The Morena Pact
August 15, 2025
Mexico’s Democracy, Mexico’s Politics, Mexico’s Economy
15/08/2025
by Luis Rubio, political analyst and chairman of México Evalúa.
In 1989, a series of protests and disturbances in China culminated in the massacre at Tiananmen Square, Beijing’s central plaza. The event shook not only China, but also the outside world, which had placed its hopes on reintegrating China into the community of nations. No less important, the bloodshed threatened the country’s ongoing process of economic transformation. Gradually, internal peace was restored, and an implicit social pact was forged that became the cornerstone of the spectacular economic growth that followed. That pact consisted of an implicit exchange: the government would do whatever was necessary to ensure rapid economic and living standard growth, in return for the population’s acceptance of the Communist Party’s exclusive rule and a commitment not to challenge the political system. The result was staggering.
Although Mexico is not — and cannot be — like China, Morena has been gradually advancing toward a similar arrangement, also implicitly. The Morena pact, articulated over the course of the previous sexenio, reveals not only the nature of Morena, with its dogmas and factions, but also the country’s current moment. One way to describe it is as a tacit agreement whereby the population accepts that there will be no economic growth, jobs, or a functioning health system in exchange for the continuation of social programs and cash transfers.
Of course, this is not a formal agreement, nor one that is explicitly recognized, but rather a de facto exchange that was shaped during the previous administration and that now explains the two most relevant factors in national politics: first, the president’s high popularity, and second, the elevated consumption levels among Mexico’s lower middle class — the primary beneficiaries (and clientele) of the government.
This also explains the significance of social programs in budget debates and, consequently, the priorities that define public spending and internal negotiations within the government and Morena. It is acceptable to cut funds for education, health, infrastructure, etc., because the essential, the crucial thing, is to nourish the funds that sustain the Morena pact.
The circle closes with the popularity of the president, whose precedent dates back to the previous administration: the key is to maintain the ruling party’s credibility — not the country’s development. More to the point, in AMLO’s own words, what matters is keeping the population poor and dependent, because once they move into the middle class, they cease to be loyal and therefore cease to be trustworthy.
This also explains the president’s approach: on the one hand, she is unwilling to take any action that could threaten or risk her popularity; on the other, she has not found a way to promote economic growth that would enable the continuation and permanence of her political project.
This dilemma/contradiction is where the challenge lies — for the government, the president, and the country. If economic growth threatens the continuation of the clientelist base, then it’s better not to promote it; but if growth doesn’t occur, there is no way to sustain the social programs.
Even assuming the fallacy behind the government-induced economic paralysis is eventually acknowledged (as suggested by her intention to promote her own “Pact for Mexico”), the next obstacle is ideological, because the current administration is very different from the previous one: AMLO was a pragmatic politician who longed for power; Claudia Sheinbaum is a person of the left who has a very clear idea of what parameters are acceptable (and, from her perspective, necessary) to promote economic growth. For her, it is the government that must promote, supervise, and control the process. This explains, for instance, why she sees no contradiction between the recent judicial reform and attempting to attract private investment. For the president, it is the government that guarantees the projects, the rules of the game, and the requirements for private investment.
Unlike China, the Morena pact lacks an economic project: in China, there has been no obstacle the government was not willing to confront, because failing to do so would break its side of the bargain; the result has been growth and extraordinary improvement in living standards. In Mexico, the pact implies not advancing — which clearly makes it unsustainable in the long term.
Unlike AMLO, who in the end had a transactional nature, the president has a univocal project and is unlikely to deviate from its constituent elements. The question is what happens when the key equation of the pact — the growth of social programs — becomes unsustainable.