Hegemonies

Luis Rubio

Is Morena the “new” PRI? The question is obvious and frequently asked. The way in which Morena has advanced its political project—now in its second administration—makes clear its aim to become a hegemonic party, as the PRI once was. However, context matters: the 21st century is very different from the last one, and Morena’s ambitions go beyond mere hegemony, though it also holds a caricatured version of the PRI (and the “old system”) in its sights.

The PRI achieved both political control and cultural hegemony, but its historical rationale bears little resemblance to Morena’s project. The 20th-century PRI emerged as a mechanism for institutionalizing power after the revolutionary period. Its specific goal was to build a platform of political stability to enable the country’s development. Since its creation in 1929, the PRI—in its three stages (PNR, PRM, and PRI)—functioned as the stabilizing factor that allowed elite circulation and the control of violence. More than a political party, the PRI was a mechanism of political control that rewarded institutional behavior and acted as a counterweight to the presidency, while also serving as its instrument.

The PRI-presidency “marriage” was, in itself, a balancing factor that limited presidential excesses and made societal progress possible. Although the institutions of that era—beginning with the three branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial)—were more formal than real, they acted as balancing mechanisms because the defining trait of that regime was its adherence to formal rules, and its objective was always the country’s development. Rules mattered and functioned as limits—something nonexistent today.

Morena is, in the words of its founder, a movement, not a party. A movement that brings together groups and individuals of great diversity, prone to fragmentation, and lacking institutional structures like those that were the essence of the PRI. It was born as a reaction to the PRI and the PAN and, although it encompasses both the historical left and the left of the old PRI, its leadership so far has aimed more at control and personality cult than national development. As the first months of the current administration have shown, in the absence of its founder, the ability to control the various groups and interests within it is extremely limited.

Of course, nothing prevents Morena from developing institutional structures that could allow it to evolve into a long-lasting political hegemony, but that is not its current reality. The party—or groups within it—controls the three branches of government but does not display the capacity for action that characterized the PRI in its golden age. Moreover, in stark contrast to the PRI, its nature is more of a burden and an obstacle to the implementation of presidential initiatives than a vehicle for advancing them. From this perspective, what resembles Morena to the PRI of that time is control over the three branches, but not its capacity to act.

As a party dedicated to promoting development, the PRI had a wide tolerance for non-violent dissent, acknowledged the country’s growing diversity, and saw itself as the representative of all Mexicans. The PRI-era government dominated but did not seek total control. Morena conceives of the world as a zero-sum game, in which opposing ideas cannot coexist. The PRI era sought cooperation; Morena puts class struggle at the forefront—even if only implicitly. The PRI enabled the country’s evolution; Morena has chosen to impede it, to avoid losing the loyalty of its client base. Social mobility during the PRI era —especially from the revolution to the 1960s— was systematic, while for AMLO it is anathema: better to preserve poverty and dependence.

Can Morena position itself in 21st-century Mexican society the way the PRI did in the 20th? The PRI and Morena are very different animals, living in historically incomparable times. The PRI sought to build a country that included the entire population. Morena aims to recreate a world that no longer exists—requiring the exclusion of a large segment of the population to do so. That is what leads its acolytes to claim that, in the vote for judges, 12% constitutes a resounding majority over the 88% they call a fascist minority. More to the point, today’s context bears no resemblance to that of the last century: the PRI was possible in an era when information was controlled by the government; today, even the poorest campesino has a device that lets them know what is happening in the world.

AMLO and Morena came to power because the public demanded a new way of governing, but what they have been constructing is a new form of imposition—not aimed at development, but at control for its own sake. As long as that vision prevails, Morena’s days are numbered, because without development, neither the party nor the country has a future. That’s something the president understands clearly (e.g., Plan Mexico), but it is not something Morena shares today.,

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