Luis Rubio

Paraphrasing Marx and Engels, a specter haunts the world, the specter of populism. This is a struggle among different models of development and ways of conducting politics. Today two models that embrace economic orthodoxy are head-to-head: the democratic-market model that characterizes most rich nations around the world, with the model of Chinese authoritarian capitalism.  But there is another dispute, that of the political leaders: there are heads of state who follow institutional rules (those which Weber denominated “legal domination”), while others have instituted charismatic profiles, whether of the Left or the Right (Trump, Bolsonaro, Chávez, Erdogan), all of which fall under the rubric of populism. Behind all this is a battle between two radically distinct modes of conceiving of the world and of adapting (or not) to the prevailing international and technological milieu.

The conflict presents itself at two levels: on the one hand, the yearning of innumerable politicians to break with the impediments imposed by the globalized economy and the constriction of the world due to the technological advance. On the other hand, the irrepressible logic of the decentralized production both far and wide, the pervasiveness of information and, especially, the revolution of the expectations deriving from the latter two factors. The key question that every political leader comes up against is whether there is really an option. Margaret Thatcher inaugurated the phase “There is No Alternative” (TINA) to explain the imperative need to reform the British economy. Whether or not one agrees with the philosophy of the so-called “Iron Lady,” the phrase that she employed sums up the nature of the dispute that still depicts today’s world

Ernesto Laclau* wrote that “normally it tends to be left to globalization to justify the TINA dogma and the most common assertation is that the fiscal constrictions that governments confront comprise the sole realistic possibility of a world in which the markets do not permit even the most minimal deviation from the neoliberal orthodoxy.” From this approach, Laclau proposes passing over the republican institutions to transform the reality.

So attractive is this overture that countless political leaders worldwide and of ideologies as diverse as those mentioned previously have attempted to pursue the route of breaking with the institutional framework as proposed by Laclau. Trump’s war cry was “drain the swamp,” a notion not distinct, in a conceptual sense, from what Podemos advocates in Spain or the Kirchners in Argentina, Correa in Ecuador or López Obrador in Mexico have procured.

The problem with voluntarist projects, those in which the ruler defies the orthodoxy and tries to ordain his own preferences and rules, is that these hit a wall, also known as reality. Mexico underwent severe crises in the past century precisely because diverse presidents felt free to do as they pleased. The same would happen were the government to adopt a collision course in the matter of the consultation on electricity that the American government has launched.

The phenomenon has worsened in the knowledge era for two reasons: first, with a couple of exceptions (such as Cuba and North Korea), the world has become integrated due to communications, which has rendered it supremely difficult for a country to abstract itself from the rest of the world. Formerly, when those circumstances did not prevail, presidents celebrated the entire production of automobiles or refined oil products in their nation, without any need to mention the global context. That is impossible today because there no longer are plants that manufacture the totality of a product and, more importantly, the population demands high-quality and immediate satisfiers. The idea that it is possible to ignore what is happening in the rest of the world is unthinkable not because of the pejoratively mentioned neoliberalism, but instead because the electorate no longer tolerates it; contrariwise, it expects answers here and now.

Laclau’s approach and that of his followers is very appealing in political and emotional terms, but all the same it is dysfunctional in the real world. The only certainty that can be stated of the voluntarist projects (those not constrained by the institutions’ strength, as in the case of Trump) is that these have been a disaster regarding economic growth and poverty reduction. Although many of the governing group consider the Venezuelan regimen a success, evidence of the disaster that is that country is overpowering. The rhetoric can be generous, but the reality is absolute.

As Jan-Werner Mueller has argued,** the evidence shows that citizens who sustain voluntarist-populist governments are not a Silent Majority, but rather a Vociferous Minority. Therefore, practically all intents at defying reality in the knowledge era end up badly. Bill Hicks, the late comic and grouch, dreamt of a political party for “people who hate people.” He just couldn’t get them to come together in the same room. The great egoist movement was undone by its central principle. Reality cannot be defied and that is what ends up terminating these unsustainable voluntarisms.

*Hegemonía y estrategia socialista; **The Myth of the Nationalist Resurgence

www.mexicoevalua.org

@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

A Palace of Versailles guide once said that Louis XIV built the palace, Louis XV enjoyed Versailles and Louis XVI paid for it. Mexico is at a stage in which President López Obrador is enjoying the economic and financial structure bequeathed by his predecessors, those damned neoliberals. The key question after the 2024 election is over is how to pay for what’s been done, and for what hasn’t been done, during the current administration to begin constructing something new and functional with an eye to prosperity and development.

In all the governments I have observed, what distinguishes the current presidential term is the absence of a project for the country’s development. Some of the prior administrations’ strategies were too ambitious, others merely ideological; in some what was noteworthy was the absence of ambition, while others were unreal for their unviability. But none lacked a schema oriented toward greater prosperity and better life levels.

For President López Obrador development is achieved virtually by osmosis: his government concentrates all the power and the rest comes to pass automatically. Instead of strategies, investments or legislation, what there has been here is a narrative devoted to nurturing an electoral base and three investment projects that not only are not ambitious but that also do not entertain any strategic sense or for the regions where they have been installed. This is about a political project, that is, one of power, and not one of development.

Beyond the excuse supplied by the pandemic to justify everything not done and undone, the evolution of the current administration that little by little draws closer to its end has been possible thanks to two decades of building institutions that yielded a financial structure for stability, a comfortable debt profile for the treasury, funds and trusteeships for cases of emergency, periods of recession or natural phenomena.

The administrations preceding the present one occupied themselves with strengthening the foundations of economic stability to avoid relapsing into the crises of the past that destroyed everything –families, savings- in their wake. Without those antecedents, the current government would never have been able to divert so many resources that once were committed to the promotion of investment (infrastructure, the generation of electricity, etc.) in the direction of its favorite clienteles. Because although the president holds forth on austerity, the latter does not exist: resources continue to be spent, only now the criterion is electoral and political profitability, not economic development.

Thus, the most generous prospect that can be computed for the future is that, at the end of 2024, only one presidential term would have been lost and nothing more. The most optimistic calculations inform that the economy will return to the 2018 level toward the end of 2024, when the population will have grown by several million Mexicans. And those are the optimistic calculations.

Today the imperative is to place ourselves in time at the first of September, 2024, the next president’s inauguration day, to start to envision the panorama that awaits Mexico, as if that day Louis XVI were to take possession. In addition to depleted coffers, but hopefully public finances not in crisis mode, all of that for having squeezed those finances to the utmost with the disappearance of the stabilization funds and various trusteeships, the country will find itself with a new government without useful instruments and with a great crisis of confidence.

Whoever the president may be, man or woman, in 2024, their options will be very limited for at the least three reasons: first, because no one will enjoy the vast support that the president achieved in 2018 nor will they be able to count on possessing his abilities or history for preserving the base that their predecessor created. None of the obvious precandidates, on both sides of the aisle, enjoys that exceptional situation. Second, the present-day government will have exhausted the entire fiscal space -resources for undertaking projects- which will obligate them to procure novel wellsprings of financing for even the most elementary governmental operations, without even thinking about matters as urgent and imperative as the security of the population.

Finally, the third reason that the options will be strained is the other side of the coin of President López Obrador’s administration: just as he built and nurtured a broad electoral base, he alienated the rest of the population. Instead of uniting, he divided and polarized, exacerbating the environment to the point of provoking impulsive and visceral reactions by those who supported him as well as by those who ended up hating him. The person assuming the Mexican presidency in 2024 will have to deal with that contradiction and start springing into action to build bridges, diminish tensions and develop institutional and sustainable sources of support. As in the old PRI system, the next government will have no alternative other than to reproduce the pendulum of yesteryear: correct the damage and start over.

This will be the main challenge: the great virtue of the NAFTA was that it furnished reliable sources of confidence that transcended the sexennia. That vanished due half to Trump and half to López Obrador. The prodigious task will be to find or erect a new platform that guarantees certainty, blunted by this government so distraught about the immediate (the electoral) but disdainful of the transcendent, development and peace.

www.mexicoevalua.org
@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

Disproportion, or the sin of pride, which the Greeks called hubris, consists of believing oneself to be more than other humans, failing to recognize and trespassing imprudently beyond the limits of our condition, forgetting one’s insuperable finiteness. This disproportion, or lack of moderation, says Aníbal Romero, includes disdain for the costs that the loss of the sense of scale can exact from others, in terms of anguish, pain and disillusion. A government devoted to capriciousness without an iota of concern for the tie-in between penalties and potential benefits is an inexorable example of disproportion.

Propensity toward disproportion is a constant in human nature. In The Iliad, Homer depicts the diverse forms in which Helene, Achilles and other personages lose their sense of reality. That is what occurs every time a government makes decisions according to myths, dogmas or preferences without repairing on the obvious: the resources it uses are not theirs. Governments utilize resources from the taxes they levy on the population; and they are, or should be, accountable to it. This clearly has not been the case of the present government of Mexico.

Governments, driven by their immense size, allocate their resources as they consider best, impacting daily life by commission but also by omission. The current government designed three emblematic projects whose cost should be measured in two ways: first, by the investment itself and the alternatives available; equally important it is indispensable to assess the consequences of the projects. There is no better example than the Felipe Ángeles International Airport (AIFA): the cost of constructing it, the cost of destroying the New Mexico City Airport (NAICM), which already entertained a nearly 40% advance, and the cost of having to build a new airport in the future because the combination of the two airports presently in operation, the AIFA and the Mexico City International Airport (AICM), is dysfunctional and, in any event, insufficient.

The government has distinguished itself by its opacity in the management of public investments, so all the available information leads to mere estimates, but published calculations suggest the following: the cost of AIFA was 5 billion dollars; the cost of demolishing the Texcoco Airport, including repayments to bondholders, borders on some 16 billion dollars. In addition to this, as all users of the old airport know, but that remains a secret for the President, is that sooner or later a new airport will be required to replace the present one (AICM) and that the new one will never be the one in Santa Lucía. The new airport will cost at least another 16 billion dollars. In sum, the president’s stunt will turn out to cost some 37 billion dollars.

Something similar happened with the Refinery and the Maya Train. The most recent estimates indicate that the Refinery will cost nearly 18 billion dollars and that the Maya Train will reach an amount of approximately 11 billion dollars. As with the airport, the calculation must be twofold: what the projects will cost and the potential benefits that the latter will come to supply. If current trends in matters of electric automobiles materialize, the best that could be expected would be that a refinery conceived to function for decades (the refinery that Pemex acquired in Texas was constructed more than a century ago), will operate for a maximum of 10 years: from the mid-twenties to the mid-thirties. That is, another enormous waste. The Maya Train constitutes a wager yet more rash, in that it does not even communicate the peninsula’s three important cities: it does not touch either Mérida or Campeche.

There are many ways to quantify disproportion, but the fundamental one is that deriving from dogmas, which never underwent any sort of screening process. I don’t know whether the Texcoco Airport was localized in the best place, but I have no doubt that the two airports existing today share the same airspace and therefore, do not add to, but rather subtract: a zero-sum game. All of this was to demonstrate Who Decides Here, as the title indicated of the book that the President placed near his armchair the day he announced the cancellation of the Texcoco airport. It’s all about power. Thanks to the absence of checks and balances, Mexican presidents wield enormous power during their term of office and exhibit a tendency toward the excesses noted herein, but none like the present one.

Arrogance and arbitrariness mix to produce not only excesses, but also devotion to each other, the best measure of hubris, that very Mexican capital sin so costly to the country throughout its history. For many years, today’s President criticized, with full legitimacy, the excessive cost of the bank rescue of the 1990s, estimated at around 12% of the GDP. The cost of his investment projects will tally close to 6% of the economy. The difference is that excessiveness in the past was the product of a poorly managed crisis; this one was intentional and self-inflicted.

President Benito Juárez portrayed beforehand the events that would take place about one hundred and fifty years after death:  “A democratic system and eminently liberal, such as that which rules us, has as its essential base the observance of the law. Not the whims of a sole man, nor the interests of certain classes of society, form its essence. Under a noble and sacred principle, it bestows the most perfect liberty, while repressing and punishing licentiousness… It is therefore evident that in the name of liberty it is never lawful to commit the least abuse”.

www.mexicoevalua.org
@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

The world of the last three decades was a historical anomaly: the end of the Cold War seemed to freeze the planet due to the existence of a superpower that made irrelevant the traditional zones of influence, where each regional power imposed its law. Regardless of the specific way the invasion of Ukraine ends, the only thing that is certain is that the so-called “world order” will have changed. We are at an inexorable turning point, just as President López Obrador goes to Washington.

Beyond sanctions and calculations about the end result of that conflict, what is directly relevant for Mexico is what will change in the US-Mexico bilateral relationship, be it with the Biden administration or with whoever follows it.

It is easy to underestimate Uncle Sam, as did the Japanese in 1941, the 9/11 terrorists, and the Russians in the Ukraine. Biden has not been a particularly successful leader, but it is not the person, but rather the superpower that he represents, that Mexico must deal with.

Seen from Mexico City, especially given the enormous capacity that AMLO seems to believe he has developed to influence internal decisions within the US, it is easy for him to imagine that he can impose his agenda on Biden, as he did with the Summit of the Americas a few weeks back. However, historical experience shows that betting against the Americans, as indeed the Mexican government has been doing, is not a very smart strategy.

In an interview when Russia began its assault on Ukraine, Natan Sharansky, a political prisoner in the Soviet era, explained Putin with the following metaphor. “The ringleader in the cell,” he said, wasn’t the one who was physically strongest but the one ready to use his knife. “Everybody has a knife, but not everybody is prepared to use it… Putin believes that he is willing to use his knife and the West isn’t —that the West can only talk even if it is physically stronger.” Putin has spent years assessing the West, especially the United States, and his reading of this led him to conclude that he could invade Ukraine and get away with it. The verdict on this is not yet in, but the fact of having conducted this invasion changed history and this entails enormous implications for Mexico.

President López Obrador is operating under the framework that existed prior to the invasion of Ukraine. Regardless of that nation, it is impossible not to recognize that the world will return to the logic of zones of influence where the world powers – two or three, depending on what turns out- will begin to make their priorities and preferences felt. What China and Russia have already been doing in their zones, each in its own way, will sooner or later be reproduced in the Western hemisphere.

Mexico is the first line of fire in this logic and will undoubtedly be the first to feel the weight of the power of the region. From the US perspective, Mexico has been adrift for years, especially in terms of security, but also because of its inability to solve elementary problems that impede the growth of its economy. For some time since the end of the eighties, when a series of seminal agreements were reached on the principles that would govern the bilateral relationship, the United States was an active and willing factor in supporting the long-awaited internal transformation, the NAFTA being the main fighting horse to achieve that goal. Over time, however, the lack of results and action on the Mexican side ushered in disillusionment in the US. which increasingly limited itself to guarding its border, abandoning the expectation that Mexico would achieve integral development as proposed forty years before.

AMLO has spent months provoking the US government, threatening and snubbing its president and, more recently, offending its population with the grandiose idea of ​​destroying the statue of liberty, one of the few symbols that still unites all Americans. I have no doubt that, geography permitting, López Obrador’s preference would be to distance Mexico from its northern neighbor, but since he cannot, he does everything possible to degrade and diminish the relationship, probably hoping to achieve the same goal, regardless of the cost.

Perhaps the president thinks that he has an inordinate ability to impose his preferences on the Americans, but everyone who knows them knows that, as a sometimes-reluctant superpower, they will sooner or later draw the line on him and impose their rules. Biden may not be able to force Mexico to confront the violence and extortion to which Mexicans are subjected or to improve their living standards, but, as Trump showed, the Americans will not tolerate one offense after another.

The president claims respect and speaks of sovereignty, but this is a chimera in the era of globalization. Respect, to exist, must be mutual and López Obrador has not been characterized by that virtue towards Biden. As for sovereignty, it is achieved and ever strengthened by turning Mexico into a great nation, not by its growing submission to organized crime and with the endless construction of barriers to economic development. The relationship with the US can help on both fronts, but not when the Americans are used as patsies.

www.mexicoevalua.org
@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

 “The future is already here, wrote the novelist William Gibson, it’s just not evenly distributed.” The change that the world is experiencing is unstoppable and is taking place on all fronts, some benign, others exceedingly risky. In recent weeks a series has accumulated of news reports and studies that, taken together, present an overly complex scenario (and, in many senses, contradictory) that obliges one to visualize the potential of the alterations in the panorama that has come to materialize over the most recent months.

A first approximation to the changing scenario is that which China provides. If one were to extrapolate the tendencies of the most recent years, China’s economy will exceed that of the U.S. by decade’s end, to become the new pole of economic and, potentially, political attraction. A study presented in Visual Capitalist[i] illustrates graphically the way the world economy evolves, and the changes anticipated for the main world economies (and that, in passing, reveals Mexico’s growing deterioration on the international horizon, suggesting future problems).

The study is built on direct extrapolation and does not take into account two elements that could  modify these tendencies:    on the one hand, there is speculation around the world concerning the veracity of China’s official statistics;  on one extreme, there are those who maintain that China’s total population is sensibly lower than that previously estimated,[ii] which would lead to the possibility that, instead of growth, China is initiating an accelerated process of contraction. Of course, this would in no way change the extraordinary performance of the Chinese economy and its enormous potential, especially because of its great advance in matters of digital technology and artificial intelligence, which would place China at the world-leadership level in the most promising industries.

A second factor in this equation comprises the dispute over the way of governing that characterize the U.S. and China, the former with a dysfunctional democracy, the latter with an autocratic system that has been capable of dislodging from poverty hundreds of millions of its citizens. Behind the conflict between the two powers are evidenced the strengths and weaknesses relative to the two nations precisely when the pandemic has yet to be resolved, inflation starts to wreak havoc and the interminable debate persists on the viability of the Chinese political system. Ian Bremmer[iii] speculates in his new book on the possibility that one of the great myths of our times (the superiority of the U.S. political system vis-a-vis the superiority of the Chinese economy), ends up being the reverse of this: that the flexibility of the U.S. economy wins while the Chinese political system proves itself more robust and sustainable.

The third element in this panorama is that of the growing inflation, for which none of the western nations appear to possess a convincing answer, threatening to plunge the planet into a recession with no obvious way out. The recent performance of the financial markets further adds to this scenario, above all the extent to which this political moment is particularly delicate in the U.S., with legislative elections at the end of this year. The inaction of the Biden government, its dubious priorities in economic matters, and its colossal loss of prestige sharpen the intricacy of the moment.

The panorama is acquiring complexity in all ambits, which does not augur well for a tranquil future for Mexico. In the last two years Mexico has enjoyed an unusual situation not thanks to the government’s strategy, but rather to the generosity of the U.S. government.  On the one hand, our exports have multiplied thanks to the exceptional growth of the U.S. economy, creating an encouraging environment for the domestic markets; on the other hand, the transfers conferred by the U.S. government on its inhabitants to mitigate the harmful effects of the economic paralysis caused by the pandemic translated into a monumental growth of the remittances of Mexicans living in the U.S. to their families back home  (which increased from 1% to 4% of GDP). None of these phenomena is attributable to the Mexican government: strictly speaking, it has been the U.S. economy that has been instrumental in avoiding an economic and social collapse in Mexico.

This situation should be held up in contrast with the clouds that could be approaching for the world economy. For Mexico, the key factors of its economic stability are exports, interest rates in US dollars and the remittances.  A severe recession in the U.S. would pose a direct threat against these three factors, inverting the panorama that has characterized the economy in recent years.

The absence of a strategy of development, the unnecessary polarization and the alienation of the U.S. government as well as of investors desirous of diversifying themselves on confronting the conflict of the U.S. with China, now become a huge risk of recession and impoverishment, not exactly the panorama promised to Mexicans while the president was campaigning back in 2018.

Americas Quarterly
Mexico
BY LUIS RUBIO
JUNE 29, 2022

 Mexico’s president thinks his penny-pinching has kept the peso afloat, but the real support has come from across the border.

MEXICO CITY – Mexico’s president is obsessed with the peso-dollar exchange rate. Looking back at Mexican history, Andrés Manuel López Obrador is certain that a president who oversees a devaluation in the currency will soon see a different kind of devaluation—that of his own popularity. And he may be right.

But how to avoid such a devaluation is a more difficult question. So far, a key factor keeping the peso, and AMLO, afloat hasn’t been the Mexican president’s much-touted austerity—but rather the U.S. government and economy. That support may dissipate in the months ahead, leaving AMLO’s future unclear.

AMLO’s view is that what went wrong in the 1970s, his principal point of reference, was high deficits. Hence his obsession with keeping Mexico’s budget balanced. Everything else—economic growth, jobs, inequality—has become secondary. This stance was more than evident during the pandemic, when he refused to spend to support families that suddenly lost their sources of income. In retrospect, particularly when one looks at the dire fiscal situation of countries like Peru or Brazil, AMLO wasn’t wrong. In contrast with those nations, Mexico still has some fiscal room to maneuver, which also explains its standing with the rating agencies.

That has also helped the peso hold roughly steady against the dollar. But what AMLO doesn’t account for is that it is the U.S. that has so far made this equation possible, in two chief ways.

One is the rapid growth of the U.S. economy. Since Mexico’s main engine of growth is exports, whatever happens to the American economy has a direct impact on Mexicans’ welfare. Exports are easily traceable and go up or down according to the performance of the US economy. And they are especially important because of very low levels of private investment, which AMLO discourages with his rhetoric, by undermining energy contracts and trust (the basic ingredient for investment) with rash decisions like canceling the new Mexico City airport contract.

The other is remittances of Mexicans living in the U.S. to their families in Mexico, which show a highly revealing trend. Remittances have risen from 2.8% of Mexico’s GDP in 2017 to 4% in 2021, a quick pace of growth. This figure is extraordinary and resembles the growth of similar transfers to Indian and Central American recipients. It tells the story of the U.S. government spending heavily during the pandemic to support workers and companies at an exceptional time, and a U.S. economy that experienced an extraordinary (and unexpected) recovery during 2021 and early 2022. Mexico has thus been an unwitting beneficiary of American largesse.

It’s impossible to say how López Obrador might have fared without these remittances, but there’s no question that he has greatly benefitted from them. But now the president, in the fourth year of a six-year administration, is beginning to lose control of events. Although he has been intent on centralizing power, he does not control key variables that may well determine how his administration ends, like a potential U.S. recession, U.S. interest rates and remittances to Mexico, now that cash transfers in the U.S. have ended. Nobody seems to know who he’s working for.

It’s also worth noting that AMLO’s self-presentation as an austere president is misleading. He has been extremely careful not to run a fiscal deficit, true, but he has also drained funds from the core functions of the government (security, health, education and the like) to channel them through direct cash transfers in the president’s name (rather than the government’s) toward his political base, as well as to a set of big infrastructure projects that have become notorious for their low multiplier effect and which don’t seem to be built to last.

The new airport for Mexico City is no substitute for the existing one, the Maya train project in the southeast does not run through either Campeche or Merida, two of the three main cities in the Yucatán peninsula, and the Dos Bocas refinery is set to come online just as oil consumption begins to wane. The president invests heavily in his electoral base and nurtures his popularity as the core objective of his administration, but without incurring into a large fiscal deficit or excessive debt. All this is about ensuring political succession, the measure of a government’s success or failure.

Were the election to be held today, AMLO’s anointed candidate would most likely win. But elections aren’t until two years from now, a very long time in politics. As time goes on, circumstances beyond AMLO’s control, especially the U.S. economy, will become paramount.

The political outlook is complex. It’s not inconceivable that there will be more than one candidate running from his Morena party. Equally important is that the opposition parties have yet to show their hand. Potential opposition candidates would have to be politically suicidal to raise their hands at this point, because AMLO would stop at nothing to erode their standing and, if possible, destroy their reputations.

It’s too early to predict the results of the 2024 elections, but what happens may hinge not on events in Mexico, but on what’s changing in the U.S. economy: a fact that may serve as poetic justice for a president obsessed with Mexican autonomy.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Rubio is chairman of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations. He writes a weekly column in newspaper Reforma, and is the author and editor of dozens of books, including Unmasked: López Obrador and The End of Make-Believe, published by the Wilson Center.
@lrubiof

https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/can-amlos-popularity-survive-a-u-s-recession/

Luis Rubio

In its eagerness to impose its manner of seeing the world, the federal government has gifted us with a true picture of what does not function and what, for that reason, it should not be. Decades -if not centuries- of centralized government with vertical control structures had the effect of stabilizing the country, but not of achieving its development. The decentralization that has characterized Mexico during the last decades did not translate into a generalized renaissance of local creativity, perhaps due in good measure to the enormous weight of the idea of central control that the president intends to recreate. As Marx wrote nearly 200 years ago, what is tragedy the first time, is a farce the second.

Accustomed as Mexicans are to powerful central governments, it is perhaps difficult for them to understand the transcendence of the local governance and, above all, the costs incurred of imposition from “the center.” The great economic successes of the last decades have arisen in states and regions that devoted themselves to promoting growth and they addressed themselves to creating conditions for this to be possible. The boom undergone by the states of Querétaro, Aguascalientes, Yucatán, Nuevo León and others has not been the product of chance, but rather of effective structures of local government.

Contrariwise, the incapacity to eradicate violence, extortion and other forms of criminal activity, as well as the poverty that continues to prevail in many zones of the country, especially in the South, reflects local governments that are incapable or, more to the point, that are dedicated to control and plundering.

The numbers show that the deterioration in matters of security advanced in parallel fashion with the weakening of the structure of centralized control from the nineties and, although there was a certain improvement at the beginning of the second decade of this century, this was not consolidated. The centralized controls of yesteryear became unviable in a country that was diversifying and democratizing, but nothing was done, especially at the local level, to build government capacity, starting with the police, the local judiciary, and mechanisms of interaction and communication between the citizenry and the elected authorities.

With the “divorce” between the PRI and the presidency in 2000, the governors, organized as a syndicate, “purloined” the federal government’s checkbook, but did not employ this sudden wealth of resources to transform their structures with an eye toward the development of their entities, but instead to get rich and/or to promote their own political careers. In manifest confessions of their priorities, the governors found no motivation to protect the citizenry in view of the brutal increase in organized crime.

From that time, we have witnessed two equally erroneous and absurd responses: on the one hand, President Felipe Calderón mobilized the Army to confront the criminals. The value of his radical decision lay in the fact that he recognized the threat that organized crime constituted    and its impact on the destruction of all vestiges of stability and economic viability; but his deploying the Army would not constitute an ideal response: the military, not being policemen, know how to pacify a region, but not to develop capacity for long term security. Aside from a few months of peace, the criminals returned, and nothing changed for the people.

The second response is that of President López Obrador, who has taken the opposite route: arguing that the ultimate causes of criminality must be attended to, he has impeded the National Guard from acting, with which he has in fact promoted a new wave of criminality, which expresses itself in the form of extortion, abduction, protection rackets and all sorts of illicit businesses. Half of the country experiences that terror.

What none of these strategies takes into consideration is that well-being -from security to development- starts from below, from the bottom, from the municipal government. The most successful cities of the world have block or neighborhood police officers who know their residents and who, by their mere presence and the authority that they represent, become guarantors of the population’s peace and security. The attempt to impose security from above has failed for the simple reason that it has never been recognized that the objective, and the raison d’être of the government, is (or should be) the citizenry and its security.

Mexico is too vast and diverse to pretend that it can be controlled from the bastions of the federal government. The thrust of the current federal government in this matter will fail, as occurred in all the previous experiments.

Fixing the security issue can only be possible to the extent that it is recognized that, first, the government’s raison d’être is the population’s well-being and, second, that the latter is only possible with the citizenry’s active involvement and participation. It is possible that in societies with autocratic cultures, or in those under dictatorships, the order can be issued from above, but that is not the Mexico of today and thus all experiments in that regard will continue to fail.

Mexican democracy suffers from multiple shortfalls because the citizenry continues to be held in check, while organized crime flourishes. This set of circumstances has made the country increasingly unstable and its economic potential dwindling. We must start with recognizing the citizenry as the heart of the future and build from below. There’s no other way.

www.mexicoevalua.org

@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

In the novel Zero and the Infinite of Arthur Koestler, Ivanov, a bureaucrat loyal to the orders of the Revolution’s Number 1, interrogates Rubachov, one of the old revolutionary leaders arrested for having doubts about the fate destined for his country after the revolutionary triumph. Rubachov, disillusioned, rebukes Ivanov with an incisive statement: “We made history; you only play politics.” Rubachov had fought to change history and improve the peoples’ lot. However, for him, the Party and the State no longer represented the true interests of human progress after the victory of the Revolution. The government, commandeered with an iron hand by Number 1, dedicated themselves more to preserving power than to promoting the well-being of the majority. Political reality eclipsed historical idealism. Ivanov or Rubachov? The eternal plight of those who govern.

As the López Obrador administration forges ahead, there appear interminable dilemmas of power that come to bear mercilessly because they recap what was done and what was not built, what made headway and what went into retreat. At this point, the only thing that does not stop, and that is irredeemable, is time, and that of President López Obrador begins to pay the piper.

All governments, in Mexico and in the world, follow a natural cycle that starts with great expectations and promises, ascends to the extent that it is consolidated and then commences to decline concurrently with the dawning of the inevitable succession. The most successful governments invest in foresightedness at the start to reap a harvest toward the end of the period and finish with flying colors. Whatever the discernment one may entertain of President López Obrador, this scenario is not the one that awaits him.

President López Obrador has pursued a very peculiar pattern: sudden ideas supported by deeply entrenched beliefs and prejudices instead of analysis and diagnosis deriving from the concrete situation that he encountered. Although his campaign was devoted to issues of poverty, inequality, stunted growth and corruption, none of his emblematic programs nor his public policy strategies have been effectively channeled toward dealing with them. This peculiarity determines the characteristics of the inescapable close of the cycle. Left to determine is the specific way payment will be exacted.

Of course, there is no doubt of the high levels of popularity, but they refer to the person of the President, not to his policies, in which divergences are great. While his predecessors displayed similarity between their personal popularity and that of their governments, in the case of the current Mexican president that does not materialize. This confirms what we all know: the President enjoys inalterable support from a political base that has placed its expectations and beliefs in the individual. No one knows how this phenomenon will evolve but, beyond the hard-core believer base (around 16 million voters to judge by the recall election), the rest presumably will go along with the results that the administration generates in the upcoming two years and with the inexorable process of succession, which will focus on the electorate on what was not done or accomplished. Transfers to clienteles will doubtlessly help, but they will go hand in hand with the political cycle.

All of which brings us back to the dilemma posed by Koestler nearly a century ago: when revolutionary fervor comes up against the reality of power, what remains is a government that did not think to sow the seeds of a better future, which in turn sealed its fate in three exorbitantly priced projects without greater viability and little impact on growth, inequality or poverty and that wagered on the personality of the president rather than on improving peoples’ daily lives. Nothing describes it better than the president’s incapacity to recognize that the corruption corroding his own government -in no way distinct from that of the past- cannot be swept under the rug.

At the end of the day, the malady of all Mexican governments, independently of their party, efficacy or popularity, is one and the same: they all consider themselves untouchable and unaccountable, until the succession arrives, and the true accountability is set into motion. The political cycle not only pertains to the government: it also pertains to its personages, all of whom become arrogant, go deaf and are blind to what from the outside is evident, but ceases being so once inside the apparatus as the sensation of power become addictive. When that process takes shape, nothing stands in its way and all the rulers and their functionaries end up suffering from it.

Mexico is about to embark upon the descending cycle of the present government and there is no human power that can stop or impede it, even though from the summit of power things are beheld as brilliant or impeccable. The hows remain to be elucidated, but the whats are clear not just because I say so, but because that’s how all governments are:  the wear and tear is natural and uncontainable.

The art of statesmanship, wrote Talleyrand, foresees the inevitable and expedites its occurrence. The greater part of Mexican presidents, despite their greed for power, knew that this ends and that then everything changes. Not so President López Obrador, for whom the exit from power will therefore be so much more complex.

www.mexicoevalua.org
@lrubiof

 Institut Montaigne

Le Mexique tient tête aux États-Unis
Trois questions à Luis Rubio
INTERVIEW – 17 JUIN 2022

Luis Rubio
PRÉSIDENT DU THINK TANK MÉXICO EVALÚA

L’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie le 24 février 2022 a entraîné une réaction ferme de la part de l’Occident. Elle s’est caractérisée par une collaboration exemplaire entre les États-Unis et l’Europe pour imposer des sanctions à la Russie et fournir une assistance à l’Ukraine. Mais un tel engagement n’a pas été partagé à l’international. Bien que 141 pays sur 193 aient voté en faveur de la résolution de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies du 2 mars exigeant que la Russie “retire immédiatement, complètement et sans condition, toutes ses forces militaires du territoire ukrainien à l’intérieur de ses frontières internationalement reconnues”, certaines abstentions ont été frappantes – notamment celles de l’Algérie, de l’Inde, du Sénégal et de l’Afrique du Sud. Et même parmi ceux qui ont condamné l’agression russe en votant en faveur de la résolution, un certain nombre de pays ont refusé de suivre l’Occident dans sa tentative d’isoler et d’affaiblir Moscou. Cela est en partie dû aux liens stratégiques et économiques de certains de ces pays avec la Russie. Ils ne sont pas disposés à compromettre leurs intérêts nationaux en se joignant aux sanctions, dans une guerre largement considérée comme un problème européen – bien que l’Occident la considère comme un enjeu mondial. L’argument, brandi par l’Occident, d’une menace pour un ordre mondial fondé sur des normes et conventions est également difficile à entendre pour de nombreux pays, qui accusent les États-Unis de faire “deux poids, deux mesures”, en citant par exemple l’invasion de l’Irak par les États-Unis en 2003, lancée sans l’approbation du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. 

Ce contexte a conduit Mahaut de Fougières, responsable du programme de politique internationale de l’Institut Montaigne, à recueillir des points de vue non occidentaux, afin de mieux comprendre l’ambiguïté perceptible de certains pays vis-à-vis de ce conflit, les dynamiques derrière les décisions, et les conséquences attendues de cette guerre au-delà du sol européen. Le Mexique est le premier pays choisi pour cet exercice. Sa position quant à la guerre en Ukraine est ambivalente. Le président Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador a refusé d’imposer des sanctions à la Russie et a critiqué l’Union européenne concernant l’envoi d’armes à Kyiv. Pourtant, le Mexique a voté en faveur de la résolution de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies du 2 mars exigeant que la Russie mette immédiatement fin à ses opérations militaires en Ukraine. Luis Rubio, président du think tank mexicain México Evalúa, explique que la réaction du Mexique est influencée d’une part par sa relation complexe avec les États-Unis, et d’autre part par le désintérêt du Président Lopez Obrador pour les affaires étrangères.    

Comment expliquez-vous la position du Mexique sur le conflit ?

Le Président mexicain Andrés Manuel López Obrador (“AMLO”) fait preuve d’un manque profond de connaissances et de dédain pour les affaires internationales. En ce qui concerne la politique étrangère du Mexique, l’une des citations préférées du président est : “la meilleure politique étrangère est une bonne politique intérieure“. En inversant quelque peu le célèbre dicton de Carl von Clausewitz (“la guerre n’est qu’une continuation de la politique par d’autres moyens“), le président partage sa conception de l’ordre mondial et son dédain pour la façon dont il a évolué. AMLO est fermement ancré dans les années 1970, époque durant laquelle il était le chef du Parti révolutionnaire institutionnel (PRI) dans son État natal de Tabasco.

AMLO est fermement ancré dans les années 1970, époque durant laquelle il était le chef du Parti révolutionnaire institutionnel (PRI) dans son État natal de Tabasco.

C’était l’époque où PEMEX, entreprise pétrolière publique et monopolistique, était en pleine expansion. C’était aussi une période où les agents de l’État, tel que le président actuel, avaient les moyens d’entretenir une clientèle favorable au parti au pouvoir. De fait, l’ensemble du gouvernement d’AMLO illustre un retour au modèle des années 1970 car, de son point de vue, celui-ci était efficace  en son temps. À cette époque, l’économie du Mexique était tournée vers l’intérieur et pilotée par le gouvernement.

Le président croit donc qu’il faut isoler le Mexique politiquement et économiquement autant que possible pour deux raisons :

• Premièrement, sur le plan économique, il pense que la pauvreté, la corruption et l’inégalité au Mexique sont dues à la libéralisation de l’économie qui a eu lieu dans les années 1980. Que cette prémisse soit vraie ou fausse, il attribue ces problèmes aux réformes menées après la quasi-faillite du gouvernement en 1982.
• Deuxièmement, il a fait marche arrière sur les réformes démocratiques, en concentrant les pouvoirs et en éliminant ou neutralisant l’édifice institutionnel bâti au cours des dernières décennies comme contrepoids au pouvoir présidentiel et il refuse d’être jugé par des personnes de l’extérieur sur ses actions.

Andrés Manuel López Obrador s’est donc efforcé de limiter les contacts avec le gouvernement américain et est revenu à l’ancienne méthode pour son pays : attaquer verbalement les États-Unis, en partant du principe que cela renforcera sa popularité nationale. Cependant, AMLO est aussi un politicien pragmatique, qui comprend les limites de son champ d’action, lui qui a joué un rôle déterminant pour faciliter la ratification de l’accord commercial USMCA (les États-Unis, le Mexique et le Canada ont mis à jour l’ALENA pour créer le nouvel accord USMCA en juillet 2020).

C’est dans ce contexte qu’il faut comprendre la position ambiguë de l’administration Lopez Obrador à l’égard de l’Ukraine, avec des forces intérieures contradictoires en jeu ; entre celles qui veulent faire partie de la communauté internationale et celles qui préfèrent s’en retirer. Il s’agit avant tout d’une tentative d’affirmer son indépendance vis-à-vis de la grande puissance du Nord. Mais c’est aussi une façon de tenir tête aux États-Unis sur des sujets relativement peu pertinents.

Quel est l’impact – s’il y en a un – de cette guerre sur la politique intérieure ? Y a-t-il un consensus sur cette question ?

Protégeant sa souveraineté nationale (avec un œil constamment rivé sur le Nord) et ayant opéré principalement dans le cadre d’un système de parti unique, auquel l’administration actuelle espère revenir, la politique étrangère traditionnelle du Mexique s’est toujours articulée autour d’une stratégie non-interventionniste. Ceci afin d’éviter tout jugement extérieur.

Il n’est donc pas surprenant que le gouvernement Lopez Obrador ait refusé d’imposer des sanctions à la Russie. Bien qu’un certain nombre de personnes soutiennent cette position, le citoyen mexicain moyen “vote avec ses pieds” (c’est-à-dire qu’il s’adapte d’une ville ou d’un État à l’autre en fonction de ses politiques gouvernementales locales), il est donc, de fait, ancré dans le local. Le meilleur indicateur des priorités et des préférences des Mexicains est l’émigration.

La politique étrangère traditionnelle du Mexique s’est toujours articulée autour d’une stratégie non-interventionniste. 

Bien que la masse de migrants ait diminué au cours de la dernière décennie (en grande partie en raison de l’évolution de la pyramide démographique), la tendance est récemment repartie à la hausse. Ce phénomène est alimenté par les difficultés économiques que connaît le Mexique et par les opportunités offertes par l’économie américaine.

La guerre peut-elle affecter les relations entre les États-Unis et le Mexique ?

Malgré une frontière commune et plus de deux décennies de partenariat, la relation entre les États-Unis et le Mexique est sans doute l’une des plus complexes au monde. Les deux pays sont divisés par l’héritage de l’histoire et des cultures très différentes. Les niveaux de développement de chaque côté de la frontière méritent également d’être mentionnés. Une forte asymétrie de puissance persistera toujours entre les deux pays. Néanmoins, l’influence du Mexique sur les États-Unis ne doit pas être négligée. L’hypothèse d’un manque de coopération du gouvernement mexicain sur des questions politiquement pertinentes pour les États-Unis ne peut être minimisé. Les deux nations comprennent donc qu’elles sont étroitement liées et s’efforcent de contrôler leur niveau de conflictualité.

Il y a près de 40 ans, les deux nations ont convenu de gérer leurs relations bilatérales sur la base de deux principes. Le premier est le cloisonnement des affaires : ne jamais mélanger les affaires qui empoisonnent la relation (comme la migration, la drogue, les exportations, les importations, les investissements, etc.) afin de ne pas politiser les problèmes et de pouvoir les traiter efficacement. Le second, est qu’aucun des deux gouvernements ne “piège” l’autre publiquement, et, comme les diplomates le disent aujourd’hui, de ne pas montrer au grand jour leurs différences afin que leurs problèmes communs puissent être gérés et anticipés. Ces deux principes ont posé les bases d’une relation pacifique et économique qui ne cesse de se développer et qui satisfait les intérêts des deux nations. Même si l’inaction politique sur différents fronts empêche le Mexique d’atteindre le niveau de développement des États-Unis, les deux pays n’ont jamais manqué de s’attaquer aux problèmes résultant de la complexité de leur voisinage. Encore récemment, le Président López Obrador a pris de court le Président Biden en annonçant publiquement le conditionnement de sa participation au Sommet des Amériques à la présence de Cuba et du Vénézuela. En outre, AMLO est le premier président, depuis la conclusion de cet accord dans les années 1980, à ne partager ni la vision d’un rapprochement, ni la nécessité d’aborder les problèmes communs en tandem.

La question cruciale pour le Mexique et, inexorablement pour la relation bilatérale, est de savoir si la vision actuelle d’AMLO marque le début d’une nouvelle ère, ou fait plutôt figure d’exception à la proximité toujours grandissante entre les deux pays, qui a caractérisé les dernières décennies. Cette question sera d’une importance capitale lors de l’élection présidentielle mexicaine de 2024. L’élection présidentielle américaine de 2024 s’avérera également cruciale, car le retour d’une administration Trump pourrait changer de manière décisive le cours de cette relation bilatérale.

Copyright : PEDRO PARDO / AFP

https://www.institutmontaigne.org/blog/le-mexique-tient-tete-aux-etats-unis

Luis Rubio

“Don’t give me that the law is the law,” said President López Obrador. In this, his approach does not constitute a break with the reality of Mexico’s recent past, except that the president does not express the minimal unease concerning the law being the guide for the functioning of the relations between the government and society and among the distinct members of the latter. The difference is that in the past, the written letter of the law was abided by -for the sake of formality, to keep up appearances, in Mexican political jargon-, while now the reality of arbitrariness has been laid bare. But contempt for any concept of legality by the Head of State constitutes a license to break the law.

When a government assumes itself to be the sole proprietor of the truth and its way of acting as a model of proper behavior, all this without rules known by all, its actions become the law of the jungle and an invitation to everyone to behave as it does. Last week’s elections demonstrated that very behavior on both poles of the Mexican political spectrum, the product of that extraordinarily pernicious way the president conducts himself.

The law is not a black and white issue: it is not as if one day there is the Rule of Law, and the next day it disappears. It is also not a matter of degrees: instead, it is an accumulative process that secures practices, institutions, and experiences until complying with the law becomes inevitable, thus obligatory for all. In the opposite direction, when practice and experience constitute unfailing evidence of the absence of a framework of laws that are known, respected and made to be complied with by all, the whole institutional lattice collapses in on itself and the country enters into the realm of permanent uncertainty.

Historically, the Rule of Law has always been addressed with enormous laxity, generally in rhetorical fashion, but the political discourse is important because it entails consequences, above all before the reality of judicial lack of definition -and frequently defenselessness- that affects all Mexicans. The law (and regulations) is argued about, but the reality is one of permanent arbitrariness in their application, judges suffering political pressure, and public prosecutors are corrupted. The government does not conceive of the law as an instrument for protecting the citizenry, but rather as a mechanism to harass it, thus hindering it from becoming a relevant political factor.

When a president -in terms of his position as Head of Government but, above all, as Head of State- relinquishes even the pretension of complying with the law, when the president attacks other the other branches of government accusing them of treason (because they didn’t vote the way he preferred), the pertinent question is whether he considers that his word or his will are above any basic principle of social coexistence.  Because one thing is the historical laxity with which these affairs are treated, and it is another thing to eliminate them completely from the panorama: two very distinct worlds.

For most Mexicans, justice and the law are two entelechies that serve only in their capacity for abuse or to benefit the rich and powerful, a key element of the president’s public support. Whosoever has been subjected to a judicial process knows that the latter are not designed to achieve “swift and expeditious” justice as promised by the Constitution, a circumstance that renders the presidential rhetoric attractive. However, the correct solution would be to transform the judicial system to make it effective and at the service of all of the citizenry, without distinction of economic or social condition.

Mexican politicians have always changed laws to fit their objectives, without realizing the implications of their actions. Rather than strengthening their mandate, they dilute it, evidencing that they merely adherence to the proper forms, but with a total disdain for the Rule of Law. López Obrador doesn’t even pretend.

The basic principle of the Rule of Law lies in protecting the citizen with respect to the arbitrary actions of the authority. That is, it implies above  all else  the political and legal protection of individual and property rights; the existence of an efficient judicial power that effectively limits the predatory behavior of the authority and that is accessible to the entire citizenry independently of their socioeconomic status; and the existence of an environment of legal safety with rules known before the fact and with the certainty that the authorities will not employ coercive power against citizens in arbitrary fashion.

In practical terms, the Rule of Law implies that laws are known beforehand, that they cannot be modified easily and without effective counterweights and that the authority cannot employ its instruments of pressure, including the threat of jail (as the preventive prison without the intervention of a judge is now being utilized) as a means to impose the will of the government on citizen rights.

The objective of a regime of legality is pacific coexistence among the members of a society with the purpose of making possible economic development and social peace. There’s hardly any doubt of the prodigious lacks that hinder the consolidation of the Rule of Law that is equal for all in Mexico, but that is no excuse to hold it in disdain, because the alternative is the law of the jungle, at whose door Mexicans manifestly find themselves.

www.mexicoevalua.org
@lrubiof