The Institution

July 6, 2025

Luis Rubio

How can one explain 20th-century Mexico? The century began with a government that had lasted nearly three decades and ended with a democratic election. The country experienced a bloody revolution that left over a million dead; following the civil war came the Cristero War; the beginnings of a political reorganization; economic growth, the “stabilizing development” period, and economic crises. In other words, it was a century that had everything: the good, the bad, and the mediocre. Although many nations in the hemisphere and beyond went through similar situations, what distinguished Mexico was its exceptional ability to preserve political stability.

I hold no nostalgia for the 20th century, but understanding its characteristics—its successes and failures—is essential to explaining our current reality, as well as to appreciating and recognizing the virtues and mistakes of those who governed at the time. There was a bit of everything. Looking south, the contrast with Mexico throughout the last century is revealing. It’s not entirely inconceivable that, had Mexico evolved differently, it could have ended up under dictatorial or military governments (as opposed to authoritarian).

The great constant of 20th-century Mexico was the political party born out of the epic revolution, without which the Mexico of the 1930s through 2000—and undoubtedly today’s as well—would be inexplicable, for better or worse. The PRI, in its three stages, was the institution that pacified the country, granted it political stability, and enabled economic growth, paving the way for the evolution that culminated in the 21st century.

Pacification and stabilization were not simple, peaceful, or always gentle processes. From its creation, the goal of the PNR in 1929 was to subjugate the leadership of parties, factions, militias, and political groups to institutional discipline in order to prevent political violence in succession processes after the assassination of Álvaro Obregón. Some leaders joined immediately, others were coerced, and others still rejected the new rules and paid the price. Its successor, the PRM (1938), continued the institutionalization process by incorporating peasant, labor, popular, and military organizations into the party, with the same goal.

The result of the process, when the PRI was formally established in 1946 with three well-defined sectors (peasant, labor, and popular) and a professionalized army, was the emergence of an institution capable of managing political conflict, channeling social demands, exercising discipline, and, in general, providing certainty, stability, and political continuity to the country. It was that institution that made it possible to absorb the costs of various crises (political, economic, financial, and electoral) that arose over the decades, especially from the 1950s to the 1990s. Without the PRI, Mexico would surely have taken a very different path. Of course, institutionalization and discipline came at the cost of the democratization of political life that other nations in the southern part of the continent experienced earlier and perhaps in a more sustainable and durable manner.

Perhaps the most notable aspect of the PRI era was the formation of a professional political class that, under various labels, still dominates the national scene. The “reign” of the PRI—that PRI—ended when it “divorced” the presidency after losing the 2000 elections. It couldn’t have been otherwise: more than a political party, the PRI was an institution, a system of control, and a source of continuity. Its defeat in 2000 turned it into an ordinary party, one that failed to reorganize itself to survive and thrive under new rules and circumstances.

Many former PRI members are now leaders in the ruling party, Morena, which remains a “movement” with radically different characteristics than the 20th-century PRI. Morena may maintain its hegemony for a while, but it will never be able to fulfill the core function that defined the PRI in its era. And that’s the key issue for both Morena and Mexico. Morena is not an institution, nor does it contribute to the country’s governance. In fact, it can’t even manage to pass the bills sent by its own president.

Mexico’s (and Morena’s) great deficit is governance. The PRI was the backbone of governance throughout the 20th century, ensuring that both skilled and inept presidents could govern and adapt the country to changing times. However, while many long for a recreation of the PRI in the form of Morena, the era of hegemonic, all-controlling parties is now a thing of the past.

Regardless of the internal structures or practices of the old PRI (which were far more active and vigorous than is usually understood), they would be incompatible with a (more or less) democratic framework like the one Mexico lives under today. But that doesn’t mean the country has resolved its governance problem, a factor that hampers its economic recovery and political stabilization. And this cannot be fixed with authoritarian controls or digital espionage.

In the absence of a new institutional framework suited to the 21st century, the tendency toward stagnation will be inevitable—and even worse in the Trump era.