collection of governmental actions oriented toward pretending to change without desiring any change whatsoever.

 

In the two ambits where there has been politico-governmental activism in recent decades, -electoral and economic and trade- the country has been distinguished by massive reforms with relatively poor results, although there are regions that grow at a nearly Asiatic pace.

 

I doubt whether there are many countries in the world that have undergone so many electoral reforms in so few years and, in spite of their having produced an extraordinarily exemplary and professional system, one that has been imitated around the world, we continue to experience uncontainable electoral disputes and of credibility, every time elections are held.

 

In the economy, the country has strived to orchestrate commercial agreements all around the world and has carried out ambitious reforms that never come to full fruition or have not been fully implemented.

 

It would not be an exaggeration to state that, thanks to NAFTA and the job opportunities that the U.S. economy has contributed for decades, the Mexican political class has not had to reorder their customs or cut down on their privileges. While the economic performance has been, to express it mildly, mediocre, it has been sufficient to keep the ship afloat.

 

But Mexico has advanced much more than it would appear at first glance: if one looks back, the magnitude of the change is impacting. Although our way of advancing is peculiar (two steps forward and at least one step back), the advance is real and can be observed in the powerful industry that has mushroomed, in the urban and rural middle class, in international commerce and,  by and large, in the improvement of human development indexes. Mexico has changed a great deal and, as a rule, for the good, but that change has been reluctant and frequently incorporated begrudgingly.

 

The reform process began in the eighties in a radically distinct international environment from that of the present. While we did not know it then, the Cold War was about to end and globalization unleashed uncontrollable energies that few understood at the time. Today the worldwide trend is toward growing disorder with strong centrifugal forces. The crisis, essentially fiscal, and the technological change undergone in the last years, has led innumerable countries to look inwardly.

 

None of that, however, changes two basic factors:  one, that technology presses on incessantly and no one can detach himself from it or its consequences. The other factor is that, although subject to governmental norms and regulations that have very profoundly altered the manner of production, consumption and living, the disappearance of globalization is unthinkable.

 

Within this context, Mexico has no alternative other than to move proactively in order to prepare its population for the upsurge of growth to come and that will be hallmarked by elements for which we are hardly prepared or, as a society, willing.

 

It seems clear that technology will continue to advance, that there are no longer mass markets but instead specialized (and profitable) niches and that  the digital revolution, which favors knowledge and creativity, will dominate value generation and production in the future. These realities situate us face to face with Mexico’s central challenge: how to reach the population that has not been able to access opportunities to benefit itself in the new economic, technological and international setting.

 

The challenge that this entails is vast because it involves processes that, by definition, take decades to consolidate, implying that every day lost postpones the opportunity, something of great concern in view of the ongoing demographic transition: if today’s young people are not incorporated into the knowledge economy, Mexico will end up a country of impoverished old people in a few decades.

 

Mexico more or less functioned in past decades because NAFTA supplied a source of indisputable certainty, while the U.S. job market diffused social pressure. Whatever happens in terms of the U.S. in the upcoming months (and I believe it will be benign), imported confidence will no longer be reliable.

 

Now everyone knows that this can disappear and that gives rise to a moment of extreme risk, but also of opportunity: the risk of destroying all that exists (without the penalties inherent in NAFTA) and the opportunity to confront our challenges to build sources of certainty founded on internal political arrangements.

 

It is important to recapitulate the reason why NAFTA has been transcendental in creating a modern economy. NAFTA was the culmination of a process of change that began in a debate within the government in the second half of the sixties and that, in the seventies, ushered the country to the brink of bankruptcy.

 

The quandary was whether to open up the economy or maintain it protected, to draw closer to the U.S. or remain distant from it, privilege the consumer or the producer, more government or less government in individual and entrepreneurial decision making.

 

That is, a debate ensued on the way that we Mexicans should conduct ourselves to achieve development.

 

In the seventies, the decision had been more government, more spending and more autarchy, and the result was the 1976 and 1982 financial crises. In the mid-eighties, in a milieu of quasi-hyperinflation, it was decided to stabilize the economy and initiate a sinuous process of economic liberalization.

 

Hundreds of businesses were privatized, the public expenditure was rationalized, the foreign debt was renegotiated and imports were liberalized. The wind change was radical; nonetheless, the much-awaited growth of private investment did not materialize. It was expected that the change in economic strategy would attract new, productive investment likely to raise the economy’s growth rate, thus the growth of employment and incomes.

 

In the end, NAFTA was the instrument that triggered private investment and, with that, the revolution in industry and exports. But NAFTA was much more than a commercial and investment agreement: it was a window of hope and opportunity.

 

For the man in the street in Mexico, this became the possibility of constructing a modern country, a society based on the Rule of Law and, above all, an open road to development.

 

This may explain the strange combination of perceptions regarding Trump in Mexico: on the one hand, disdain for the person, but not, broadly speaking, rampant anti-Americanism among the population. On the other hand, a terrible uneasiness: as if the dream of development was now standing in the pillory.

 

In “technical” terms, NAFTA complied extensively with its commitment: it has facilitated the growth of productive investment, generated a new industrial sector, impressive export prowess and has afforded investors certainty with respect to the “rules of the game.” Indirectly it also forged a sense of clarity in terms of the future, even for those not participating directly in NAFTA-linked activities. In a word, NAFTA became a portal of access to the modern world. The menace that Trump has imposed upon it gives rise to a threat not only to investment, but also to the vision of the future that the majority of us Mexicans share.

 

In its essence, NAFTA was a form of limiting the capacity of abuse from the government: on levying new game rules, it established a foundation of credibility in the development model. The effect of that vision made possible the political liberalization that followed which, although wanting, reduced the concentration of power and changed, at least an iota, the relationship of power between the citizenry and the politicians.

 

At the same time, a paradox allowed the politicians to continue living in their microcosm of privilege, without troubling themselves to perform the elemental functions that correspond to them, such as governing, engendering a modern educative system and guaranteeing the security of the population.

 

No one knows what will come to pass with NAFTA, but there is no doubt that the blow has been severe. Trump not only exposed the political vulnerabilities typifying Mexico, but he also destroyed the source of certainty that this “ticket to modernity” inherent in NAFTA entailed. While we might end up with a transformed and modernized NAFTA, no one can take away the blow already struck. The perceptions -and, along with that, the hopes and certainties- will not be the same any longer.

 

It is not by chance that proposals are reappearing to go back to festering within ourselves, take revenge on the U.S. and return to the efficient (?) state of yesteryear. Those recommending the latter do not understand that NAFTA was much more than an economic tool of the trade: it was the golden opportunity for a new and clear cut future.

 

Mexico’s true dilemma is the same as fifty years ago, but it now looms unavoidable. The country requires a thorough political transformation founded on an effectively represented population, a system of government that responds to it and a government whose purpose comprises that absentee verb: to govern.

 

The geopolitical challenge of Mexico is internal

 

The nation’s priority must be development. Our problem is that we have not brought the revolution that commenced in the eighties to a close. Two types of firms coexist –but do not communicate with each other- in today’s Mexico: those that are unviable enterprises and the most productive and successful of enterprises to be found in the globalized economy. The fusion of these has not been a very happy one because it has curtailed the growth capacity of the most modern of the latter, while preserving an old industry with no capacity whatsoever to compete. The predicament is how to correct these gaps. The tessitura is obvious: proceed to development or maintain the mediocrity.

 

A quarter of a century after NAFTA started it is evident that in politics (as in economic policy) long-term investment is the one that pays dividends. Many of the political avatars of recent years, and not a few of our difficulties, have been the product of short-term gambles, which never turned out well. NAFTA is the best example of that the long term is what yields results. Therefore, it is crucial to recognize that the “philosophy” that shapes it is what is imperative to promote: clear rules, mechanisms for adherence to them and no political interference.

 

What to do?

 

The big question is how to focus ourselves on the future? The country is saturated with diagnoses, some good and others bad, all intent upon slashing open a path and demolishing the obstructions to everyday life. It is evident that Mexico needs to refocus its efforts on countless areas, from the educative to the infrastructure, passing through the reform of which no one speaks but that is the most crucial, that of the government.

 

Nevertheless, the lesson of NAFTA and that provided by countries that have in effect achieved transforming themselves (including Spain, Chile, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and China) is a very simple one: development is not a question of specific policies, albeit these would be required, but rather of vision and focus.

 

Essentially, the dilemma is: go backward or go forward. The dilemma is whether to attempt to solve all the problems from the government’s uppermost level: creating conditions for development to be possible, establishing general conditions and attending to key development problems, such as education and reforming, once and for all, the system of government at the federal level as well as its relationships with the states and municipalities.

 

The so called “developmentalist” projects of the XX century were centered on a “strong” government and control of the population and of the productive apparatus. The economy grew swiftly in that era (although no more than other similar economies, such as Brazil or Argentina).

 

Today the key lies in the form of government, very different from that geared to control which characterized the past and that still inspires many of our politicians. Governing does not consist of dictating preferences from above, but of solving problems, bringing about conditions for the progress and prosperity of the citizens. In a word, making it possible for the people to live a better life.

 

Mexico’s political system was created one hundred years ago to stabilize the country and control the population. Today, one hundred million Mexicans later, that system is totally obsolete and patching it up –like the electoral repairs of recent decades- is no longer sufficient. Mexico has to build a new system of government that confers certainty and obliges those in government to govern and to serve the citizen.

 

The many reforms will serve for nothing if there is not an ambience conducive for these to advance, and promotion of the internal market will in turn serve for naught if productivity does not escalate. Reforms are mere devices; without a strategy to articulate the reforms, development is impossible.

 

The two mainstays of development in the last decades, migration and NAFTA, will not bear the same fruits anymore in the future. Migration has changed in part due to that the U.S. workforce demand has diminished, but also because the demographic curve in Mexico has been transformed; in addition, the growing difficulties involved in crossing the border undeniably discourage migration.

 

For its part, the transcendence of NAFTA has diminished radically: with Trump the notion has disappeared that NAFTA is untouchable and that has caused investment to collapse. Unless we construct internal sources of certainty, NAFTA will no longer be the growth engine that it has been to date. Without investment, the economy will not grow however many reforms are produced or however much the internal market is highlighted. The only thing left as a possibility is the creation of conditions that render development feasible and that is nothing other than heightening productivity.

 

How can that be done? Productivity is the result of a better use of human and technological resources and that requires an educative system that permits the development of knowledge, skills and capacities for the productive process; that is, education must cease to be at the service of the political control that the unions exercise for their own benefit and must concentrate on the development of human capital to prepare individuals for a productive and successful life.

 

The same is valid for the infrastructure, for communications, for the way the bureaucracy treats the citizenry and, of course, for the judiciary. The point is that development is not free of charge nor can it be imposed by decree: it is the result of the existence of an environment that makes it possible to raise productivity and everything should be devoted to that.

 

Procuring the ambience of certainty that development requires implies abandoning the arbitrary nature of the governmental function, i.e., a political revolution.

 

Our system of government has made development impossible because it is designed for a few to control the key processes that generate power and privilege, as in the case of education. As long as that does not change, the economy will remain in stagnation, whether the project is one of great reforms or of the internal market. It’s all the same.

 

What has changed is the environment: the subterfuges devised to avoid decisive actions toward development and the future have vanished; we either do the job or stay stuck.

 

“The best way to predict the future, wrote Peter Drucker, is to create it.”

 

1. With or without NAFTA, Mexico must redefine its relationship with the U.S., which implies internal decisions and global negotiation of the interaction and of the neighborhood.
2. It is urgent for Mexico to find internal sources of certainty, that is, it must make its own the objective of institutionalizing Mexican politics, constructing checks and balances and enforcing compliance with the law.
3. Mexico should take leave of the XX century and integrally embrace the future, which implies building the institutions and the forms of interaction of a modern country and one that is desirous of being successful.

 

*from ¿y ahora qué? México ante el 2018, Penguin Random House.

 

Americas Society Council of the Americas
Luis Rubio

 

The presidential election of 2018 will be the first to be held in Mexico without an international anchor that guarantees the continuity of economic policy since the era of competitive, democratic elections was inaugurated back in the 90s. That anchor has proven to be key to attracting investment and conferring certainty to the population as well as to investors and hence, to the gradual evolution of the country. This does not necessarily mean that there will be radical changes in the government’s strategy. However, for the first time since NAFTA came into effect in 1994, the decision of how to conduct the country’s destiny will no longer be constrained by international commitments and, thus, whoever wins the upcoming election will have unbound power in this regard. The whole political point of NAFTA—an established framework to work under any electoral scenario—will no longer be there. Mexico is living a completely new political reality.

The rhetorical attacks on trade matters and, particularly, NAFTA that President Trump launched since his campaign in 2016 and his insistence on the possibility of cancelling it, has had a decisive impact on Mexican politics. By eliminating the “untouchable” character of the deal within Mexico, the certainty that emanated from it has also evaporated. Even if NAFTA were to continue (in my opinion, the most likely scenario), the damage already inflicted is enormous- as the high domestic political costs that a withdrawal at Mexico’s behest would have entailed no longer exist.

All presidential elections since 1994 took place within a context that took NAFTA as given; therefore, the inherent risks in those contests turned out to be, in retrospect, limited. Now, in a context of uncertainty regarding the future of the agreement, the dispute over economic policy could be, as in the 70s and 80s, the main issue of dispute in the coming electoral platforms.

Regardless of the economic policies that the next government adopts, its main challenge will be to convince the Mexican population and the international investment community that there will be economic stability and not radical change. Moreover, it will have to develop internal sources of credibility and certainty to counter the weakening of NAFTA. The challenge is not minor: one must not forget that NAFTA emerged as a response to the lack of confidence that existed back in the 90s regarding the continuity and permanence of the reforms that Mexico had undertaken in the late 80s and early 90s, and to which the US government assigned critical importance to its own security.

Given the absence of internal sources of certainty, NAFTA was looked upon as a bulwark of stability. Now that this anchor has been weakened, the challenge will be to create new ones, which cannot come from anywhere else but from within Mexico, through the consolidation of the rule of law. For this to happen, however, the government would have to surrender the enormous powers that it actually enjoys—which are known as “meta constitutional” because they vastly overstep what the Constitution confers upon it—so that effective checks and balances can emerge in both the legislative and judicial branches. That’s an enormous challenge in any circumstance and even more so when it depends on the government itself to accept limits on its own powers, not an easy feat to accomplish, therefore unlikely to take place. In other words, the key prerequisite for the rule of law to come about would be that the political system that emanated from the 1910 Revolution would cease to exist in its present form: a structure centered on the presidency exerting vertical control.

These elements shape the environment that will characterize 2018 and will imply enormous electoral effervescence, important definitions regarding economic policy and governance (the rule of law), as well as a rocky bilateral relationship with the United States, the world’s foremost superpower and Mexico’s largest trading partner by any measurement. All of this occurs within the context of a lame duck presidency that loses credibility and capacity to operate at an accelerated pace.

Regardless of the electoral preferences of the Mexican voters in July 1, the year that now begins promises enormous volatility. It is not only that there will be three very active presidential candidates running under the flag of the country’s major political parties, but that there will most likely be at least one independent candidate and maybe two. Also, the way the United States, particularly President Trump, conducts itself within the next several months could easily have an enormous bearing on the result. Just as Mexico has become an issue of domestic politics in the United States, the US and president Trump are issues of domestic politics within Mexico.

In sum, the next few months will be of great complexity and the end result could be anything. All three candidates have a fair chance of winning and each has strengths and weaknesses. Whatever the result, it is not only Mexico that will suffer the consequences, but so will the United States; after all, there is no country in the world that will impact the United States in the future as much as Mexico. Our destiny is bound together whether we like it or not.

Luis Rubio is the president of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, known as COMEXI. 

http://www.as-coa.org/articles/viewpoint-mexico-2018