Opposition

Luis Rubio

The great success of the PAN (National Action Party) in the 1980s and 1990s lay in a strategy of gradual territorial conquest. Instead of launching a direct attack on the presidency—an impossible feat against a hegemonic party—their strategy consisted of a gradual, bottom-up process of persuasion: starting with urban municipalities to capitalize on the growing public discontent with the poor administration of the then-ruling party, and then moving upward, pressing to gain governorships and, eventually, to contend for the presidency. History vindicates the foresight and wisdom of the leadership that spearheaded those efforts. And that is the crucial issue: those leaders had a cause to embrace and a strategy to achieve it. Most current opposition leaders use their party positions to pursue personal business. A huge difference.

With the possible exception of intrinsically and structurally authoritarian political systems like China, no hegemonic party lasts forever. The Soviet Union collapsed under the weight of its own incompetence and inability to meet the basic needs of its population, and the same happened with dictatorships, hard and soft, in the southern part of the continent and in Asia. The PRI era ended in a negotiated and benign manner for similar reasons: because there is a blatant contradiction between an attempt at hegemonic control and the demands of economic development in an age marked by the ubiquity of information and the knowledge economy of the 21st century. The same will happen to Morena.

But one thing is Morena’s internal struggles and limitations, and another, very different, is the existence of a viable alternative capable of competing and defeating today’s ruling party. The transition that took place between the PRI and the PAN in numerous municipalities, some states, and eventually the presidency of the republic was possible because both components existed: professional politicians within the PRI and an emerging party led by leaders with clear goals and a well-structured institutional framework. None of that exists today.

Today’s opposition consists of three feeble parties and the possibility that a few more might be registered in the upcoming federal election. The PRI and PAN are suffering the consequences of their own mistakes, while also lacking competent leadership to compete with Morena. The so-called “Pact for Mexico” during the Peña Nieto era branded them as clumsy and corrupt parties that disregarded the public in order to advance an agenda with no popular support and therefore vulnerable, as the following years proved. Movimiento Ciudadano has avoided allying with the first two to avoid being “contaminated” by the disrepute surrounding them, which has benefited it electorally by providing a vehicle for opposition among citizens who reject Morena but cannot tolerate the PAN or the PRI. In their current state, none of the three are a real option to compete with Morena, and none of the emerging parties preparing to seek registration seem likely to become one either.

The dilemma is profound—both for the parties themselves and, above all, for the citizenry. If one goes by the results of the 2024 election, 40% of the population voted for parties other than Morena in the presidential race, and 45% did so in the legislative elections. Moreover, in that election the real candidate was the person who dominated national political life—a scenario that no longer exists. That is, at least in theory, it is unlikely Morena could retain its previous share of the vote. The problem is, as the saying goes, it takes two to tango, and there is no partner on the horizon ready to catch the dancer.

What I have no doubt about is Morena’s vulnerability. Morena is still López Obrador’s party, and it was his leadership that gave life to the party and functionality to his government. In five years, things could be very different, and the candidate nomination process extraordinarily complex. The question then becomes obvious: will alternative leaderships capable of successfully competing emerge?

At the end of 1788, the hesitant government of Louis XVI invited the French people to express their grievances and complaints. That was a strategic mistake, argues historian Margaret MacMillan: the opening unleashed a Pandora’s box that made it possible to imagine a different future. All of this brings us back to the crucial issue for both the conduct of national affairs and electoral contests: the quality of leadership.

The country is calm, as if nothing were happening, but nothing is moving either. There are scandals, daily violence, and not much more. There is no direction or leadership to organize it. For their part, none of the current opposition parties lack competent, experienced, and visionary politicians—but none of those individuals lead those organizations. The question is whether the private interests of the party bosses will allow attractive alternatives to emerge—alternatives committed to the cause of a successful, prosperous, and equitable Mexico—because it certainly won’t come from the government.

www.mexicoevalua.org
@lrubiof
a quick-translation of this article can be found at www.luisrubio.mx