Luis Rubio

For Machiavelli, successful political operators are those who give the appearance of naiveté and cultivate a reputation of benevolence, independently of what they are conniving sub rosa. In contrast, those who assume themselves to be Machiavellian and attempt to develop a reputation as such –crafty rumormongers and other pretentious politicians- are not. This reflection on the virtues of power and its administration came to mind when I read an exceptionally interesting book, owing to the author’s honesty as well as its implications.

Michael Ignatieff, a Canadian, was a successful professor of politics at Harvard when he was invited to enlist in the politics of his country with prospects of the leadership of his party. The book, Fire and Ashes, is an  incisive account of his (pathetic) decision making process, the election that led him to lose the power, the party and even his own seat in the Canadian Parliament.

In reality the book is a great reflection about the contrast that exists between academia and public life, two worlds that evidently interact but that are not the same and that, with few exceptions, are distinguished by skills that are not transferable between them, however much many, like the cunning bruiter who fancies himself/herself the epitome of Machiavellianism, might think the contrary.

In his book Los Presidentes, Julio Scherer cites Octavio Paz affirming that “intellectuals in power stop being intellectuals although they continue to be learned and intelligent… because thinking is very distinct from giving orders…” Ignatieff explains the other side of the coin: the dilemmas, the deficiencies and the incompetence of a serious and successful academic in his transit through the spheres of power. The author’s terminus a quo and, in a certain manner, the sum of this argumentation, is that the skills of a successful politician (in the Machiavellian sense) can be learned but not taught. That is, the liaison between the two worlds is indirect and tenuous.

Ignatieff’s book led me to three reflections. First about something that Michael Barone, an American political analyst, has described for some time now about his country: the ideas stemming from academia are not always applicable to the world of politics, no matter how impeccable the mathematical and conceptual models from which they emanate appear. While the scholar is committed to his own learning and analysis  –and changes his mind as his own observations exact it-, the politician lives in the trenches trying to advance projects, objectives and even ideas, when his instinct tells him the time has come. The intersection is obvious, but so are the differences: the politician knows that he cannot control all of the variables and that time –timing- is key. For the academic it is easy to isolate the variables and suppose that the world will act the way his model suggests.

The second reflection is about power. Ignatieff relates his conversations and encounters with professional politicians whose motivation and conduct is that of constant competition for a seat in parliament and, by that means, to advance his/her plans and projects, personal as well as those for society. The academician inside the author is capable of analyzing the phenomenon and understanding its dynamic but does not know how to deal with it.  In an interesting passage in his book, Ignatieff detects circumstances typical of politics, above all of the way an idea or approach gathers strength because someone “important” voices it and it, albeit false, spreads like wildfire, repeated by one and all. A politician grapples with forces that are obvious and many that are not, a distinct atmosphere from that of academia where speculative discussion is not only valid, but also rewarded.

Finally, my third reflection on reading this failed politician concerns the daily activity of politicians, accented in countries where reelection is for real and that entails positioning oneself close to the electorate on an ongoing basis. On the one hand there’s the real satisfaction of needs and petitions of those represented, a circumstance requiring attention, management and action. On the other hand there is the imperious need for the politician to be a permanent actor, to convince the voters that he/she is working for them and to never lose his composure. Politics 24/7, unknown in the Mexican arena where (many of) the posts, including the electoral ones, are parceled out, not won.

Perhaps the characteristic of open polities, directed by the citizen and subject to constant reelection, is that politicians are in the catbird seat while they’re there but afterward they have to earn a living again some other way. In some countries they retire, in other they start a business and yet others find ways of occupying their time whether by giving classes again (Ignatieff), as being consultants or lobbyists.  They accept that their cycle has come to an end. That doesn’t happen in Mexico, the country of the Ferris wheel.

Ignatieff, recognized expert on Machiavelli, devoted himself to teach the book that changed the knowledge and perspective of politics. Notwithstanding this, when the time came to perform in politics he lacked the capacity to do so and ended up a failure as candidate, leader and politician. In a recent article, after the publication of the book, he asks whether the President (Obama) is sufficiently Machiavellian. That’s the question that the author himself, and any academic or intellectual with a yen to get into the world of politics, should ask himself/herself before taking the leap.

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Luis Rubio

Mexico has two economies that almost don’t communicate with each other (at least in terms of what they produce), a circumstance that does not predict a happy ending. The dual economy does nothing but wreak havoc and, the longer their integration is postponed, the worse the impact will be on employment and the well-being of millions of families. The dilemma is evident, but the risks of not acting are growing, above all in that the digital economy flattens everything in its path that existed previously.

The dilemma is not simple: on the one hand, diverse mechanisms of protection and subsidy have allowed the old manufacturing plant, the one installed from the forties on, to continue to plod on. Same is true for the informal economy, that keeps on expanding, mostly the result of a policy of protection, more social than economic, that has the effect of hindering adaptation and thus growth. On the other hand, the export industry competes successfully with the best in the world. The former produces, a rough estimate, 20% of the industrial GDP, but employs 80% of the sector’s workforce. The opposite occurs with the export industry. Although there doubtlessly is corruption in the assignment of subsidies and the determination of duties that (at least partially) isolate the old industry from competition via imports, the reason why this schema is preserved has to do with the perceived risk that would derive from the potential loss of jobs and, needless to add, to the relationships of dependency that this creates and politicians of all breeds happily exploit.

The dilemma is not the exception in today’s world. The digital revolution entails a radical transformation of the labor market: in developing countries there are entire professions that have been wiped off the map, only to be replaced by computers. According to two Oxford professors*, 47% of existing jobs could eventually become automated in the next two decades. Although in the short term Mexico could “snap up” some of these jobs as it has already been doing, sooner or later, inexorably, automation will affect us.

If one reads the history of the Industrial Revolution at the beginning of the XIX Century, what’s striking is how violent, in terms of economic dislocation, transition of agriculture and manual activities was to the automation inherent in the introduction of steam engines**. Two centuries later, it is easy to minimize the depth of the change that took place at that time but everything indicates that what happened then was nothing compared with what’s to come. While I have no doubt that in the long run (nearly) everyone will come out a winner, there’s no way to ignore two evident facts: the disappearance of a multiplicity of fields of work and the snail’s pace at which new opportunities will begin to be engendered. That contrast is the one that is giving rise to enormous apprehension in governments worldwide, but this doesn’t change the fact that, sometime or other, everything will end up adjusting.

It appears to me that there are two key questions: on the one hand, whether it’s possible to fend off the blow that is drawing near and, on the other, whether the types of measures that have been employed in Mexico (subsidies and duties) are the adequate ones.

The first thing that appears evident is that the torrent of change that is approaching will be brutal. Beyond the scenarios that distinct scholars discern, what has already begun to occur in diverse professional activities (accountants, lawyers, some branches of medicine, cashiers, etc.) suggests that the dislocation that will take place in all productive activities will be massive. The true choice eventually becomes attempting to contain the torrential waters that will come or preparing the country and the population to navigate these the best way possible.

There seem to be three phases, at least in the conceptual plan, that have to be sorted out: the first is the automation of activities and processes; second, the growing complexity of the processes and the     consequent demand for personnel, at all levels, with exceptional degrees of preparation and skill; and third, the disappearance of whole segments of activities and professions in which there will be no more sources of employment. Each of these phases entails its own consequences, but what is evident is that this requires a clear-minded public policy in place, very focused on giving all Mexicans the opportunity to “make it” in this new global stage.

According to the literature, it is clear that  thinking is required with regard to a radical change of strategy, all of this oriented toward achieving quantum leaps in the growth of productivity. For that it will be imperative to see to the productive chains, the market structure, the infrastructure (that of security the well as the patrimonial and physical) and education, above all technical: skills based. The point is to arrive at a generalization of the growth of productivity and not, as it is today, where there are areas that experience huge growth of this with others that subtract from it. Today, as in the first decades of the Industrial Revolution, the benefits of the growth of productivity are consolidated in a few enterprises and regions of the country.

The risk of mass unemployment is evidently the greatest concern. Although history demonstrates that technological change, disruptive as it may be, always generates new opportunities, I have no doubt that there can be moments (on occasion lengthy ones) of dislocation. In the end, the dilemma for the government lies between persisting in, ostrich-like, hiding its head in the sand or beginning to articulate a strategy that makes the next era of growth possible. Reforms are important, but execution is everything. The latter includes the need to anticipate and to foresee, not the most sterling of our qualities.

*http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf

**A great book on this is  The Second Machine Age.

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Luis Rubio

In his book Foucault’s Pendulum, Umberto Eco affirms that “any fact becomes important when it connects with another”. There’s nothing like having hard numbers to able to understand the tessitura in which the Mexican economy finds itself. While discussion inside and outside the government is concentrated on taxes, expenditures and legislation oriented toward imposing ever more controls, a new study* reveals that the underlying problem of the Mexican economy does not reside in those issues but in that in reality it is about two distinct economies that clash and have the effect of diminishing the growth rate. The study shows why averages say nothing and that an accurate diagnosis would allow focusing the government’s policy with better aim.

In a word, the Mexican economy works at two speeds: one feeds the growth of productivity while the other one subtracts from it. According to the statistics, growth of productivity in recent decades has been scraping the bottom of the barrel: 0.8% on average. However, the modern sector of the economy has experienced an average annual growth of productivity of 5.8%, while that of the traditional and informal economy has diminished at a rhythm of 6.5% per annum. The average does nothing but confuse the issue and justify counterproductive public policies.

Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything, writes Paul Krugman in The Age of Diminished Expectations (1994): “A country’s ability to improve its standard of living over time depends almost entirely on its ability to raise its output per worker”. Productivity is the result of everything that occurs in the economy, thus constituting a crucial measurement of the performance of it. What happens when the average tells us absolutely nothing significant?

The McKinsey report begins with a series of contrapositions: “What is Mexico? Is it a dynamic industrial power that builds more cars than Canada and that has become a global automobile exporter? Or is it a land of traditional slow-growing businesses and informality? Has it found the right combination of reforms to restore rapid GDP growth and raise living standards? Or is it stuck in a perpetual cycle of economic advances and retreats? Is it a modern, urbanized state that has adopted market reforms and built well-functioning institutions, or is it a place where corruption and crime are tolerated?” This is only the beginning and there’s no flab in the questions…

Let’s see some suggestive numbers. The report states that there are two economies: one that grows rapidly and another that tends to contract. Traditional and informal enterprises achieved 28% of the productivity of the modern ones in 1999, but only 8% in 2009: that is, not only is there a large gap between the two sectors, but also this is widening. Old-style bakeries exhibit one fiftieth the productivity of modern bread-making producers; 53% of small and medium-sized business have no access to financial services; at the current growth of productivity, the growth rate of the overall economy will decrease to 2% annually at the outside. Taken together, the Mexican productive plant has a productivity of 24% of that of the U.S., even though many Mexican companies are more productive than those of the U.S. In a word, to reach a sustained GNP growth of 3.5%, not by any means the most ambitious goal, the average rhythm of the growth of productivity would have to triple. The big question is whether something of that magnitude can be achieved.

Whoever has observed or experienced the way the country functions would immediately recognize the contrasts and contradictions. As the report says, there are two economies: one that runs at high speed, and another that lags behind. But it’s not only that: the country is characterized by situations that are unintelligible for a foreign observer or investor. Perhaps Mexicans –accustomed as we are to the surrealism of daily life- are not surprised by cases such as those of Line 12 of the Metro (a misfit between the contractor who built the line and the supplier of the wagons that do not match the rails) or by Oceanografía (a case of outright fraud involving politicians from all parties) which, although not inconceivable in other latitudes, over there would be treated, and dealt with, as aberrations. For Mexicans these are frequent occurrences, not aberrations: excesses, frauds, unscrupulous authorities, the absence of a government that adheres to the rules, manipulation of facts and times for political or individual gain, supposedly independent regulators (and now with “constitutional autonomy”) with mandates that are contradictory and potentially detrimental to the success of their function.

In a world that advances at the speed of light, the snapshot that this report presents to us is moreover worrisome because it reveals a country that refuses to deal with its underlying deficiencies, or that has been incapable of doing so, and that is experiencing a growing gap in its economy. The modern part accelerates the growth of its productivity and becomes a global exporter. The traditional part –that defends itself tooth and nail from any change- drags its feet and impoverishes the country. And the latter is winning over the legislative battles.

Many studies similar to this one conclude with a list of great reforms that would be indispensable for  reverting the diagnosis, which renders their proposal only marginally useful. The immense value of this report resides in the wisdom of its recommendations: reduce the consumption of electricity, improve the productivity of investments in infrastructure, emphasize the development of skills. Evidently many changes are required, but the key lies in the details that make the difference and that would make a much more successful country possible.

* McKinsey Global Institute, A tale of two Mexicos: Growth and prosperity in a two-speed economy.  http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/Americas/A_tale_of_two_Mexicos?cid=other-eml-alt-mgi-mck-oth-1403

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@lrubiof

PROJECT SINDICATE – The world’s opinion page

Jaana Remes – Luis Rubio

  MEXICO CITY – Mexico is making headlines of late. For a change, they are mostly positive. January marked the 20th anniversary of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the treaty that created a single market with the United States and Canada, and helped to propel Mexico into the top ranks of manufacturing exporters. The reform agenda of President Enrique Peña Nieto has received global attention. And, in recent months, global leaders in auto and food manufacturing have announced multi-billion-dollar investments in new facilities.

Indeed, in a world that has grown nervous about emerging economies, Mexico stands out as an island of opportunity, with a stable fiscal position and the prospect of rising demand for its goods as the US recovery gathers momentum. Yet there is another side to the Mexico story. For all of its successes under NAFTA and other market-opening devices, the country has recorded relatively slow GDP growth. For the past 20 years, annual GDP growth in Mexico has averaged about 2.7%, which is low by emerging-economy standards and not enough to raise living standards substantially across a growing population.

The main factor behind Mexico’s anemic growth is chronically weak productivity increases. If Mexico cannot find ways to spur higher productivity soon, it could be headed to 2% growth, rather than the 3.5% that is widely expected. That is because population aging and a falling birth rate will slow the flow of new workers into the labor force, the source of more than two-thirds of GDP growth in recent decades.

The solution to the productivity problem is easy to state but difficult to accomplish: the country must bridge the widening gap between the “two Mexicos” – the agile, dynamic, post-NAFTA modern economy (the “Aztec tiger”)and the traditional economy of slow-growing, unproductive traditional businesses. These two Mexicos are pulling in opposite directions, which explains why three decades of reforms to open markets, privatize industries, embrace free trade, and welcome foreign investment have failed to raise growth rates. This is the central finding of our recent research.

Modern, highly productive, and globally competitive Mexico has flourished under NAFTA and other rounds of market liberalization. Today, Mexican multinationals such as FEMSA, Grupo Alfa, Grupo Bimbo, Grupo Lala, Mabe, and Walmex have become leaders in some of the most competitive markets in the world.

But policy changes have barely touched the other Mexico, where traditional enterprises operate in the same old ways and are experiencing falling labor productivity. While the largest modern companies have been ratcheting up productivity by 5.8% annually, productivity at traditional Mexican enterprises – tiny stores, bakeries, low-skill manufacturers – has been declining by 6.5%. Worse, employment is growing faster in the traditional economy, in effect shifting labor from high-productivity to low-productivity work – the opposite of what any economy wants.

The question looming over Mexico today is whether Peña Nieto’s reform agenda can fuel economic growth in both Mexicos. Two broad priorities need to be addressed:

Mexico must work to transform the traditional sector from a low-productivity, low-wage trap for workers into a dynamic source of growth, innovation, and employment. The share of workers employed by medium-size Mexican companies – a potential engine of job growth – dropped from 41% in 1999 to 38% in 2009.

Mexico needs to create a level playing field on which all companies can blossom; today regulatory preferences, tax policies, and other structural obstacles limit the growth of the modern sector and perpetuate the traditional and informal sector.

Of course, no magic wand can turn small business owners with limited capital and skills into entrepreneurs. But conditions encouraging more small companies to join the formal, modern economy can be created.

For starters, incentives that reward companies for remaining small, inefficient, and informal should be removed. To take one example, small business owners subscribe to electric service as individual consumers and can even qualify for subsidies of up to 80%. Likewise, traditional markets and street stalls pay no sales taxes. Despite recent labor-market reforms, limitations on layoffs and temporary workers continue to encourage even large companies to hire full-time workers through third-party agencies (and thereby avoid burdensome restrictions).

Access to capital is another barrier. Mexico lags far behind its emerging-market peers in outstanding bank loans. We estimate that Mexico’s annual credit gap – the difference between what companies would be expected to borrow and what is actually loaned – is $60 billion a year. Three-quarters of that gap is under-lending to small and medium-size enterprises, which in other economies create new products and services and deliver the most employment growth.

To achieve the second goal – making Mexico a place where modern companies thrive – Mexico needs not only to remove obstacles such as restrictive zoning, which limit the growth of modern stores; it also must improve the overall business environment and ensure that contracts can be enforced. Despite Mexico’s energy riches, for example, the cost of electricity for commercial customers is 73% higher than for US businesses.

Moreover, Mexico would need to invest $71 billion annually to bring infrastructure to the level needed to support 3.5% growth. Mexico also needs to continue to raise educational attainment to prepare the labor force for modern-sector employment.

The private sector has a critical role to play in bridging the two Mexicos. Even in auto manufacturing, where top global competitors are maximizing plant productivity, 80% of companies are small, traditional shops, with fewer than ten employees. These subcontractors provide low-cost labor to global parts makers and assemblers and have one-tenth the productivity of producers in the top 10%.

Some global companies are already working with their small suppliers, providing technical know-how and even access to capital for new equipment and technology. Mexico needs more of this kind of development. Most important, Mexico needs to become a place where those who do not play by the rules are penalized and where law-abiding companies grow and prosper – and inspire others to emulate their success.

Jaana Remes

Jaana Remes is a partner at the McKinsey Global Institute, based in San Francisco.

Luis Rubio

Luis Rubio is chairman of Mexico’s Center of Research for Development (CIDAC – Centro de Investigación Para el Desarrollo AC).

Read more from “Submerging Markets?”

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/jaana-remes-and-luis-rubio-take-issue-with-flattering-headlines-heralding-a-new-emerging-market-success-story

Luis Rubio

The reforms that began last year place Mexico, potentially, in the world’s big leagues, there where the players are professionals and the game rules transparent. The mere opportunity of our being able to play in that scenario constitutes an authentic milestone. At the same time, it is necessary to take note of the conditions that remain for the country to satisfy in order to put in at a good port, thus the fragility of the instruments with which it is arriving at the table.

The generic matter is that of the Rule of Law and the institutions that lend it form and make it possible, a theme of frequent concern for me. While a company of contractors can be administered by a middling and even parochial government, the awarding of contracts and concessions to the world’s leading oil conglomerates implies a quantum leap in these matters. These enterprises are at home all the countries of the world, work in the most amenable regions of the globe as well as in the most corrupt and mafia-ridden. Their experience is garnered by hundreds of attorneys and an instantaneous, sometimes irreflexive, disposition to litigate any significant issue before the courts. The question is whether Mexico is really capable of, and prepared to, play in those leagues.

While a discussion on the Rule of Law tends to be abstract and ethereal, the administration of complex processes based on first-world contracts is not abstract and theoretical but concrete and real. With respect to the coming into fruition of the reforms approved last year, above all that of energy, the country will find itself confronting the reality that the big leagues entail in this matter and, I have no doubt, it will become evident very fast that this is not a lesser challenge.

As in sports, being in the big leagues implies submitting to a regime of higher-level scrutiny, professional referees and arbitral tribunals, over which the government has no control. That is, it implies assuming the responsibility for professional conduct that is very distinct from the provincial practices typifying us. I ask myself how we will make the leap. The evidence available for assessing this contingency up to today is mixed.

In economic matters, one part of the country has clearly taken that step. The tourism industry has transformed itself into one that caters to and competes for the world’s most demanding tourism. The same is true for the exporters who have superseded Japan in the U.S. automotive market. That is, there’s nothing in Mexicans’ DNA holding them back from achieving a transformation or from competing successfully. However, the great difference between exporters or hoteliers with regard to the challenge of the big leagues is that, in the first case this is about individual actors who possess the flexibility to adapt with celerity and who are focused on very concrete affairs. The same is not true for the energy sector.

In the case of energy and, in general, of an investment regime and modern as well as in competitive trade markets, what will be required is legislation that is defendable in international tribunals. When a lawsuit comes about, prosecutors and investigators will have to be capable of supplying reliable and genuine evidence, regulator entities will have to be able to confront the government and impose themselves, judges will have to hand down rulings susceptible to the scrutiny of non-traditional arbiter bodies and so forth. To date, none of the country’s legislative, judicial or regulatory institutions could boast of such a benchmark. For the country to be successful in the big leagues it will be necessary to change everything about the way the Mexican State functions. This is a major summons and it will demand not only human capability but also exceptional leadership that, in addition, will have to be able to confront all of the injustices of our political and judicial system. I doubt that the government today comprehends the nature of the challenge.

One comparative index* that evaluates the degree of the Rule of Law that characterizes the countries of the world employs eight indicators: limits to governmental authority, absence of corruption, governmental transparency, fundamental citizen rights, order and security, the capacity to make regulations complied with, civil justice and criminal justice. Each of these indicators carries with it a trail of analytical elements, but I doubt whether any Mexican would be surprised that the index ranks us in 79th place of 99. Taken together, the indicators attempt to measure only one thing: does the government (including the legislative and the judicial branches) work to protect the rights of individuals (including investors) or not? Unfortunately, the verdict furnished by the indicator does not lie outside of the reality.

The great question, perhaps key for making the success of reforms like that of energy possible, is whether the country, beginning with its government, is willing to undertake institutional reforms that would make possible the installation of a system of government capable of imparting continuity to the citizenry in terms of living in a safe environment, protected by laws and with ease of access to justice. If the response to this obvious question is no, the country is in big trouble; if Mexicans are not capable of making life simpler for the ordinary citizen, what makes one think that we’d be capable of attracting investors who have their own means of defense. The challenge moving forward is monumental.

*http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/files/wjp_rule_of_law_index_2014_report.pdf

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                                                                                                                                 Luis Rubio

Interesting to observe Mexico from the standpoint of the debate taking place in Washington. The financial crisis that overtook the U.S. in recent years has been as political as it has been economic and that political component made it particularly distinct from our experiences at similar moments. To view Mexico from Washington allows understanding the resemblances, but also the differences.

Two themes have been slated for debate in Washington from the moment the 2008 crisis began: one, the type of response that the government was required to give and two, the cause of the crisis itself. The response stemmed from the newly inaugurated Obama in the form of an ambitious program that, however, left the then Congressional Leader the responsibility of deciding on the allocation of monies. In contrast with the President about to take office, the-then Speaker of the House was saddled with vast political debt, which translated into a poorly focused stimulus, ill calibrated, thus one accompanied by an inevitably poor result. The successive debate, over the past five years, has been devoted to determining whether the stimulus should have been greater or whether there should have been an additional one. Few took it upon themselves to note, or were willing to accept, the fact that the stimulus was inadequate and that its impact on the extraordinary growth of the public debt was enormous.

The debate on the causes of the crisis is much more interesting because it casts light on a way of conducting politics that is radically distinct from Mexico’s. There’s virtual consensus that the crisis began in the financial sector and that in its management lie the instruments that agglutinated or “packaged” home mortgage loans: in general terms, the economists coincide in that it was the pressure exerted by diverse members of Congress to oblige the banks to grant loans to persons of scarce resources that unleashed the crisis. The reason for this resides in that the financiers, ever creative (and steeped in perverse incentives), devised mechanisms to provide mortgage credit to resource-poor individuals (who never should have assumed it) through an instrument that permitted very low mortgage payments during the first years but that later increased abruptly. The result was that millions of persons took out this credit and, when the cost rose, abandoned their properties, precipitating the crisis. The fact is that the crisis transformed the U.S. financial system as well as U.S. politics.

Contrary to what politicians sought and expected, the crisis wound up allowing a small ensemble of mega-banks to sprout up and strengthen, which further concentrated the risk. On the political side, the crisis generated an abysmal cleft that has divided U.S. politics, impeded approval of the budget over the past five years and created frequent crises over debt ceiling. Although at specific junctures one party has won and the other has lost, surveys show that it’s the politicians in general, independently of the party to which they belong, who have forfeited legitimacy.

All of this has created an extremely polarized climate, where the Democratic Left has advanced its high expenditure agenda, higher taxes and programs to attack poverty, while the Republican Party has been divided into those who would rather wheel and deal with their Democratic colleagues and those who, from the “Tea Party” tribune, propose paralyzing the government on behalf of decreasing its expenditure and returning to financial stability.

The first great contrast with Mexican politics lies in the government’s capacity to act. Although we Mexicans complained a lot, during the epoch of financial crises as well as in successive years, the prime characteristic of the Mexican political system has been for the President to retain massive latitude to act and respond. When Zedillo confronted the crisis of 95, Congress voted for the entire package that he proposed. In some cases, such as Fobaproa, debate and controversy ensued but, in the end, the President got its way. In contrast, Obama has not been able to advance his budgetary initiatives and his singular program in health insurance matters continues to experience one setback after another. The difference between the two political systems is laser-sharp.

One way of interpreting the differences is to observe the mechanisms of checks and balances that exist in both societies. While in Mexico the government has the capacity to twist arms, buy votes or impose its will, the U.S government survives at the mercy of its Congress and enjoys relatively moderate powers. In Mexico the government emits decrees that, although criticized, become public policy, while in the U.S. the government finds itself up against the Supreme Court every time steps over the line. Democracy has its costs, but also its virtues.

Perhaps the greatest of the differences resides elsewhere: in Mexico the darlings of the regime, in each government, entertain a disproportionate capacity for influencing the future, modifying the Constitution and advancing their preferences. There are dozens of constitutional reforms that are were inadequate, counterproductive and vice-ridden from the very beginning, which are due to individuals within the government who, on meeting no counterbalance whatsoever, eventually have their druthers.

The U.S. has problems but a political system that protects the citizen from the most egregious excesses. In Mexico that protection is overall open to question. Democracy takes its toll, but the absence of checks and balances is conceivably the most unmistakable measure of underdevelopment encountered in daily life.

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@lrubiof

Luis Rubio

About 25 years back, Mariano Grondona, perspicacious Argentinean observer, explained his skepticism about the liberalizing reforms of that era. His argument was two-fold: on the one hand, he said, “We are surfacing from some decades during which it came to be thought that the State is the panacea… now we run the risk of believing that the market is that panacea”. On the other hand, he inquired, “Is capitalism a movement that emerges naturally when we remove all of the controls…? Latin America has cultural roots that are not capitalist. Our structure is based on the family, not on the society. Our idea is that the family is the model and that the State is not unlike the paternal custodian of a large family. That is where we come from. And I do not think that can change simply by throwing out the rules and letting the market operate magically”. “What has died is the belief that the State will fix everything”.

Twenty five years and many crises later, Grondona’s words continue to have an impact on me. Not only did he clairvoyantly anticipate the problems of his own country, but also his skepticism has been well justified. Although it cannot be denied that, at least in some countries, beginning with Mexico, there has been great material progress during these decades, it is also evident that we are far from having consolidated a sturdy route to growth and development.

Mexico has achieved the consolidation of a powerful growth engine in exports but has fallen behind drastically in its internal market. Two things illustrate the latter: one is, plain and simple, the differences in the growth of productivity: while corporations that export and those that have transformed themselves exhibit spectacular productivity growth rates, the traditional manufacturing sector experiences negative productivity year after year. Thus, although the average growth of productivity gives every appearance of being dismal, that number conceals more than it reveals, and what it reveals is a political and social problem that successive governments have been unwilling to attack: they have preferred the status quo, regardless of whether this implies systematic impoverishment of those in the low-productivity economy, rather than the risk of the process of change and adjustment that would be necessary to carry out in order to give growth a chance in that lagging economy. Concern about the risk is reasonable, in view of that something like 80% of the population employed in manufacturing is concentrated in the “old” economy, but the consequences of going down that road are not at all promising: it’s enough to observe other cases in the south of the continent.

The other example took place in 2009. When the U.S. crisis began, many economists expected that, because Mexico exports the equivalent of one third of the GDP, the economy’s contraction would be approximately one third that of the U.S.. But the opposite happened: the contraction was three times greater. Instead of the internal economy getting the country back on its feet, its contraction placed in evidence its dependence on the demand generated by the economic demand produced by the exports.

The current government is attempting to construct a new domestic engine of growth in the form of public deficit spending and investment in infrastructure. This is not an innovative mode of promoting growth but, given the evident deficit in infrastructure that the country is undergoing, everything helps. The problem lies elsewhere: as we saw in the period between the seventies and the nineties, that is not an engine that can be sustainable because it entails the risk of exacerbating the growth of imports and, with that, a currency crisis. With this I do not mean to be catastrophic: a moderate deficit might work; but the historical antecedents are not kind in tests of moderation and restraint.

The long-term viability of the economy resides in something that Grondona understood very well: the only way to secure development is through the constitution of a strong market and a strong State, one balancing the other, and each holding in check the excesses of both. A strong market impedes the government from running riot and undertaking extravagant and counterproductive policies. A strong government establishes rules of the game for the market to function efficiently. All successful countries boast a good combination of these two factors.

Simplifying, without the desire to generalize excessively, it seems to me that there are two types of countries: those that have achieved an equilibrium between State and market (an equilibrium that is very distinct in Hong Kong from that of France, but both with strong markets and governments) and those without. Very few countries have been able to transit from precarious economic and governmental structures to a consolidated market. The European crisis of recent years has exposed the absence of equilibrium in some nations (e.g., Greece) as well as how unsustainable the equilibrium was in others (e.g., Spain).

But only a handful of nations have achieved a successful transition: evident examples are Korea and Chile. The strength of these two nations lies in their having devoted themselves to constructing the foundations and scaffolding of a modern State and economy. Each followed its own particular path and neither was free of violence and abuse, but both have something important to teach us. The question is why our inclination is toward imitating lost cases (or, at least, not winners) such as Brazil, rather than heeding those that have taken the great leap ahead. That is our challenge and if the government doesn’t rise to it, it will end up like all its predecessors.

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Luis Rubio

Reality is constructed on the accumulation of actions and inactions, decisions and omissions. What follows are some observations of the current Mexican moment:

1. The capture of “El Chapo” and the death of Nazario Moreno reopened the debate on security and the similarities or differences between the former administration and the present one. Are there differences? The evidence suggests that the only notable difference resides in the strategy of communication, in which President Peña-Nieto’s government excels. The government’s manner of acting suggests efficacy and competency but, at least in this matter, there’s not the least doubt but that luck also is on their side. Those responsible for both facts –the police, the Navy, the Army- have not changed in the past several years and it is clear that the current government does not have a new strategy, in the police-military arena, distinct from the former one. Time will tell whether their political management, through their representative (some say “proconsul”) in Michoacán, yields different results.

2. The dilemma of competition in the economy is more complex than the argument suggests concerning the declaration of “preponderance” emitted by the recently created the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (IFETEL). There is no doubt of the dominance of two companies in television and telecommunications, respectively, but the solutions are not simple, in good part due to the technological change that has been taking place over recent decades. There are various things that seem evident to me, some apparently contradictory: a) today’s great issue in telecommunications is access to mobile networks and to the Internet.  The demand for liberalization, for equality of access for other companies, seems logical and conducive to the creation of a public good –interconnection- that, no ifs, ands, and buts about it, should have been the original criterion for privatization more than two decades ago. Interconnection is the critical issue; b) the issue about television has changed in one sense and remained the same in another: on the one hand, the future of television lies in closed networks, via the Internet and mobile phones, which the experts call “triple play”. This places the viability and economic attractiveness of open television in doubt, at least in the long term. On the other hand, the contempt and disapproval of opinion leaders with respect to the television conglomerates perhaps has less to do with their dominance than to the perception that they are less dedicated, as they affirm, to entertainment than to political manipulation. Within this perspective, Carlos Slim, who is not perceived in the political arena as a political actor but as an encumbered businessman, may well be a solution to the television dilemma: a credible competitor; c) IFETEL’s decision has yet to weigh in with concrete criteria, some of which, I suppose, would derive from the secondary law that remains to be passed in the Congress, but it is paramount for IFETEL’s board to realize that competition is a means, not an objective. By the same token, I wonder whether IFETEL acted autonomously, if it responded to the clamoring from the gallery that demanded “giving their comeuppance the big ones” or whether there is an institution with looming strength, capable of confronting the government and the power moguls even if this would make it unpopular, not a small matter in light of what’s to come on the energy front. No less important is the government’s statement that it will not seek the breakup of other big companies that, given Mexico’s history, are present in many a sector.

3. The celebration of the 85th anniversary of the founding of the PRI constitutes a milestone not so much for the longevity of the party, but for its evident resurrection, and all which that implies. Above all, the PRIists are making haste to recover legislative control in 2015 and all of their actions appear oriented toward achieving that objective. Seen in retrospect, it is evident that the PRI never left and the PANists, in perhaps their greatest turpitude, were never able to dismount the scaffolding that sustained their power networks. But the “return” of a PRI that never faced the need to reform itself says a lot about the political culture of the country and about the PRI’s exceptional characteristic as a disciplined, pragmatic lot, capable of constructing and reorganizing its electoral machinery, of developing novel methods for building up and fattening their clientele and centralizing the power. No one knows what will take place in next year’s elections, but there are three issues on which it’s worthwhile to reflect: first, the President’s popularity isn’t what it once was, possibly forecasting a 2015 not necessarily like 1991 when Salinas won by a landslide; second, the economy is always a crucial factor in electoral matters and the present situation is not exactly buoyant; finally, both the PAN, as well as the Left, finds itself cowering in chaos, each of its own nature. It may be that the most pertinent question is not so much whether the PRI will dominate the next electoral processes and more about whether other parties will be capable of resurging as seasoned, capable checks and counterweights before a party that may no longer be a “state party” but that has proven an amazing ability to impose itself because of the weakness of the opposition, as the Pact for Mexico itself shows.  On the side of the PRI, the question is which of the PRIs would dominate the future, because its historical nature as a party of coteries remains alive and kicking.

4. Perhaps the most interesting thing for 2015 might be the battle for Mexico City, which PRD has held since its inception in 1997. Some, in the Left, will seek to convert it into a state (with all the complexities that that entails, not unlike DC, Moscow or Paris); others, in PRI, would wish to regain it electorally. Surely no one will get its druthers, but in the PRI the Foxist battle cry, paraphrased here, of “get the PRD out of the DF”, no doubt reverberates.

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          Luis Rubio

First they approved the constitutional laws, now all efforts are concentrated on secondary laws, the so-called implementing legislation. Then will come the most important part, the tertiary laws: reality. Says the eminent philosopher James Morris, “One of the nice things about reality is that it is what is, no matter what anybody says it is.” He could have been talking about the Mexican legislative process: in the past months, the Coordinator of Teachers, a union of dissident teachers, CNTE, showed how effective –and transcendent- this third stage is. This perspective should be incorporated into the drafting process of the implementing legislation on energy…

Reality has distinct dimensions. The most obvious, because it’s in the public light, at least in form, is the one that takes place in the legislative process itself: at least in theory, this is where all the positions, vested interests and relevant actors turn up. In a serious country the process would begin and end there. In Mexico’s case, that dynamic is going to be very distinct as compared with last year: for those who count –those who would be affected or benefited by the new legal schema, the constitutional laws can change the context, but what really matters are the specific regulations and it is there, this year, that all the “inside” interests will make their weight felt.

Another dimension of the reality is what takes place after the process: in the streets and in the plants, that is, in the mundane reality. That is the true test of the viability of a law. The bureaucrats, unions, contractors, mafias and other actors in each of the sectors affected can be as obstreperous as the CNTE or as subtle as a bureaucrat finessing the control of a neuralgic asset, but both have the same effect: paralyzing or “adapting” the reform in practice. In a certain manner, the CTNE was an anomaly during this last year due to the “formal” union’s decapitation. Its strength would have been much less under the status quo ante bellum.

Whatever might have been, in 2014 we are witnessing two processes: the legislative and the real one, “the tertiary law”, and the latter tends to be much more relevant and transcendental than the wishes of the keenest and most resolute reformer. Once again, the example of the CNTE is useful simply because of the enormous weakness of the State: if it can’t even guarantee peace, how can it be expected to attain, in the exquisite designation of bureaucratic lingo, to rule over the economy (rectoría del Estado in Spanish).

One need not proceed too far afield to imagine how complex what is coming is and, within it, the vast number of opportunities for paralyzing a reform such as that of energy. Without knowing much about the sector, some obvious key areas are: bidding for public contracts, regulation, credibility of the regulator, interconnection (ducts, cables, electricity grid), competition. In the past there has been an infinity of bidding for diverse-type contracts in PEMEX that, although formally international and transparent, end up being monopolized by two or three engineers because the bidding rules are so skewed that only these personages could satisfy them. Obviously this did not happen by chance.

This year will be crucial for the country. After the constitutional monsoon of last year, what is to come will define what type of economy Mexico will have and, doubtlessly, what kind of country it’ll construct. The transformation that, at least potentially, has been legislated is so enormous that the secondary laws will require great care in handling and, at the same time, will be subject to interminable pressures on the part of all of the actors: from the reformers with no particular interest but who often assume more than they actually know, which leads to many, often serious errors in the law, to the dozens of individuals and groups whose interests are on the line. To top all of this off the ideological actors will appear who, in the pose of safeguarding the Republic, will incorporate all manner of restrictions in the guise of baroque terminology that later will give the lawyers and courts a wide berth.

To complicate the matter, for obvious reasons of the country’s history, in Mexico there is no major experience in energy affairs from the legal perspective because the reality would not require it. This fact is neither good nor bad in itself, but implies that, whatever emerges from the legislative process will thence comprise the platform employed to settle lawsuits when these arise. Given the very abrupt manner in which the constitutional reform was approved, Mexicans’ proclivity for producing unintelligible legislative after pains (and deliberately saturated with confused wording designed to grant discretional powers to the authority), and the arbitrariness with which things are decided upon on a day-to-day basis, the potential for conflict is infinite. If the objective is to attract foreign investment, inevitably long-term in this sector, everyone should know that litigants will be poised one step behind every decision, all ready to pounce.

In a word, the reality will impose itself independently of the preferences of all involved. The tertiary law is always definitive and brutal and, worse yet, as Machiavelli said in his Florentine histories, “winners have no shame, no matter how they win.” To those who can emerge winners or losers, their lives will be spent in whatever surfaces in the reform; thus they will do everything possible to impede the reforms, adjusting their needs to or neutralizing them. The CNTE may be very obvious and crude in its ways and proposals but no one can be blind to their unmistakable win in the terrain that counts, that of reality.

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Luis Rubio

The detention of drug lord “El Chapo” Guzmán is of enormous importance but its transcendence will depend on what’s done here on out. It is still premature to venture a conclusion, but it’s indeed possible to speculate about its potential implications.

The propaganda surrounding the Chapo has brought to mind the characterization that Hannah Arendt made of Adolph Eichmann when she covered his war-crimes trial in Jerusalem. Although it is evident that the Holocaust has nothing to do –in dimension, scale, horror or evil- with the narco, the photograph of the personage from northern Sinaloa state allows us to observe that it concerns a mere link in a long chain in which the individual, isolated from his mafia, is no more than another simple cog –a “functionary” she said- in the wheel. Thus, however much his capture merits, the problem laying siege to the population –extortion and kidnapping- does not end with the detention of a capo but rather demands attention to the entire system that makes it possible. The great question is whether this detention will bestow on the government the courage to confront the true challenge.

The government is correct in congratulating itself and no one can withhold from it the credit for having laid the long arm of the law on the one who, for so many years, had outfoxed the justice system. The government can boast about its efficiency but it will now have to demonstrate that it is really willing to design and to enforce a strategy that transcends the issue of the individual in question, or, even, of the narco industry in its entirety, in order to attend to the underlying theme, which is the safety of the population and the absence of an effective government that makes it real.

The capture is important because of its symbolism: from now on a real struggle against impunity could be constructed, but in this Mexico’s history is not kind. Despite the narrative that was swiftly fashioned concerning the mechanics of the detention, information from the outside suggests nothing exceptional in the actions of the government’s security forces. It was U.S. entities that provided the critical data that made possible the capture of the capo by the Mexican Navy so cleanly and efficiently. Nothing wrong with that, but it made it obvious that a new strategy does not exist.

The matter of the strategy is more relevant than one might think. In the first place, it’s worthwhile asking whether in reality there exists the conviction necessary to reconstitute (or create anew) the institutions responsible for guaranteeing the safety of the population. Although a year ago the President heaped praise on the police reform in the state of Nuevo León, there’s no indication that this, or any other, is being applied to achieve what plainly is key: to develop police and judicial capacity at the state and local level.

In second place, if in effect no new security strategy exists, in the administration continuing to follow the U.S. “cutting heads” strategy? In concept, the search for capos and their “elimination” or incarceration makes all the sense in the world because it advances the cause of justice and attacks impunity head on. However, that strategy would perhaps be viable or suitable for U.S. territory where there are functional police and judicial authorities at the three levels of government: when a capo is detained, the local police act against the rest of the mafia involved and, usually, achieve dismantling the organization as a whole. The experience in Mexico, and it’s not exaggeration to say it, in Iraq, suggests that this strategy is counterproductive where there is no similar structure of authority because capturing the capo does not lead to the dismantling of the organization but instead, to its fragmentation, with the consequent upsurge in levels of violence. I do not wish to suggest with this that the search and capture of these leaders should be abandoned, but it is not sufficient, and it is not what’s most relevant.

That’s the rub: there’s the possibility, not at all remote, that the capo’s detention will become a trophy on the mantelpiece that, as in the case of the teachers’ union leader, entertains no further transcendence than the ephemeral benefit of making the government appear more efficient that it really is. Thus, the ball is in the government’s court for determining how it will use the detention, hopefully in a more effective and lasting manner than in the previous case.

Because, at the end of the day, Mexico’s true problem does not lie in the narco but in the incapacity of the country’s system of government (at all three levels) to maintain the peace, protect the population and create a climate of stability that makes it possible for the economy to progress. No one can ask the government, at only one year of its inauguration, to hand in perfect accounts, but it is clear that there is no strategy that leads to that institutional strengthening (beginning with the police and the judicial power), wherein the sole possibility lies for, eventually, resolving the country’s security problems.

Mark Kleiman, an American academic and former law-enforcement official, affirms that the key lies in utilizing the existing police and judicial capacity to impose upon the narco-trafficking mafias as severe rules and limitations –though inevitably modest at the beginning- as it is capable of enforcing, followed by a systematic strengthening of that capacity until peace is imposed and the action of the narcos is strictly limited to the movement of their merchandise to the North.  The capture of the Chapo permits launching a strategy like this, but it will only work if it’s truly designed and made to work. For this rhetoric is insufficient: acting is de rigueur.

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